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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship between civil society, social movements and 
the state in ethnically-divided countries, using the case study of Malaysia. The 
argument begins with the observation that the respective literatures on civil society 
and social movements occupy a broadly congruent paradigm, but the relationship 
between the two is poorly theorised. Through a critical discussion of existing 
approaches, a synthesis of civil society and social movements theory is produced, 
which argues for a dualistic interpretation that emphasises both institutional 
linkages and cultural and discursive relationships. It is further argued that this latter 
aspect is of particular importance in ethnically-divided countries, as cultural 
differences between groups may hamper the effective mobilisation of movements. 
Thus may exist a form of `slippage' between civil society and movement 
mobilisation, unidentified in much of the literature that tends to view the two as 
dynamically homogenous. 
The empirical section of the thesis utilises this model to examine the trajectories of 
civil society and social movements in Malaysia, focussing on the two decades from 
1981 to 2001. It is argued that the first half of the 1980s saw the expansion of a 
broadly middle class-led, multiethnic civil society but that successful movement 
mobilisation nonetheless remained rooted in ethnic concerns. Nonetheless, the 
decade saw in increasing challenge to the regime's hegemonic position. As internal 
relations within the government coalition fractured during the middle years of the 
decade, parties and factions within the regime lurched to more ethnicist positions, 
contributing to an increasing spiral of ethnic `outbidding' and social mobilisation. 
In October 1987, this was brought to an end by a widespread crackdown that 
brought social mobilisation to an abrupt halt. Combined with the continuing elite 
111 
fracture, this effectively re-channelled the increased protest of the period into the 
political sphere, where a broad opposition coalition was formed to contest the 
1990 elections. With the democratic system long since undermined, however, the 
government won and even maintained its two-third majority. 
In the late 1990s, the dynamics of state, civil society and social movement were 
again clearly visible following the dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim as deputy prime 
minister and the mass protest refornarr movement it unleashed. The reformasi 
movement attempted to cultivate new modes of mobilisation, such as the Internet, 
appropriate to its multiethnic aspirations, but also relied heavily on the existing 
mobilisational networks of the Islamic movement. This mobilisational bias was 
reflected in the degree of electoral support for the movement's political 
manifestation in the 1999 general elections and contributed to the quick demise of 
the electoral coalition it provoked. The slippage between a multiethnic civil society 
and the ethnic bases of movement mobilisation in Malaysia has thus hampered the 
emergence of effective opposition to the regime. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is premised on two puzzles 
- 
one theoretical, the other empirical. 
The first puzzle relates to the theoretical relationship between civil society and 
social movements. The respective bodies of scholarship associated with these 
concepts often talk about each other, but, it seems, rarely to each other. Thus, in 
the conceptual literature there exists something of an analytical void on the 
exact nature of the relationship between these two social phenomena. How can 
we begin to understand the relationship between these them? The second, 
empirical puzzle revolves around the trajectory of social and political 
contestation in Malaysia over the past few decades. At one level, both in terms 
of political discourse and academic historiography, the focus of attention in 
Malaysia is often `nation-building' and the concomitant declining role of 
ethnicity in the country's political processes. ' Despite this, however, ethnicity 
and ethnic relations remain the dominant paradigm for political activity, both in 
electoral and 
- 
as we shall see herein 
- 
societal mobilisation. Is ethnic salience 
in the political process in Malaysia declining, persisting, or, in some way, both 
declining and persisting? 
This dissertation thus addresses both theoretical and empirical questions but, 
with an opening gambit such as that above, it should come as no surprise to 
learn that the central assertion of this thesis is that the answers to these two 
puzzles are related. More specifically, it will be argued that the divergent 
For the most explicit recent formulation of this approach, see Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: 
The making of a nation, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002; see also Hari 
Singh, `Ethnic conflict in Malaysia revisited', Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 39: 1 
(2001), pp. 42-65. 
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trajectory between ethnicised social and electoral mobilisation and the 
increasingly multiethnic or nonethnic political discourse of both civil society 
and the state in Malaysia is symptomatic of a broader theoretical space for 
`slippage' between civil society and social movements. Whilst civil society can 
and does play an important role in organising and channelling social 
movements, movements are also shaped by the existing processes of 
mobilisation 
- 
both in terms of protest infrastructures and framing 
- 
which may 
be associated with political discourses and ideologies that differ radically from 
those advanced in civil society. This theoretical slippage, it is further suggested, 
may have particular importance in ethnically-divided countries, such as 
Malaysia, where differing cultural `tool kits' affect the mobilisational potential 
of civil society. In the Malaysian context, it is argued that the emergence of a 
broadly multiethnic civil society over the past two decades has not yet overcome 
the existing, ethnically-delimited processes of mobilisation in the country. At 
times of regime crisis and heightened protest, such as occurred in 1987 and 
1998, social mobilisation is thus drawn in contradictory directions, which 
ultimately hampers its efficacy in making claims on and against the state. 
This thesis thus offers a theoretical critique of existing literature on civil society 
and social movement and a subsequent re-synthesis of the two frameworks to 
incorporate this realm of societal slippage. Empirically, it is a national-level 
study of the politics of opposition in Malaysia over the two decades from 1981 
to 2001. In as much, it seeks to fill something of a void in studies of 
contemporary Malaysia, which have tended to focus either on the regime and its 
associated elites, or else on micro-level studies of resistance and opposition. 
The following chapter makes the theoretical argument which will underpin the 
2 
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thesis. The remainder of this chapter briefly introduces the Malaysian case 
study and the format of the thesis. 
THE MALAYSIAN CASE 
Since gaining Independence from the British in 1957, Malaysia has been ruled 
continually by a coalition of a fluctuating number of ethnically based political 
parties, the Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front). Initially called the 
Alliance, it comprised three parties representing the main ethnic communities 
- 
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (Mic). Parliament was 
suspended for almost two years after ethnic rioting following the 1969 general 
election, in which the Alliance performed relatively badly. Upon the restoration 
of Parliament, the coalition was expanded through the cooptation of a number of 
smaller parties and, for a while, the main Malay opposition party, Parti Islam 
seMalaysia (PAS 
- 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party). In the following years, the 
coalition became increasingly dominated by UMNO, and pursued a more 
stridently pro-Malay programme, epitomised by the 1971 promulgated New 
Economic Policy (NEP), which focussed on redistributing economic power 
towards the Malay community. 
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Figure 1.1: Alliance/ßN share of vote and share of seats won in federal elections, 1959-1999 
1959 1964 1969 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1995 1999 
GOVERNMENT: 
BN 
OPPOSITION: 
PAS 
DAP 
PBS 
SEMANGAT'46 
KEADILAN 
OTHER OPPOSITION 
TOTAL 
Table 1.1: Parliamentary election results, 1982 
- 
1999 
--f- Seats 
--a- Vote 
1982 1986 1990 1995 1999 
Seats "%Vote Scats ! /. Vote Scats "%Vote Scats %lo te Seals "/. Vote 
132 60.5 148 57.3 127 53.4 162 65.1 148 56.5 
5 14.5 1 15.5 7 6.7 7 7.3 27 15.0 
9 19.6 24 21.1 20 17.6 9 12.1 10 12.7 
-- 
14 2.3 8 5.3 3 3.2 
8 15.1 6 10.2 
-- 
5 11.5 
8 5.4 4 6.1 4 4.9 0 2.0 3 1.8 
154 177 180 192 193 
The period under examination in this thesis began with what was then the most 
ordered political transition in Malaysia's history. In February 1981, Tun 
Hussein Onn, Malaysia's third prime minister, announced that he would be 
stepping aside for his deputy, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who formally took office 
in July the same year. Against virtually all expectations, Mahathir remained in 
power for over two decades, despite major heart surgery and advancing age, 
finally stepping down in October 2003 at the age of 76. Yet this apparent 
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continuity masks the wholesale transformation of Malaysian society during 
these years. As Mahathir neared the end of his term in office, the regime faced 
unprecedented levels of social opposition. 
As Malaysian society has been transformed over the past two decades, so it is 
undeniable that the politics of opposition has likewise been transformed. This 
thesis seeks to explain that transformation, within the theoretical context of civil 
society and social movements. In as much, it employs a broad definition of 
opposition, including not only the `formal' politics of elections and parties, but 
also socially-based opposition movements. 2 The focus of the thesis will be a 
comparative examination of two critical challenges to the Barisan Nasional 
regime: The UMNO split and the Semangat '46-led opposition in the years 1987- 
1990, and the reformasi movement, from 1998 until 2001. As we are not 
merely concerned with the state itself, but also society more broadly conceived, 
the thesis also examines social transformation during the preceding and 
intervening years. 
The past two decades have seen two major economic recessions in Malaysia 
and, in their wake, two distinct episodes of political turmoil. A deep economic 
recession in 1985, caused mainly by a collapse in the price of Malaysia's major 
commodity exports, notably rubber and tin, preceded a schism in UMNO. This 
eventually resulted in the formation of a loose opposition coalition around the 
UMNO splinter group, Semangat '46 (The Spirit of '46 
-a reference to the year 
UMNO was founded). More recently, the sudden and dramatic expulsion in 
2 It should be noted that many of the principle actors in such opposition movements would 
strongly deny that they are in `opposition' to the government at all. Interview: S. M. 
Mohamed Idris, President of CAP and SAM, George Town, June 2001. 
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September 1998 of the deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim from the 
government and from UMNO set into motion a series of tumultuous events which 
resulted in the formation of another new opposition party, Parti Keadilan 
Nasional (KEADILAN, or National Justice Party) and an even tighter opposition 
alliance. 
In June 1987, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his deputy, Ghafar Baba, 
were challenged for the leadership of UMNO. The challengers were Tengku 
Razaleigh Hamzah, the Trade and Industry Secretary, and Musa Hitam, the 
previous deputy prime minister, who had resigned abruptly in 1986 over 
`irreconcilable differences' with Mahathir, to be replaced by Ghafar. At the 
time, Mahathir's leadership looked extremely vulnerable, after a series of 
financial scandals in which were implicated high profile businessmen and 
politicians close to Mahathir, and a deep recession which was largely blamed on 
economic mismanagement by Mahathir and his Finance Minister, Daim 
Zainuddin. Nonetheless, a credible challenge to an incumbent leader was 
unprecedented in a party that prides itself on a culture of loyalty and deference 
to leadership. 3 
Mahathir survived the challenge, but by the narrowest of margins, and Ghafar's 
winning margin over Musa Hitam was less than the number of spoilt ballots. In 
the aftermath of the UMNO election, a series of political and legal skirmishes 
between the winning camp and the losers led to the formation of a breakaway 
3A previous challenge had been mounted to Hussein Onn's leadership in 1978, but the candidate 
was weak and Hussein won easily. On the `invention' of UMNO's traditions, see Hari Singh, 
`Tradition, UMNO and political succession in Malaysia', Third World Quarterly, 19: 2 (1998), 
pp. 241-54. 
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party, Semangat '46, led by Razaleigh. With a general election approaching, 
Semangat '46 managed to secure a coalition with the other two main opposition 
parties, PAS and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a secular, predominantly 
Chinese party with leftwing tendencies. The coalition was in the form of two 
bilateral agreements, as major differences between PAS and DAP made a 
multilateral pact untenable at the time. 
In 1990, when the general election was eventually held, the Barisan Nasional 
thus faced, for the first time, a comparatively united opposition front. Its 
position was weakened even further when one of its smaller, locally-based 
components, the Part Bersatu Sabah (PBS 
- 
Sabah United Party), pulled out of 
the coalition after nomination day, leaving the government unable to field new 
candidates. The government survived the renewed opposition challenge, albeit 
with a considerably reduced majority, although still retaining its habitual two- 
thirds majority. It also lost control of two state assemblies 
- 
Kelantan fell to the 
PAS-Semangat alliance, and Sabah to the PBS. 4 Despite this relative success, 
however, the opposition alliances soon started showing signs of strain, and 
dissolved as members of Semangat slowly returned to UMNO and the DAP 
increasingly felt hampered by its connection to PAS. At the subsequent election 
in 1995, the BN was returned to power again, with its greatest ever majority. 
More recently, there has been a similar heightening of opposition to the regime, 
centred on the expulsion from UMNO of its erstwhile Deputy President, and 
4 Elections for the state assemblies are held concurrently with the general election in all states 
except the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. The ßN thus lost control of the Sabah 
state assembly when the PBS withdrew from the coalition and formed an administration on its 
own, rather than at the election itself. 
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Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Anwar had 
been at the forefront of an Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. He was the founding 
president of the influential Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM 
- 
Islamic 
Youth Movement of Malaysia), and led several large student demonstrations, 
which ultimately ended in him being detained without trial under Malaysia's 
notorious Internal Security Act (ISA). In 1982, however, he confounded his 
supporters and opponent alike by joining UMNO, quickly rising through the 
ranks under Mahathir's own patronage, eventually becoming Deputy Prime 
Minister in 1994. 
Anwar's fall, when it came, was even more meteoric than his rise. On 2 
September 1998, Mahathir unceremoniously sacked Anwar from his 
government positions, and he was expelled from UMNO the next day. Amid 
allegations of sodomy and corruption 
- 
widely believed to be trumped up 
- 
he 
was arrested and eventually sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in a series 
of dubiously judged trials. His downfall, however, immediately set off a series 
of street demonstrations, some of which Anwar fronted until his arrest, 
including a demonstration on 20 September of around fifty thousand people in 
front of the world's press, at the opening of the 1998 Commonwealth Games. 
The protests, which continued sporadically into 2001, gave birth to a reforniasi 
(reform) movement, symbolically led by Anwar's wife, Wan Azizah, as the 
leader of the newly formed Parti Keadilan Nasional. 
These two regime crises have been the focus of much academic attention. 5 As 
yet, however, little work has been done to situate them comparatively, within 
5 Major works discussing these events are discussed in chapter three. 
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the broader perspective of social transformation in Malaysia; such a comparison 
provides the empirical crux of this thesis. The thesis is arranged in a broadly 
chronological manner. Chapters two and three provides the theoretical 
framework through, respectively, a critical discussion of theories of civil society 
and social movements and a review of the existing literature on Malaysian 
politics and society. Chapter four sets the empirical context through a survey of 
thematic concerns prior to the period under specific examination. Chapters five 
to eight examine the development of civil society and social movements during 
the 1980s and 1990s, falling relatively neatly into four time period: 1981-1987, 
1987-1991,1991-1997 and 1997-2001. Chapter nine offers the concluding 
remarks. 
9 
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 
This chapter sets the theoretical framework for the thesis, drawing on an 
analytical discussion of the literature on civil society and social movements. 
Although these two bodies of theory operate within the same broad paradigm 
and concern themselves with similar sets of institutions and processes, there is 
little theoretical interaction between the two concepts. Scholars of one concept 
tend to draw uncritically upon the other, without explicitly theorising the 
relationship between the two. As we shall later see, this assumption of dynamic 
homogeneity is particularly problematic in the Malaysian case, where the 
mobilisation of popular protest under the aegis of social movements has 
diverged substantially from the strategies and objectives of civil society 
organisations. 
This chapter thus formulates a synthetic model of state, civil society and social 
movements which anticipates the empirical difficulties of cases such as 
Malaysia. It argues for a dualistic interpretation of state and civil society, each 
with a discursive and an institutional element, in which the cultural mediation of 
discursive practices 
- 
in part mediated by social movement organisation and 
popular mobilisation 
- 
is critical to the form and outcome of contentious 
politics. 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society is perhaps one of the most pedigreed concepts in modern political 
theory, with antecedents stretching back as far as Plato and, in the modem 
10 
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period, Thomas Hobbes, although its use and meaning have undergone many 
revisions during that period. ' Plato's conceptualisation of civil society as `a 
politically organized commonwealth', which guarded against the `dangers of 
private interest' and state power finds many echoes in modem writings on the 
subject. 2 His emphasis on the power of `reason' in the realm of civil society to 
arrive at a unitary `Good', however, would strike many modem theorists, 
particularly those of a Gramscian bent, as in itself overly oppressive and of as 
much danger as the state itself. 
Contemporary conceptualisations of civil society find their common roots in 
Alex de Tocqueville's work on democracy. Tocqueville's main concern was to 
explain why democracy in America appeared so much more successful than in 
his native France. He concluded that in the United States, a `weak' state 
complemented by robust civic associations was far more conducive to 
democracy than the `strong' state and weak social groupings in France. ' Civil 
society 
- 
the intermediary level of association between the state and the 
individual 
- 
was the key to resisting state oppression. Tocqueville's 
formulation of civil society was thus almost diametrically opposed to that of the 
I This chapter does not attempt to provide a detailed historical analysis of the development of 
the concept. A number of existing works provide such analyses. See, for instance Jean L. 
Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, London, MIT Press, 1994; John 
Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The critical history of an idea, New York, New York University 
Press, 1999; and, for a more critical perspective, Krishnan Kumar, 'Civil society: An inquiry 
into the usefulness of an historical term', British Journal of Sociology, 44: 3 (1993), pp. 
375-95. Another useful source on the historical usage of civil society, as well as non-Western 
perspectives, is offered by the essays collected in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (eds. ), 
Civil Society: History and possibilities, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Ehrenberg, Civil Society, pp. 3-4. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1, New York, Vintage, 1954 and The Old 
Regime and the French Revolution, New York, Doubleday Anchor, 1955. 
2 
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first modern theorist of civil society, Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, an all- 
powerful `leviathan' state was necessary to regulate civil society, which would 
otherwise descend into his famous war of all against all. 4 
If Tocqueville remains the anchor for modem conceptualisations of civil 
society, Foley and Edwards have noted that the term now encompasses `a 
complex set of arguments, not all of which are congruent'. 5 Broadly speaking, 
however, two distinct approaches to civil society can be identified in the 
contemporary period. The first, and probably dominant, approach is the liberal 
perspective, which is primarily concerned with civil society as a constituent of 
democratisation and the democratic process. Is democracy viable without a 
robust civil society? Does such a mature civil society engender 
democratisation? These are the types of question that concern liberal theorists. 
On the other hand, the Marxist approach is more concerned with civil society as 
the legitimising extension of a hegemonic state. 6 Clearly, a full picture of civil 
society would address both these concerns. Chandhoke neatly sums up the 
shortcomings of exclusive focus on one or other approach thus: 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
5 Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, 'he paradox of civil society', Journal of Democracy, 
7: 6 (1996), pp. 37. 
6 Joseph Femia, 'Civil society and the Marxist tradition', in Kaviraj and Khilnani, Civil Society, 
pp. 131-4G. 
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Liberals concentrate on the oppressions of the state, but they do 
not inquire into the oppressions of civil society. And the Marxist 
concentration upon the oppressions of this sphere has led them to 
neglect any analysis of the institutions and values of civil 
society. ' 
Liberal Perspectives 
In the liberal tradition, civil society is employed in a Tocquevillean sense to 
signify 
an intermediate associational realm between state and family 
populated by organisations which are separate from the state, 
enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed 
voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their 
interests or values. ' 
The liberal interpretation of civil society ascribes it a strongly democratic 
dimension, in some cases viewing it almost functionally as part of a `transition' 
process that leads from authoritarianism to democracy. Socially, this process is 
linked to the emergence and growth of a strong middle class, itself predicated 
upon strong economic growth. In a widely cited essay, Larry Diamond thus 
identifies ten `democratic functions' of civil society, ranging from its limiting 
7 Neera Chandhoke, State and Civil Society: Explorations in political theory, New Delhi, Sage, 
1995, p. 162. 
8 Gordon White, `Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the analytical 
ground', Democratization, 1 (1994), pp. 375-90. 
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effect on state power to its role in the selection and training of future political 
leaders. 9 
Enthusiastic studies of post-Communist Eastern Europe and redemocratisation 
in Latin America and Asia have emphasised the role of civil society in such 
democratic transitions. 10 In Africa also, `nascent civil societies' have been 
considered as the `forefront' of democratic transitions. " After the waning of 
this initial euphoria of this `third wave' of democratisation, however, the same 
scholars are now arguing that it is the poor quality of civil society in some of 
these new democracies that has hampered the `consolidation' of democratic 
practices. Thus, for instance, forty years after he proposed civil society as one 
of `the conditions that favour democracy', Seymour Martin Lipset noted that the 
newly democratised Eastern Bloc countries `are faced with the consequences of 
the absence of modern civil society, a lack that makes it difficult to 
institutionalize democratic politics'. '2 Other liberal scholars, however, maintain 
the view that civil society is only `crucial primarily in the moments leading to, 
and perhaps immediately following' democratic transition; in democratic 
9 Larry Diamond, `Towards democratic consolidation', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner 
(eds. ) The Global Resurgence of Democracy [Second edition], Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996, pp. 111-23. 
10 One of the earliest, and in many ways paradigmatic, exposition of the `democratic transition' 
thesis is Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986. Other important works in this genre include Ernest Gellner, 
Conditions of Liberty: Civil society and its rivals, London, Allen Lane, 1994; Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman, 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991(a). 
11 E. Gyimah-Boadi, 'Civil society in Africa', Journal of Democracy, 7: 2 (1996). 
12 Seymour Martin Lipset, 'The social requisites of democracy revisited: 1993 presidential 
address', American Sociological Review, 59: 1 (1994), pp. 12 and 13. For the original thesis, 
see his Political Man: The social bases of politics, Garden City NY, Doubleday, 1960, ch. 2. 
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consolidation, civil society plays only a `supporting role'. 13 Moreover, 
statistical analyses of economic time series and subjective measures of 
democracy such as those provided by Freedom House have suggested that the 
correlation between economic growth and democratisation is not as strong as 
was previously thought. '4 
The confusion over the exact role of civil society in this paradigm is mirrored by 
a proliferation of democratic typographies; one review has identified more than 
five hundred `subtypes' of democracy described in the literature 
- 
more than 
two for every country in the world. 15 This terminological confusion is more 
than just irascible social scientists failing to agree on terms of reference but is, 
as Thomas Carothers points out, symptomatic of the failure of the transitions 
paradigm to account for the wide range of regime trajectories in the `third wave' 
13 M. Steven Fish, 'Russia's fourth transition', in Diamond and Plattner, The Global Resurgence 
of Democracy, p. 267. 
14 See, for instance, Robert J. Barro, 'Determinants of democracy', The Journal of Political 
Economy, 107: 6 (1999), pp. S158-5183 and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose 
Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, 'What makes democracies endure? ', Journal of 
Democracy, 7: 1 (1996), pp. 39-55. 
15 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in 
comparative research', World Politics, 49 (1997), pp. 430-51. In this vein, the Malaysian 
regime has variously been characterised as 'quasi-democratic', 'semi-democratic' and 
'competitive authoritarian', to give but a few examples. The last of these terms is the most 
misleading. Given that Malaysia has maintained democratic institutions for more than four 
decades (with the exception of the 1969-71 Emergency) and that what is lacking from these 
institutions is meaningful competition, 'competitive authoritarian' seems a remarkably inapt 
description with, if anything, 'uncompetitive democracy' more appropriate. For the various 
terms listed here see, respectively, Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 'Malaysia: Quasi-democracy in a 
divided society', in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Lipset (eds. ), Democracy in 
Developing Countries Vol. 3: Asia, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1989, pp. 347-81; William Case, 
'Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the pressure for regime change', Pacific Affairs, 
6: 2 (1993), pp. 183-205; and Larry Diamond, 'Elections without democracy: Thinking about 
hybrid regimes', Journal of Democracy, 13: 2 (2002), pp. 21-35. 
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countries. 16 Moreover, the desire to classify and characterise regime types and 
their democratising trajectories in `large-N' style comparative studies has 
arguably resulted in analyses and analysts which are so thin on empirical detail 
that they have virtually no correspondence to reality. To give one circumstantial 
example, in an article on the relationship between culture and civil society in 
Asia, Francis Fukuyama consistently misspells former Singaporean prime 
minister Lee Kuan Yew's name and erroneously uses Malaysian prime minister 
Mahathir's honorific `Datuk Seri' as his first name. 17 Such gross basic mistakes 
reinforce the perception that some of these scholars are less concerned with the 
actual experience of individual countries, and more concerned with fitting data 
to their grand theories. 
An alternative liberal account of civil society, which is necessarily more 
grounded in empirical detail, is offered by the concept of social capital. Often 
couched in economistic terms as a public good, social capital accounts for the 
less tangible qualities of civil society. In the words of Robert Putnam, one of 
the foremost proponents of the theory, social capital `refers to features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate 
16 Thomas Carothers, 'The end of the transition paradigm', Journal of Democracy, 13: 1 (2002), 
pp. 5-21. 
17 Francis Fukuyama, 'The primacy of culture', in Diamond and Plattner, The Global 
Resurgence of Democracy, pp. 320-7. Fukuyarna's misspelling is 'Lee Kwan Yew' and he 
refers to Mahathir as Datuk Seri Mahathir, which is correct for subsequent references (though 
hardly necessary in academic writing) but insufficient for a first reference, akin to making a 
first reference to a knighted person as, for instance, Sir Colin. The suspicion that he has 
mistaken 'Datuk Seri' as some form of 'first name' is confirmed by the book's index, which 
lists him as 'Mahathir, Datuk Seri', with no reference to his actual 'full' name of Mahathir 
Mohamad. 
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coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit'. 18 The general thesis put 
forward by proponents of social capital is that democratic civil society functions 
best 
- 
or only 
- 
where social capital is strong. In his acclaimed empirical study 
of local government in Italy, Putnam thus argued that local government was far 
more successful in the north of the country because of dense networks of civil 
engagement, which were lacking in the south. '9 By contrast, however, he saw a 
steady erosion of social capital in the United States, epitomised by his now 
famous phrase that America goes `bowling alone'. 
Putnam's formulation of social capital is persuasive, not least because it 
provides an at least partial solution to the nagging problem of collective action, 
which lurks at the edges of much writing on civil society. Social capital 
provides the glue that binds people together in what political economists like 
Mancur Olson viewed as fundamentally 'irrational' behaviour. In addition, it has 
the added advantage of some degree of measurability. Although, as has already 
been noted, social capital represents the intangible qualities of civil society, it is 
relative easy to measure its epiphenomena 
- 
Putnam employs associated 
empirical data ranging from political participation to Parent-Teacher 
Association membership. Thus, one is able to produce a chronologically or 
geographically comparative analysis. 20 Indeed, the concept of social capital has 
18 Robert D. Putnam, 'Bowling alone: America's declining social capital', Journal of 
Democracy, 6: 1 (1995), p. 67. 
19 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993. 
20 Although he does not explicitly use the terminology of social capital, Ashutosh Varshney's 
examination of the link between levels of `associational engagement' and ethnic violence in 
major Indian cities is a superb exposition of such a geographic comparison. See his Ethnic 
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proved especially attractive to those social scientists that employ mathematical 
and statistical techniques to model political behaviour, precisely because of its 
measurability. 21 This facet of social capital has also been the source of a 
criticism that it represents a theoretical `Trojan horse' through which the overly 
abstracted and fundamentally asocial theories of economics may come to 
`colonize' more of the social sciences. 22 
Where Putnam's conceptualisation of social capital has also been criticised is in 
his assumption that social capital is, in all its forms and at all times, of net social 
benefit. 23 Critics have pointed to the `negative externalities' of social capital, 
noting that `group solidarity... is often purchased at the price of hostility 
towards out-group members'. 24 This problematic dimension of social capital is 
reflected in wider concerns in liberal conceptualisations of civil society. 
Alexander, for instance, has noted a `bifurcating discourse' in civil society, in 
Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
2002. 
21 See, for instance, Pippa Norris, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing political activism, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, esp. ch. 8 and, for a more critical use of the 
concept, John A. Booth and Patricia Bayer Richard, 'Civil society, political capital and 
democratization in Central America', The Journal of Politics, 60: 3 (1998), pp. 780-800. 
22 Ben Fine and Francis Green, 'Economics, social capital and the colonization of the social 
sciences', in Stephen Baron, John Field and Tom Schuller (eds. ), Social Capital: Critical 
perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 78-93. Ironically, however, in their 
introduction to the same volume ('Social capital: A review and critique', pp. 1-38), Schuller, 
Baron and Field note that two Nobel Laureates in economics 
- 
Kenneth Arrow and Robert 
Solow 
- 
have rejected the concept of social capital as imprecise and lacking the key features 
of 'capital'. 
23 In fact, Putnam's later writings accept this darker side to social capital. See his Bowling 
Alone: The collapse and revival of American community, New York, Simon and Schuster, 
2000. 
24 Francis Fukuyama, 'Social capital, civil society and development', 771ird World Quarterly, 
22: 1 (2001), p. 8. 
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which the `citizen' is postulated against the 'enemy' 
. 
25 Civil society, for 
Alexander, is both liberal and repressive: liberal towards its citizens, but 
repressive towards its enemies. Alexander's primary concern is in international 
relations; others, such have Whitehead, have identified a similar contradiction 
on a national level. All conceptualisations of civil society, Whitehead argues, 
`admit a third category of "uncivil citizens", or persons enjoying political rights, 
but not submitting themselves to the constraints imposed by "civil society" 
. 
26 
As Whitehead notes, this leaves an arena of `uncivil interstices', into which he 
puts such groups as religious fundamentalists and mafia organisations - 
generators, one might suggest, of `antisocial capital'. 
In another similarity with the democratic transitions paradigm, Putnam's critics 
have also questioned the direction of causality in his argument. Just as 
Huntington, Diamond and their colleagues are finding it hard to explain whether 
civil society is a prerequisite of democracy or dependent thereupon for its 
vitality, so other theorists have questioned whether high levels of social capital 
are, in fact, a consequence of good governance rather than its cause. 27 Thus, in 
25 Jeffrey C. Alexander, 'Citizen and enemy as symbolic classification: On the polarizing 
discourse of civil society', in Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed. ), Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of 
institutionalization, London, Sage, 1998, pp. 96-114. 
26 Laurence Whitehead, 'Bowling in the Bronx: The Uncivil Interstices between Civil and 
Political Society', in Robert Fine and Shirin Rai (eds. ), Civil Society: Democratic perspectives, 
London: Frank Cass, 1997, p. 95. 
27 See, for instance, Bo Rothstein, 'Social capital, economic growth and quality of government: 
The causal mechanism', New Political Economy, 8: 1 (2003), pp. 49-71. 
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the words of one critic, social capital `is both cause and effect... It leads to 
28 positive outcomes... and its existence is inferred from the same outcomes'. 
Liberal theories of civil society, then, face two major challenges in their 
accounts of democracy and democratisation. Firstly, their broad failure to 
consider `uncivil' tendencies in voluntary spheres of social activity (the realm of 
`civil' society) has resulted in often over-optimistic evaluations of civil society's 
democratising `function'. Secondly, they have been unable to counter 
convincingly charges that the direction of causality in their argument is the 
wrong way round. Implicit in both these problems is an unresolved `End of 
History' teleology. 29 Whilst few analysts would still openly support 
Fukuyama's thesis that liberal democracy has `won' the future, liberal accounts 
nonetheless continue to assume that it has an at least privileged relationship with 
civil society. 
For liberal theorists, then, civil society and its infrastructural constituent social 
capital enjoy a privileged and mutually reinforcing relationship with democracy. 
Civil society is seen as a rein on the excesses of state power; a vibrant civil 
society leads to an accountable state. For many Marxist analysts, particularly 
those influenced by Gramsci, almost the direct opposite is true. In this 
paradigm, civil society is understood as the arena in which the state perpetuates 
its power through hegemonic rather than coercive means. 
28 A. Portes, `Social capital: Its origins and applications in modem sociology', Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24 (1998), pp. 1-24. 
29 Francis Fukuyama, 'The end of history? ' The National Interest, 16 (1989), pp. 3-18. 
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Marxist and Gramscian Perspectives 
Modern Marxist theorisations of civil society have been dominated by the 
legacies of Antonio Gramsci. Within Gramsci's own writings, however, there is 
some confusion as to the exact role of civil society. In one note, Gramsci writes 
`State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by 
the armour of coercion'. 30 Elsewhere, in a formulation more akin to those of 
liberal theorists, he suggests that civil society stands `between the economic 
structure and the State'. 31 Inconsistencies aside, however, it is clear that 
Gramsci viewed civil society as the primary vehicle for the state's hegemonic 
project. Civil society fulfils this role for Gramsci in two ways. Firstly, it is the 
arena of the `intellectuals', who themselves have a vital role in giving a sense of 
consensual legitimacy to the state. Secondly, civil society exerts the state's 
hegemonic influence through `so-called private organisations, like the Church, 
the trade unions, the schools'. 32 
It is this second, institutional aspect of civil society that Althusser later 
developed into the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAS), which 
reproduce the State's hegemony in the greater public and which hold back the 
tide of (proletarian) revolution with almost as great a degree of inevitability as 
that with which the revolution would presumably otherwise happen: 
30 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From The Prison Notebooks, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 
197 1, p. 263. 
31 Ibid., p. 208. 
32 Ibid., p. 56. 
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The ideology that a class in power makes the ruling ideology is 
indeed `realized' in those ISAS, but it goes beyond them, for it 
comes from elsewhere... the ISAS represent the form in which the 
ideology of the ruling class must necessarily be realized. 33 
Althusser undoubtedly takes the structural elements of Gramsci's writings to a 
functional and deterministic extreme, whereby civil society 
- 
as manifested by 
his ISAS 
- 
acts solely as a legitimising medium for the state. 34 But his reminder 
of the relationships between institutions and ideology is an important one. 
If Althusser represents his deterministic extreme, Gramsci himself was also 
reticent on the counterhegemonic potential of civil society. Broadly speaking, 
he identified two potential counterhegemonic approaches: the `war of position', 
in which class alliances are forged and broken, and the revolutionary `war of 
movement'. He further suggested that the relative strength of civil society in the 
West compared to the East made the war of position the most appropriate 
socialist strategy in the European context. 35 Like Marx, however, Gramsci's 
work focused overwhelming on an analysis and critique of the existing 
structures of power, with the process of counterhegemonic manoeuvre given 
scant attention. 
33 Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an investigation', 
in Slavoj Lizek (ed. ), Mapping Ideology, London: Verso, 1994, p. 138; emphasis original. 
34 For a clear critique of Althusser and other Gramscian theorists, see Neil Abercrombie, S. Hill 
and B. S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis, London, Verso, 1980. 
35 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, pp. 229-38. 
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An important critique of Gramscian civil society is provided by Laclau and 
Mouffe. 36 They reject the essentialist `confluence of struggles into a unified 
political space', and argue instead for civil society as a site of considerably more 
contention than it is for Althusser and even Gramsci himself. 37 Indeed, such is 
their refusal to tie certain roles uniquely to either state or civil society, that they 
concede that the state may at times be more progressive than civil society, as, 
for instance, when states have passed anti-sexism legislation to which civil 
society was broadly opposed. Civil society, for Laclau and Mouffe, is not just 
an intermediary between the state and the individual, but is itself a site of 
contestation and oppression unto itself. Thus, civil society is not only the 
domain of hegemony, but also of counterhegemony. This sentiment was 
reflected by Stuart Hall in his celebrated Gramscian critique of Thatcherism, 
when he noted that Thatcherism `must "win" in civil society as well as in the 
state'. 38 
Gramscian readings of civil society, then, accept that civil society has at least 
the potential to provide opposition to the state 
-a role which the liberal tradition 
conversely privileges. In one Gramscian formulation, for instance, Chandhoke 
identifies a process of: 
36 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, London, Verso, 1985. 
37 Ibid., p. 112. 
39 Stuart Hall, 'Authoritarian populism: A reply', New Left Review, 151 (1985), p. 119. 
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the neutralization of the emancipatory potential of civil society 
and of its appropriation by the dominant classes and the state... 
The appropriation of this space by dominant practices does not, 
however, invalidate it. 39 
For Chandhoke, as for Laclau and Mouffe, civil society is primarily an arena of 
discursive contestation. In particular, Chandhoke identifies the concept of rights 
as historically critical to the civil society discourse. States, she argues, have 
legitimised themselves through civil society by the extension of (discursive) 
rights to their citizens. Civil society, in turn, has grasped these rights and 
`progressively widened' them. Thus, Chandhoke accepts that civil society may 
engender democracy, but argues that the often non-inclusive nature of civil 
society 
- 
an objection mirroring those of Alexander and Whitehead 
- 
gives rise 
to a `crippled form of democracy'. 
Whilst Gramscian analysis provides a Marxist perspective on the relationship 
between the state and civil society, it has been criticised for its virtual silence on 
the relationship between civil society and the market 
-a relationship that is 
central to the liberal account of civil society through its focus on economic 
growth and the middle classes. In seeking to overcome this lacuna, Michael 
Burawoy has recently attempted to provide a synthesis of the works of Gramsci 
and Karl Polanyi, producing what he calls a `sociological Marxism'. 40 Burawoy 
argues that both Gramsci and Polanyi, through a rejection of the deterministic, 
classical Marxism of the early twentieth century, converge on the centrality of 
39 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society, p. 203. 
40 Michael Burawoy, `For a sociological Marxism: The complementary convergence of Antonio 
Gramsci and Karl Polanyi', Politics and Society, 31: 2 (2003), pp. 193-261. 
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society 
- 
`civil society' in Gramsci, `active society' in Polanyi 
- 
as both the 
source of the durability of capitalism, and the arena in which it may be 
overcome. Polanyi, Burawoy argues, provides the link between (civil) society 
and the market that is missing in Gramsci. 
In addition, Burawoy argues that the voluntarism of Polanyi's work counteracts 
the `thin' exposition of counterhegemony in Gramsci. Polanyi argues that 
society is the product of the markets but the source of their potential decline 
through the commodification of land, labour and money, which, he argues, 
threatens the stability of capitalism. `Active society' is thus a contested sphere 
in which the state attempts to resist the commodification of these factors and in 
which classes are `impelled to organise... against their degradation'. 41 This 
contestation of active society is, according to Burawoy convergent with the 
Gramscian civil society as an arena of hegemonic contestation, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Burawoy's map of Sociological MarxismQ 
41 Ibid., p. 212. 
42 Reproduced from Ibid., p. 221. 
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Thus far, then, two broad strands of civil society theory have been identified and 
discussed 
- 
the liberal and the Gramscian. An informative example of the 
differences between these traditions, and perhaps the respective political agenda 
underlying their perspectives, is in their treatment of Israel. In the democratic 
transitions paradigm, Israel is a `consolidated and liberal democracy', one of 
only twenty-four such countries in the world, and along with Japan, one of only 
two outside the Western bloc of Europe, North America and Australia/New 
Zealand. 43 In as much, it attracts little attention. In a broader liberal approach, 
discussions of Israel have focussed on its conceptualisation of citizenship and 
the effectiveness of its constitutional arrangements 
- 
`extreme' proportional 
representation with a directly elected prime minister. Such studies have argued 
that Israel has witnessed a `gradual transformation, since 1967, into a civil 
society in the liberal sense of the term'. 44 In contrast, Gramscian readings of 
civil society in Israel draw a picture of ingrained hegemony and an almost 
unrivalled system of domination, which `repels all social change'. 45 
The example of Israel demonstrates the extent to which differing perspective on 
civil society can produce widely differing conclusions. In fact, at their 
deterministic extremes, the liberal and Gramscian traditions of civil society are 
almost diametrically opposed, the former viewing it as an emancipatory process, 
the latter viewing it as a hegemonic tool. As we have seen, however, both 
schools are increasingly addressing their own shortcomings, with the liberal 
43 Larry Diamond, `Is Pakistan the (reverse) wave of the future', Journal of Democracy, 11: 3 
(2000), p. 95. 
44 Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israel: The dynamics of multiple citizenship, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 336. 
45 Uri Ben-Eliezer, 'State versus civil society? A non-binary model of domination through the 
example of Israel', Journal of Historical Sociology, 11: 3 (1998), pp. 370-96. 
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school introducing concepts of `uncivility' and the Gramscians attempting to 
expand the counterhegemonic potentialities of civil society. From the 
perspective of this thesis, however, the Gramscian perspective provides a 
number of advantages over the liberal. Firstly and most importantly, the 
Gramscian account of civil society as an arena of contestation is simply more 
sophisticated and convincing than the liberal account. Secondly, the Gramscian 
perspective on civil society tends to be more historically grounded and less 
concerned with classification and typologies than the liberal account. Deriving 
from these two points, the Gramscian reading of civil society is in many ways 
less teleological than the liberal account. Moreover, the Gramscian reading of 
civil society, as we shall see presently, provides the most appropriate avenue for 
the synthesis of civil society and social movements theory. Before moving on 
to consider social movements theories, however, we must briefly examine some 
more region-specific treatments of civil society. As we shall see throughout this 
thesis, normative notions of what civil society should be or, at least, how it 
should behave, have formed an increasingly important part of the state's 
discursive output in Malaysia, and Southeast Asia more generally. 
Regional Perspectives 
Over the past decade, two issues have dominated popular and academic debate 
about civil society in Southeast Asia: `Asian Values' and Islam. The concept of 
`Asian Values' was propagated during the late 1980s and 1990s by a number of 
Asian political leaders 
- 
notably Mahathir and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew 
- 
who sought to explain and justify the phenomenal economic growth but limited 
democratic practices of their respective countries. Like most popular political 
discourse, the precise nature of these Asian Values was never clear, and this 
27 
Theoretical Context 
fuzziness was reflected in the academic debate on the issue. A good summary 
of the core of these values is provided by Khoo Boo Teik: 
A supposedly and distinctively `Asian' 
" predisposition towards strong and stable leadership rather 
than political pluralism; 
" respect for social harmony and an inclination towards 
consensus as opposed to a tendency towards dissent or 
confrontation; 
" acceptance of broad and penetrating state and bureaucratic 
intervention in social and economic affairs; 
" concern with socio-economic well-being instead of civil 
liberties and human rights; and 
" preference for the welfare and collective good of the 
community over individual rights. 46 
Clive Kessler has criticised the academic community for not taking the `Great 
Asian Values Debate' seriously enough. 47 Yet the issue surrounding the debate 
- 
the applicability of culturally relativistic definitions of democracy and civil 
society 
- 
is, in fact, an old problem. Indeed, the implications of culturally 
presumed social characteristics (i. e. Asian Values) have long since been a 
subject of academic debate: compare Max Weber's famous characterisation of 
46 Khoo Boo Teik, `Nationalism, capitalism and "Asian Values"', in Francis Loh Kok Wah and 
Khoo Boo Teik (eds. ), Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and practices, Richmond, Curzon, 
2002, pp. 52. 
47 Clive Kessler, The Abdication of the intellectuals: Sociology, anthropology and the Asian 
Values debate 
- 
or, what everybody needed to know about "Asian Values" that social 
scientists failed to point out', Sojourn, 14: 2 (1999), pp. 289-312. 
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Chinese Confucianism as an impediment to capitalism with Lucien Pye's 
argument that precisely these Confucian traditions were central to the economic 
success of the Chinese diaspora. 48 Such culturally essentialist arguments have 
lost much credibility in recent years, however, which may have contributed 
towards the reluctance to confront Asian Values that Kessler perceives. 
From the perspective of this thesis, the importance of the Asian Values debate 
lies not so much in the content of the debate itself, which was never more than 
political rhetoric to justify authoritarian policies and controls; as Anthony 
Langlois points out, when `culture' is invoked by the state, it becomes a `means 
of exerting power'. 49 For our purposes here, the Asian Values debate points to 
the important distinction that must be made between civil society as a heuristic 
tool of scholarly analysis and civil society as a political discourse; as Thompson 
remarks, Asian Values may be `thoroughly discredited internationally... [but 
they] face a more complex fate at the domestic level'. 50 Put another way, we 
must differentiate between a positive idea of civil society and a normative idea 
of how groups and individuals should behave in civil society. The Asian Values 
argument was clearly the latter, and echoes of it can be found in much of the 
Barisan Nasional discourse, particularly in the writings of Mahathir himself. 51 
48 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Berkeley CA, 
University of California Press, 1978; Lucien W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The cultural 
dimensions of authority, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985. 
49 Anthony J. Langlois, The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: Southeast Asia and 
universalist theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 26. 
50 Mark R. Thompson, `Whatever happened to "Asian Values"? ', Journal of Democracy, 12: 4 
(October 2001), p. 155. 
51 See for instance, Mahathir Mohamad and Shintara Ishihara, The Voice of Asia: Two leaders 
discuss the coming century, Tokyo, Kodansha International, 1995. Mahathir's cultural 
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Yet, as James Scott would remind us, the public prevalence of such as discourse 
is no proof that it has been privately accepted or `internalised' by the wider 
population. 52 In as much, it is worth noting that in a survey of political attitudes 
in Malaysia, Bridget Welsh found that attitudes towards leadership are at best 
mixed, with less than one in twenty of her respondents favouring a strongly 
authoritarian leadership. 53 Nonetheless, as a political discourse that sought both 
to defend its propagators' practices and to condemn Western excesses 
- 
what 
Inoue Tatsuo refers to as `Asian Orientalism' 
- 
the concept of Asian Values 
remains important. 54 
Similar concerns are raised in attempting to reconcile Islamic traditions with 
civil society. The compatibility of Islam with civil society, and democracy in 
particular, was a question of increasing importance in the eyes of many Western 
scholars, even before the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. The 
debate is most closely associated with Samuel Huntington. As one of the 
foremost proponents of the Third Wave of democratisation, Huntington had 
once claimed that it was `unclear' whether Islamic democracy was a 
`contradiction in terms' or not. 55 Barely a few years later, with the publication 
essentialism dates back to his earliest works, including the controversial Malay Dilemma 
(Petaling Jaya, Federal Publications, 1981). 
52 James C. Scott, Dominance and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden transcripts, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1990. 
ss Bridget Welsh, 'Attitudes towards democracy in Malaysia: Challenges to the regime? ', Asian 
Survey, 36: 9 (1996), pp. 882-903. 
54 Inoue Tatsuo, `Liberal democracy and Asian Orientalism', in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. 
Bell (eds. ) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, pp. 27-59. 
55 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 27. 
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of his clash of civilisations thesis, however, Huntington had clearly made his 
mind up: 
Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, 
human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free 
markets, the separation of church and state, often have little 
resonance in Islam, Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox 
culture. 56 
Huntington's views here sound remarkably similar to the kind of Orientalist 
generalisations famously castigated by Edward Said. Compare, for instance, the 
above quote from Huntington with Said's sarcastic paraphrasing of Orientalist 
discourse two decades previously: 
On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are 
the Arab-Orientals; the former are (in no particular order) 
rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, 
without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things. 57 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their closer interaction with the societies 
involved, scholars of Southeast Asia tend to take a more moderated view of 
Islam's civil potential. Thus, for instance, Clive Kessler argues that it is not 
modern, but classical Islamic political discourse which allows `no notion of a 
56 Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations? ', Foreign Affairs, 72: 3 (1993), p. 40. 
57 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient, London, Penguin, 1978, 
p. 49. 
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public domain... of civil society itself 
. 
5S He argues that the fundamental 
relationship in classical Islam was between the individual and the umma (the 
community of the faithful), governed by a didactic and exclusive state 
- 
as 
epitomised by shari'a law and the rule of ulama'. Serif Mardin broadly concurs 
with this analysis, arguing that Islamic societies have historically had a different 
'dream' from the Western one, often looking back to a past 'Golden Age' of 
Islam, and which often had little room for concepts of civil society. 59 This 
historically nuanced reading of Islam is more moderated than that of 
Huntington, in that Kessler and Mardin accept that whilst this classical 
discourse continues to resonate today, it is by no means the only political 
interpretation of Islam available. Moreover, even in the classical context, 
Kessler concedes that Islamic wagf (charitable trusts and public welfare groups) 
`provided scope and space for independent initiative' and were `the NGOs of 
classical Islamic society'. 
Empirical studies of modern Muslim politics have concluded that Islam is not 
only compatible with democracy, but can provide a vital force in fostering civil 
society. Mastura, for instance, concurs with Kessler that ivaqf institutions have 
played an important role in fostering civil society, in this case in the Southern 
Philippines. 60 More broadly, Robert Hefner argues that the social base and 
tolerant traditions of Indonesian `civil Islam' made it a vital force in the 
58 Clive Kessler, 'State and civil society: Global context, Southeast Asian prospect', Sojourn, 
13: 1 (1998), pp. 38-61. 
59 Serif Mardin, 'Civil society and Islam', in John A. Hall (ed. ), Civil Society: Theory, history, 
comparison, Cambridge, Polity, 1995, pp. 278-300. 
60 Michael O. Mastura, The making of a civil society through waqf institution in Mindanao', in 
Omar Farouk Bajunid, Nakamura Mitsuo and Sharon Siddique (eds. ), Islam and Civil Society 
in Southeast Asia, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, pp. 117-34. 
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democratic movement to topple Suharto's New Order regime. 61 Much of the 
Islamic mobilisation in the early years of the Iranian revolution was likewise 
democratically inclined, although the ultimate victory of the Khomeini faction 
clearly warns of equally undemocratic potentialities within Islam. 62 In the 
Malaysian context, it has been suggested that Islamic organisations, especially 
PAS and ABIM, were central to the enlargement of civil society in the 1980s. 63 
The events of 11 September 2001 in the United States notwithstanding, a broad 
consensus thus exists among Islamic intellectuals and activists that Islam and 
democracy are indeed compatible, and that Islam can contribute to, or even 
provide the foundations of, a mature civil society. Increasingly, mainstream 
Islamic political discourse has become dominated by the Qu'ranic concept of 
Utihad (reasoned understanding) instead of taglld (unquestioning acceptance). 
Indeed, many of those perceived in the West as fundamentalists have also 
espoused the virtues of democracy. The founder of Pakistan's Jan: aat-e-Islami, 
Sayyid Adul Al'a Maududi, for instance, claimed at the height of the Cold War 
61 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2000. See also Robin Madrid, `Islamic students in the Indonesian 
student movement, 1998-1999: Forces for moderation', Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, 31: 3 (1999), pp. 17-32. 
62 Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies and Revolutions: A comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua 
and the Philippines, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
63 Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Islam, civil society and ethnic relations in Malaysia', in Nakamura, 
Siddique and Banujid, Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia, pp. 57-75. For an interesting 
early appraisal of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia, see also his 'Kebangkitan Islam dan proses 
politik di Malaysia' [Islamic resurgence and the political process in Malaysia], Malaysia dari 
Segi Sejarah, 9, pp. 10-25. 
64 Sycd Ahmad Hussein, 'Muslim politics and the discourse on democracy', in Loh and Khoo, 
Democracy in Malaysia, pp. 75-107. 
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that Islam forms the basis of a `superlative' democracy, which avoids the 
excesses of both Communism and Western democracy. 65 
One of the foremost regional proponents of an Islamic civil society in the 1990s 
was Anwar Ibrahim, then Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister, along with the 
prominent social activist and intellectual, Chandra Muzaffar. 66 Anwar proposed 
a normative concept of Islamic civil society, al-mutjama' al-madani or, in 
Malay, masyarakat madani, with, as its `basic proposition', the `idea of the 
dignity of man'. Yet, whilst Anwar's vision of civil society was remarkably 
Western in many respects 
- 
calling for `the spirit of liberty, individualism, 
humanism and tolerance', he nonetheless demands a relativistic view, in which 
Islamic civil society must be allowed to differ from Western perceptions. In 
particular, he notes that the `inalienable rights' of Western democratic society 
are complemented, in his picture of masyarakat madani, with `unshirkable 
responsibilities', especially to God. 67 
In many respects, these modem formulations of Islamic civil society are similar 
to the `Asian values' discourse discussed previously, and this is hardly 
surprising. Both seek to invoke a fundamentally Western model of civil society 
- 
both Anwar and Chandra make direct references to Tocqueville 
- 
but with 
culturally justified limitations. They should be understood in discursive terms 
as an attempt to define the normative content of civil society, rather than a 
65 Sayyid Adul 'Ala Maududi, Political Theory of Islam, Lahore, Islamic Publications, 1960, 
p. 42. 
66 Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance, Singapore, Times Books International, 1996; 
Chandra Muzaffar, The emergence of civil society in Malaysia: Role of the state and society', 
MSRC Current Affairs Forum, Series 5 (1997), pp. 31-40. 
67 Anwar, The Asian Renaissance, pp. 49-51. 
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positivistic model of its operations. This is not to suggest that debates over 
Islam and Asian Values are unimportant 
- 
as we shall see in later chapters, both 
discourses have had significant repercussions on the state-civil society dynamic 
in Malaysia. 
We have seen, then, that the concept of civil society provides a good structural 
account of the relationship between state and society. Where it has proved 
inadequate is in explaining social and political transformations, particularly 
where conflicting trajectories are evident, as we shall find in the Malaysian case. 
Social movement theory provides the promise of addressing these dynamics. 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
If civil society is one of the oldest concepts of political theory, social 
movements theory is a relative infant. Recent interest in collective action and 
social movements was largely sparked by the protest movements of the 1960s 
across Europe and the United States. Since then, a substantial and sophisticated 
body of literature has built up concerned with social movements and collective 
action. Yet, as with the concept of civil society, a straightforward definition of 
social movements has proved elusive. According to Tar ow, sustained and 
coordinated `contentious politics' is the defining feature of social movements. 68 
For Touraine, however, they are `not exceptional and dramatic events', they are 
`the expression of the collective will'. 69 In many respects, this definitional 
problematic is exacerbated by the vast empirical subject area it covers. The 
terminology and theoretical innovations of social movements have been 
68 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 2. 
69 Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 29. 
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employed in settings as diverse as national revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua to 
micro-level studies of Alcoholics Anonymous in New York. 70 
In seeking to provide an integrated understanding of social movements, 
della Porta and Diani identify four `characteristic aspects' of social movements, 
which are accepted by most scholars: 
1. Informal interaction networks 
2. Shared beliefs and solidarity 
3. Collective action focusing on conflicts 
4. Use of protest. 7' 
This useful schema draws attentions to the multi-faceted nature of social 
movements. As with civil society, social movements are understood to have 
both institutional and discursive dimensions. They operate both on the 
organisational and structural level, and on the more intangible plane of culture, 
ideology and beliefs. 
Historical Specificity or Teleology?: `New' social movements 
For many years, one of the most hotly contested topics in socials movements 
literature was the distinctiveness 
- 
or lack thereof 
- 
of the `new' social 
movements. Originally a product of the response by predominantly European 
scholars to the failure of Marxist interpretations of social conflict to explain 
70 Parsa, States, Ideologies and Revolutions; Leonard Blumberg, The ideology of a therapeutic 
social movement: Alcoholics Anonymous', in Russell L. Curtis and Benigno E. Aguirre 
(eds. ), Collective Behavior and Social Movements, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1993, pp. 282- 
91. 
71 Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999, pp. 14-15. 
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such phenomena as the women's movement, the ecological movement and the 
peace movement, they sought to postulate `new' social movements against the 
`old' economistically determined class conflicts of industrial society. 72 The 
emergence of the `new' movements is thus seen as coinciding with the rise of 
post-industrial society, and the realignment of new classes and states. 73 
Concomitant with this is the emergence of `new' ideologies and forms of 
protest, as well as a declining relevance of the `old' industrial and class 
conflicts. In a recent formulation, for instance, Rucht and Neidhardt, argue that 
current `macro-structural' alignments in Western societies predispose towards 
the emergence of non-class movements. 74 The concept of new social 
movements has also been applied in post-colonial settings, where new 
movements are contrasted against the `old' liberation and independence 
movements of the colonial period. 75 
The new social movements school has been roundly criticised for its claim of 
novelty, when much of what they analyse empirically has been apparent in `old' 
movements, and for amalgamating together a series of diverse and different 
72 Claus Offe, 'New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics', 
Social Research, 52 (1985), pp. 817-68. 
73 Touraine, The Voice and the Eye. 
74 Dieter Rucht and Friedhelm Neidhardt, Towards a "Movement Society"? On the possibilities 
of institutionalizing social movements', Social Movement Studies, 1: 1 (2002), pp. 7-30. 
75 See, for instance: Samir Amin, 'Social movements at the periphery', in Ponna Wignaraja (ed. ), 
New Social Movements in the South, London, Zed Books, 1993, pp. 76-100; Harsh Sethi, 
'Survival and democracy: Ecological struggles in India', in Wignaraja, New Social Movements 
in the South, pp. 122-48. Compare, with respect to civil society, Partha Chatterjee, 'On civil 
and political society in post-colonial democracies', in Kaviraj and Khilnani, Civil Society, pp. 
165-78. 
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movements. 76 More epistemologically, they have been criticised for a 
teleological perspective which privileges the modern transition from `old' to 
`new' against other transformations in society. Yet, as one of the foremost 
proponents of new social movements, Albert Melucci, has pointed out, this 
critique is itself based on an `ingenuous historicism that assumes the substantial 
continuity of the historical flow'. ' Since the 1990s, however, the debate has 
more-or-less evaporated. Whilst most analysts add a qualifying caveat to their 
use of the term, `new social movements' have widely become accepted as an 
empirically discernable group of movements that can be uniquely identified 
with the modem period. Within this thesis, the concept and terminology of new 
social movements will be utilised to understand a historically specific 
transformation in social mobilisation from ethnic- and labour-based discourses 
to environmentalist-, gender- and human rights-based discourses. 
Political Opportunity Structure and Resource Mobilisation 
As we have seen, theories of civil society are unable to account for dynamic 
change in a political system. In addition, the concept of new social movements, 
whilst defining an empirically identifiable set of social transformations, is by 
itself unable to account for the dynamics of these changes. One of the most 
influential concepts in modem social movements theory that has sought to 
overcome these limitations is the `political opportunity structure' thesis. Tarrow 
provides the most succinct summation of this view thus: 
76 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
77 Alberto Melucci, 'Getting involved: Identity and mobilization in social movements', in Bert 
Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi and Sidney Tarrow (eds. ), From Structure to Action: 
Comparing social movement research across cultures, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988, 
p. 336. 
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People engage in contentious politics when patterns of political 
opportunities and constraints change and then, by strategically 
employing a repertoire of collective action, create new 
opportunities. 78 
In Soviet Russia, for instance, theorists suggest that the political openings 
created by Mikhael Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost' was 
seized upon as an opportunity by a democratic movement which eventually 
brought about the downfall of the regime. 79 Similarly, in the United States, it 
has been argued that the broadening of political space for social movements 
after the 1960s was, in itself, a result of the movements of the 1960s. 80 
The political opportunity structure thesis provides a persuasive account of when 
social movements arise, as well as the relative susceptibility of the regime to 
their demands. Its appeal lies in its ability to offer a dynamic understanding of 
the relationship between state and social movements (rather than privileging one 
or the other), and a strong comparative framework. As Gamson and Meyer 
note, it also `balances elements of structure and agency' 
. 
81 Perhaps the greatest 
drawback of the concept, however, is its lack of specificity. Different 
commentators have identified a bewildering number of dimensions to the 
opportunity structure, running the risk of it becoming a "`dustbin" for any and 
78 Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 19. 
79 Elena Zdravomyslova, 'Opportunities and framing in the transition to democracy: The case of 
Russia', in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds. ), Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures and cultural 
framings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 122-40. 
So Tarrow, Power in Movement. 
81 William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, 'Framing political opportunity', in McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, p. 276. 
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every variable relevant to the development of social movements'. 82 Recent 
works have sought to rationalise the concept, and Doug McAdam has produced 
what he claims is a `highly consensual' list of four principle dimensions: 
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized 
political system; 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite 
alignments that typically undergird a polity; 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies; and 
4. The state's capacity and propensity for repression. 83 
Of these four factors, the first three are relatively straightforward and self- 
explanatory. It is important to bear in mind, however, that it is changes in these 
dimensions that primarily interest political opportunity structure theorists. The 
question of state repression is somewhat more problematic, as there is 
considerable disagreement between scholars as to whether the exercise of 
repression acts as a halter on social movements or whether, through a process of 
radicalisation, it actually encourages the movement. Empirical studies have 
concluded that both effects are possible, but that radicalisation is more likely in 
movements with closely integrated networks. 84 An alternative argument is 
provided by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, who suggest that: 
82 della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, p. 27. 
ßs Doug McAdam, 'Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions', in McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, p. 26. 
84 Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, 'Repression, micromobilization and political protest', in 
Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (eds. ), Social Movements: Readings on their emergence, 
mobilization and dynamics, Los Angeles, Roxbury, 1997, pp. 190-206. 
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Repression may be selective, in which case it isolates more 
militant groups and closes off to them prescribed or tolerated 
means of contention. Or it can be generalized, in which case it 
throws moderates into the arms of the extremists. 85 
If the political opportunity structure approach provides a useful framework for 
understanding when social movements arise, it is virtually silent on the question 
of why they do so. Indeed, one of its most problematic assumptions is that 
social movements will arise almost automatically when the opportunity 
structure allows them to do so. Some critics have in fact seen this as tantamount 
to the `normalization' of political protest. 86 Increasingly, therefore, social 
movements theorists have been returning to the question of why social 
movements arise, and why people take part. 
Culture and Framing 
In the mid-1990s, Johnston and Klandermans identified an emerging paradigm 
of social movements theorisation that focussed more attention on the concept of 
culture. 87 The cultural analysis of social movements provides an important way 
to overcome the shortcomings of structural explanations of social movements. 
Theorists of social movements have realised that not only are culture and 
cultural practices key to understanding the emergence and trajectory of social 
85 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 69. 
86Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, 'Collective Protest: A critique of resource 
mobilization theory', in Stanford M. Lyman (ed. ), Social Movements: Critiques, concepts, 
case-studies, London, MacMillan, 1995, pp. 137-67. 
87Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, 'The cultural analysis of social movements', in Hank 
Johnston and Bert Klandermans (eds. ), Social Movements and Culture, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995, pp. 3-24. 
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movements, but that these social movements are, in turn, a central force in the 
dynamics of culture, in the creation of new identities and ideologies. 88 
One of the key concepts that have been developed to apply the study of culture 
to the study of social movements is the idea of cultural `frames'. Frames have 
been defined as `schemata of interpretation' 
-a generalised and standardised 
cognitive view of the world. 89 The degree to which social movements activists 
are able to frame their protests in a way that resonates broadly thus affects the 
extent to which the movement is able to attract participation and influence. It 
has further been argued that, within a given context (e. g. national, regional, 
etc. ), a small number of `master' or `dominant' frames may emerge, which most 
social movements will attempt to employ. 90 In the United States, for instance, 
groups as diverse as gay activists and gun lobbyists have invoked the master 
frame of `civil rights'. 91 
As with the concept of the political opportunity structure, the idea of `framing' 
is clearly somewhat loose. Its analytical appeal lies rather in its ability to bring 
together a number of diverse concepts, all of which have been identified as 
important to social movements. The concept of framing thus incorporates 
88 Ann Swidler, 'Cultural power and social movements', in Johnston and Klandermans, Social 
Movements and Culture, pp. 25-40. 
89 David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, 'Frame alignment processes, 
micromobilization, and movement participation', American Sociological Review, 51 (1986), p. 
464. 
90 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 'Ideology, frame resonance and participant 
mobilization', in Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow, From Structure to Action, pp. 197-219; 
David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 'Master frames and cycles of protest', in A. Morris and 
Carol Mueller (eds. ), Frontiers in Social Movements Theory, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1992, pp. 133-55. 
91 Tarrow, Power in Movement. 
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aspects of collective identity, political discourse and ideology, as well as 
cultural practices, myths and beliefs. It provides a route for understanding the 
role of symbols and symbolic figures 
- 
the Liberty Bell in the US civil rights 
movement, or Nelson Mandela in anti-apartheid and anti-racism movements 
worldwide 
- 
which structural explanations miss. 
The concept of framing also provides an important avenue for analysing not 
only why people participate in social movement, but also why movement 
activists behave the way they do. Inasmuch, it draws attention to the 
performative aspects of social movements, and collective action in particular. 
Thus, for instance, Esherick and Wasserstrom have re-interpreted the 1989 
Tiananmen Square protests as political `theatre', illustrating the ways in which 
the students made use of potent symbols of China's imperial past, as well as 
other symbols that would resonate in the West, such as the Statue of Liberty. 
This serves as an important reminder that an understanding of collective action 
as performance must also include an appreciation of its `audience'. The use of 
English language banners in Tiananmen Square, for example, demonstrated 
clearly that the protestors were `acting out democracy' for the international 
audience, as well as the domestic. 92 In a similar vein, Laurence Whitehead has 
claimed more broadly that `every [democratic] transition obeys the logic of a 
public dramatic performance'. 93 
92 Joseph W. Esherick and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, 'Acting out democracy', Journal of Asian 
Studies, 49 (1990), pp. 835-65. 
93 Laurence Whitehead, `The drama of democratization', The Journal of Democracy, 10: 4 
(1999). 
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CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS 
It was claimed earlier that theories of civil society and social movements rarely 
interact with each other, despite occupying a broadly compatible or even 
complementary paradigm. To give a concrete example, a recent empirically and 
theoretically rich book by three leading American scholars of social movements 
- 
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly 
- 
contains only one 
reference to civil society, which is worth quoting in full: 
Voting and civil rights [in Mexico] expanded as groups outside 
of the government's corporatist family produced a vital and 
remarkably contentious civil society 
- 
symbolized on the one 
hand by the Assembleas de barrio formed after the Mexico 
earthquake and, on the other by protracted semi-insurgency in 
the Chiapas in the 1990s. 94 
The assumptions here about civil society and its positive correlation with social 
movements are clear. Implied is a dialectic relationship between civil society 
and social movements: a vibrant civil society, itself the product of social 
movements, provides the launch pad for further social movements. Nowhere, 
however, is such a relationship explicitly stated or theorised. Interestingly, 
Mabel Berezin makes a similar observation about civil society and political 
culture, which, as we have seen, is increasingly being placed at the centre of 
94 McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, p. 295. 
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social movements analysis: 'Civil society and democratization discussions 
assume a political culture but do not explicitly theorize it'. 95 
One of the few works which directly addresses this relationship is Cohen and 
Arato's Civil Society and Political Theory. Employing a revision of Habermas' 
system/lifeworld theory of the public sphere (Offentlichkeit), they argue that 
social movements constitute the `dynamic element' in the formation and 
realisation of civil society. 96 Social movements, they argue, provide the 
opportunity for new groups to gain power and influence, but are unlikely to 
succeed without a parallel strategy aimed at both civil society ('a politics of 
identity') and at political society ('a politics of influence'). 97 In doing so, they 
reject the `stage' theory of social movements, which posits a linear trajectory 
from collective action expressing non-negotiable demands to institutionalisation 
and compromise. 98 Instead, they argue that social movements are dualistic, 
confronting both civil society and the state. 99 
Cohen and Arato's account is persuasive in that its dualistic interpretation of 
social movements allows the integration of the cultural and the structural 
explanations of social movements and incorporates the trend towards a 
discursive understanding of civil society identified above. For instance, if a 
95 Mabel Berezin, `Politics and culture: A less fissured terrain', Annual Review of Sociology, 23 
(1997), p. 368. 
96 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, p. 498. 
97 Ibid., pp. 552-3. 
98 For the classic exposition of this theory, see Robert Michel, Political Parties: A sociological 
study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, New York, The Free Press, 1962. 
99 This 'movement career' model is also rejected by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly on essentially 
empirical grounds that the predicted deradicalisation of movements has not been universally 
experienced. See McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, p. 65. 
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social movement achieves the institutionalisation of certain rights in the political 
sphere, it also creates new collective identities founded on these rights that 
reorient and strengthen civil society. For our purposes here, however, it has 
two shortcomings. Firstly, by employing Habermas' theory of the public sphere 
as the foundation of their analysis, they also appropriate the limitations thereof. 
As Nancy Fraser reminds us, Habermas' inquiry was concerned with `the rise 
and decline of a historically specific and limited form of the public sphere', 
which, she argues, is no longer an applicable framework in late-capitalist 
democracies. 100 Whether or not Habermas' Eurocentric theory is applicable in 
postcolonial, non-European settings is thus surely questionable. 
The second area where Cohen and Arato's formulation falls short of the 
requirements here is in their normative content. With their emphasis on 
democratising civil society, they appear more concerned to describe how social 
movements should behave than to explain how they do behave. Thus, for 
instance, their contention that `the traceless transformation of movements into 
bureaucratic political parties or lobbies remains both a negative and an 
avoidable model' seems overstated at least; one can point to many social 
movements, such as the environmentalist movement in Germany, that have 
arguably achieved more through institutionalisation than through perpetuated 
social protest. 101 Building on this normative approach, however, Cohen and 
Arato reject precisely such evaluations of the success of social movements, 
100 Nancy Fraser, `Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually 
existing democracy', in Craig Calhoun (ed. ), Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1992, p. 111. 
101 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, p. 561. 
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suggesting that success should not be reckoned in terms of `substantive goals', 
but in the `democratization of values, norms, and institutions'. 102 
From the perspective of this thesis, then, their Eurocentric, normative approach 
renders Cohen and Arato's theorisation less useful. Firstly, the underlying 
assumption that all social movements are democratising would, in any sense of 
the word, prove highly problematic in the Malaysian context. Secondly, such a 
theorisation thus overlooks any `slippage' or mismatch between the goals, 
beliefs and identities of a social movement and those dominant in civil society. 
As we shall see later, this was precisely the problem faced by civil society 
activists in Malaysia in attempting to harness, direct and ultimately democratise 
the popular force of the reformasi movement. 
How, then, can we understand this divergence? It will be argued here that, 
judiciously redeployed, the conceptual tools of the existing literature allow us a 
means of understanding this social `slippage'. In particular, it will be argued 
that the concept of culture is key to reconciling these traditions. 
As was noted earlier, the cultural analysis of social movements is a relatively 
new development, but one that has important implications for the problem at 
hand. Johnston and Klandermans make a convincing case for the systematic 
cultural analysis of social movements, noting that culture `functions as the 
broadest and most fundamental context for social action' although, as we shall 
see, their view of (each) society as having a `stable' dominant culture is 
problematic. 103 Culture, in this context, is understood as a broad set of semiotic 
102 Ibid., p. 562. 
103 Johnston and Klandermans, `The cultural analysis of social movements', p. 4. 
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ideas (a `tool kit', in Anne Swidler's oft-quoted formulation), such as metaphors 
and historical examples, through which people understand and interpret the 
world. 104 The problems inherent to this approach are obvious, and scholars 
who employ it are often careful to make as few assumptions as possible about 
the extent to which culture is uniformly interpreted as a homogenous, organised 
body of ideas, 105 although it has also been argued that even when cultural 
practices are not widely internalised (i. e. they are `disbelieved'), they still have 
behavioural repercussions on society at large. 106 Despite its problems, however, 
it is argued here that the cultural analysis of social movements provides the 
necessary bridge between theories of social movements and civil society. 
Indeed, in the Malaysian case at least, it is precisely these cultural ambiguities 
which can help explain the divergent trajectories. 
The essential problem with culture analysis is ascertaining who `subscribes' to a 
given set of cultural values, how far they are internalised, and how far they 
genuinely affect (collective) behaviour. The cultural essentialism of the 
Weberian `Protestant Ethic' and other such formulations 
- 
which social 
movements scholars stand accused of employing in the place of newer, more 
interpretative systems of analysis such as those developed by Clifford Geertz 
104 Ann Swidler, 'Culture in action: Symbols and strategies', American Sociological Review, 
51(2) (1986), pp. 273-86. 
105 See, for example, William A. Gamson, 'Political discourse and collective action', in 
Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow, From Structure to Action, pp. 219-44, especially p. 220. 
106 Swidler, 'Cultural power and social movements'. Swidler cites an examination of Christmas 
gift-giving behaviour in the United States which found that the majority of respondents did not 
'believe' in giving presents and rejected the commercialisation of Christmas, but none the less 
indulged in the practice and, moreover, attached great importance to the value of presents 
given and received. 
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and Michelle Foucault 
- 
are particularly susceptible to such problems. 107 The 
ubiquity of `subcultures' and `countercultures' is a further complication for 
those who would invoke culture to explain the trajectory of social forces. 108 
For cultural analysts of social movements, the key role of culture in determining 
the success or failure of popular mobilisation is in the framing of protest. Social 
movements that are successful in framing their protest in such a way that has 
broad cultural resonance will, it is argued, generally be able to mobilise more 
support. The process is, however, dialectical 
- 
movements which are successful 
in mobilising support are able to influence cultural attitudes through the creation 
of new frames of action. In some cases, this can even be the result of deliberate 
manipulation by the organisations involved. In the 1970s and 80s, for instance, 
the head of Greenpeace International David McTaggart consciously promoted 
the `Save the Whale' campaign as a means of inducing a `green' frame of 
protest, despite his personal belief that it was a `soft' issue. Said McTaggart: 
[Greenpeace] must have at least one soft issue to draw the 
public's awareness [and] win people into the fold, leading them 
into other heavy issues. Hundreds of thousands of people who 
may have been ambivalent about nuclear power joined 
Greenpeace to save the whales. Who knows how many of them 
heard the message about nukes? ' 09 
107 lbid. 
108 Greg Martin, `Conceptualizing cultural politics in subcultural and social movement studies', 
Social Movement Studies, 1: 1 (2002), pp. 73-88. 
109 David McTaggart, from an internal Greenpeace memo quoted in Fred Pearce, 'Greenpeace: 
Storm-tossed on the high seas', in Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann (eds. ), Green 
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How do we relate this back to theories of civil society? An initial problem to 
overcome here is that theorists of civil society have generally not addressed 
questions of culture directly. Nonetheless, the kind of processes and structures 
that we have broadly lumped together as `culture' can be found within civil 
society theory, particularly among Gramscian theorists who emphasise the 
discursive nature of civil society. It is this discursive arena which allows us to 
integrate civil society theory with the (cultural) analysis of social movements, 
whilst simultaneously providing a theoretical explanation for possibly divergent 
trajectories. Given such a discursive interpretation of civil society, it is 
important to distinguish between civil society on the one hand and culture on 
the other. Clearly the two concepts have a lot in common here 
- 
which is in fact 
to our advantage, as it allows us to mesh the two together theoretically. As a 
cognitive phenomenon, however, culture is a private, internal process, albeit one 
that is widely shared. In contrast, civil society can be understood as the public 
realm of cultural and socio-political contestation. Thus, it embodies not just the 
discursive elements which interact directly with cultural processes, but also 
institutions and individuals 
- 
the `intellectuals' of the Gramscian reading. 
In this interpretation, civil society is thus a dualistic phenomenon with both an 
institutional and a discursive aspect. Institutionally, it is characterised by NGOs, 
trade unions and other such voluntary organisations, independent media 
publications as well as casual and informal networks of association. This 
institutional aspect gives concrete organisational form to civil society, providing 
leadership, meeting places and the broad fora for discursive and cultural 
Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 1996, 
London, Earthscan Publications, 1996, p. 76. 
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interaction. It is also this aspect which is directly susceptible to state regulation 
and repression through, in the Malaysian case, such mechanisms as the Internal 
Security Act as well as more insidious institutions like the Registrar of 
Societies. Clearly, this institutional framework overlaps considerably with the 
institutions of social movements themselves. It is, however, possible to make a 
broad typological distinction between social movement organisations, which 
mirror the historical specificity of social movements along with their goal- 
oriented strategies, and the more enduring and often more wide-ranging 
institutions of civil society. To give examples from the Malaysian case, despite 
its deep involvement in the reformasi cause, ALIRAN would be classifiable as a 
civil society organisation as opposed to, say, the GAGASAN coalition, which 
evolved specifically within the context of the reformasi movement (see chapter 
eight). It is pertinent to note that many social movement organisations, like 
GAGASAN, are initially formed from coalitions of previously existing civil 
society organisation. Indeed, it is frequently argued that such coalitions are vital 
to the success of social movements. ' 10 Such a typology, however, cannot be too 
strict, and it is interesting to note that many enduring and successful civil society 
organisations have themselves grown out of such movement coalitions, the 
formation of SUARAM out of an ISA detainees support group being one such 
example. 
Organisational overlap notwithstanding, it is the second aspect of civil society, 
its discursive output, which provides a link to the cultural analysis that we have 
110 See, for example, Parsa, States, Ideologies and Revolutions and Meredith L. Weiss, `The 
Politics of Protest: Civil society, coalition building and social movements in Malaysia', PhD 
Thesis, Yale University, 2001. 
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placed at the heart of social movements. Discourse and culture are concepts 
closely interlinked; both are concerned with the processes through which 
individuals interpret and understand the world. In this context, however, 
discourse can be understood as the public contestation of meaning and ideology, 
whilst culture refers to the cognitive processes through which these 
contestations are interpreted. Thus, whilst discursive contestation provides the 
grounding of counterhegemony (by, for instance, promoting concepts of `human 
rights' or `sustainable development'), it is through cultural interpretations that 
these ideas are transformed into mobilisation. As Fine notes, a key process here 
is the individual narrative, which translates the often grandiose or abstracted 
concepts of civil society discourse into appreciable and (important for 
mobilisational potential) emotive cultural markers. "' Fine is concerned 
primarily with private, small-scale narrations, such as those in groups like 
Alcoholics Anonymous or Victims of Child Abuse Laws, but the process is 
equally effective on a more public level. The virtually endless list of 
assassinations or incarcerations of societal leaders that have mobilised protest 
movements 
- 
Benigno Aquino in the Philippines, Nelson Mandela in South 
Africa, Xanana Gusmäo in East Timor 
- 
is an obvious indicator of the power of 
narrative. ) 12 Neither are such processes limited to the narrative of well-known 
individuals; the perceived suffering of the forest-dwelling Penan folk in 
Gary Alan Fine, `Public narration and group culture: Discerning discourse in social 
movements', in Johnston and Klandermans, Social Movements and Culture, pp. 127-43. Fine 
(p. 135) identifies three specific forms that such narration can take: horror stories ('affronts to 
the movement actor'), war stories ('collective experiences within the movement') and happy 
endings ('stories that reaffirm the value of the movement'). 
112 Of course, the nature of such a narrative is no guarantee of the outcome of the movement it 
provokes. Mahathir, a widely unpopular national leader, sacked his popular finance minister 
and lived to tell the tale; in the same situation, Louis XVI of France ultimately lost his head. 
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Sarawak has been a spur to the environmentalist movement not just in Malaysia, 
but worldwide (see chapter seven). 
We are now beginning to develop a dynamic picture of the relationship between 
civil society and social movements that accounts both for institutional structures 
and for the processes of contestation and mobilisation. What is missing from 
the picture thus far is the object of these struggles, and it is thus to the state and 
its relations with society that we must now turn. At the most fundamental level, 
the state is both the object of much social contestation and often its source. It 
has, for instance, been argued that it was the divisive economic policies pursued 
by the Malaysian regime in the 1970s that led to the emergence of an ethnically 
divided civil society. "3 State-led modernisation and consequential social 
dislocation has, historically, been the source of many episodes of contentious 
politics worldwide. 114 What concerns us here, however, is not so much the 
broad structural changes brought about by the state, which we can to some 
extent take to be exogenous to the model, but its direct interaction with civil 
society and social movements. In this context, we can identify three important 
dimensions to state strategy: hegemony and `official' discourse; regulation and 
repression; and, regime mobilisation. 
113 Yoshiki Kaneko, `Malaysia: Dual structure in the state-NGO relationship', in Shinichi 
Shigetomi (ed. ), The State and NGOs: Perspectives from Asia, Singapore, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, pp. 178-99. 
114 See, for example, James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, `How traditional rural patrons 
lose legitimacy: A theory with special relation to Southeast Asia', Cultures et developpement, 
5: 3 (1973), pp. 501-40. 
53 
Theoretical Context 
Hegemony and `Official' Discourse 
At the broadest level, hegemony can be defined as the ways in which state 
dominance is maintained `not so much by sanctions and coercion as by the 
consent and passive compliance of the subordinate classes'. ' 15 In as much, it is 
to be understood as an alternative, or more accurately, as a complement to 
coercive means of domination. Whilst investigations of coercion most usually 
treat it as a mechanism at the state's disposal and analyse it as such, however, 
theories of hegemony tend to situate dominance in terms of structural 
explanations in which the nature of the regime and its hegemonic influence are 
inseparable. 
An alternative approach is to view hegemony as a `whole range of practical 
strategies by which a dominant power elicits consent to rule from those it 
subjugates'. ' 16 The importance of this formulation is that it relieves hegemony 
of its theoretical ubiquity and structural inevitability. A weaker, but even less 
deterministic and more analytically useful formulation of this might be to define 
hegemony as a range of practical strategies by which a dominant power seeks to 
elicit consent to rule. Such a formulation has the advantage that, whilst 
retaining the theoretical validity of hegemony, it would understand hegemony as 
practical project which is neither inevitable nor inevitably successful. In this 
reading, hegemony represents the state's discursive input into the cultural arena. 
115 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1986, p. 316. 
116 Terry Eagleton, `Ideology and its vicissitudes in Western Marxism', in Slavoj Lizek (ed. ), 
Mapping Ideology, London, Verso, 1994, p. 198; emphasis added. 
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In pursuing its hegemonic/cultural agenda, the state clearly has an advantage 
over non-state actors in terms of the institutions it controls and the resources at 
its disposal. As Sudipta Kaviraj points out: 
If they are subjected to state practices... people must develop a 
practical understanding of what these involve. Every successful 
transaction with the state on matters relating to property claims, 
inheritance, civil marriage, litigation about infringement of 
rights, freedom on newspapers, habeas corpus, etc., constantly 
forces people to act these concepts. 117 
In this respect, we can understand controls over the media, the assimilation of 
trade unions and political controls over universities and other such strategies as 
attempts by the state to appropriate and control channels of cultural transmission 
to enhance its own hegemonic stance. Sites of contestation and negotiation 
exist even within the most tightly controlled institutions, thus rejecting the 
extreme Althussarian formulation in which all such bodies are necessarily and 
inevitably `Ideological State Apparatuses'. Thus, for instance, despite the 
stringent legalistic controls and extensive regime ownership of the (non- 
electronic) media in Malaysia, periods of liberalisation and contestation have 
surfaced. 118 
Sudipta Kaviraj, 'In search of civil society', in Kaviraj and Khilnani, Civil Society, p. 312. 
118 See Graham K. Brown, `Apologists and eunuchs? Regime control of the media in Malaysia 
and its weaknesses', paper presented at the International Workshop on Communications and 
Democratization in Asia, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, University of Nottingham, 25-26 
April, 2003. 
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Repression and Regulation 
An alternative strategy of control for the state is to employ repressive measures 
against civil society. As political opportunity structure theorists make clear, 
however, it is not just the state's active deployment of its repressive arsenal that 
affects the emergence and trajectory of popular protest, but also its underlying 
repressive capacity and its willingness (or perceived willingness) to use these 
powers. Dynamically, changes in this underlying framework of repression, 
either incremental or decremental, can provide the opportunity for increased 
mobilisation. 
Repression, however, is arguably just an extreme form of regulation with, 
perhaps, some unnecessary normative connotations. Regulation here is taken to 
mean coercive controls over the institutional operations of organisations and 
individuals. In the Malaysian context, a whole array of state powers constitute 
such regulation, embodied in such laws as the Official Secrets Act and the 
Sedition Act, as well a the discretionary powers of bodies like the Registrar of 
Societies and the Director-General of Trade Unions. On-going regulation of 
civil society can be an effective means of suppression, arguably even more so 
than direct repression, precisely because the latter tends to create such narratives 
of injustice that, as we have seen, are often key to mobilising opposition. To be 
somewhat facetious, `Free Anwar' is a much more convincing battle cry that 
`Deregulate the Newspaper Industry'. 
In the dualistic interpretation of civil society proposed above, then, state 
hegemony and official discourse constitute the state's response to the discursive 
aspect of civil society; regulation and repression constitutes its response to the 
institutional aspect of civil society. The two, however, are interlinked. 
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Regulation and repression of civil society in effect constricts the channels of 
cultural and counterhegemonic transmission available. Moreover, in responding 
to state hegemony through regulated channels, the discourse of civil society 
itself in inevitably affected. In New Order Indonesia before 1985, for instance, 
NGO5 were not centrally regulated in the same way as in Malaysia, but were 
under the constant bureaucratic supervision of BANGLES (Pembangunan Desa 
- 
the Rural Development Arm of the Department of Home Affairs). After 1985, 
however, NGOs were been specifically required to include the state ideology of 
Panca Sila as their sole ideological motivation in their statement of objectives. 
This combination of bureaucratic interference together with hegemonic 
assertion resulted in the emergence of a distinctive conceptualisation of 
democracy based on a discourse of self-reliance and participation, both in 
themselves acceptable to the New Order hegemon. 19 
Regime Mobilisation 
Hegemony and coercion are both commonly used concepts in the analysis of 
state dominance. What is less well examined is the phenomenon of `regime 
mobilisation', by which I mean collective action organised and mobilised by or 
on behalf of the state. This can take a variety of forms and be effected through 
varying degrees of institutionalisation, coercion and `free-will', from the 
spectacle of goose-stepping troops marching through the Red Square and the 
`spontaneous' demonstrations of support for the North Korean regime in its 
confrontations with the United States to more `genuine' demonstrations, such as 
119Philip J. Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation in 
Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1995. 
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those in support of Philippines president Joseph Estrada during the last days of 
his presidency. 
In terms of concrete outcomes or influence, regime mobilisation is inevitably 
somewhat vacuous. Despite this, however, it frequently attracts spectacular 
numbers of participants. In the analytical context of the `problem' of collective 
action, this is hardly surprising, given the fact that the risks to the individual for 
being involved in such demonstrations are virtually non-existent, compared with 
the risk of arrest, imprisonment or more surreptitious means of retribution meted 
out against participants in oppositional demonstrations. Indeed there may be a 
positive incentive to participate for those seeking regime patronage (or, 
alternative, the risk of retribution for not participating). What, then, are the 
incentives for authoritarian regimes to indulge in such mobilisation? As with 
socially driven collective action, it is the performativity of regime mobilisation 
that is most important. Regime mobilisation allows the state to contest the 
meaning of collective action frames in a way in which more `normal' state 
politicking might not. At the most fundamental level, it allows the regime to 
contest the very `meaning' of collective action as `protest'. It also allows the 
regime to frame its own discourse within the context of collective action. Of 
course, this `competition' is not a fair one; legislative restrictions on collective 
action are not applied to the state, and the media in authoritarian states often 
reproduces regime performances in a far more favourable light that opposition 
protests. 
As a political actor, then, the state has enormous resources in shaping civil 
society through discursive, coercive and active (mobilisational) mechanisms. 
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Yet it also has its own peculiar vulnerabilities, most notably in its need to retain 
broad legitimacy amongst a substantial proportion of the population. The cost 
of maintaining dominance without such legitimacy 
- 
both in domestic economic 
and, increasingly, in international terms 
- 
is hard for even the most authoritarian 
and autarkical state to endure. It is often in the discursive interaction between 
the state and civil society that such legitimacy is created and destroyed. 
We have now completed our reformulation of civil society and social 
movcments within the context of state-society relations. The programme is 
summarised schematically in figure 2.2. Having developed this broad schema, 
the final task of this chapter is to bring the theory closer to our case study by 
looking at its specific application in multiethnic societies. 
Figure 2.2: Schematic diagram of state-society relations 
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Civil Society and Social Movements in Ethnically Divided Societies 
Ethnicity here and throughout this thesis is understood as a sense of common 
identity based on shared social and cultural norms and practices, a 
comprehensive list of which is given by Bulmer as: 
real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, 
and cultural emphasis on one or more symbolic elements which 
define the group's identity, such as kinship, religion, language, 
shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. 120 
As Ratcliffe notes, a formulation such as this can be problematic in that it 
`opens the door to the creation or nomination of an almost limitless number of 
"ethnic groups" without regard to the significance of the delineating factors'. 121 
Instead of viewing this as problematic, however, it can arguably be turned to our 
advantage, through the key question of political salience. Asking why certain 
ethnic distinctions gain or lose political salience at certain times may provide an 
important avenue for understanding the dynamics of the societies in question. 
A constructivist notion of ethnicity such as that given above not only avoids the 
unpleasant Orientalist and biologically deterministic undertones of `race', but 
also provides the key to understanding the importance of ethnicity in social 
120 M. Bulmer, 'Race and ethnicity', in R. G. Burgess (ed. ), Key Variables in Social 
Investigation, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 54; quoted in Peter Ratcliffe, "'Race" in 
Britain: Theory, methods and substance', in Peter Ratcliffe (ed. ), "Race"; Ethnicity and 
Nation: International perspectives on social conflict, London, UCL Press, 1994, p. 115. 
12! Peter Ratcliffe, `Conceptualizing "race", ethnicity and nation: Towards a comparative 
perspective', in Ratcliffe, "Race"; Ethnicity and Nation, p. 6. Ratcliffe's comments are based 
on M. Bulmer's definition of an ethnic group as given above. 
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mobilisation, through its incorporation of `culture' as a defining characteristic. 
Culture, Devalle notes, `is ethnicity's privileged field' in that it `sustains the 
political expressions of ethnicity'. '22 By placing culture as central to our 
formulation both of state-societal contestation and of ethnicity, we can gain an 
understanding of the relationship between the two. In essence, ethnicity 
- 
even 
when it is `constructed' 
- 
provides pre-existing `channels' along which 
emergent societal mobilisation easily runs, even when movements are not 
explicitly ethnic in their orientation. Symbolic mobilisers such as potent 
religious myths 
- 
obviously a crucial element in millenarian movements 
- 
or 
heroic historic examples may not cut across ethnic boundaries. 
The argument here is that in multicultural and multiethnic societies, social 
movements, which take (some of) their mobilisation force from cultural 
practices and norms, will inevitably appeal more to some cultural and ethnic 
groups than to others. In some cases, movements are obviously directly related 
to specific cultures and groups, the civil rights movement in the United States 
and women's movements worldwide being obvious examples. Even where a 
movement does not `target' a specific cultural (or ethnic) group, however, the 
framing process 
- 
the reduction of a broad array of demands and grievances into 
easily digestible, bite-sized (and, in the modem day, byte-sized) cultural 
semiotics 
- 
will find greater resonance in some cultures than others. 
The importance of ethno-cultural resonance goes beyond the motivational 
framing of a movement to influence the repertoire of collective action itself 
- 
the substantive form that protest takes. For example, hunger strikes undertaken 
122 Susana B. C. Devalle, Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture and protest in Jharkland, New Delhi, 
Sage, 1992, p. 235. 
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by Hispanic American students to protest the content of an ethnic studies 
programme in 1993 seemed excessive to outsiders, but to that community, 
inspired by Caesar Chavez, it was `culturally consonant'. 123 Cultural and ethnic 
differences and distinctions, then, affect the mobilisational potential of social 
movements through differing access to, and appreciation of, the processes of 
mobilisation. Semiotic frames and forms of action that strike a chord in one 
ethno-culture may be entirely dissonant in another. 
Having made this theoretical stand, it is now time to turn our attention to the 
case study of Malaysia, beginning with a discussion of existing approaches to 
Malaysian politics. 
123 Mayer N. Zald, `Culture, ideology and strategic framing', in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, p. 268. 
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APPROACHES TO MALAYSIAN POLITICS 
The previous chapter developed a theoretical model of social mobilisation and 
the state. Before proceeding to demonstrate this model in the Malaysian 
context, it is necessary to contextualise the study with a discussion of the 
existing literature on Malaysia, which is the task of this chapter. 
STATIST APPROACHES 
Since the 1960s, the dominant approach to studying Malaysian politics has 
focused attention on the post-colonial state and the relationships between the 
country's ethnic elites. ' The most explicit recent example of the statist approach 
to Malaysian politics can be found in the work of William Case, most notably in 
his book Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a consociational 
democracy. 2 From the outset, Case acknowledges that this approach is 
somewhat limited in that one may be `unable to grasp the peculiarities of 
Malaysian politics', but, taking a comparative approach, rejoinders that `what 
might be lost in precision is perhaps gained in wider relevance'. 3 Here lies the 
main strength of the elitist approach, as epitomised by Case. It offers an easily 
2 
For an early example of such an approach, see Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, New 
York, New York University Press, 1970. 
William Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a consociational democracy, 
Clayton, VIC, Monash Asia Institute, 1996. See also his 'Semi-democracy in Malaysia: 
Withstanding the pressure for regime change', Pacific Affairs, 6: 2 (1993), pp. 183-205; 
'Aspects and audiences of legitimacy', in Muthia Alagappa (ed. ), Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 69-108; 'Elections as 
flywheels: Advancing or reversing Malaysia's hard-driving democracy? ', paper presented at 
the Third International Malaysian Studies Conference, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
Bangi, Malaysia, 6-8 August 2001. 
Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia, p. 4. 
3 
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identifiable (and relatively easy to research) set of individuals, organisations and 
institutions as the focus of attention. Case is thus able to produce a clear and 
persuasive account of regime stability in Malaysia. The story told is one of 
essential continuity 
- 
stable `semi-democracy' maintained by consensual elite 
unity, which, at various points, has been `tested' by both inter-elite and intra- 
elite crises. 
Case argues that the widely-acknowledged elite bargain fostered at the time of 
independence 
- 
whereby the Chinese elites accepted political under- 
representation in return for `some economic assurances and basic citizenship 
guarantees' 
- 
was `part of a broader tradition of elite accommodation and 
compromise', a tradition mainly forged through British tutelage. He goes on to 
argue that although the first thirty years of Independence (1957-1986) saw the 
Malay elites in UMNO increasingly encroaching on the Chinese elites' side of the 
`bargain', this period nonetheless saw a continuation of the `basically persistent' 
consensually unified elite configurations. Even in the post-1969 era, when the 
government started to take substantive measures to redistribute the economy in 
favour of the Malays under the New Economic Policy, elite unity was 
nonetheless maintained, due to Malaysia's generally good economic 
performance in the 1970s and some political concessions, which took the edge 
off the Chinese elites' diminishing slice of the economic pie. 4 
The main problem with Case's approach is what has been left out. By focusing 
almost exclusively on the state, and a very narrow definition of the state as 
manifested in elite relations, ideas of civil society and non-state actor, or `mass 
Ibid., pp. 84-86. 
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constituents' to use Case's phrase, are more often than not reduced to almost 
functional aspects of elite competition: 
[W]hen opportunities arise, activist subelites may arouse mass 
grievances against their own leaders by portraying them as too 
conciliatory... Mass constituents, in turn 
- 
their outlooks shaped 
strongly by structural forces 
- 
must select or decline to select 
among the appeals and choices that are made available to them. 
But while mass constituents are thus exposed to a range of elite 
and subelite-sanctioned options they are unable to move outside 
these options to initiate and sustain their own complex political 
undertakings. 5 
Popular sentiments and mass grievances thus have relevance only when an elite 
or subelite adopts them for its own furtherance. Civil society is a mobilised, 
rather than a mobilising force. Granted, he accepts the existence of `civil elites', 
but ranks them of lowest importance in terms of `relative weightage and tasks' 
- 
the use of the term `task' here hardly serving to counter accusations of 
functionalism 
- 
and suggests that the state elites can `if consensually unified... 
exclude civil elites without quickly or seriously impairing basic regime 
stability'. 6 
Case's primary defence of this reductionist approach is that it makes for easier 
comparison with other countries. As soon as one looks beyond Malaysia, 
however, the ability of `mass constituents' to undertake social mobilisation 
s Ibid., pp. 12-13; emphasis added. 
6 Ibid., pp. 16-22. 
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under their own banner is undeniable. Case cites the examples of the 1989 
events in Tiananmen Square and the massacres in Rangoon in 1990 as proof of 
the state elites' ability to repudiate civil elites effectively. These are, no doubt, 
spectacular examples that support Case's case. Equally spectacular, but harder 
to explain with Case's approach, are the events of Spring 1998 in Indonesia, or, 
within Case's own time-frame, the Philippines' `People Power' revolution. 
Case's desire to `speak with more than the world's several dozen Malaysianists' 
is, of course, laudable but to do so by cutting civil society out of the picture, 
arguably results in him being unable to engage with precisely those he wishes. 
Even within the context of Malaysian politics, this is a highly dubious 
contention to make. Whilst civil elites have clearly played a historically less 
prominent role in Malaysia than in neighbouring countries, it would nonetheless 
be remiss to suggest that their `task' is unimportant or uninfluential. The issue 
of Islamisation is perhaps the most obvious example of a `civil elite' forcing an 
agenda upon the regime, rather than vice versa. Most studies of the Islamisation 
process have concluded that it was `an increasing number of largely symbolic 
concessions to Muslims' aimed at harnessing the legitimacy afforded by the 
Islamic resurgence. 7 Even if the response has been purely symbolic, it seems 
undeniable that Islamisation was forced upon the regime by societal pressures. 
Rather than focus on the configuration of state elites, other analysts have 
focused on the machinery of the state more broadly. Perhaps the most 
systematic and sophisticated analysis of the institutions of democracy and 
7 Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Ahmad Shabery Cheek, 'Malaysia's Islamic movements', in Joel 
S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds. ), Fragmented Vision: Culture and politics in 
contemporary Malaysia, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992, p. 97. 
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authoritarianism in Malaysia has been undertaken by Harold Crouch. Central to 
Crouch's work is the idea that the state-society relationship in Malaysia 
engenders both democratic and authoritarian pressures. In his Government and 
Society in Malaysia, for instance, Crouch traces institutional changes since 1970 
and concludes that, although this period has seen an increase in authoritarian 
institutions and powers, the regime nonetheless retains some democratic 
aspects, most notably regular elections, which force it to be responsive to, if not 
representative of, `public pressures'. 8 
Crouch ably demonstrates the process of incremental authoritarianism in 
Malaysia, and in particular the ways in which measures and strategies 
introduced to combat specific threats have afterwards remained in an ever- 
growing armoury of authoritarianism. Where his argument is slightly weaker is 
his attempt to demonstrate that democratic pressures nonetheless force the 
regime into `responsiveness'. For the most part, he relies on somewhat 
assumptive statements to the extent that regular elections, although neutered of 
any real political import, nonetheless serve as a check on the regime. Most 
tellingly, the chapter in Government and Society in Malaysia that explores these 
democratic pressures is in fact devoted to the 1987 UMNO split. 9 Although 
Crouch, like Case, views the origins of the UMNO split as a clash of elites and 
personalities in which `ideological and policy differences seem to have played 
almost no part', he is more concerned with its repercussions in terms of 
S Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, St. Leonard's, NSW, Allen and Unwin, 
1996(a), p. 244. 
Crouch's argument concerning the 1987 UMNO split is further expounded in Harold Crouch, 
'Authoritarian Trends: The UMNO split and the limits to state power', in Kahn and Loh, 
Fragmented Vision. These events will be dealt with in detail in chapter six of this thesis. 
9 
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democracy and authoritarianism than with the machinations of the elite. He 
views the UMNO split in terms of fostering further democratisation, arguing that 
it represented a drastic increase in the `competitiveness' of the democratic 
process. He argues that the Team BISemangat `46 challenge was important in 
that the government was unable to resort to the repressive machinery it had used 
in facing down previous challenges because of the strength of the dissident 
movement and its popularity amongst the civil service, police and military. In 
as much, it was demonstrative of the `limits to state power', and the return of 
parliament to being a `forum of significant political debate'. The failure of 
Semangat to capitalise on this during the 1990 election is explained by Crouch 
as due to the economic recovery which saw much popular support returning to 
UMNO. Thus, after examining the roots of the split and the way it played out, 
Crouch concludes: 
[The 1990] election illustrated the significance of electoral 
competition in the Malaysian system. As long as the BN 
- 
in 
particular, UMNO 
- 
was united and the opposition split along 
communal lines, government victory was assured in each 
election. But the UMNO split and the steps towards the 
formation of a multi-communal opposition front raised the level 
of competitiveness in the system and forced the government to 
respond to pressures from below to secure its victory. 10 
This conclusion is a far cry from Crouch's general assertion that elections force 
the regime into democratic responsiveness. If the state is to be deemed 
10 Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, p. 129. 
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`responsive', this surely carries the implication that civil society is able to form 
autonomous demands and pressure to which the state `responds'. Yet by 
placing this responsiveness as contingent upon divisions within the regime 
- 
divisions which Crouch attributes `in the first instance to personal and factional 
rivalries' within UMNO 
- 
Crouch undermines societal autonomy from the state. I I 
Instead, this is reminiscent of Case's claim that civil society is unable to do any 
more than select amongst elite-sanctioned options. 
Crouch goes some way towards this elsewhere, when he develops further the 
democratic pressures side of his argument, using examples from both within the 
Malay and the non-Malay communities to illustrate the ways in which the 
regime has been forced to take account of popular sentiment. 12 He argues that 
the regime has responded promptly and substantively when it has felt that it 
Malay base of support is being eroded, with measures such as the NEP and the 
Islamisation programme. Response to non-Malay pressures, however, has 
tended to be slower and more symbolic in nature. In general, Crouch argues, 
the regime has responded to non-Malay pressures only when the Malay vote is 
split, as in 1990, and the regime thus requires strong Chinese and Indian support 
to ensure its victory. 
SOCIETAL PERSPECTIVES 
Thus far, two interconnected models of Malaysian politics have been 
considered, which focus attention primarily on the state. An alternative body of 
literature has also built up on Malaysia, which focuses more attention on society 
11 Ibid., p. 26. 
12 Harold Crouch, 'Malaysia: Do elections make a difference? ', in R. H. Taylor (ed. ), The Politics 
of Elections in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996(b), pp. 114-35. 
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more generally, rather than the politics of elections and government. 
Undoubtedly the best known and the most influential work from this perspective 
is that of James C. Scott, in particular his detailed study of peasant resistance in 
a Malaysian village in Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of peasant 
resistance, and its more theoretical successor, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: Hidden transcripts. 13 Scott's primary aim in these two volumes is 
to `read, interpret and understand the often fugitive political conduct of 
subordinate groups'. 14 The main thrust of his argument is that traditional views 
of the elite-subordinate relationship on which political activity is predicated is 
inaccurate, in that it overlooks a vast arsenal of subordinate resistance, which 
does not register on the traditional scale. This includes `arson, sabotage, 
boycotts, disguised strikes, thefts and imposed mutuality', `footdragging, 
lateness, unpredictability', as well as more `symbolic' resistance such as `spirit 
possession, gossip, aggression through magic, rumor, anonymous threats and 
violence, the anonymous letter and anonymous mass defiance'. 15 
Scott ably demonstrates the extent to which political affiliation reaches into 
almost every aspect of village life, characterised by a `relatively 
straightforward' sociology of wealth and patronage. 16 `Development' monies 
provided by the state were channelled through the Jawatankuasa Kemajuan 
Kampung (JKK 
- 
Village Development Committees), which were exclusively 
13 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak. - Everyday forms of peasant resistance, New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1986; James C. Scott, Dominance and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 
transcripts, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 
14 Scott, Dominance and the Arts of Resistance, p. 17. 
15 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 241; Scott, Dominance and the Arts of Resistance, p. 140. 
16 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 132. 
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run by UMNO members. Individual membership of UMNO also reaped 
substantial benefits, mostly in the form of access to various loans, permits and 
licenses. Political factionalisation of the village between UMNO and PAS 
supporters extended to which coffee shop one frequented, and where one bought 
supplies. Yet for Scott, this is not the end of the story. Rejecting any concept of 
a hegemonic state, he argues that political infiltration does not have the ability to 
control the thoughts or perceptions of the peasants, who display their resistance 
to modernisation associated with this politicisation through the `everyday' 
means described above. Symbolic resistance was also evident, such as those 
who insistently remained members of PAS, despite the economic hardship it 
brought. 
Other micro-level studies of rural society have also emphasised the extent to 
which organisational affiliation became an integral part of social interaction and 
resistance. In his analysis of a predominantly Malay plantation settlement, for 
instance, Zawawi Ibrahim reasserts the importance of both political parties and 
trade unions in rural social organisation. '? In this case, it was the arrival of 
UMNO and the National Union of Plantation Workers (NuPw) in the mid-1960s 
that galvanised the Malay labourers' resistance to exploitation by the 
plantation's European owners. UMNO was seen as a form of `protection' by the 
labourer, which could act as an intermediary with the European bosses. Yet 
UMNO was reluctant to involve itself in outright protests and strike activity, a 
role that the NUPW fulfilled instead. Thus, the relationship between these two 
organisations and their leaders and members 
- 
sometimes complicit alliance, 
17 Zawawi Ibrahim, The Malay Labourer: By the Window of Capitalism, Singapore, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1998. 
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other times more suspicious opposition 
- 
became the defining feature social 
organisation and political resistance. A similar pattern of politicisation, 
development and dependency is identified in Rogers' examination of a rural 
village in Johor. 18 In Rogers' case study, however, no rival organisation to 
UMNO emerged, and thus UMNO was able to develop its patronage network 
almost uninhibited 
- 
by 1978 over eighty per cent of the adult villagers in his 
case study were UMNO members, and membership of the party was seen as both 
a duty, and also the only avenue through which grievances could effectively be 
expressed. In a similar study, Guinness concurs that `firm' support for uMNo in 
a village was a means of exerting pressure on the state for the provision of 
amenities and sanitation. 19 
The studies discussed above are all primarily concerned with rural Malay 
communities, and the ways in which their inhabitants have been reluctantly 
drawn into the modem state, whether it be through the introduction of 
agricultural technology, which Scott analyses, or the `proletarianisation' of 
labour conditions, which Zawawi describes. In all these studies, societal 
penetration 
- 
essentially through the formation and operation of local UMNO 
branches 
- 
is a key strategy employed by the state. 
Another aspect of Malay society that has drawn much attention from scholars is 
Islam and its revival. William Roff has pointed out that the debate in Malaysia 
about the role of Islam in politics and society predates even the arrival of the 
18 Marvin L. Rogers, Local Politics in Rural Malaysia: Patterns of change in Sungai Raya, 
Oxford, Westview Press, 1992. 
19 Patrick Guinness, On the Margins of Capitalism: People and development in Mukim Plentong, 
Johor, Malaysia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 98. 
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British, who perceived that `Moslem law would have ended by becoming the 
law of Malaya had not the British stepped in to check it'. 20 Since the 1970s, 
however, Islamic resurgence and dakwah 
- 
propagation movements 
- 
have 
undeniably flourished. Dakwah presents an elusive challenge to the regime in 
that it undermines the state's legitimacy in the cultural arena but, short of 
outlawing all of the many dakwah movements, the government has no legalistic 
or political mechanism to combat it. As Clive Kessler argues, dakwah 
movements provide `an important parapolitical outlet, one that the government 
is reluctant to choke off too clumsily or abruptly and which therefore enjoys a 
certain immunity'. 21 In attempting to combat the counter-hegemonic influence 
of dakwah, then, the regime is faced with the problem of de-legitimising a 
movement that has a strong and popular claim to moral legitimacy, one that the 
regime itself is eager to appropriate. 
Perhaps one of the most important general conclusions that can be drawn from 
studies of the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia is the extent to which they 
demonstrate the importance of alternative means of transmission in resisting the 
state's dominance. A whole host of innovative and informal media have been 
employed by dakwah organisations to spread their word. In an early study of 
Islamic resurgence, Judith Nagata noted the prevalence of horizontal ties 
amongst dakwah movement, often recruiting in small groups (usrah) organised 
20 William R. Roff, 'Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s-1990s: Exemplars, institutions, 
and vectors', Journal of Islamic Studies, 9: 2 (1998), pp. 210-228. 
21 Clive Kessler, 'Malaysia: Islamic revivalism and potential disaffection in a divided society', 
Southeast Asia Chronicle, 75 (1983), p. 8; emphasis original. 
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along the lines of the classic Leninist cell-structure. 22 Technological innovation 
has also been well employed by the dakwah movement; Roff has noted that 
Islamic proselytising has expanded beyond printed materials to dissemination 
`by sound and video cassettes, by photocopying, fax, and e-mail, and by the 
Internet'. 23 
Thus far, then, we have seen that micro-level studies of rural Malay society have 
drawn a different picture from that of the statist literature discussed previously. 
Whilst state penetration and patronage networks are undoubtedly important, this 
body of literature has also identified important sites of resistance and 
contestation, which the statist literature tends to overlook. Increasingly, 
scholars are finding other such sites of contestation across Malaysia's socio- 
ethnic and geographical divides. Within the urban Malay community, for 
instance, Islamisation has also been identified as an important site of resistance 
to the regime. In as much, Zainah Anwar identified in the mid-1980s usrah 
similar to those described by Nagata in a study of dakwah movements amongst 
university students. 24 Interestingly, these studies have often emphasised the role 
of those 
- 
including university students 
- 
who have migrated from the 
countryside to the city, in a way similar to Benedict Anderson's `Creole 
pioneers'. 25 It has been argued that this shift from the countryside to the city 
22 Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern religious radicals and their 
roots, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1984. 
23 Roff, `Patterns of Islamization', p. 226. 
24 Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the students, Petaling Jaya, 
Pelanduk, 1987. 
25 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism, London, Verso, 1981. 
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has forced a radical reappraisal of Malay identity and Islam. As Sharifah Zaleha 
notes: 
In the new environment, it was no longer possible for the Malay 
middle class to defend existing identities that were constructed 
on the presumption that social bonds could be effectively forged 
through descent, ethnic origin, loyalty to the state, the village, 
the local patron and religion. 26 
Conversely, Eric Thompson has identified an essential continuity of narrative 
amongst rural-urban migrants, concluding that experiences of the urban 
environment are often shaped by persistent kainpung discourses. 27 The terms of 
contestation, then, are not just resource driven, but involve the struggle to define 
culture, identity and identity formation. 
Neither is this contestation limited to the Malay community, or to religion and 
labour as the subject of contestation. Tan Liok Ee, for instance, has argued that 
the issue of education has been an important site of resistance to the regime 
amongst the Chinese community. 28 The reasons for the survival of Chinese 
26 Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, 'Islamisation and urban religious identity: The middle class of 
Bandar Baru Bangi', in Abdul Rahman Embong (ed. ), Southeast Asian Middle Classes: 
Prospects for social change and democratization, Bangi, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 2001, p. 136. 
27 Eric C. Thompson, 'Migrant subjectivities and narratives of the kampung in Malaysia', 
Sojourn, 17: 1 (2002), pp. 52-75. 
28 Tan Liok Ee, 'Chinese schools in Malaysia: A case of cultural resilience', in Lee Kam Hing 
and Tan Chee-Beng (eds. ), The Chinese in Malaysia, Shah Alam, Oxford University Press, 
2000, pp. 228-254. See also: Tan Liok Ee, 'Dongzhaojong and the challenge to cultural 
hegemony, 1951-1987', in Kahn and Loh, Fragmented Vision, pp. 181-201; Tan Liok Ee, The 
Politics of Chinese Education in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
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education are, Tan argues, inseparable from the issue of Chinese identity and 
`the major social and political transformation of the Chinese from an immigrant 
society to an integral part of an independent nation'. 29 Tan draws particular 
attention to the development of the two Chinese educationalist organisations 
known collectively as Dongjiaozong, and argues that the movement played a 
vital role in resisting attempts by the Alliance and Barisan Nasional regimes to 
integrate independent Chinese schools with the state school system, thus 
obligating them to teach in either Malay or English and subsuming them within 
the parameters of a `National Culture' based overwhelmingly on Malay 
standards. She concludes that Dongjiaozong has had only mixed success 
because it `has remained entrapped within the prevailing parameter of a political 
discourse which casts all its actors in ethnic terms'. Nonetheless, what success 
Dongjiaozong has seen is demonstrative of the potential strength of resistance, 
even within the ethnic minority Chinese community. To this extent, Tan draws 
attention to the `dramatic manifestations' of civil mobilisation that 
Dongjiaozong has on occasion benefited from, the most spectacular of these 
being in 1973, when `barbers, taxi-drivers, shopkeepers and many other groups, 
donated a days' taking to the tcs [Independent Chinese Schools] fund'. 30 
The predominantly Chinese city of George Town in the northern state of Penang 
has also been identified as such a site of resistance, where the urban landscape 
itself has become the contested arena, and where notions of space, development 
and heritage have been employed by disenfranchised groups to stake their 
29 Tan, `Chinese schools in Malaysia', p. 229. 
30 Tan, `Dongzhaojong and the challenge to cultural hegemony', pp. 195-7. 
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claims. 31 This has involved both Muslim and Christian communities, as well as 
more secular protests. Nowhere has this contestation for meaning been more 
evident or more enduring than in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak. Here, the 
state's desire to exploit the state's vast natural resources 
- 
primarily timber 
- 
has brought it into often physical confrontation with some of Sarawak's native 
tribes, many of them still living a pre-modern, semi-nomadic lifestyle. These 
protests will be the subject of considerable discussion in later chapters. Suffice 
it here to note that this collision of modernity and tradition has been interpreted 
by commentators both as a struggle for meaning and identity, and as a more 
objective struggle for resources. 32 
THE PARADOXICAL MIDDLE CLASSES 
Since the mid-1990s, a throng of studies has emerged which have sought a more 
nuanced and detailed understanding of the middle classes. 33 Much of this work 
31 See, for instance: Goh Beng Lan, 'Modern Dreams: An enquiry into power, cityscape 
transformations and cultural difference in contemporary Malaysia', in Joel S. Kahn (ed. ), 
Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the politics of representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998, pp. 168-202; 
Goh Beng Lan, 'Rethinking urbanism in Malaysia: Power, space and identity', in Maznah 
Mohamad and Wong Soak Koon (eds. ), Risking Malaysia: Culture, politics and identity, 
Bangi, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001, pp. 159-78; Judith Nagata, 'Heritage 
as a site of resistance: From architecture to political activism in urban Penang', in Maznah and 
Wong, Risking Malaysia, pp. 179-202. 
32 Ida Nicolaisen, 'Timber, culture and ethnicity: The politicization of ethnic identity among the 
Punan Bah', in Robert L. Winzeler (ed. ), Indigenous Peoples and the State: Politics, land and 
ethnicity in the Malayan Peninsula and Borneo, New Haven, Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 
1997, pp. 228-59; Fadzilah Majid Cooke, The Challenge of Sustainable Forests: Forest 
resource policy in Malaysia, 1970-1995, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 1999(a); Tim 
Bending, `Telling stories: Representing the anti-logging movement of the Penan of Sarawak', 
European Journal ofDevelopinent Research, 13: 2 (2001), pp. 1-25 
33 See, for instance: Abdul Rahman Embong, 'Malaysian Middle Class studies: A critical 
review', in Jomo Kwame Sundaram (ed. ), Rethinking Malaysia: Malaysian Studies 1, Kuala 
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has focussed on the question of why the emerging middle classes have not 
provided a stimulus for greater democratisation. This question is addressed 
most directly by Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo Kwame Sundaram in their 
book, Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, and a 
later article `Authoritarianism, Elections and Political Change in Malaysia'. 34 
Gomez and Jomo trace the emergence of a middle class through the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), fashioned in the wake of 
the 1969 ethnic riots. They argue that, whilst the NEP was broadly successful in 
achieving both its stated objectives 
- 
the eradication of poverty and the 
eradication of race-occupation corollaries 
- 
it created in the process a Malay 
middle class dependent upon regime patronage for its survival, a dependency 
which the regime `had for political reasons encouraged'. 35 
Lumpur, Malaysian Social Science Association, 1999, pp. 107-25; Abdul Rahman Embong, 
'Globalisasi, negara dan pembentukan kelas di Malaysia', in Norani Othman and Sun-tit K. 
Mandal (eds. ), Malaysia Menangani Globalisasi: Perserta atau mangsa? Bangi, Penerbit 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000, pp. 124-38; Abdul Rahman Embong, 'Beyond the 
crisis: The paradox of the Malaysian middle class', in Abdul Rahman, Southeast Asian Middle 
Classes, pp. 80-102; Jomo Kwame Sundaram, 'A Malaysian middle class?: Some preliminary 
analytical considerations', in Jomo, Rethinking Malaysia, pp. 289-312; Joel S. Kahn, 'Growth, 
economic transformation and the middle classes in Malaysia', in D. Goodman and R. Robison 
(eds. ), The New Rich in Asia: Mobile phones, McDonalds and middle-class revolution, 
London, Routledge, 1996(a), pp. 59-74; Joel S. Kahn, 'The middle class as a field of 
ethnographic study', in Muhammad lkmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds. ), Malaysia: Critical 
perspectives, Petaling Jaya, Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1996(b), pp. 12-33; Johan 
Saravanamuttu, 'Malaysian civil society: Awakenings? ', in Maznah and Wong, Risking 
Malaysia, pp. 93-111. 
Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Malaysia's Political Economy: 
Politics, patronage and profit, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Edmund 
Terence Gomez and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, 'Authoritarianism, elections and political 
change in Malaysia', Public Policy, 2: 3 (1998), pp. 113-44. 
Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy, p. 117. 
34 
35 
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For Gomez and Jomo, then, the primary obstacle to a democratising middle 
class is the extent to which it is dependent upon the regime for its patronage. 
Even beyond those directly involved in patron-client business relationships, a 
sense of dependency or `subsidy mentality' pervades the Malay middle class: 
The limited reformist orientation of the middle class may also be 
due to the fact that the access of most bumiputras to higher 
education has been facilitated by state scholarships and ethnic 
quotas. 36 
Whilst this may explain the lack of democratic pressures from the Malay middle 
class, it by no means explains the apparent reluctance of the non-Malay middle 
class to oppose the regime; indeed one would expect increased opposition given 
the blatant pro-Malay bias of government policy. Gomez and Jomo argue that 
after the failure of initial attempts to protect Chinese business interests (e. g. 
Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd. ) the Chinese business community has, by and 
large, seen best to work within the NEP-fostered political economy, developing 
often `subtle' ties with Malay entrepreneurs, an argument supported by Heng 
Pek Koon. 37 
In addition, they suggest two other factors have staved off democratic pressures 
from the non-Malay middle class: a persistently buoyant economy, which has 
brought many benefits even to the non-Malays, and a programme of cultural 
36 Gomez and Jomo, `Authoritarianism, elections and political change', p. 135. 
37 Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy, p. 48; Heng Pek Koon, 'Chinese Responses 
to Malay Hegemony (1957-1996)', in Zawawi Ibrahim (ed. ), Cultural Contestations: 
Mediating identity in a changing Malaysian society, London, ASEAN Academic Press, 1998, 
pp. 51-82. 
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liberalisation which has been `politically expedient and attractive'. 38 These two 
apparently mitigating factors, however, are somewhat problematic. For most of 
their argument, Gomez and Jomo seek to explain the failure of modernisation 
theory in the Malaysian case within its own parameters 
- 
they highlight factors 
that have retarded the development of a democratic middle class. But these last 
two factors, smuggled in without much analysis, are in fact precisely the kind of 
factor which modernisation theory suggests would lead to democratic pressures. 
Implicit in their argument here, instead, is some notion of political gratitude or 
loyalty, which is a thorny enough problem in considerations of Malaysian 
politics, and is directly contradictory to the `rational choice' type approach 
which predicates modernisation theory and which is adopted throughout the 
remainder of their argument. 
This view of the middle classes 
- 
both Malay and non-Malay 
- 
as politically 
dependent is widely accepted. Studies of the Chinese middle class, for instance, 
have concluded that Chinese businesses have `become more dependent on 
Malay patronage', and on UMNO patronage in particular. 39 Yet other scholars 
have questioned these conclusions. In a focussed study of political affiliations 
within the middle classes, for instance, Peter Searle has shown that, whilst there 
has undoubtedly been a proliferation of politically-linked businesses and 
entrepreneurs since the 1970s, a `dynamic core' of politically independent non- 
ethnically exclusive businesses has also developed, particularly during the 
38 Gomez and Jomo, `Authoritarianism, elections and political change', p. 136. 
39 Heng Pek Koon and Sieh Lee Mei Ling, The Chinese business community in Peninsular 
Malaysia, 1957-1999', in Lee and Tan, The Chinese in Malaysia, pp. 123-68. 
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1990s. 4° He thus concludes that the accepted characterisation of Malaysia's 
political economy as being divided into a politically dependent Malay business 
class and a distinct Chinese business class `no longer seem appropriate'. 41 
These conclusions are supported by other empirical studies that have 
demonstrated the remarkably similar performance of politically affiliated 
businesses and of their non-affiliated counterparts. 42 
In many ways, the contributions discussed in this section complcmcnt the statist 
approach of scholars discussed above. They develop broadly similar arguments 
but focus on different areas: political economy and the institutions of democracy 
and authoritarianism respectively. Read together, they build up a persuasive and 
sophisticated picture of Malaysian politics. At the core of both contributions, 
however, there lies some ambiguity. In the case of Gomez and Jomo, this 
ambiguity circles around exactly what kind of pressures 
- 
democratic or 
authoritarian 
- 
the middle classes produce. In Crouch's work, there again 
remains some ambiguity about the exact role of elections. 
Some light can possibly be thrown on these ambiguities if we consider 
Mitchell's critique of Statist theories. 43 Mitchell argues that state centred 
analyses suffer from a common problem in defining its `boundaries'. The 
interface between state and society 
- 
both conceptually and empirically 
- 
has 
40 Peter Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers or real capitalists? Honolulu, 
University of Hawai'i Press, 1999. 
41 Ibid., p. 248. 
42 M. Fazilah binti Abdul Samad, The performance of politically affiliated businesses in 
Malaysia', in Jomo, Rethinking Malaysia, pp. 1-24. 
43 Tim Mitchell, The limits of the state: Beyond statist approaches and their critics', American 
Political Science Review, 85: 1 (1991), pp. 77-96. 
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proved to be `elusive, porous and mobile'. 4 Thus, the ability of society to 
influence state decisions is rendered analytically unclear. This analytical 
problem is maybe nowhere more demonstrable than with the literature discussed 
thus far. At the one extreme, Case adopts a state-purist position, positing almost 
complete state autonomy from society. As already argued, the experience of 
many Southeast Asian nations has rendered such a conceptual separation as 
palpably absurd. Whilst Crouch, Gomez and Jomo all incorporate societal 
pressures into their arguments, they encounter problems at precisely the point 
Mitchell's critique would predict. 
In the economic sphere, the boundary between state and society is never more 
blurred than when regimes, parties and government individuals have substantial 
`private' economic interests of their own and a host a patronage opportunities 
and government rents under their control in the public sector. This blurring of 
the boundary may well account for Gomez and Jomo's sometimes contradictory 
claims about the nature of the state-society relationship. A similar boundary 
problem arises in Crouch's work. In an ideal, `model' representative 
democracy, elections should serve as a one of the few well-defined interfaces 
between state and society 
- 
the state providing an impartial mechanism for 
society to voice its preferences. But when elections are subject to all kinds of 
state interference 
- 
from constituency gerrymandering to monopolies on media 
and information, as is the in Malaysia 
- 
then this boundary becomes again 
increasingly blurred. This may give rise to the kind of ambiguities we see in 
Crouch. 
44 Ibid., p. 77. 
82 
Approaches to Malaysian Politics 
AN EMERGING SYNTHESIS 
Thus far, then, this review has identified three broad trends in Malaysian 
studies, which have respectively focused attention on the state, society, and the 
political economy of the middle class. The insights and conclusions of these 
different approaches are by no means completely exclusive, and since the early 
1990s, a number of attempts have been made at synthesis. Writing in the mid 
1990s, the anthropologist Joel S. Kahn made a strong argument for such a 
synthesis, with a broadened conceptualisation of the middle class as the key: 
Very few Malaysianists 
- 
in Malaysia or overseas 
- 
have done 
more than mention the middle class in passing; and there have 
been even fewer attempts to clarify the use of the concept in 
Malaysian conditions, or to assess its impact on the taken-for- 
granted contours of Malaysian society. 45 
The economic role of the middle classes is, as already noted, an integral part of 
many analyses of Malaysia's political economy, but Kahn argues for a broader 
examination of the middle classes 
- 
not just the Malay businessmen, but also the 
growing numbers of white collar workers, professionals and technicians 
- 
to fill 
the `yawning gap' between elite analysis and subaltern studies. 
The middle classes, Kahn argues, have an important role to play `in both the 
legitimisation of and resistance to regimes of power'. Thus, he rejects the 
`assumption of unity' within much of the literature, which reduces the middle 
classes to being `an epiphenomenon of the economy, or the structure of 
45 Kahn, 'Growth, economic transformation and the middle classes', p. 59. 
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power' 
. 
46 Central to Kahn's proposed project is thus an examination of the role 
the middle classes play in presenting and representing ethnicity, identity and 
culture. In as much, he explicitly rejects formulations of middle class politics 
by other Malaysian observers such as Johan Saravanamuttu, who employ an 
exclusively economic definition of the middle classes. 47 
Although Kahn does not explicitly address the concept of civil society, then, his 
formulation of the Malaysian middle classes raises similar concerns, and 
demands a more nuanced interpretation that the dependency-democratisation 
paradox explored above. An earlier volume that addresses some of these 
concerns, co-edited by Kahn with Francis Loh Kok Wah, is Fragmented Vision: 
Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia. In their introduction to the 
volume, Kahn and Loh note that `analyses of Malaysian economy and polity... 
have only had limited reference to the cultural dimension of social change in 
Malaysia'. 48 Although their emphasis is on the politics of culture, rather than 
the middle class or civil society per se, the pieces collected within the volume 
nonetheless serve to bring attention to how aspects of civil society can influence 
and shape the political situation, rather than simply being able to respond ex 
post to top-down political options, as Case suggests. 
46 Ibid., pp. 70-73. 
47 Kahn, 'The middle classes as a field of ethnographic study'. Kahn himself has been criticised 
for going to the other extreme to Saravanamuttu, and relying too much on the role of the state 
in his conceptualisation of the middle classes. See Abdul Rahman Embong, 'Social 
transformation, the state and the middle classes in Post-Independence Malaysia', in Zawawi, 
Cultural Contestations, pp. 83-116. 
48 Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah, 'Introduction', in Kahn and Loh, Fragmented Vision, 
p. 2. 
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Perhaps the strongest demonstration of the importance of civil society in 
Fragmented Vision is Francis Loh's chapter on Kadazan revivalism. In this 
essay, Loh argues that the early 1980s saw a growing nationalism amongst the 
mainly Christian Kadazan people of Sabah. 49 This revivalism is attributed to 
the emergence of a Kadazan middle-class intelligentsia, and a simultaneous 
return to popularity of Kadazan folklore and ritual, mainly under the auspices of 
the Kadazan Cultural Association. This movement eventually saw the multi- 
ethnic, but Muslim-dominated BERJAYA party swept out of office in the 1985 
state elections and replaced by Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), a Kadazan-based 
party formed when Joseph Pairin Kitingan, a vocal proponent of Kadazan 
`rights', was thrown out of the BERJAYA party barely six months previously. 
Loh's primary aim is to examine how `culture and cultural distinctiveness gains 
political saliency'. 50 His analysis of this episode in Malaysia's political history 
speaks volumes to the concerns raised so far in this review. Whilst it is 
certainly true that the new `state elite' created by PBS contained many of the old 
BERJAYA elite, it would be wrong to perceive Sabah politics during this time as a 
case of internal elite fracture, as one might conclude if one focused purely on 
the state. Indeed, although Loh accepts the involvement of the Kadazan elite in 
the revivalist movement, he rejects out of hand any claims that it was `an 
outcome of ideological manipulation on the part of the intelligentsia to serve 
their own interests'. 51 Thus, the rapid emergence of PBS as the dominant party 
in Sabah can be attributed to exactly the kind of `complex political undertaking' 
49 Francis Loh Kok Wah, 'Modernisation, cultural revival and counter-hegemony: The Kadazans 
of Sabah in the 1980s', in Kahn and Loh, Fragmented Vision, pp. 225-53. 
50 Ibid., p. 225. 
51 Ibid., p. 248. 
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by `mass constituents' which Case rejects. In this respect, it is worth noting that 
Loh perceives the revivalist movement as having been `formalised' by the 
creation of PBS, rather than vice versa. By shifting the focus away from the 
state, Loh demonstrates the way that developments in civil society can force 
change upon the regime. In this case, the changing parameters of civil society 
in Sabah created a political space for a strong Kadazan party. 
Few academics have directly addressed the question of civil society in Malaysia. 
Those who have, tend to employ somewhat uncritically a liberal interpretation, 
contextualised and limited by local circumstances. Civil society in Malaysia is 
thus typically characterised as being divided along ethnic lines. In his classic 
study of communalism in Malaysia written in the early years of Independence, 
K. J. Ratnam concluded that interest groups and NGOs have had a significant 
impact on the political process only when `they operate within a communal 
framework and represent communally sensitive issues'. 52 These social, cultural 
and linguistic differences have since been exacerbated by the ethnically-divisive 
policies pursued by the government since the 1970s under the auspices of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP). 53 Differential access to the government and its 
patronage, in both economic and political terms, has thus led to the emergence 
of different civil society orientations between communities. 
52 K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaysia (Singapore: University of 
Malaya Press 1965), p. vii. 
33 Yoshiki Kaneko, 'Malaysia: Dual structure in the state-NGO relationship', in Shinichi 
Shigetomi (ed. ), The State and NGOs: Perspectives from Asia, Singapore, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, pp. 178-99. 
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Such is the approach taken by Jesudason, who argues that civil society in 
Malaysia has been `truncated' by three factors: 
1. The development of a strong state that precedes 
political participation; 
2. The centrality of the state in economic development; 
and 
3. Religio-cultural schisms in socicty. 54 
Jesudason's formulation of civil society in Malaysia is a useful synthesis of 
important themes in Malaysian politics, but does not offer any new 
understanding that cannot be garnered from the literature already discussed. A 
more recent and more nuanced argument from a similar perspective is provided 
by Meredith Weiss. 55 Whilst she accepts the ethnically delimited nature of civil 
society in Malaysia, Weiss argues that the reformasi movement helped establish 
greater `norms' of interethnic collaboration in civil society. In introducing the 
concept of reformasi as a social movement, Weiss thus transforms Jesudason's 
relatively static interpretation of civil society into a more dynamic model. 
sa James V. Jesudason, 'Statist democracy and the limits of civil society in Malaysia', National 
Universityof Singapore, Dept. of Sociology Working Paper no. 119 (1993), p. 13. 
ss Meredith L. Weiss, 'The Politics of Protest: Civil society, coalition building and social 
movements in Malaysia', PhD Thesis, Yale University, 2001(a); Meredith L. Weiss, 
'Overcoming race-based politics in Malaysia: Establishing norms for deeper multiethnic co- 
operation', in James Chin and Ho Khai Leong (eds. ), Mahathir's Administration: Performance 
and crisis and governance, Singapore, Times Books International, 2001(b), pp. 62-99. 
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A more theoretically critical usage of civil society in the Malaysian context has 
been employed by Sheila Nair. 56 She argues for a Gramscian interpretation of 
civil society, similar to that offered by Neera Chandhoke. 57 Whereas 
Chandhoke formalises civil society as an arena for discursive contestation, 
however, Nair understands it more narrowly, as a sphere for counter-hegemonic 
activity, in particular resisting the `official nationalism' of the Barisan Nasional 
regime. Although she derides the West's `privileging' of the nation-state, her 
articulation of state-society relationships thus leaves her open to precisely the 
kind of criticism offered by Scott. She depends too much on the state as the 
prime mover in social relationships, and relies on neo-Marxian `contradictions' 
as the sole opportunity for civil society: 
The incompleteness of the ideological project opens up 
opportunities for resistance within civil society... In Malaysia, 
the contradictions evident in the [regime's] nationalist 
constructions enable alternative ideological possibilities to be 
58 expressed in a number of ways. 
Civil society so perceived is almost nothing more than an oversight by the state. 
The clear implication is that, were the state only to get its act together, a 
56 Sheila Nair, 'States, Societies and Societal Movements: Power and resistance in Malaysia and 
Singapore', PhD Thesis, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1995; Sheila Nair, 
'Constructing civil society in Malaysia: Nationalism, hegemony and resistance', in Jomo, 
Rethinking Malaysia, pp. 84-106. 
57 Neera Chandhoke, State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory, New Delhi, 
Sage, 1995. 
58 Nair, `Constructing civil society in Malaysia', p. 94. 
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`complete' Althussarian hegemony could be achieved, excluding all dissenting 
voices, presumably in perpetuity. 
Thus far, then, a case has been made for the use of civil society and social 
movements theory in the study of Malaysian politics. Whilst both Weiss and 
Nair employ some conceptualisation of social movements as the dynamic force 
in civil society, however, they both lack an explicitly stated understanding of the 
relationship between the two, a failing that, as we saw in the last chapter, is also 
common to most theoretical writings on the concepts. The remainder of this 
thesis addresses these issues and, in doing so, provides an exposition of the 
theoretical model formulated in chapter two. 
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HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT: 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BEFORE 1980 
This chapter sets the empirical context for the thesis with an analysis of political 
and societal developments from the late colonial period and Independence until 
1980. It identifies two trends in the emergent state-society relationship which 
have important implication in respect of the theoretical framework outlined in 
the second chapter. Firstly, the successive tightening of legislation for social 
control 
-'incremental authoritarianism' in Harold Crouch's phrase' - proved an 
effective strategy for the regime in responding to societal mobilisation. Trade 
unionism and the student movement alike were effectively demobilised by 
legislative changes and the occasional detention of their leadership. The success 
of this strategy relied on the relative acquiescence of the groups involved and 
society more generally to such changes. Secondly, and more broadly, it argues 
that the `grand narratives' of colonial and early post-colonial Malaysian society 
- 
ethnicity and labour 
- 
appeared to have decline in political salience by the end 
of the 1970s as the BN regime consolidated its grip on the state. At the same 
time, the early rustlings of a new multiethnic civil society were detectable. 
LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM: ETHNICITY AND LABOUR 
The formation of an independent Malaysia, both geographically and politically, 
was a protracted and often painful affair. Geographically, it reached its present 
borders in 1965, after the expulsion of Singapore from the wider Malaysian 
Federation, which had been formed in 1963 by the incorporation with peninsular 
Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, St. Leonard's, NSW, Allen and Unwin, 
1996(a). 
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Malaya 
- 
itself independent since 1957 
- 
of Singapore and the Borneo states of 
Sabah (previously British North Borneo) and Sarawak. Politically, Malaysia's 
staggered independence from British rule came against the backdrop of 
tumultuous Japanese Occupation, a communist insurgency and Emergency and 
an abortive attempt by the British to impose a centralised state, the `Malayan 
Union' plan. 
Given the relative youth of the Malaysian state and the trauma of its birth, it is 
hardly surprising that this continues to have repercussions in the contemporary 
scene. In institutional terms, for instance, the wide array of repressive state 
mechanisms at the regime's disposal have been traced back to the conditions of 
Independence and, in particular, the British-fostered Emergency regulations to 
counter the communist uprising. 2 Perhaps most important here is the particular 
reliance in Malaysia on the police, rather than the army, as a mechanism of civil 
control and repression. This is in stark contrast to other postcolonial states in 
the region, such as Indonesia and Burma, where the army has been the primary 
vehicle of repression. 3 
A result of its geographical diversity and the British colonial policy of importing 
labour, Malaysia is a diversely multi-ethnic society, comprised of indigenous 
2 Richard Stubbs, The Malayan Emergency and the development of the Malaysian State', in Paul 
B. Rich and Richard Stubbs (eds. ), The Counter-Insurgent State, London, MacMillan, 1997, 
pp. 50-72. See also Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 'Malaysia', in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold 
Crouch (eds. ), Military Civilian Relations in South-East Asia, Singapore, Oxford University 
Press, 1985, pp. 118-35. 
3 It has, however, been noted that the military is of declining importance in the region. See 
Muthiah Alagappa, 'Asian civil-military relations: Key developments, explanations and 
trajectories', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed. ), Coercion and Governance: The declining political 
role of the rlitary in Asia, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 433-98. 
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bumiputera (lit. `sons of the soil') and mainly Chinese and Indian immigrant 
communities. The bumiputera comprise over half the population, with a 
substantial Chinese minority, and a smaller Indian population. Higher birth 
rates amongst bumiputera, however, have seen their share of the population 
increase from a bare majority at the time of Independence to around two-thirds 
today (see table 4.1). The buiniputera themselves are divided into the Malays, 
who form the vast majority of the peninsular bumiputera, and the various tribes 
of Sarawak and Sabah, including the Iban, Melanau, Bidayuh and Dayak in 
Sarawak, and the Kadazan-Dusun, Bajau and Murut in Sabah. 
Table 4.1: Ethnic Distribution of Malaysia, 1964 and 2000° 
Bumiputera 
Chinese 
Indian 
Others 
1964 2000 
50.1% 66.1% 
36.8% 25.3% 
11.2% 7.4% 
1.9% 1.2% 
Malaysia is as diverse religiously as it is culturally. All Malays are by 
constitutional definition Muslim, as are some of the non-Malay bumiputera 
tribes, including the Melanau and Bajau, and a significant proportion of the 
Indian population. The Indian community also has large numbers of Hindus 
and Christians, and a smaller number of Sikhs. Christianity is the main religion 
amongst non-Muslim bumiputera tribes, such as the Kadazan-Dusun, often with 
a strong animistic influence. Christianity also has a substantial following 
amongst the Chinese. Aside from a small number of Muslim converts, the 
4 Source: Government of Malaysia, Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005, p. 89, figure 4.1; Gordon 
P. Means, Malaysian Politics, New York, New York University Press, 1970, p. 12, table I. 
Figure for 1964 excludes Singapore, which is overwhelmingly Chinese. The figures given are 
thus geographically directly comparable. 
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majority of the rest of the Chinese population practice some form of Taoism or 
Buddhism. 5 
Since Independence, Malaysia has been governed by a multi-ethnic coalition, 
increasingly dominated by its largest component, the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO). Together with the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (Mic), these three parties formed the 
Alliance government, which took over from the British administration. When 
parliament was restored in 1971 after the 1969 Emergency (see below), the 
Alliance had been expanded to take in a number of smaller `mosquito' parties, 
some of which flitted in and out of the coalition, and was later renamed as the 
Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front). 6 The BN has remained the dominant 
political force since. 
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY 
Malaysia is a constitutionally and institutionally democratic, but there are few, if 
any, academic observers who would characterise the country as a fully 
functional democracy. Institutional bias and undemocratic practices virtually 
ensure the regime re-election at the federal level. State governments have been 
less easy for the regime to control, with three out of the thirteen states 
- 
Kelantan, Sabah and Terengganu 
- 
having fallen into opposition hands at one 
See Susan E. Ackerman and Raymond L. M. Lee, Heaven in Transition: Non-Muslim 
religious innovation and ethnic identity in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Forum, 1988. 
The BN coalition as lined up in 1971 also included the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS 
- 
Pan- 
Malaysian Islamic Party), until then the largest opposition party, which had controlled 
Kelantan since Independence. PAS left the coalition again in 1977. 
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time or another. In such cases, however, the federal government has often 
resorted to draconian measures to reel in the errant state. 7 
Among the factors that have been identified as serving to inhibit the democratic 
process in Malaysia are: 
Control of the media. Virtually all the mainstream daily newspapers are owned 
by companies themselves controlled by, or closely associated with, BN 
component parties and individuals. 8 Slavishly pro-government reportage is thus 
the norm, particularly during election periods. 9 Non-regime controlled 
publications are severely restricted by the Printing Presses and Publications Act, 
which requires them to apply annually for a publishing permit and which allows 
the government to ban any publication or periodical. The regime has also made 
it clear that it will not allow opposition parties broadcast time on the national 
radio and television corporation RTNI (Radio Televisyen Malaysia) as it is `the 
official channel of the government of the day [which] conveys official 
7 On Kelantan, see Simon Barraclough, The dynamics of coercion in the Malaysian political 
process', Modern Asian Studies, 19: 4 (1985): 797-822. 
8 Edmund Terence Gomez, Political Business: Corporate involvement of Malaysian political 
parties, Townsville: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1994; Zaharom Nain, The 
structure of the media industry: Implications for democracy', in Francis Loh Kok Wah and 
Khoo Boo Teik (eds. ), Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and practices, Richmond: 
Curzon, 2002, pp. 111-37. 
9 For a detailed content analysis of newspaper coverage during the 1959 and 1964 elections, see 
Abdul Latiff Abu Bakar, Peranan Media dalam Pilihan Raya Persekutuan [The role of the 
media in federal elections], Shah Alam, Fajar Bakti, 1998. No such study has been carried out 
of more recent elections. Recent changes in media content are discussed briefly in Francis 
Loh Kok Wah and Mustafa K. Anuar, 'The press in Malaysia in the early 1990s: 
Corporatisation, technological innovation and the middle class', in Muhammad Ikmal Said 
and Zahid Emby (eds. ), Malaysia: Critical perspectives, Petaling Jaya, Malaysian Social 
Science Association, 1996, pp. 96-131. 
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information to the people'. 10 Nonetheless, some degree of press freedom does 
exist in small pockets. Until recently, the Chinese press was relatively 
independent, and opposition groups have made effective use of alternative 
media, most notably the Internet, although some analysts have questioned the 
ultimate efficacy of the Internet as a tool of opposition dissemination. " 
Repressive legislation. A number of powerful and discretionary acts have 
imbued the state with wide-ranging repressive capabilities. Most notorious 
amongst these is Internal Security Act (ISA), which allow for effectively 
indefinite detention without trial, with little legal recourse for detainees. The 
Police Act requires permits to be obtained for all public gatherings 
-a 
requirement stringently enforced for opposition groups, and all but ignored for 
government parties. In July 1999, the Penang branch of the Democratic Action 
Party complained that it received only twelve permits for ceramah (public talks) 
in two years, whilst BN parties were able to hold twenty-two public gatherings in 
the same state within a three month period because `the same requirement [of 
obtaining a permit] was not applied to Barisan Nasional component parties'. 12 
Amendments to the Societies Act and the Official Secrets Act, in 1981 and 1986 
respectively, fettered even further the arena of public debate. Conversely, as we 
10 Daily Express, 22 July 1999. 
Jason P. Abbott, 'Democracy@intemet. asia? The challenges to the emancipatory potential of 
the net: Lessons from China and Malaysia', Third World Quarterly, 22: 1 (2001), pp. 99-114. 
The MCA purchase of the Nanyang group of newspapers in June 2001 has considerably 
curtailed the independence of the Chinese media. See Graham Brown, 'Apologists and 
eunuchs? Regime control of the media in Malaysia and its weaknesses', paper presented at the 
International Workshop on Democratisation and the Media in Southeast Asia, Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, University of Nottingham, 25 April 2003. 
12 'Complaint about permits. ' New Straits Tunes, 14 July 1999. 
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shall see later, these laws have also occasionally provided the focal point for 
opposition collaboration and unification. 
Constitutional amendments. With its habitual two-thirds majority, the regime 
has amended the constitution to its needs as it sees fit. Government politicians 
from Mahathir down often show disrespect for the constitution as the supreme 
law of the land; in 1997, for instance, the then vice-president of the MCA Fong 
Chan Ong claimed that `the people should be grateful to the Government for 
ensuring their freedom of speech and religion and the independence to practise 
their own cultures and traditions' 
- 
rights enshrined in the constitution, which, 
at least theoretically, supersedes any government policy. 13 It has been claimed 
by the opposition DAP that the government has amended the constitution over a 
thousand times since independence. Indeed, Means argues that 
the Constitution is valued for its capacity to provide the rituals of 
legitimacy, but [its] constitutional limitations on the government 
provide little more than a temporary check on the exercise of 
power. ' 4 
Control of the Judiciary. Writing in 1987, the prominent social activist Chandra 
Muzaffar suggested that the Judiciary was an important force that `may help 
preserve Malaysian democracy'. 15 Since then, however, the independence of 
the Judiciary has been greatly reduced, bringing it firmly under the control of 
13 New Straits Times, 24 April 1997. 
14 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, p. 142. 
15 Chandra Muzaffar, Challenges and Choices in Malaysian Politics and Society, Penang, 
Aliran, 1989, p. 147. 
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the Executive. This has been defended by the regime as necessary to ensure the 
democratic accountability of the Judiciary. '6 Indeed, Mahathir has even gone so 
far as to suggest that the Judiciary needs further reform as `they tend to favour 
[the opposition]'. 17 Despite Mahathir's protestations, however, the judiciary 
remained overwhelmingly politically compliant throughout the 1990s, as 
evidenced in the various trials of Anwar Ibrahim. '8 
`Money politics'. Initially under the guise of the 1971 promulgated New 
Economic Policy (NEP), the regime has developed a fearsome machinery for 
dispensing patronage to supporters of the government. This `money politics' 
involves both state and private funds 
- 
the BN parties control between them a 
massive corporate empire 
- 
and operates on the individual, corporate and even 
state 19 The abuse of public funds is often unabashed. In the run up to the 
March 1999 state elections in Sabah, for instance, it was declared that the 
Federal Government `could not be generous [with funding] to an opposition 
state government' and would only provide larger allocations of federal monies if 
the BN won the election. 20 A similar threat was been made in relation to Kedah, 
16 Mahathir Mohamad, The Malaysian System of Government, Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister's 
Office, 1995. 
" 
`Mahathir interview 
- 
Politics and the Anwar affair. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 June 
1999. 
18 For an analysis of judicial independence in these trials, see William Case, `The Anwar Ibrahim 
trial and its wider implications', in Colin Barlow and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds. ), Malaysian 
Economics and Politics in the New Century, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2003. 
19 See Edmund Terence Gomez, Money Politics in the Barisan Nasional, Kuala Lumpur, Forum, 
1991; Gomez, Political Business; Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy. 
20 `Bigger allocations only with BN govt, says PM. ' New Straits Times, 11 March 1999. 
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one of the states that PAS had the greatest possibility of capturing at the 1999 
general election. 21 
Electoral gerrymandering. The process and conduct of elections themselves is 
also often highly dubious. A Commonwealth observer group somewhat 
reluctantly invited to oversee the 1990 general elections concluded that the 
conduct of elections in the country was `free but not fair'. 22 Regular 
constitutional redelineation exercises, carried out by the nominally independent 
Elections Committee, invariably favour the regime, including increasing over- 
weightage in traditional government strongholds, such as Johor and Sarawak. 
In the 1999 general election, for instance, the government won more than three 
quarters of the seats on a popular vote of barely fifty-six per cent. Actual fraud 
during elections has also been widely alleged, though such claims are hard to 
substantiate. Former Sabah Chief Minister Joseph Pairin Kitingan has claimed 
that `pollution in the electoral role' was the main reason for the Btu's continued 
success in the state. 23 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY BEFORE 1980 
Ethnic Mobilisation 
Donald Horowitz has persuasively argued that a multiethnic coalition, such as 
the BN, is the most stable form of government for a multicultural society, but 
that only one such coalition can survive long term in any single polity. 24 Such a 
21 'Sanusi: State can't afford Opposition regime. ' New Straits Times, 1 July 1999. 
22 Commonwealth Observer Group on the Malaysian Elections, Malaysian Elections: 20 and 21 
October 1990, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1991. 
23 Interview, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, Penampang, August 1999. 
24 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1985; Donald L. Horowitz, 'Incentives and behaviour in the ethnic politics of Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia', Third World Quarterly, 10: 4 (1989), pp. 18-35. 
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coalition must necessarily situate itself in the ethnic middle ground, and 
challenger coalitions are thus forced to ethnicist extremes, making enduring 
cooperation impossible. Although he is not concerned with consociationalism 
per se, Horowitz's studies nonetheless underline the strength of 
consociationalism as a form of government in multiethnic societies, including 
its ability to preclude effective political opposition. Supporters of the 
consociationalist view have argued nonetheless that it is in fact more democratic 
that other forms of democracy: 
The government-versus-opposition norm prescribed by 
normative democratic theory appears to be a principle of 
exclusion: a large minority should be kept out of the 
government. 25 
Opponents have argued that consociationalism engenders a process of `ethnic 
outbidding', which would ultimately bring about the downfall of democracy in 
such societies. 26 Most observers of Malaysian politics, however, concede that 
the debate over consociationalism has been redundant since the ethnic riots of 
May 1969, which brought about a radical change in Malaysian government, and 
the end of any consociationalist tendencies that might have existed. 
The process of decolonisation in Malaysia contributed to the ethnicisation of its 
society at every level. The geographical formation of Malaysia had ethnic 
ramifications. In the early 1960s, the British government asked Malaya to 
25 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A comparative exploration, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1977, p. 29. 
26 Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A theory of democratic 
instability, Columbus, Merrill, 1972. 
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incorporate Singapore into its federation. The British government was 
becoming increasingly worried by the rise of communism in Singapore, and 
incorporation into Malaya was seen as a way to neutralise this. The inclusion of 
Singapore 
- 
with its overwhelmingly Chinese population 
- 
would, however, 
have tipped the ethnic balance too far away from Malay dominance for the 
Malayan government's comfort. Malaya's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman thus demanded the inclusion of the north Borneo states27 to offset the 
impact of Singapore's entry. Clearly, Singapore's hasty departure from the 
federation thus tilted the scales once again in favour of the bumiputera, although 
this effect was somewhat mitigated by unexpected divisions within the 
bumiputera. Tunku Abdul Rahman's assumption that the East Malaysian 
bumiputera would act in tandem with the peninsular Malays was confounded 
when some communities, most notably the Christian Kadazans in Sabah and 
Dayak in Sarawak, began articulating their own agenda and demands. 28 
A range of other factors in the decolonisation process aggravated these 
demographic differences and contributed further to the ethnicisation of society. 
The social unrest of the immediate pre-Independence period radicalised the 
ethnic tensions left behind by the British ethnic division of labour. 29 The 
overwhelmingly Chinese profile of the communist insurgency was perhaps the 
27 The original proposal had included both Sabah (then British North Borneo) and Sarawak and 
what is now the Sultanate of Brunei. Brunei, however, pulled out during the negotiations. 
28 See, for instance, Loh, 'Modernisation, cultural revival and counter-hegemony', and Jayum A. 
Jawam, The Ethnic Factor in Modern Politics: The case of Sarawak, East Malaysia, 
Kingston-upon-Hull, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hull, occasional 
papers no. 20,1991. 
29 Timothy N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. 
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most important factor here. Others have traced this heightening of tensions 
further back to the Japanese Occupation from 1943-45, and their select 
discrimination of the Chinese. 30 Moreover, the process of negotiating 
Independence itself contributed further to divisions between ethnic groups, 
particularly over such issues as the status of Islam as the official religion, 
English and/or Malay as the official language and role of `special rights' for the 
Malays. The process of decolonisation was thus not just a negotiation between 
a nascent independent Malaya and its erstwhile colonial masters, but also an 
internal negotiation between the major ethnic groups of the new state. 31 
Particularly important here was the original British plan for Malayan 
independence, the Malayan Union plan, which would have stripped the Malay 
monarchs of all but ceremonial powers and granted broad citizenship rights to 
non-Malays. Malay protests against this plan were led by the newly formed 
UMNO, and had long-lasting ramifications on the construction of ethnic politics 
in the country. 32 `Malay nationalism' became the backbone of Malayan politics, 
aimed at improving the economic lot of the Malays in relation to the Indian and 
especially the Chinese, and also to establish Malay identity as the basis of 
30 See Cheah Boon Kheng, `Sino-Malay conflicts in Malaya, 1945-1946: Communist vendetta 
and Islamic resistance', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12: 1 (1981), pp. 108-117 and 
Cheah Boon Keng, 'Memory as history and moral judgement: Oral and written accounts of 
the Japanese occupation of Malaya', in P. Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong (eds. ), War and 
Memory in Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 
pp. 23-41. 
31 Lee Kam Hing and Heng Pek Koon, 'The Chinese in the Malaysian political system', in Lee 
and Tan, The Chinese in Malaysia, pp. 194-227. 
32 For the classic study of the Malayan Union protests, see Anthony J. Stockwell, British Policy 
and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948, Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1979. 
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Malaysian politics. 33 The anti-Malayan Union agitation and the issue of Malay 
`special rights' became an important recourse for UMNO to assert its political 
role in protecting Malay special rights. 
The formation of Malaysia, then, in particular the Malayan Union plan and the 
inclusion of Singapore, stoked ethnic tensions. Ethnic violence associated with 
the struggle for independence and Singapore's entry into the federation was 
sparked on a number of occasions. In 1950, three days of rioting broke out in 
Singapore when the high court annulled the Muslim marriage of a Dutch girl 
brought up by a Malay family, and returned her to Holland. Demonstrations by 
Singaporean Malays against what they saw as an insult to their religion, 
apparently orchestrated by militant left-wing groups agitating for a `Greater 
Indonesia', descended into violence against both Europeans and Chinese. 34 
Rioting broke out again in 1956 over the alleged infiltration of Chinese middle 
schools in Singapore by the Malayan Communist Party. The riots raised the 
prospect of communal conflict as the sole fatality caused by the rioters 
themselves was a Malay driver beaten by the Chinese rioters, but appeals for 
calm by Malay political leaders averted wider clashes. 35 The 1956 riots also left 
their mark on the Singapore government, which became convinced that a tight 
internal security apparatus `was essential if they were to persuade the British to 
33 Muhammad Ikmal Said, 'Malay nationalism and national identity', Suomen Antropologi, 2 
(1995), pp. 11-31. 
34 See Anthony J. Stockwell, 'Imperial security and Moslem militancy, with special reference to 
the Hertogh riots in Singapore', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 17: 2 (1986), pp. 322-335. 
On the links with left-wing Malay groups, see Firdaus Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics: Its 
origins and early development, Kuala Lumpur, Pelanduk, 1985. 
35 Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1962, London, 
Faber and Faber, 1973. 
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allow them to full independence' in the context of the Malaysian Federation 36 
After Singapore's inclusion in the Malaysian federation, ethnic rioting again 
broke out in 1964 following anti-PAP agitation, this time by UMNO-sponsored 
groups. 37 Thirty-three people were killed in those disturbances, which played a 
decisive role in fomenting the break between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. In 
an inflammatory passage in his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew alleged that if 
Singapore had not been expelled from Malaysia, on going legal proceeding 
following the riots `would mean a devastating exposure of key UMNO leaders' 
methods of incitement to racism and bloody riots'. 38 
Aside from the status of Singapore, one of the most contentious ethnic issues of 
the early years was that of the national language, with educated Chinese and 
Indians 
- 
many of whom at the time were not proficient in bahasa Melayu 
(Malay) 
- 
eager for English to be maintained as a national language. The 
Constitution designated Malay as the sole national language, but allowed the 
usage of English for a period of ten years, from 1957. As 1967 approached, 
communal antipathies were again raised by the demands of some radical Malay 
groups that Malay be enforced as the sole language in all government 
institutions, including schools. As Means notes, however, much of the ethnic 
tension of this period was overshadowed by the prevailing external threats to 
Malaysia 
- 
konfrontasi with Indonesia, and the Philippines' claim on Sabah. 39 
361bid., p. 141. 
37 Michael Leifer, `Communal violence in Singapore', Asian Survey, 4: 10 (1964), pp. 1115-21. 
38 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore story, 1965-2000, New York, 
HarperCollins, 2000, p. 622. 
39 Means, Malaysian Politics. 
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Nonetheless, prior to 1969, ethnic rioting had broken out on a number of 
occasions across the country, resulting in around fifty fatalities. 40 
These ethnic disturbances were overshadowed on 13 May 1969 when 
widespread ethnic violence broke out following a general election. Such was 
the political impact of these riots that is virtually impossible to analyse 
Malaysian politics over the last three decades without some consideration of the 
events of May 1969. This is not just because of the events themselves and their 
political repercussions, but also a reflection of the extent to which they have 
become embedded in the popular memory and political discourse of Malaysians 
of all ethnicities. As much as Independence itself, 13 May 1969 is arguably the 
defining moment 
- 
in the minds of Malaysians 
- 
of Malaysian history. In a 
recent survey of social attitudes towards history in Malaysia, this view was 
particularly strong amongst Malay respondents, who ranked race riots as the 
second most important event in Malaysia's history; Chinese and Indian 
respondents ranked them of fifth and sixth importance respectively. 41 
The events themselves are not entirely clear. Polling for the 1969 general 
election took place on 10 May for the Peninsular states, with the East Malaysian 
states scheduled to hold their polls later in the month. When the results of the 
voting were counted, it became clear that the Alliance government has lost 
40 See Government of Malaysia, Towards Preserving National Security, Kertas Perintah 1988, 
14 (Appendix I) for a list of such incidents. 
41 See James H. Liu, Belinda Lawrence, Colleen Ward and Sheela Abraham, `Social 
representations of history in Malaysia and Singapore: On the relationship between national 
and ethnic identity', Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 5: 1 (2002), pp. 3-20. All groups 
ranked Independence as the most important event. It should be noted that the survey sample 
was restricted to university undergraduate students. 
104 
Historical and Political Context 
substantial support, particularly the MCA, which lost twenty out of the thirty- 
three seats it contested. Although the government was at no risk of losing its 
majority, it seemed likely that it would lose control of several states, including 
the urban centres of Selangor and Penang, and even its two-thirds majority in 
the federal parliament, which it had held since independence and has held again 
ever since. 42 The Chinese opposition parties arranged celebratory parades, 
which provoked retaliatory demonstration by UMNO members and supporters, 
apparently led by the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Selangor, Harun bin 
Haji Idris. On 13 May, the demonstrations descended into riots, which lasted 
fours days and saw the deaths of at least two hundred people and the destruction 
of six thousand (overwhelmingly Chinese) homes. 43 In response to the crisis, a 
third national state of Emergency was declared, and Parliament and the 
Constitution were suspended. Academic observers at the time concluded that 
44 democracy in Malaysia was finished. 
Parliament was, however, restored in 1971, after all the major opposition parties 
except the DAP had been coopted into the government, which was later renamed 
the Barisan Nasional. In addition, the Prime Minister since independence, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman had been somewhat unwillingly retired and been 
replaced by his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, who had been Director of the 
National Operations Council, which had run the country during the suspension 
42 Early election results (no final tally was produced) suggested that the Alliance had in fact won 
less than fifty per cent of the vote. See K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, `The 1969 parliamentary 
election in West Malaysia', Pacific Affairs, 43: 2 (1970), pp. 203-26. 
43 Leon Comber, 13 May 1969: A historical survey of Sino-Malay relations, Kuala Lumpur, 
Heinemann Asia, 1983. The official death toll for the riots stands at 196, but the real toll is 
widely believed to be much higher. 
44 Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies. 
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of Parliament. Beyond these superficial changes, it was clear that the 
fundamental basis of Malaysian politics had changed. Gone were the laissez- 
faire economy and the political consociationalism, which had characterised the 
political situation in the immediate post-independence period. In their place, the 
government promulgated a series of chauvinistic pro-Malay policies. 
The government argued that the root cause of the May 1969 riots had been the 
economic disparities between the Malays and the non-Malays, a legacy of the 
colonial administration and its policy of an `ethnic division of labour'. 45 In an 
attempt to reverse this, the Razak administration implemented the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP had two ostensible goals 
- 
the complete 
eradication of poverty, and the eradication of the association between ethnic 
group and economic role. In reality, however, it heralded a new era of state 
interventionism and Malay chauvinism; in the words of Alasdair Bowie, it 
represented `a form of Third World economic nationalism [in which] the 
. 
principal antagonist was not foreign but rather domestic [i. e. the Chinese]' 46 
That May 1969 marks a turning point in Malaysian politics is undisputed. 
Many commentators have noted that it marks a departure from the 
Independence struck bargain of `Politics for the Malays, Economy for the 
Chinese' towards a much more aggressively pro-Malay stance in all areas of 
society. What is less commonly noted is the importance of this period in terms 
of Malaysian political consciousness. Social, economic and ethnic groupings 
45 For the official government report on the riots, see The National Operations Council, The May 
13 Tragedy: A Report, Kuala Lumpur, 1969. 
46 Alasdair Bowie, The dynamics of business-government relations in industrialising Malaysia', 
in Andrew MacIntyre (ed. ), Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, London, Allen 
and Unwin, 1994, p. 171. 
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often define themselves today in terms of their deal before and after 1969. 
Given the radical shift in politics associated with the 1969-71 period, this is 
hardly surprising. May 1969 represent more that concerns over economic and 
political power, however. It has entered the Malaysian consciousness as a 
political myth: an almost ever-present threat (or reminder) of what may happen 
if the ethnic balance is disturbed. This mythical quality has undoubtedly been 
refined by the regime's constant reminders of the events, which have made it, to 
use the words of one opposition leader, a `political bogey with which to frighten 
the people into voting BN'. 47 Thus, for instance, in the run-up to the November 
1999 general elections, Mahathir openly stated that it was a `fact' that 
a weak government will bring about chaos and racial rioting... 
We did not get two-thirds majority [in 1969] and there were 
riots... If I don't tell the people this, then I am not carrying out 
my responsibilities. 48 
The curbs on political participation in the wake of the 1969 riots led to a fall in 
directly expressed ethnic tensions. The inclusion of PAS in the widened Barisan 
Nasional government proved a moderating influence. 9 PAS' inclusion in the 
government also provided the social space for a number of new and critical 
Islamic organisations to arise, however, most notably Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia (ABIM 
- 
Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia), fronted by Anwar 
Ibrahim. 50 These organisations spearheaded a popular Islamic revivalist 
47 Interview, Joseph Pairin Kitingan. Pairin's PBS has since rejoined the BN. 
48 Borneo Post, 11 August 1999. 
49 Syed Ahmad Hussein, 'Muslim politics and the discourse on democracy', in Loh and Khoo, 
Democracy in Malaysia, pp. 75-107. 
50 Jomo and Ahmad, 'Malaysia's Islamic movements'. 
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movement, mostly inspired by the religious struggle in Iran. 51 The success of 
ABIM in particular was largely a result of the NEP, under the auspices of which 
the number of Malay students at local universities had increased drastically. Yet 
ABIM's involvement in student politics, and its focus on rural poverty rather than 
ethnic issues per se, also mitigated its ethnic chauvinism. By 1980, ethnicity 
was thus apparently of declining importance in the political process. 
The Labour Movement Before 1980 
The labour and trade unions movement in Malaysia has historically occupied a 
curious position. Inherently tied to a socialist ideology that rejected ethnicity as 
the mobilising force for popular politics, the movement itself was nonetheless 
rent by ethnic divides, largely a legacy of the colonial organisation of labour. 52 
The limited participation of the Malay community in waged labour during the 
colonial period left the unions ethnically marginalised in the Malay-dominated 
postcolonial polity. Even as Malays began entering the workforce in greater 
numbers, the tendency to use their local UMNO branches as the medium for 
voicing labour grievances and settling disputes rendered the unions less 
51 Interviews: Raja Petra Raja Kamaruddin, Free Anwar Campaign Director, Bangsar, April 
2001 and Zulkifli Sulong, Harakah editor, Kuala Lumpur, May 2001. A simple illustration of 
the Islamic revival can be seen in a comparison of the Malay films of the 1960 and those of 
the modem period, in particular in the form of dress by the women. 
52 On the colonial labour movement, see Leong Yee Fong, Labour and Trade Unionism in 
Colonial Malaya: A study of the socio-economic and political bases of the Malayan labour 
movement, 1930-1957, Pulau Pinang, Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1999. The literature 
on the ethnic division of labour in colonial Malaya is wide and varied; a good exposition is 
provided by Colin E. R. Abraham, Divide and Rule: The roots of race relations in Malaysia, 
Petaling Jaya, Institute for Social Analysis, 1997, whilst a more critical treatment can be found 
in Paul H. Kratoska, `Rice cultivation and the ethnic division of labor in British Malaya', 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 24: 2 (1982), pp. 280-314. 
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effective and reinforced ethnic divisions within the movement. 53 In addition, 
the overwhelmingly Chinese constituency of the communist insurgency left a 
legacy of ethnically-delimited militancy with, broadly speaking, Chinese-based 
unions favouring a militant approach to labour demands, and Indian-based, 
often state-sponsored unions, favouring a less combative approach. 54 
With the outbreak of the communist insurgency, labour agitation and strikes 
were `intense' in the early post-war years 
- 
more than one million workdays 
were lost to strikes in 1946 and 1947.55 Inimitably linked with the communists 
and other militant organisations including `triad' gangs and Chinese secret 
societies, these protests were often strong-handed, provoking equally strong 
reactions from the security forces. In April 1947, after police fired on strikers in 
a Kedah rubber estate, the British administration stepped in to restore labour 
discipline, and began working closely with employers and the secret services to 
avert further strike action. 56 The administration's repression of the labour 
movement was stepped up considerably following the declaration of Emergency 
in 1948; the police forces cracked down on unions and labour organisations, 
detaining leaders and raiding offices, and closing down almost half the 
country's unions. Those unionists who survived the purge were seen as having 
53 See, especially, Zawawi, The Malay Labourer and Minder Bhopal, `Malaysian unions in 
political crisis: Assessing the impact of the Asian contagion', Asia Pacific Business Review, 
8: 1 (2001), pp. 73-100. 
54 See, for instance, Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Patricia Todd, Trade Unions and the State in 
Peninsula Malaysia, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1994. On the Indian union sector, 
see P. Ramasamy, Plantation Labour, Unions, Capital and the State in Peninsular Malaysia, 
Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
55 Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, p. 133. 
56 Ibid., p. 135. 
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collaborated. 57 Popular support for the labour movement was also shattered by 
the activities of the unions themselves, which had `degenerated into a lawless 
and destructive movement'; labour militancy came to an abrupt halt. 58 
The labour movement was, however, remobilised in the immediate pre- 
Independence period, from 1956-57 (see Figure 4.1). Whereas the prior 
mobilisation was linked directly with the communist organisations of the 
Emergency, however, this resurgence was more closely associated with the 
Malaysian Labour Party. The Labour Party had been trounced by the Alliance 
in the 1955 pre-Independence elections, and had subsequently sought to broaden 
its support through the trade unions, encouraging an upsurge in labour 
activism. 59 A strong market for tin and rubber, strengthening the movement's 
demands for higher wages, exacerbated this new militancy. In the face of 
government repression, including the arrest of over a hundred unionists in 1958, 
and labour legislation that allowed employers to sack striking workers, the 
resurgence could not sustain its momentum. 60 Nonetheless, it indirectly ushered 
in further legislative restrictions on union activities in 1959, effectively 
eradicating political trade unionism. 61 
57 Jomo and Todd, Trade Unions and the State, p. 85. 
58 Leong Yee Fong, The emergence and demise of the Chinese labour movement in Colonial 
Malaya, 1920-1960', in Lee and Tan, The Chinese in Malaysia, p. 181. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Jomo and Todd, Trade Unions and the State, p. 95 
61Leong, `The emergence and demise of the Chinese labour movement', p. 189. 
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Figure 4.1: Workdays Lost Due to Strikes, 1946-198062 
Following Independence, the new post-colonial state enjoyed a `honeymoon' 
period in labour relations, as the left focussed on electoral contests rather than 
labour agitation. 63 Political parties associated with the labour movement 
performed respectably in the 1959 general elections. The Socialist Front 
-a 
coalition of the Chinese-based Labour Party and the Malay-based PRM (Part 
Rakyat Malaysia, or Malaysian People's Party) 
- 
won thirteen per cent of the 
vote and eight seats. The left-leaning PPP (People's Progressive Party) also 
performed well, winning over six per cent of the vote and four seats. 
The end of the Emergency in 1960 gave the unions more freedom to mobilise, at 
least briefly. From 1962 onwards, a variety of factors led to a renewed 
confrontation between the labour movement and the state. The period from 
1962 to 1969 saw the most sustained labour mobilisation since the war, 
although annual levels never reached peaks of the mid-1940s. For the most 
part, however, this increase in labour activism has been attributed to more 
62Source: Adapted from Jomo and Todd, Trade Unions and the State, table 2-16 and Iiarper, The 
End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, p. 133. Figure for 1946 for April-December only. 
63 Jomo and Todd, Trade Unions and the State, p. 106. 
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conventional and less political labour demands, such as pay and conditions. 64 In 
as much, it is worth noting that the period coincided with the rise of the 
Malayan (later Malaysian) Trades Union Congress (wuc) as the main umbrella 
body for the union movement. The MTUC had a long-standing policy of non- 
participation in politics. Nonetheless, the government's toleration of even this 
more benign labour movement was short-lived. Further legislative restrictions 
on unions were enacted in 1964 under the guise of the Second Emergency at the 
time of the Indonesian konfrontasi. 
In the 1964 general election, the Socialist Front improved its share of the vote to 
more than sixteen per cent, surpassing even PAS, but this translated into only 
two seats. This performance, however, was quickly followed by a period of 
fragmentation and dispute in the parliamentary left. Over the following two 
years, the Socialist Front collapsed amid acrimonious disagreements between 
the Labour Party and PRM. 65 The formation of the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) as a Peninsula off-shoot of Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore-based People's 
Action Party further split the left. The Labour Party subsequently underwent its 
own internal split between its militant leftwing and the more moderate 
rightwing, with the former eventually gaining the upper hand. Following the 
militant take-over, the party withdrew from electoral politics. 
In 1967, after the collapse of the Socialist Front and largely inspired by the 
widespread protests in Hong Kong and Macau following the advent of the 
64 Ibid., p. 116. One notable exception to the de-politicisation of the union movement was the 
100-day strike by newspaper workers at the Utusan Melayu, protesting its acquisition by 
UMNO. 
65 R. K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society: A study of non-communal political parties in West 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971. 
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Cultural Revolution in China, militant labour activism surged. In June, a wave 
of demonstrations and small riots hit Malaysia and Singapore. 66 Falling rubber 
prices had hit both the urban and rural poor hard, but the demonstrations were 
overwhelmingly Chinese, a fact that the government used welcomingly to 
support its allegations of a Communist plot. Following the disturbances, two 
Hong Kong-based magazines and three songs eulogising Mao Zedong were 
banned, and three Labour Party leaders, including one state assemblyman, were 
detained under the ISA. 67 In November, a clumsy policy decision by the 
government gave the left the opportunity it had been waiting for. At the time, 
Malaysia was under-going a currency transition from the old currency based on 
the British sterling to a new currency based on gold. After Harold Wilson's 
devaluation of the pound, the Malaysian government took the surprising and 
short-sighted decision to devalue the old currency by fifteen per cent, but not the 
new currency. Poor farmers and urban workers of all ethnic groups were 
particularly affected by the move, as they tended to keep their savings in cash, 
much of which was in the old currency. The Labour Party called for a hartal 
(general strike) in Penang to protest the move. The city quickly descended into 
rioting and violence, leaving eleven dead and over a hundred injured on the first 
day of the strike. 68 The government responded by imposing a twenty-four hour 
curfew and bringing the army in to patrol the streets. As the disturbances spread 
to other areas, however, it became clear that the violence was communally 
linked. After an attempt to organise a similar hartal in Kuala Lumpur failed, the 
rioting faded out. Official tolls put the total dead at twenty-nine, with two 
66 The Communist wolf. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 June 1967 
67 `Round-up. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1967 
63 'Red or racial? ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 03 December 1967 
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hundred injured and over a thousand arrested. 69 Among those arrested were 
twenty-four Labour Party leaders, including the chairman of the Penang 
Division. The Penang hartal was the last hurrah of militant labour activism. 
The Labour Party collapsed shortly after and, two years later, the 1969 
Emergency saw the introduction of further legislative restrictions on trade 
unions, including measures forcing public service unions to withdraw from the 
MT C, and ushered in a period of labour demobilisation and `hollow 
corporatism' that would last throughout the 1970s. 70 
Some observations can be made of the trends in the labour movement 
elaborated above, which will have important ramifications for the discussion of 
the labour movement in later chapters. Firstly, it should be observed that labour 
mobilisation from after the war until 1980 followed a pattern of periodic, but 
ever-decreasing, upsurges in activity. Secondly, associated with this was an 
increasing depoliticisation of the unions, and a concomitant move away from 
militancy. Although prominent unionists such as the MTUC General Secretary 
V. David remained active in opposition politics, the unions themselves 
increasingly steered clear of political entanglements, and by the 1970s what 
little labour mobilisation remained was almost exclusively industrial rather than 
political. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this survey of the labour 
movement before 1980 has demonstrated the extent to which the use of 
increased legislative restriction and selective repression has been a highly 
effective tool for the government in the Malaysian context. 
69 Nancy Snider, 'What happened in Penang? ', Asian Survey, 8: 12 (1968), p. 966. 
70 Jomo and Todd, Trade Unions and the State, p. 126. 
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`New' Sites of Resistance and Opposition 
Thus far, then, this brief sketch of social mobilisation and civil society prior to 
1980 has highlighted two important trends. Firstly, ethnic divisions in Malaysia 
became increasingly delineated, both institutionally and socially, although the 
new political environment of the 1970s saw a drop in the fervour of these 
confrontations. Secondly, the mobilising potential of the trade unions and 
labour movement declined drastically over the same period. It has been argued 
that, by the 1980s, the labour movement had been `coopted' by the regime far 
enough to `secure its allegiance to the state'. 71 Whilst it will be shown in later 
chapters that the labour movement in fact retained some importance as a site of 
resistance and opposition in Malaysia, it cannot be denied that its mobilising 
potential was a fraction of its previous strength. 
During the 1970s, social opposition and mobilisation remained almost 
exclusively linked to these two themes of labour and ethnicity. Nonetheless, 
this period did see the emergence of a number of organisation and groups that 
have had a profound impact on Malaysian politics since the 1980s. Amongst 
these were the Consumer Association of Penang (cAP) and Sahabat Alain 
Malaysia (SAM 
- 
Friends of the Earth Malaysia), formed in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s by Mohamed Idris, who remains active with both organisations to 
date. Also founded at this time were the Environmental Protection Society of 
Malaysia (EPSM) and the Selangor Graduates Society (SGS), both led by Gurmit 
Singh K. S., who also remains active today. Last, but by no means least, Aliran 
Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN 
- 
National Consciousness Movement) was formed 
in 1977, and grew to be perhaps the most influential NGO in the 1980s and 
71 Nair, 'Constructing civil society in Malaysia', p. 94. 
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1990s. The emergence of these groups was concomitant with the appearance of 
`new' social movements as important phenomena in Malaysian politics. Again, 
the impact of these movements was somewhat limited until the 1980s, yet some 
patterns and trajectories were already becoming evident in the 1970s. In 
particular, their ability to form cross-ethnic solidarities and alliances was 
evident from the outset. 72 
The 1970s also saw the brief emergence and demise of student activism. As 
mentioned above, the development of student activism was integrally linked 
with the drastic increase in Malay student numbers under the NEP. 
Organisations like ABIM flourished in this environment. An uneasy truce 
emerged on the campuses between the Malay and non-Malay groups, who 
found it hard to co-operate, but were joined by a common idealism and desire 
for political accountability. Although student activism remained a 
predominantly Malay affair, it thus did not take on communal overtones 
- 
although a government White Paper blamed, ironically, Chinese communists for 
student unrest. 
The main cause adopted by this activist movement was rural poverty. From 
1974 through 1976, a number of large demonstrations were held in affected 
areas, as well as on the university campuses. The government response was the 
same as its tried and tested formula against the trade unions: new legislative 
restrictions and selective repression. The Universities and University College 
(Amendment) Act in 1975 prohibited students from membership of any 
organisation or society without prior written authorisation from the vice- 
72 Interview, Gurmit Singh K. S, environmentalist, Petaling Jaya, July 2001. 
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chancellor. They were further not permitted to `say or do anything that could be 
interpreted as supporting, sympathizing with, or opposing any political party or 
trade union'. 73 The ability of university staff to participate politically was also 
restricted. In terms of repression, the demonstrations themselves were faced 
down with massive deployments of Federal Reserve Units and mass arrests 
were made 
- 
at one demonstration over one thousand students were arrested. 
The majority of arrests were short-lived 
- 
most were released within a few days. 
Student leaders, however, were selectively detained for longer periods under the 
[SA. Anwar himself was detained for almost two years; another leader, the 
former secretary general of the PRM and lecturer at Universiti Malaya, Syed 
Husin Ali was also detained for six years for his involvement. Student activism, 
or at least the mass mobilisation thereof, was effectively brought to an end. 
73 Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, p. 93. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CIVIL SOCIETY ASCENDANT: 
THE POLITICS OF PROTEST, 1981-1987 
The mid-1980s saw an unprecedented social challenge to the Barisan Nasional 
regime in Malaysia and its hegemonic foundations. This chapter examines the 
development and transformation of civil society and social movements in these 
years, arguing that the emergence of a broadly-based middle class and the 
concomitant `new' social movements 
- 
in particular environmentalism and a 
broadly conceived notion of human rights 
- 
ushered in a transformation of civil 
society towards more multiethnic concerns and predicated a renewed social 
challenge on the legitimacy of the regime, particularly in the years 1984-1987. 
Despite this, however, social mobilisation beyond civil society elites remained 
firmly rooted in ethnic concerns, although not always immediately visibly so. 
During the mid-1980s, Malaysian society experienced a surge in protest 
mobilisation against the BN regime (see Figure 5.1). Whilst previous cycles of 
protest had been predominantly rural and rooted in ethnic concerns, protest 
movements in the 1980s started to break through both these boundaries, with 
urban, nonethnic discourses taking up an increasingly important role in civil 
society, a transformation driven by the emergence of a new middle class. Yet 
whilst nonethnic discourses penetrated civil society, the processes of social 
mobilisation remained rooted in ethnicity, even when `new' issues were at 
stake. In some cases, these `new' protest movements made an explicit ethnic 
connection to their demands, but often the interplay was more subtle and 
understated. 
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Figure 5.1: Reported Incidence of Collective Protest by Quarter, 1980-19891 
By the 1980s, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was beginning to have marked 
transformative effects on the country's class structure. A large middle class 
with a substantial Malay component was emerging, largely driven by extensive 
rural to urban migration. 2 To a large extent dependent on regime patronage 
- 
both through the allotment of development projects and through preferential 
treatment such as quota-based access to higher education 
- 
the formation of this 
new Malay class had repercussions on all levels of the polity. In the state itself, 
UMNO increasingly became a party of `rent-seeking' entrepreneurs and 
professionals, replacing the teachers and British-trained aristo-bureaucrats that 
had previously dominated the grassroots and the leadership respectively. 3 
1 Source: Collected daily newspaper reports, 1981-1989. 
2 For an analysis of the middle class that deals with its migratory origins, see Abdul Rahman 
Embong, 'Beyond the crisis: The paradox of the Malaysian middle class', in Abdul Rahman 
Embong (ed. ), Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Prospects for social change and 
democratization, Bangi, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001, pp. 80-102. 
3 Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Malaysia's Political Economy: 
Politics, patronage and profit, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
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Symbolic of this was the rise of Mahathir himself 
- 
the first UMNO leader not 
from the Malay aristocracy. The MCA also deepened its patronage networks, 
mainly through the establishment in 1975 of Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad 
(MPHB), a large conglomerate principally designed to protect Chinese business 
against the ravages of the NEP. 4 This new middle class was not entirely without 
ideological conviction, however, and came to play an important role in 
expanding civil society during the early and mid 1980s. 
QVIL SOCIETY: BUILDING NETWORKS AND SHIFTING LEADERSHIP 
The emergence of this new middle class was critical to the formation during the 
1980s of important civil society coalitions and `trust networks' across class, 
regional and ethnic divides. Such groupings are fundamental to the 
development of a strong and proactive civil society. Indeed, popular 
movements for political change are unlikely to be successful in the absence of 
such coalitions. 5 Clearly, the more divided a society, the more difficult the 
4 See Bruce Gale, Politics and Business: A study of Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad, Kuala 
Lumpur, Eastern Universities Press, 1985; and Alasdair Bowie, The dynamics of business- 
government relations in industrialising Malaysia', in Andrew Maclntyre (ed. ), Business and 
Government in Industrialising Asia, London, Allen and Unwin, 1994, p. 167-94. The 
importance of MPHB to the MCA was made clear in the mid-1980s with the rise of its director, 
Tan Koon Swan, to the presidency of the MCA (see next chapter). It has also been noted that 
the establishment of MPFtß was an attempt to overcome dialect-based divisions within the 
Chinese community by establishing a nationwide business association to replace the dialect- 
based associations that had previously dominated; see Lee Kam Hing and Heng Pek Koon, 
'The Chinese in the Malaysian political system', in Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee-Beng (eds. ), 
The Chinese in Malaysia, Shah Alam, Oxford University Press, p. 211. 
See, for instance, Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies and Revolutions: A comparative analysis 
of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Doug 
McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
5 
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formation of such coalitions. As we have seen in the Malaysian context, deep 
ethnic divisions have historically formed a substantial impediment to such 
coalitions. 
During the 1980s, however, civil society was transformed by the development 
of such multiethnic networks and coalitions. This transformation was driven by 
two main factors. Firstly, multiethnic coalitions of NGOs and activists, formed 
to fight specific government legislation, broadened into a more concerted 
attempt to reshape civil society in a more multiethnic mould. Secondly, civil 
society was further transformed during this period by the ascendancy of a 
number of organisations voicing `new' concerns, such as environmentalism and 
human rights. Behind both these factors lay the emergence of the new middle 
class. 
In attempting to reconcile elitist theories of revolutionary change with more 
`bottom up' structural accounts, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly note that `the 
process of cross-class coalition formation was [in Nicaragua and the 
Philippines] punctuated and, in large part, fueled by a succession of ill- 
conceived regime actions'. 6 A similar process occurred in Malaysia during the 
1980s, when regime actions 
- 
specifically, government legislation aimed 
directly at reining in civil society 
- 
promoted the formation of impressively 
wide interethnic coalitions on two separate occasions. In March 1981, a diverse 
group of NGOs began cooperating in opposition to proposed amendments to the 
Societies Act, which would have seriously restricted their freedom to operate. 7 
6 Ibid., p. 203. 
7 
'Mahathir gets memo from 18 societies. ' New Straits Times, 21 March 1981. 
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The Societies Act is one of the regime's most powerful pieces of social control 
legislation, giving the government powers to deregister and declare illegal any 
society or organisation. Amongst the proposed amendments, the most 
Draconian would have made it obligatory for all societies to register as 
`political' or `friendly', and forbade any political involvement or even comment 
by `friendly' societies. Opposition to the amendments was widespread amongst 
civil society organisation, and prompted the organisation of a coordinated front 
against the amendments, formalised by the formation of a `co-ordination 
committee' between the main groups, which was later named the Secretariat for 
the Conference of Societies (scs). Over sixty NGOs eventually took part, 8 of 
which important participants were: 
" Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM 
- 
Islamic Youth 
Movement of Malaysia): A large, student-based Islamic 
organisation that had been instrumental in large demonstrations 
against rural poverty in the 1970s. Its president, Anwar Ibrahim, 
was a charismatic and popular figure and vocal critic of the 
government, for which he been detained under the ISA; 
" 
Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN 
- 
National Consciousness 
Movement): A small but influential Penang-based reform 
movement created in the late 1970s by a group of academics; 
S 
`Pledge by 64 groups against changes to Act. ' New Straits Times, 18 April 1981. The 
academic Chandra Muzaffar, who was ALIRAN president at the time of the protest, counts the 
total number of NGOs involved as 118; Chandra Muzaffar, 'Non-government organizations 
(NGOs) as a vehicle of social change', in Colin Barlow (ed. ), Modern Malaysia in the Global 
Economy: Political and social change into the 21"' century, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2001, 
p. 191. 
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" 
The Consumers' Association of Penang (CAP): Another 
influential Penang-based social reform organisation; 
" 
The Malaysian Bar Council: The executive branch of the Bar 
Association, a mandatory body representing all practicing 
lawyers; and 
" 
The United Chinese School Committees Association (UCSCAM) 
and the United Chinese School Teachers Association (UCsTAM): 
A large and (within the Chinese community) hugely influential 
educationalist lobby. 
Chaired by Anwar, the scs also notably included organisation from all the main 
religious, ethnic and class groups in the country, including the Young Christian 
Workers and the Hindu Youth Council. Such a social coalition that breached 
the major societal divides was unprecedented. In as much, it marked an 
important milestone in the development of civil society, and came to play an 
important role as a model for later attempts to foster interethnic co-operation. 
Indeed, for this very reason, some prominent activists still view it as civil 
society's `finest moment'. 9 
It has been typical to attribute the successful alignment of diverse twos under 
the scs to growing middle class disillusionment with perceived increasing 
authoritarianism by the regime. 1° Johan Saravanamuttu, for instance, describes 
9 Interviews, Gurmit Singh K. S., former president of EPSM, Petaling Jaya, July 2001 and 
Chandra Muzaffar, former president of Aliran, Petaling Jaya, April2001. 
10 See, for instance, Simon Barraclough, 'Political participation and its regulation in Malaysia: 
Opposition to the Societies (Amendment) Act 1981', Pacific Affairs, 57 (1984), pp. 450-61. 
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it as a `middle class revolt'. " The participation of otherwise conservative 
professional groups such as the Bar Council and the Malaysian Medical 
Association certainly gives credence to this view. It is also important to 
recognise, however, that the proposed amendments would have seriously 
hampered the organisation, operations and fund-raising of all societies, 
irrespective of their political, ethnic or class allegiances. In as much, it is worth 
noting that a similar coalition of interests failed to emerge to protest the 1980 
amendments to the Trade Unions Act, equally draconian in their own way, but 
restricted in impact to the union sector. 12 The formation of the sus must thus be 
viewed within the context of the amendments themselves. It was arguably the 
convergence of self-interest between these diverse societies as much as loftier 
principles that was the immediately motivation for the SCS. 
If opposition to the amendments provoked greater cooperation between societal 
organisations, however, they were not able to mobilise corresponding support in 
terms of collective protest or popular mobilisation of the wider public. The 
campaign produced a petition of some seventy thousand signatories, but 
otherwise received little demonstration of support from the public as a whole, 
beyond the activist 'core'. 13 The only instance of reported collective protest 
Johan Saravanamuttu, `Malaysian civil society 
- 
awakenings? ', in Maznah Mohamad and 
Wong Soak Koon (eds. ), Risking Malaysia: Culture, politics and identity, Bangi, Penerbit 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001(b), p. 101; see also his `The state, ethnicity and the 
middle class factor: Addressing nonviolent democratic change in Malaysia', in Kumar 
Rupesinghe (ed. ) Internal Conflict and Governance, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992. 
12 For details of the amendments and their repercussions on industrial relations, see Ponniah 
Arudsothy, 'The state and industrial relations in developing countries: The Malaysian 
situation', AsEAN Economic Bulletin, 6: 3 (1990), pp. 308-329. 
13 `Societies Act: 70 000 sign up in protest. ' New Straits Times, 18 November 1981. 
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against the amendments was a demonstration by two hundred lawyers, fronted 
by the Bar Council, outside the Kuala Lumpur High Court. 14 Whilst the 
spectacle of quintessentially middle class lawyers being dispersed by riot police 
may have been `disquieting' for the regime, 15 it failed to resonate with the wider 
public. The formation of the scs thus foreshadowed another trend that was to 
emerge throughout the 1980s 
- 
the divergence between civil society and social 
mobilisation. 
From 1982 onwards, the scs lost momentum, partly due to the cooptation of the 
charismatic Anwar into UMNO in March of that year, and further by the 
revocation the following year of some 
- 
though not all 
- 
of the provisions in the 
amended act. 16 Nonetheless, in an appraisal of the scs, the human rights group 
ALIRAN noted that, although an `unforeseen' consequence of the opposition to 
the amendments, the formation of such a multi-ethnic confederation was 
`encouraging in a society like ours, beset by communalism and chauvinistic 
politicians'. 17 In an attempt to keep this multiethnic spirit of the scs alive, 
ALIRAN also instigated its `Dialogue of Concern' 
- 
an annual colloquy of NGOs 
themed on nonethnic issues. Another formal coalition grew out of these 
14 `Amendments: Bar puts its case to MPS. ' New Straits Times, 8 April 1981. 
15 Barraclough, 'Political participation and its regulation in Malaysia', p. 461. 
16 According to some sources, these two events are connected. It is suggested that Anwar set a 
precondition for joining UMNO that the Act be watered down, essentially to save face, as he 
had been so strident in his opposition to it. Other sources reject this claim, however, noting 
that the Societies Act came under the purview of Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister 
Musa Hitam. As Musa was apparently one of the most determined opponents of Anwar being 
allowed into UMNO, it is unlikely that he would have struck such a deal. An alternative 
viewpoint suggests that the amendments were withdrawn because the new leadership was 
keen to emphasise its liberal credentials. 
17 `Working Together. ' Aliran Monthly 2: 2, March 1982. 
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dialogues, the Movement for Freedom and Justice (PKK 
- 
Pergerakan untuk 
Kebebasan dan Keadilan). Although it was comprised of many of the same 
organisations as the scs, the coordinating role that had been ABIM'S was taken 
over by ALIRAN and Chandra Muzaffar, ALIRAN's president, became its chief 
spokesperson. In contrast to the scs, however, the ALIRAN `Dialogues' and the 
PKK had little or no public profile. Their importance lay rather in their 
facilitation of an enduring interethnic dialogue across civil society. Participants 
thus viewed such a dialogue approvingly as a `trust-building exercise' between 
different sectors of society, albeit only at the level of civil society elites. 18 
Many of the public themes and ambitions of the scs were reignited in 1986, 
when another broad coalition across civil society was formed, once again in 
protest against authoritarian amendments to the legal system, this time to the 
Official Secrets Act (osA). The amendments included proposals to make all 
government documents automatically `secret', unless explicitly declassified, and 
to make the dissemination of such documents a heavily punishable offence, 
even if the information was already in the public domain by other means. 19 The 
organisations involved in the new coalition were much the same as those 
involved in the scs, although ALIRAN and the National Union of Journalists 
1B Interviews, Chandra and Gurmit Singh. 
19 The amendments have been linked to a confrontation between the government and the Asian 
Wall Street Journal, which published a number of critical column in 1985. The government 
responded by banning (temporarily) the newspaper and expelling its two resident journalists, 
although this latter move was overturned by the Supreme Court. See Diane K. Mauzy, 
`Malaysia in 1986: The ups and downs of stock market politics', Asian Survey, 27: 2 (1987), 
pp. 231-241. 
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(NUJ) played a much more prominent role in the anti-osA movement, in the 
latter case probably because they felt most at risk from the new law. 20 
The anti-osA campaign was even more successful than the scs in arraigning a 
coalition of civil voices against the regime. Most notable is the fact that a 
number of normally regime-associated actors joined the protest against the 
amendments. These included Malaysia's two surviving former prime ministers, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Hussein Orin, and Musa Hitam, who had 
recently resigned as Mahathir's deputy. 21 The former Auditor-General, Ahmad 
Noordin, also became actively involved in the campaign. 22 Two of the smaller 
and more independently minded BN parties 
- 
PBS and GERAKAN 
- 
even urged 
Mahathir to `rethink' the amendments. 23 Once again, however, the protest was 
marked by the absence of significant public demonstrations of support. Another 
petition was organised, this time reaching around fifty thousand, and two small 
public rallies held but, as with the scs protest, they were attended overwhelming 
by members of the organisation involved, rather than drawing on broader public 
20 `Govt revises OSA Bill. ' New Straits Times, 3 December 1986. 
21 `People have cause to fear amendment 
- 
Hussein. ' New Straits Times 19 November 1986; 
`Consider views on OSA amendments. ' New Straits Times, 21 November 1986. 
22 
'Ahmad Noordin picked to lead campaign. ' New Straits Times, 10 November 1986. As 
Auditor-General, Ahmad Noordin had, against the government's wishes, published the report 
of his investigation into a major financial scandal, which hinted at top level government 
involvement, including the finance minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. 
2J `Gerakan urges Govt to rethink OSA. ' New Straits Times, 3 November 1986; `Review 
proposed changes to Secrets Act: PBS. ' New Straits Times, 6 November 1986. 
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support 
. 
24 One closed-door ceramah (political talk) held in Penang did, 
however, attract over two thousand members of the public. 25 
It has been typical to treat the protests against the Societies Act and against the 
Official Secrets Act as essentially synonymous, but a comparison of the two 
movement yields some significant points. In terms of similarities, there are two 
important aspects. Firstly, as perhaps the only instances of a coalescence of 
organisations from across all sectors of civil society before 1987, it is interesting 
to note that both were in reaction to legislative restrictions on the ways in which 
these organisations could operate, suggesting that when fundamental 
organisational restrictions are imposed, diverse groups have come together in 
protest. This points to an important, arguably quintessential, theme in 
Malaysian opposition politics 
- 
not so much whether, but when my enemy's 
enemy is my friend. The second similarity worth noting is that both these 
movements were unable to mobilise significant support from the broader public. 
Such collective protests that did occur were `internal' mobilisations by the 
activists involved 
- 
by the Bar Council the first time, and by the NUJ on the 
second occasion. 
To understand the differences between the two coalitions, we must look beyond 
the protests themselves, to the conditions in which they arose. As we shall see, 
the anti-osA movement emerged at a time of economic recession, of raised 
societal mobilisation, with a number of long-running protests putting pressure 
on the regime, and at a time when the internal politics of the BN was in a state of 
24 'NUJ sends signature petition to Dr M. ' New Straits Times, 6 December 1986; `400 press union 
members picket NST offices. ' Straits Times, 23 April 1987. 
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flux. Indeed, the coalition emerged almost immediately in the wake of Musa 
Hitam's sudden resignation from his post as Deputy Prime Minister in February 
1986 
- 
the first public sign that something was seriously amiss within UMNO 
(see next chapter). In comparison, the scs movement arose during much more 
favourable conditions for the regime. Whilst the protest straddled the transfer of 
power from Hussein Orin to Mahathir, this was undoubtedly the most ordered 
and planned succession in Malaysia's history 
-a demonstration, perhaps, of 
UMNO's confidence in itself at the time, and contrasting strongly with the 
political uncertainty following Musa's unprecedented departure. The changing 
dynamics of BN politics 
- 
these changes themselves heightened by societal and 
economic pressures 
- 
can thus help explain the presence of more 
`establishment' figures in the anti-osA protest. 
It can also be seen from the differences between the two protests that the 
contours of civil society itself had shifted considerably in the intervening years. 
The most important changes here were associated with the shifting leadership of 
civil society, however informal it may have been. In the early years of the 
1980s, the most prominent leading force Was ABIM and Anwar Ibrahim in 
particular, as evidenced by his chairmanship of the scs. The Malaysian Trades 
Union Council (Mmc), led by V. David, was also prominent, both in the 
opposition to legislative changes 
- 
it had led its own campaign against earlier 
changes to the labour laws 
- 
and also in other areas such as consumer rights, 
where it led a number of campaigns against price hikes in basic provisions. 26 
Within the Chinese community, the business-oriented Chinese Assembly Halls 
25 `The Penang Ceramah. ' Aliran Monthly, 6: 11/12, December 1986. 
129 
Civil Society Ascendant, 1980-1987 
and the educationalist Dongjiaozong organisations were the most important 
groups. Towards the mid-1980s, however, other organisations began to take 
central stage, both in terms of media representation and also civil society 
networks. ABIM and the MTUC lost their standing as the main representatives of 
civil society. ABIM was much diminished by the departure 
- 
treachery some 
said 
- 
of Anwar for UMNO, and increasingly concerned itself with international 
Islam 
- 
the Palestine question in particular 
- 
rather than local politics. Whilst 
the MTUC remained prominent throughout the 1980s, it restricted itself more to 
matters directly pertaining to the unions and the labour movement (at least until 
1988), possibly because its own position as the only national level 
representative for the labour movement was threatened by the government's 
recognition of CUEPACS (Congress of Unions of Employees in the Public and 
Civil Services) as an alternative negotiating body (see below). In the place of 
ABIM and the MTUC, a number of other organisations took up prominent 
positions in civil society. ALIRAN 
-a relatively young organisation in 1981 - 
had, by 1984, taken on an important coordinating role. Others were the 
Consumers Association of Penang (CAP), Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM 
- 
Friends of the Earth Malaysia) and the Selangor Graduates' Society (sGs). SGS' 
president, Gurmit Singh, had also taken over the chairmanship of the SCS after 
Anwar's departure for UMNO and was also chairman of another prominent 
organisation, the Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia (EPSM). 
These changes in the organisational networks and network leadership 
demonstrate two important points. Firstly, civil society was increasingly 
26 `MTUC to step up boycott. ' New Sunday Times, 3 May 1981. 
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becoming dominated by much smaller organisations of `professional activists' 
- 
a fact that the regime often highlighted in public confrontations with civil 
society, arguing that these organisations were unrepresentative and, hence, 
undemocratic. ALIRAN and CAP had between them less than two hundred 
members in 1983, and there is every possibility that many of these were 
members of both. 27 This compares to the MTUC, with membership through its 
affiliated unions at around six hundred thousand. 28 It is also interesting to note 
that both ALIRAN and CAP, along with SAM, were based in the affluent Chinese 
majority state of Penang, which was, in the 1986 general election, to become a 
stronghold of the opposition DAP. 
Secondly, the rise of these smaller organisations also brought to the fore very 
different concerns and issues. Mzvc and ABIM very much represented the grand 
narratives of Malaysian history 
- 
`Labour' and `Islam/Ethnicity' respectively. 
The new organisations, however, reflected different, `newer', concerns 
- 
environmentalism, consumer protection and even human rights. Of course, this 
does not mean that Labour and Islam were spent forces; the MTUC and PAS were 
still important organisations, and the DAP retained (although often downplayed) 
its Socialist inclinations. Nonetheless, in terms of the purely societal 
movements, as opposed to those with governmental ambitions, and 
- 
perhaps 
more importantly 
- 
in terms of organisational roles within civil society, the 
`new' movements took on important roles which belied their size. 
27 `Consumer bodies and foreign funds. ' New Straits Times, 23 November 1985. 
28 Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Labour and Manpower Report 1982/83. 
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This shift had important implications not only for the organisations themselves, 
but also in the reproduction and negotiation of civil society and its discourses 
through the regime controlled mass media. The Mzvc and ABIM, large 
organisations which openly challenged the regime, tended to receive a very 
negative press. In contrast, the more nominally `apolitical' organisations like 
CAP and SAM, whose agenda was not directly confrontational with the regime 
and which seemed to push for the concerns of the not entirely slavish media's 
readership, tended to receive a much more favourable press. Even when they 
did directly criticise the regime, the press did not always censure and censor 
this. In 1983, for instance, when SAM criticised the government over the state of 
the country's roads, the New Straits Times picked up the story and ran several 
follow ups. 29 Even ALIRAN, a more directly political organisation, received 
some sympathetic press coverage compared to the virtual blackout it receives 
today. 30 The regime's tolerance of these new movements was, however, short 
lived. By 1985, it had already become concerned with their consistent `running 
down' of the government. 31 In 1987, Mahathir went as far as to label some of 
these organisations `saboteurs' and `enemies of the state'. This change in stance 
was coincident with a drastic increase in social mobilisation under the aegis of 
these ` new' movements, to which we will return later. 
The new civil society that emerged during the 1980s was thus a reflection of the 
growing political importance and awareness of the educated middle class. 
Academics (Chandra Muzaffar of ALIRAN, Jomo Kwame Sundaram of the 
29 'SAM: Look into state of highways. ' New Straits Times, 10 December 1983. 
30 See, e. g., 'BMF affair: Aliran puzzled by statement. ' New Straits Times, 3 January 1984. 
31 `Stop it, Govt tells errant consumer association. ' New Straits Times, 14 November 1985. 
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Institute for Social Analysis), lawyers (Param Curumaswamy of the Bar 
Council) and engineers (Gurmit Singh of EPSM) were the new voice of civil 
society, replacing the unionists and Islamists of previous years. 32 This middle 
class civil society also brought forth a new social discourse, based on concepts 
of human rights, political transparency and environmentalism, but also - 
conforming to what we have seen is often characterised as a peculiarly `Asian' 
trait 
- 
social responsibility and obligations. The Consumers Association of 
Penang and Sahabat Alam Malaysia were particularly concerned with social 
obligations as well as rights; indeed their chairman S. M. Mohamed Idris denies 
that his organisations are in any sense `human rights' groups. 33 Yet if the new 
civil society was drawn overwhelmingly from the middle class, it was by no 
means representative of the entire class, much of which remained dependent 
upon state patronage, and it thus had difficulty mobilising broad support for its 
discursive vision. Nowhere was this more clear than in the legislative protests 
discussed above. In as much, Saravanamuttu's description of these protests as 
`middle class revolts' is misleading; they were revolts from the middle class, 
even for the middle class, but certainly not of the middle class as a whole. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that in his own more recent survey of middle class 
32 The obvious exception from this is S. M. Mohamed Idris, the founder and president of both 
CAP and SAM. Lacking any formal higher education, Idris is, however, a phenomenal 
autodidact, and 
- 
as I have witnessed 
- 
is capable of holding his own in an academic 
discussion of the applicability of Marxist analysis to the Malaysian situation. Idris' lack of 
formal education is, in any case, somewhat made up for by his brother, Muhideen Abdul 
Kadir, deputy president of CAP and former PRM treasurer, who has both a civil engineering and 
a law degree to his name. 
33 Interview, George Town, October 2001. 
133 
Civil Society Ascendant, 1980-1987 
attitudes, Saravanamuttu has found that `a large proportion of this class 
woefully lacks political awareness and civil orientation'. 34 
Despite the general lack of middle class mobilisation, however, the new civil 
society became closely involved in an emerging non-middle class social 
resistance to the state in the mid-1980s. As the contours of civil society shifted 
towards `new' interests during the first half of the 1980s, Malaysia saw a 
concomitant increase in collective action and social mobilisation within these 
parameters, most notably a series of high profile protests against proposed 
development projects. Yet whilst these new movements ushered in a 
transformation in civil society, the mobilisation of these movements was most 
successful when there was also an ethnic element in the protest. 
`NEW' SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTALISM 
As the regime's developmentalist drive took hold, increasing groups of 
individuals found themselves dislocated or disadvantaged by the speed and 
trajectory of development. The 1980s saw the proliferation of small, 
unintegrated protests against the negative side-effects of development 
- 
ranging 
from dust pollution to rubbish dumps. 35 There were two particular sites of 
34 Johan Saravanamuttu, 'Is there a politics of the Malaysian Middle Class? ', in Abdul Rahman 
Embong (ed. ) Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Prospects for social change and 
democratisation, Bangi, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001(a), p. 116. An earlier 
survey by Saravanamuttu, which found stronger democratising sentiments among the middle 
class, has been criticised for its over-reliance on existing civil society elites as its respondents, 
thus invalidating its results. See Abdul Rahman Embong, State-Led Modernization and the 
New Middle Class in Malaysia, London, Palgrave, 2001, p. 150. 
35 
'100 residents demonstrate against dust pollution. ' New Straits Times, 17 August 1981; 
'Protest by 500 residents of Kampung Pisang. ' New Straits Times, 8 October 1984; 'Officials 
to meet residents over rubbish dump. ' New Straits Times, 6 July 1987. 
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sporadic protests. Firstly, a number of `squatter' communities 
- 
ramshackle 
villages and suburbs which built up over time on disused private or state-owned 
land 
- 
staged vehement and sometimes violent protests when attempts were 
made to reclaim the land for development. 36 Secondly, `settlers' in the state- 
owned FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority) plantations schemes 
began protesting what they saw as exploitation by FELDA. 37 These protests, 
whilst often vehement, reflected the social dislocation that caused them, in that 
they lacked integration or sustained movement characteristics. 
The first major sustained protest movement to reflect these concerns emerged in 
1984, when residents of the town of Papan in Perak began protesting a proposed 
radioactive waste dump near the town. 38 Regular protests were held through the 
second half of 1984, sometimes attracting thousands of participants. 39 Indeed, 
as one newspaper report candidly admitted, most of the town's two thousand 
residents took part on a regular basis. 40 A brief reprieve came in 1985 
- 
and 
with it, a drop in protest activity 
- 
when the courts allowed an operating 
injunction against the company concerned 
- 
Asia Rare Earth, a subsidiary of the 
Japanese firm Mitsubishi 
- 
on safety grounds, but this was lifted in February 
36 See, for instance, 'Tear gas used in scuffle with squatters. ' New Straits Times, 11 October 
1984; 'Squatters protest against takeover attempt. ' New Straits Times, 21 May 1985. 
37'500 FELDA settlers stage protest. ' New Sunday Times, 17 July 1983; 'Watch on FELDA 
scheme after incident. ' New Straits Times, 16 May 1988. For more on the development of the 
FELDA schemes, see Zawawi Ibrahim, The Malay Labourer: By the Window of Capitalism, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1998 and Halim Salleh, 'Peasants, 
proletarianisation and the state: FELDA settlers in Pahang', in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Kok Wah (eds. ), Fragmented Vision: Culture and politics in contemporary Malaysia, 
Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992, pp. 107-3 1. 
38 '500 stage protest over radioactive dump site. ' Straits Times 19 June 1984. 
39 '3,000 join peaceful protest in Papan. ' Straits Times, 2 July 1984. 
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1987, provoking further demonstrations by over ten thousand people 
. 
41 The 
protest was resolved unexpectedly in 1989, however, when Asian Rare Earth 
went bankrupt. 
On the surface, the protests appeared to have been a purely environmentalist 
movement against the dumping of nuclear waste, and they were often taken as 
such. Singapore's Straits Times newspaper, for instance, referred to the 
demonstrations as `Malaysia's first anti-nuclear protest'. 42 Yet the Papan 
movement had originally sought only the relocation 
- 
not the complete 
cancellation 
- 
of the waste dump. 43 It was thus a more complex movement than 
the simple environmentalism it appeared to entail. Below the surface, the Papan 
movement was in fact symptomatic of the complex interplay of ethnicity, state 
and civil society which characterise social movements in Malaysia. 
Although the issue of ethnicity was never publicly connected with the Papan 
movement, those who were involved have stressed it as an important mobilising 
element. 44 According to environmentalists involved in the campaign, the waste 
dump had originally been planned near a Malay settlement, but the location had 
quietly been moved to Papan 
-a predominantly Chinese town - before the plans 
had been made public. 45 It was this sense of outrage that the government saw fit 
to impose on a Chinese town what was too dangerous to locate next to a Malay 
village that had brought the town as a whole onto the streets. 
40 'Demo against Mitsubishi. ' New Straits Times, 12 December 1984. 
41 `Cops warn panel against anti-ARE demo. ' New Straits Times, 6 April 1987. 
42 'Radioactive waste dump fuels resistance. ' Straits Times, 30 June 1984. 
43 '500 stage protest over radioactive dump site. ' Straits Times 19 June 1984. 
44 Interview, SAM activists, August 2001. 
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Despite this strong ethnic undercurrent, however, both the demonstrators and 
the government sought to present their case as purely environmentally related. 
Various environmental experts were engaged by both sides to declare the safety 
or danger of the site. 46 Local residents set up the decidedly unethnic sounding 
Perak Anti-Radioactivity Committee (PARC) to co-ordinate the protests. Whilst 
it welcomed the involvement of environmentalist groups like SAM and EPSM, 
however, PARC explicitly rejected the advances of political parties which offered 
help. 47 Nonetheless, the eagerness of the DAP and smaller SDP (Social 
Democratic Party) 
- 
Chinese based parties both 
- 
to get involved in the 
campaign and PAS' virtual silence on the matter, clearly indicate the ethnically 
delimited political appeal of the protest movement. 48 Conversely, the local 
determination to keep ethnically oriented political parties out of their movement 
demonstrates the local desire to keep their protest publicly nonethnic. 
If ethnicity was kept below the surface of the Papan movement, other anti- 
development protests were more explicitly linked with ethnicity. In 1984, for 
instance, the DAP started a campaign against a proposal to develop Bukit Cilia, 
an old Chinese cemetery and Buddhist temple in Malacca. 49 The burial place of 
a number of prominent Chinese pioneers, Bukit Cilia was seen as integral to the 
local Chinese identity, and many Chinese thus took the development proposal as 
a deliberate ethnic slight by the government. 50 The campaign saw regular 
45 Interview, Gurmit Singh. 
46 "`Back your claims" challenge. ' New Straits Times, 3 July 1984. 
47 `Radioactive waste dump fuels resistance. ' New Straits Times, 30 June 1984. 
48 'Papan people bum effigies of Mitsubishi products. ' New Straits Times, 10 December 1984. 
49 'Lim leads demo on Bukit China. ' New Straits Times, 3 July 1984. 
50 Interview, DAP activists, April-November 2001. 
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protests for six months, and the state government eventually backed down. 51 
On the other side of Malaysia 
- 
and the ethnic divides 
- 
another protest 
movement was emerging in Sarawak among the Penan and other native tribes. 
Nomadic jungle-dwellers, who had long resisted attempts to lure them into city 
life, the Penan began, in the mid-1980s, setting up blockades to prevent logging 
in the jungle. Blockades were up for months at a time, and were manned by 
hundreds of tribesmen. 52 At the height of the blockading, the government 
arrested over eighty Penan in the space of a week. 53 As the cat-and-mouse 
game of blockade and dismantle intensified, the Penan began even more 
aggressively burning down bridges. 54 The destruction of the Sarawak 
rainforests and the displacement of its inhabitant tribes became something of a 
cause celebre within the environmentalist movement, with groups like SAM and 
EPSM setting up permanent centres in Sarawak. 55 At the time, the regime 
blamed this movement on the incitement of a Swiss artist, Bruno Manser, who 
had been living with the Penan for a number of years. As the Penans' protests 
gained national and international media coverage, however, other native groups 
in Sarawak and Sabah, including the Muruts and Orang Ulu, began echoing 
51 `1,500 in protest at Bukit China. ' New Straits Times, 9 July 1984; 'DAP's jog up Bukit China. ' 
New Straits Times, 25 August 1984. 
52 
'Sarawak cops detain four. ', New Straits Times, 27 July 1987. 
53 
'Penans detained over blockades. ' New Straits Times, 17 January 1989. 
54 
'Penans get support of Bar Council, ABIM. ' New Straits Times, 15 June 1987; 'Penans held 
for burning bridges. ' New Straits Times, 1 September 1987. 
55 Interview, SAM activists. 
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their calls, and taking similar action against logging, even without the benefit of 
a European artist-in-residence. 56 
The juxtaposition of these three sustained protest movements is illuminating in 
that they all engaged aspects of environmentalism, anti-development and 
ethnicity, albeit to varying degrees. Whilst the Bukit Cina protests made a direct 
connection between ethnicity and development, the two other movements were 
less explicit in their ethnic orientation. As already noted, the Papan protests in 
fact sought to avoid ethnic references. In Sarawak, the issue of ethnicity 
surfaced as a result of who was affected by the logging, rather than as an aspect 
of the logging protest itself. As in Papan, the broad environmentalism of the 
movement was an extension of more specifically development related protest. 
There is no evidence to suggest, for instance, that the Papan objected to the 
deforestation of Bangladesh, or even logging in other parts of Sarawak. 
The proliferation of environmental and anti-development movements over the 
1980s opened up a whole range of framing opportunities, which were difficult 
for the regime to counter. As governments around the world have discovered, 
the emotive quality of `environmentalism' as a mobilising force is hard to 
counter. Yet for a regime like the BN 
- 
whose legitimacy was, to a large extent 
based on its ability to deliver development 
- 
environmentalism and associated 
concerns with over-development, such movements represented an 
unprecedented challenge to its hegemonic foundations. 
sb 'Muruts now against logging. ' New Straits Times, 7 July 1987; `Anti-logging groups getting 
bolder. ' New Straits Times, 13 June 1989. 
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Wherever and whenever they arose, these `new' protests tended to attract the 
attention and support of the established civil society organisations, even where 
an immediate discursive connection was not obvious. The Penans' protests in 
Sarawak, for instance, attracted support from groups as diverse as the Bar 
Council and ABIM 
- 
strange indeed when one considers that ABIM was an 
Islamic dakwah organisation, and that the Penans were animist, and that there 
were few Penans wealthy enough to engage the services of any Bar Council 
lawyers. 57 The connection, however, was not just discursive, but active 
- 
protest of any form would naturally attract the attention of other protestors. 
These expressions of support can thus be interpreted in two ways 
- 
as an 
attempt to broaden coalitions of civil society activism and concern, and as an 
attempt to incorporate these `new' frames of meaning within the existing 
discursive structures of established organisations. As environmentalism and 
concerns about the negative effects of development emerged as potentially 
powerful sources of mobilisation, so the `big players' of civil society sought to 
claim these concerns as their own. In doing so, they had mixed success. As 
already noted, the Papan demonstrators rejected the advances of opposition 
political parties, whilst welcoming the involvement of environmentalist groups. 
In contrast to this, however, the DAP was very successful in penetrating the 
FELDA protests and established a number of branches in FELDA settlements 
- 
much to the annoyance of the regime, which viewed these as its own territory. 58 
Both DAP and ALIRAN had similar success in organising squatter protests. 59 It 
57 
'Penans get support of Bar Council, ABIM. ' New Straits Times, 15 June 1987. 
58 `Three more DAP branches. ' New Straits Times, 10 October 1987. 
59 `Squatters protest against takeover attempt. ' New Straits Times, 21 May 1985. 
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should be observed that where emerging protest movements had an organisation 
infrastructure of their own, as in Papan, they were less eager to accept the 
assistance of the existing civil society groups. 
What is interesting about these environmentalist and anti-development 
movements, then, is the extent to which they were the subject of much 
contestation between existing civil society groups. As this new paradigm 
emerged as a frame of action which clearly offered great mobilisational 
potential, existing groups 
- 
within the context of a divided civil society 
- 
sought 
to appropriate these new frames as part of their own. On some occasions, this 
process of appropriation was aided by the presence of ethnic undercurrents and 
the organisational shortcomings of the new movement. Other movements, 
however, fought to keep control of their own frame of action 
- 
precisely fearing, 
it could reasonably be asserted, that the `aid' offered by existing organisations 
would result in the distortion and reconceptualisation of what were, originally, 
specifically goal-oriented movements. 
We have seen, then, that there was a dialectical relationship between the 
emergence of a middle class-based, multiethnic civil society and the 
mobilisation of often decidedly non-middle class protest against the social 
dislocation of the regime's developmentalist drive. Civil society groups helped 
give organisational form to these protests, and brought them onto the national 
stage. In turn, however, this mobilisational potential attracted the attention of 
other civil groups and political parties, which sought to appropriate those 
concerns as there own. Yet we also saw that successful sustained protest 
mobilisation was often also linked with ethnicity 
- 
an influence anathema to the 
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middle class civil society. It is thus to the ethnic currents of mobilisation that 
we must now turn. 
`OLD' SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ETHNICITY AND LABOUR 
Despite the rise of a nonethnic, middle class-based sphere of civil society, 
ethnicity remained the masterframe for mobilisation throughout the period of 
heightened contention in the mid-1980s. Even where `new' concerns were 
discursively paramount, ethnicity remained the main cultural mobilising force. 
The `Save Bukit Cina' campaign mentioned above was an example of a 
movement which combined `new' interests with ethnic concerns. In fact, all the 
protest movements which arose in Malaysia during the 1980s and were able to 
mobilise significant collective action over a period of time, were at least 
partially ethnically oriented. Within the two main ethnic groups 
- 
the Malays 
and the Chinese 
- 
it is possible to discern some consistent trends in their 
mobilisation, which belied the other changes in civil society explored above and 
which are reflective of the underlying structures of Malaysian politics. 
Chinese Social Movements 
During the period 1981-1987, there were three specifically Chinese movements 
of contentious politics. The first of these was the Bukit Cina controversy 
discussed above. The second came about as a direct result of the economic 
collapse of 1985, and was tied in with a number of government financial 
scandals. In the 1970s, as a response to the regime's more aggressively pro- 
Malay stance, the Chinese community had 
- 
with the backing and partial 
involvement of the MCA 
- 
set up a number of `Deposit Taking Co-operatives' 
(DTCs), a financial pooling system designed to protect Chinese economic 
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interests and to ensure the continued provision of community services such as 
private schools. 60 Following the nationwide economic collapse of 1985, 
however, two of the largest DTCs announced that they were close to collapse, 
provoking a series of demonstrations and occupations by investors demanding 
that the government help the ailing co-operatives. G1 The last instance of 
substantial specifically Chinese mobilisation in this period was the surface cause 
for the 1987 `Operation Lalang' crackdown. In August 1987, the government 
announced the promotion of a large number of non-Mandarin speaking teachers 
in Chinese schools, provoking outrage amongst the Chinese community. 
Educationalism has long been an important aspect of the Chinese community, 
and the government's move was immediately condemned by the United Chinese 
School Committees Association (ucscAM) and the United Chinese School 
Teachers Association (UCSTAM). 62 A number of small rallies were held, and a 
boycott called, which saw over thirty thousand students kept away from school 
by their parents. 63 Some factions within the MCA also expressed support for the 
boycott, which in turn provoked demonstrations from UMNO loyalists, 
particularly UMNO Youth. 64 This escalation of mobilisation and counter- 
60 For more on the DTCs and the dynamics of Chinese business in Malaysia see Heng Pek Koon, 
The Chinese business elites of Malaysia', in Ruth McVey (ed. ), Southeast Asian Capitalists, 
Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1993. 
61 e. g. `Co-op depositors protest outside Wisma MCA. ' New Straits Times, 17 November 1986; 
`Depositors stage `sit-in' at co-op head office. ' New Straits Times, 7 January 1987; '21 held 
over co-op demo. ' New Straits Times, 7 January 1987. These protests will be the subject of 
more discussion in the following chapter. 
62 'Five parties support "boycott classes" move. ' New Straits Times, 12 October 1987. 
63 `Get them back to school. ' New Straits Times, 16 October 1987. 
64 
'UMNO members hold protest. ' New Straits Times, 12 October 1987. 
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mobilisation was abruptly halted by the October 1987 crackdown, which also 
banned all public rallies. 
These three protest movements, the latter two of which will be the subject of 
more extensive analysis in the next chapter, reflect three of the main political 
concerns of the Chinese community in Malaysia: fear over the undermining of 
their cultural heritage, the erosion of their economic strength, and 
educationalism. All these protests were primarily defensive, seeking to prevent 
the further erosion of Chinese societal and economic autonomy and 
distinctiveness. 
An increased willingness to mobilise in defence of the Chinese community 
cannot, however, be explained by the issues at stake, as these were perennial 
ones. From the perspective of the political opportunity structure, the timing of 
these protests 
- 
emerging in 1984,1986 and 1987 
- 
thus suggests a regime 
crisis in these years, rather than in the post-1987 period. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, the largest Chinese party in the government coalition, the MCA, 
was beset with internal turmoil over these years. These protests also coincided 
with an increase in the electoral fortunes of the Chinese-based DAP opposition 
party. In the period 1982-1984, the DAP won three by-elections against 
prominent MCA leaders, not only increasing their parliamentary representation 
significantly, but also suggesting a wider disillusionment with the MCA. This 
disillusionment was borne out by the DAP's performance in the 1986 general 
election, where the DAP won twenty-four seats and over a fifth of the popular 
vote, its best performance to date. This points us to the importance of political 
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parties and elections in social mobilisation trajectories, something which will be 
discussed further below. 
Malay Social Movements 
If Chinese societal protests were primarily defensive, the Malay-based 
opposition was overwhelmingly offensive, pushing in particular for further 
Islamisation of society. In as much, it continued a trend which had become 
evident since the early 1970s, with the rise of ABIM and other dakwah 
organisations. The Islamic revivalism of the 1970s was given a huge fillip by 
the outcome of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Many of the prominent 
Islamists who emerged in the 1980s attribute their involvement in the cause to 
the inspirational example of the Iranian Revolution. 65 Upon taking office, the 
Mahathir administration indicated a renewed drive towards Islamisation 
- 
symbolised by the cooptation of Anwar into UMNO. Yet Mahathir is known as 
no great Islamist 
- 
opposition groups frequently contrast his faltering reading of 
the Qur'an in Arabic with Anwar's fluent recital from memory. 66 The 
Islamisation drive of the early 1980s should thus be understood as an attempt to 
appropriate the political strength that came from Islamic revival by a regime that 
recognised that if it did not do so, the opposition undoubtedly would. 67 
65 Interviews, Raja Petra Kamaruddin, Free Anwar Campaign Director, Bangsar, April 2001 and 
Zulkifli Sulong, Harakah editor, Kuala Lumpur, May 2001. 
66 Interviews with PAS activists, April-November 2001. 
67 This view is expounded in, amongst others, Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Ahmad Shabery 
Cheek, 'Malaysia's Islamic movements', in Kahn and Loh (eds. ), Fragmented Vision, pp. 79- 
106. For an alternative viewpoint, see R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, The Mahathir 
Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam', Pacific Affairs, 56: 4 (1983/84), pp. 
617-48. 
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The renewed commitment to Islam by the Mahathir administration does appear 
to have had the effect of demobilising Islamic opposition movements, at least in 
the short run. There were virtually no reported incidents of collective action 
mobilised in support of Islam between 1982 and the early months of 1984 (see 
figure 5.2). It should be remembered, however, that social movements are not 
only to be reckoned in terms of collective action, but even in terms of civil 
society more broadly conceived, it appears that Islamic movements were 
suffering somewhat. ABIM, as has previously been noted, was reduced 
considerably by Anwar's departure, and Darul Argam, the other major Islamic 
force in civil society (PAS excepted), was yet to make its presence felt on a 
national level (see chapter seven). It should also be noted that this lull in 
societal Islamic mobilisation came not long after the regime had used its 
Draconian powers to oust a PAS-led state government in Kelantan. 68 
Figure 5.2: Incidence of Islam-oriented protests by half year, 1981-198889 
ýa See Simon Barraclough, The dynamics of coercion in the Malaysian political process', 
Modern Asian Studies, 19: 4 (1985), pp. 797-822. 
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The Islamic movement was revived in 1984 by a renewed confrontation 
between PAS and UMNO. Dubbed by the press the kafir-mengkafir issue, it was 
primarily a heightening of the long-running rhetorical argument over which 
party 
- 
PAS or UMNO 
- 
was the `true' representative of Islam. 70 The dispute 
heightened political divisions within the Malay community, with many mosques 
having to resort to two imams to lead supporters of the rival parties in prayer. 
To support its claims, PAS held a series of ceramah and other demonstrations. 71 
The regime responded in August 1984 by imposing a ban on all political rallies 
in the Malay majority states of Kedah, Perak and Kelantan which PAS, for the 
most part, ignored. 72 The movement finally petered out in mid-1986, following 
a dismal performance by PAS in the 1986 general election. 
This pattern of Malay-Muslim mobilisation thus suggests once again the 
importance of political parties in social movement prospects. After the lull in 
societal Islamic activity in the early 1980s 
- 
attributable to the regime's 
commitment to further Islamisation 
- 
the increased level of collective action 
from 1984 until mid-1986 
- 
mainly under the aegis of PAS 
- 
corresponds with a 
period when PAS' was on the political offensive. PAS, however, was not the only 
Islamic organisation to be enjoying a resurgence at this time. The number and 
influence of dakwah (Islamic propagation) organisation had spread considerably 
69 Source: Collected daily newspaper reports, 1981-1988. 
70 
`The PAS ceramah onslaught. ' New Straits Times, 9 August 1984. Kafir means infidel, and 
mengkafir means to call or pronounce someone an infidel. For an extended analysis of the 
discursive elements of the debate, see Mohamad Abu Bakar, 'Konservatisme dan konflik: Isu 
'kafir mengkafir' dalam politik kepartian, 1955-2000', Pemikir, 21 (2000), pp. 121-59. 
71 For instance, "Protest' prayers by PAS members. ' New Straits Times, 13 July 1984; 'The PAS 
ceramah onslaught. ' New Straits Times, 9 August 1984. 
72 
"PAS will not stop holding ceramahs'. ' New Straits Times, 13 August 1984. 
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at this time, causing the regime some concern. 73 As the DAP'S success in the 
1986 election foreshadowed an increase in Chinese-based collective action, 
however, PAS' dismal performance in the election 
- 
garnering only one seat 
- 
was followed by the dissolution of the previously reinvigorated societal 
mobilisation. 
The foregoing analysis of ethnic mobilisation has highlighted two main issues. 
Firstly, it has again pointed to the period 1984-1987 as being key to the 
dynamics of the regime challenge that was to emerge after the 1987 UMNO 
general assembly. Secondly, from a more theoretical perspective, it has 
introduced another important aspect of mobilisation 
- 
the role of political 
parties. We will return to these themes at the conclusion of this chapter. Before 
doing so, however, we must consider a final form of social mobilisation 
- 
one 
that is often neglected in studies of Malaysia: the labour movement. 
The Labour Movement 
In the last chapter, we saw that it has generally been argued that the systematic 
demobilisation and repression of labour in the 1960s, backed up by ever 
increasing restrictions on the organisation, unionisation and mobilisation of 
labour has resulted in a weak labour movement. 74 This weakness has been 
exacerbated by ethnic divisions within the movement. 
Despite intermittent attempts at reconciliation, the labour movement remained 
organisationally fragmented throughout the 1980s. A broad strategic divide 
73 `Thrashing out problems of dakwah activity. ' New Straits Times, 9 May 1985. 
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between the two major union centres 
- 
the Malaysian Trades Union Congress 
(MTuc) and the Congress of Unions of Employees in the Public and Civil 
Services (CUEPACS) 
- 
over how to push workers' claims hampered the 
movement's political power and mobilisational potential. In 1980, the MTUc 
suffered a damaging split, when six major unions also affiliated to CUEPACS left 
the congress. 75 The split was essentially caused by differing strategies between 
the two factions. The CUEPACS affiliated unions representing public servants, 
who were relatively highly educated and had established contacts within the 
government, favoured a mild approach to industrial negotiations, whilst the 
alternate faction, headed by V. David of the Transport Workers Union, was 
more militant in its approach. Ethnic differences may also have played a part 
here. Figures for the breakdown of union membership by ethnicity are 
unavailable, but the preferential policies of the NEP meant that public sector 
employees 
- 
who formed the bulk of CUEPACS' membership 
- 
were 
overwhelmingly Malay. 
Although the government initially disapproved of the union split, apparently 
concerned about having to deal with too many labour bodies, it increasingly 
played on these differences in a `divide and rule' strategy, instigating the two 
labour centres against each other. In 1982, for instance, the government stunned 
the unions by announcing that it would treat CUEPACS with equal status to the 
MTUC as a national labour representative. This predicated a violently oscillating 
relation between the two organisation throughout the 1980s, at some times 
74 See, for instance, Arudsothy, `The state and industrial relations in developing countries'; Jomo 
Kwame Sundaram & Patricia Todd, Trade Unions and the State in Peninsula Malaysia, 
Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
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agreeing, though never quite managing, to merge for the sake of `labour unity', 
at other times almost reaching outright warfare, particularly over the annual 
selection of representative for the International Labour Organisation 
conference. 76 In addition to encouraging differences between the MTUC and 
CUEPACS, the regime sought to undermine the power of the more militant MTUc 
in particular by encouraging in-house unions, which would weaken the 
bargaining power (and mobilising potential) of the national-level 
organisations. 77 
In the event, however, the main labour dispute of the 1980s came not from the 
MUTC but from CUEPACS. In 1983, following the split, Ahmad Nor was elected 
president of CUEPACS with the public support of the regime, and, along with the 
secretary-general A. Ragunathan, was often seen to favour the BN. Immediately 
after he was elected, Ahmad declared CUEPACS' apolitical stance 
- 
in fact a tacit 
support of the regime's position 
- 
stating that `politics and unions don't mix'. 78 
In 1984, thirty thousand members of CUEPACS were even `instructed' by Ahmad 
to attend a pro-government rally to `show their support' for Mahathir. 79 
Ahmad's tenure with CUEPACS was short lived, however, as was his political 
allegiance to the regime 
- 
in 1986 he quit as CUEPACS president to become the 
chairman of the opposition Social Democratic Party (sDP). 8° 
75 `Unionised but not unified. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 October 1980. 
76 
'MTUC: Don't split labour unity. ' New Straits Times, 1 December 1984; 'CUEPACS chief 
picked for Geneva conference. ' New Straits Times, 23 May 1984. 
77 'In-house trade unions?. ' New Straits Times, 24 March 1983. 
78 
'Politics and unions don't mix: Ahmad. ' New Straits Times, 12 August 1983. 
79 
'30 000 CUEPACS members to attend rally. ' New Straits Times, 4 January 1984. 
80 
'CUEPACS' president is new chairman of SDP. ' New Sunday Times, 2 March 1986. 
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This apparent turnabout in Ahmad's political inclinations reflected a shift in 
CUEPACS as a whole towards a more confrontational stance against the regime. 
From 1984, a number of public sector pay disputes involving the larger unions 
and the statutory negotiating bodies for civil servants, the National Joint 
Councils (NJCs), raised tensions between CUEPACS and the government, 
culminating in 1985 and 1986 with a series of mass pickets and illegal strikes. 81 
This confrontation fell off again after the government agreed to meet CUEPACS 
representatives for negotiations and a pay settlement was reached. At the same 
time, Ahmad Nor resigned his presidency of the union body to join the SDP, and 
Ragunathan renewed CUEPACS' apolitical stance in the run up to the 1986 
general elections. 82 
This broad picture of labour mobilisation is conducive with the trends in other 
social movement mobilisation outlined above, with sustained high levels of 
protest emerging in the mid 1980s. Overall, labour protests and official strikes 
surged in the mid 1980s despite the economic recession, during which time 
classical industrial relations economics would suggest that labour protests 
should be falling. The internal instability of the BN regime in these years thus 
provided the political opportunity for labour activists to press their claims. 
81 
`14,000 artisans to picket nationwide. ' New Straits Times, 24 May 1985. 
82 ,, CUEPACS to stay neutral in polls". ' New Straits Times, 15 July 1986. 
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Figure 5.3: Official strike activity, 1980-198983 
Figure 5.4: Reported labour protests and unofficial strikes by quarter, 1981-198994 
83 Source: Malaysia, Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Labour and Manpower Report, various 
years. 
84 Source: Daily newspaper reports, 1981-1989. 
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THE STATE RESPONSE 
We have seen that the emergence of a broadly middle class, nonethnic sphere of 
civil society and the associated mobilisation of `new' social movements in the 
mid 1980s presented an unprecedented challenge to the regime and its 
hegemonic foundations. The regime's response to these developments differed 
greatly from its approach towards previous challenges. In combating Islamic 
resurgence since the 1970s, the regime had employed a variety of 
complementary strategies aimed at undermining the societal challenge it 
posed. 85 The cooptation of popular and charismatic leaders, most notably 
Anwar's entry into UMNO in 1982, was complemented by a largely symbolic 
Islamisation drive, which sought to appropriate the resurgent Islamic discourse 
into the regime and nullify its oppositional potential. The broad success of this 
approach is evidenced by PAS' disastrous performance in the 1986 general 
election, and the subsequent demobilisation of Islamic protest activity although, 
as we shall see in later chapters, Islamic opposition to the state was down, but 
not out. Similarly, the regime had continued its strategy of harassment and 
cooptation against the labour movement, which had resulted in the broad 
alignment of CUEPACS with the regime for much of the decade. 
In contrast, a strategy of cooptation was markedly absent from the regime's 
interaction with the middle class-led civil society. If attempts were made to 
coopt its leaders and their organisations into the regime, they were clearly 
unsuccessful. Given the deliberate and often public moves by organisations 
such as ALIRAN and CAP (as well as the more issue-specific Perak Anti- 
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Radioactivity Committee) to distance themselves from party politics 
- 
whether 
BN or opposition 
- 
it is hardly surprising that the regime met with little success. 
Many unionists, including the MTUC secretary-general V. David, aspired to a 
parliamentary career; by the late 1970s, it was equally clear that Anwar was 
positioning himself for a move into party politics. The same could not be said 
of Chandra Muzaffar, Gurmit Singh or any of the other leaders of this new 
generation of civil society. 86 Moreover, the cooptation of these individuals 
would have been less attractive to the regime. Anwar brought many of his loyal 
followers into UMNO with him; such strong `followership' was absent from 
middle class civil society organisations and their leaders. 87 
In approaching the new civil society prior to 1987, the regime adopted less 
directly confrontational tactics. Firstly, as we have seen, it introduced new 
legislation to regulate the activities of civil society groups 
-a strategy that 
backfired somewhat, as it provoked greater coordination and cooperation within 
civil society. Secondly, it engaged in a discursive contest with the new civil 
85 See, for instance, David Camroux, `State responses to Islamic resurgence in Malaysia: 
Accommodation, co-optation and confrontation', Asian Survey, 36(9), pp. 852-69. 
86 As we will see in later chapters, Chandra Muzaffar did eventually make the move into 
opposition party politics in 1999 but had resisted attempts to lure him into the opposition 
coalition in the run-up to the 1990 elections. When interviewed during his tenure as Parti 
Keadilan Nasiona! deputy president, Chandra expressed great satisfaction at his move into 
party politics 
-a satisfaction that, however, had clearly dissipated by the time he left the scene 
again in 2001. 
87 The term 'followship' is used wryly by Clive Kessler in his analysis of Malay political culture. 
He suggests that the concept of `leadership', often perceived to be prominent in Malay culture, 
is not analytically problematic. What is problematic, is explaining why so many people follow 
these leaders. See Clive Kessler, `Archaism and Modernity: Contemporary Malay political 
culture', in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds. ), Fragmented Vision: Culture and 
politics in contemporary Malaysia, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992, pp. 133-57. 
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society over its goals and ambitions. Environmentalism in particular was 
singled out as the work of `extremists' bent on `disrupting' growth. 88 A notion 
of `development' was propagated, which was presented a `national' goal and 
environmentalism was thus `anti-national', tantamount to treason. 89 As we saw 
earlier, the regime also tried to brand the new wave of NGOs as undemocratic, 
and as stooges for the opposition parties, `foreign interests', or even the pitiful 
remnants of the communist insurgency. 90 Despite - or perhaps even because of 
- 
these moves, however, the new NGOs had, by the mid-1980s, `acquired a 
certain legitimacy', albeit limited to the middle class. 91 With the political crisis 
of 1987, the regime thus took more Draconian action against the new civil 
society, which will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
THEORETICAL PARENTHESIS: CIVIL SOCIETY, POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
ELECTIONS 
Theories of civil society usually postulate it as a sphere of political association 
autonomous and separate from the state. Political parties, following this 
approach, fall clearly on the state side of the equation. As we have seen, 
however, in countries such as Malaysia this distinction is less clear. Political 
parties, particularly in the opposition ranks, frequently act in the civil society 
arena, organising societal campaigns and mobilising protest movements. 
Initially, this unclear distinction may seem theoretically problematic. As 
88 'Don't cause disruption. ' New Straits Times, 15 November 1985. 
89 'Lim and Gurmit rapped over Bakun statement. ' New Straits Times, 31 December 1985. 
90 `Musa: New tactics by CTS. ' New Straits Times, 8 April 1983; `Consumer bodies and foreign 
funds. ' New Straits Times, 23 November 1985. 
91 Chandra, 'Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a vehicle of social change', p. 191. 
155 
Civil Society Ascendant, 1980-1987 
Mitchell points out, however, the `greyness' of this boundary in fact provides us 
with an important inroad into understanding the relationship between the two. 92 
Arguably precisely because they are denied any genuine opportunity to 
influence the state from within, opposition parties in Malaysia frequently act in 
a way more akin to civil society organisations, organising rallies and protests, 
and attempting to influence the state from outside. Indeed, for PAS in particular, 
it is important to note that its political agenda (i. e. contesting parliamentary seats 
and its periods of governance at the state level) increasingly became only one 
aspect of a broader societal agenda that sought greater Islamisation of society. 93 
Whilst an integral part of this agenda was the eventual implementation of an 
Islamic state 
-a necessarily political objective - the party also attempted to 
influence the transformation of Malay society through less directly political 
means, in its exhibitions, ceramah and other cultural activities. The fact that 
this increased societal agenda may have been driven by the party's lack of 
political success is, to an extent, irrelevant to our discussion. What is important 
is that the party operated on two levels, both as a political party and as a civil 
society organisation. Of course the two aspects were mutually reinforcing 
- 
success in the societal sphere would inevitably lead to greater support for the 
party at elections. A similar case, although less clear, can be made for other 
opposition parties such as the DAP. Thus, for instance, the party's success in 
92 Tim Mitchell, `The limits of the state: Beyond statist approaches and their critics', American 
Political Science Review, 85: 1 (1991), pp. 77-96. Mitchell speaks in terms of a state-society 
divide, rather than using the explicit terminology of `civil society'. The thrust of his argument 
is, however, equally applicable in the theoretical framework employed here. 
93 Interviews with PAS activists, April-November 2001. 
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preventing the development of Bukit Cina was not a reflection of its 
parliamentary strength, but of its societal campaign. 
If pursuing a civil society agenda provided opposition parties an avenue to 
circumvent their lack of political representation, the holding of regular elections 
in effect brought the political and social dimensions of opposition politics 
together. Despite the fact that elections in Malaysia are so heavily slanted 
towards the regime that it is virtually unimaginable it might lose, elections 
nonetheless retain a broad legitimacy in the country, even among opposition 
activists. In this context, elections might be understood by opposition parties as 
a referendum on their societal performance. The relationship of the 1986 
general elections to the dynamics of ethnic mobilisation is instructive here. 94 
Approaching the elections, PAS was seen as being on the political offensive - 
largely because of its contentious societal campaign - and expected a strong 
performance. The party's surprisingly dismal performance was followed by a 
sharp demobilisation of its societal campaign. In contrast, the DAP's strong 
showing 
- 
attributable both to political factors such as ongoing factionalism in 
the MCA and to its successful pursuit of societal agenda 
- 
gave the party a 
renewed confidence to press societal campaigning. This interplay of civil 
society and party politics is affected by the capricious nature of the Malaysian 
ethnically-gerrymandered first-past-the-post electoral system. The huge 
difference between PAS' and the DAP's performance 
- 
one federal seat compared 
to twenty-four, respectively 
- 
and its subsequent effects on societal mobilisation 
94 For an analysis of the 1986 elections, see Sankaran Ramanathan and Mohd. Hamdan Adnan, 
Malaysia's 1986 General Election: The Urban-Rural Dichotomy, Singapore, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 88,1990. 
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belied a much closer performance differential in terms of the proportion of votes 
captured 
- 
around fifteen percent for PAS and twenty-one percent for the DAP. 
If elections provide the opportunity for the enmeshment of civil society and 
political objectives, however, they also have a darker side in perpetuating or 
even heightening ethnic division. Across the developing world, the link 
between democratisation and the outbreak of ethnic conflict has been well 
documented, especially since the end of the cold war. 95 Elections, it is argued, 
engender processes of `ethnic outbidding', in which the contest for the votes of 
any given ethnic party results in parties parading ever greater degrees of ethnic 
chauvinism. In Malaysia, the explicitly ethnic configuration of the BN coalition 
ensures that elections remain ethnically charged events. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, this ethnic dimension of elections took on an even greater 
importance in 1990, when the BN regime faced its sternest electoral test since 
1969. 
Elections, then, are not merely `political' events, but are embedded in the 
interplay of civil society and the state. A clear demonstration of this linkage 
beyond Malaysia comes from the Philippines, where elections under varying 
conditions of authoritarianism 
- 
both prior to and after Marcos' declaration of 
martial law 
- 
provided the focus for the resurgence of civil society through the 
formation of broad coalitions under the banner of the National Movement for 
Free Elections (NAMFREL). In the Malaysian case, elections constituted a kind 
of conduit between civil society and political opposition. As we shall see in the 
95 For a recent formulation, see Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and 
nationalist conflict, London, W. W. Norton, 2000. 
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next chapter, this crosscutting role of elections was to prove decisive in the 
dynamics of the regime crisis after the 1987 UMNO split. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the expansion of civil society and the emergence of 
new social movements in the 1980s. In the theoretical framework developed in 
chapter two, it was argued that existing writings on social movements and civil 
society mistakenly assume a dynamic homogeneity between the two. 
Exemplifying this, we have traced in this chapter the divergence between an 
emergent, middle class-led, discursively nonethnic civil society in Malaysia, and 
the persistence of ethnicity as the masterframe for protest mobilisation. Civil 
society, however, was not entirely impotent without ethnic claims to draw upon. 
In 1982, for instance, a campaign by environmentalist organisations against a 
proposed dam in a national park successfully brought about its cancellation. 96 
Nonetheless, by the mid 1980s, there was clear evidence of a dynamic slippage 
between the multiethnic goals and aspirations espoused by civil society and 
ethnic dynamics of social protest. Only where these interests coincided 
- 
as in 
Papan and Bukit Cina 
- 
were significant social movements able to sustain 
themselves. In focussing attention primarily on the transformation of civil 
society itself, this chapter has only briefly touched upon the state and its 
relationship with civil society. The next chapter addresses this aspect in greater 
detail with an examination of the political crisis of the latter half of the 1980s 
and how this related to the emergent civil society and social movements. 
96 'Action group to campaign against dam project. ' New Straits Times, 29 April 1982; 
'Tembeling: Energy needs won't be hit. ' New Straits Times, 17 January 1983. 
159 
CHAPTER SIX 
CRISIS AND RESPONSE I: 
STATE AND SOQAL MOBILISATION, 1987-1990 
This chapter reinterprets the regime crisis in the latter half of the 1980s, 
particularly in the years 1987-1990. Standard explanations of this crisis, which 
centred on the 1987 schism in UMNo and its repercussions, tend to suggest that 
the crisis was a function of the economic collapse of 1985, which intensified 
factionalism within the party. ' This chapter argues that this presents only a 
partial explanation of the crisis and its resolution, and that to understand it fully, 
including its lasting impact on the contours of Malaysian politics, we must 
situate the crisis more explicitly within the social transformations of the period. 
It was in the context of the increased social mobilisation of the mid-1980s that 
the government factionalism provoked by the economic crisis spilled out into a 
cycle of ethnic outbidding, which ultimately provided the justification for the 
dominant faction in UMNO to reassert its position through the most extensive 
societal repression Malaysia had seen since 1969. 
In the last chapter, we saw that civil society in Malaysia underwent a drastic 
transformation and expansion during the early and mid-1980s. This was 
accompanied by an unprecedented surge in social movement activity and 
collective protests, mainly by those sectors of society disenfranchised or 
dislocated by the regime's drive for economic growth. Together, these two 
developments presented an unprecedented societal challenge to the regime and 
See, for instance, William Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational 
Democracy, Clayton vic, Monash Asia Institute, 1996 and Harold Crouch, Government and 
Society in Malaysia, St Leonard's NSW, Allen and Unwin, 1996. 
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its hegemonic foundations. In this chapter we shall see that this challenge was 
exacerbated by a number of political crises within the Barisan Nasional regime 
that at times threatened the coalition's survival, particularly in the period 1987- 
1990. It will be argued that the principle cause of the political crisis was party 
factionalism heightened not only by economic contraction, but also by the 
impact and logic of social mobilisation at the time. Moreover, the subsequent 
crackdown on civil society and social mobilisation associated with the October 
1987 `Operation Lalang' arrests effectively reclirected the increased societal 
opposition of the preceding years towards more political and electoral 
participation. Whilst this, combined with the UMNO split, resulted in a 
substantial democratic opening in the 1990 general elections, there was 
nonetheless no real threat of the BN losing its parliamentary dominance given its 
long-standing subversion of the democratic process. 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES: ELITE FRACTURE 
In states such as Malaysia, where one party or coalition has an enduring 
monopoly on political power, `normal' non-contentious struggles for power by 
individuals or groups of individuals are likely to take the form of factionalism 
within the dominant political organisation. Put simply, anyone who aspires to 
be Malaysia's prime minister solely or primarily as an end in itself is more 
likely to do so from within the BN regime than to challenge it from the outside. 
Indeed, even for those who would seek major transformation of the state, 
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working to `change from within' is often a tempting option when facing an 
entrenched regime. 2 
Factionalism within a dominant elite is, however, often in itself a source of 
contentious mobilisation, particularly when this factionalism reaches crisis 
point. Weaknesses within the regime brought about by factional struggles 
provide the political opportunity for more contentious, socially-based challenges 
to the state to emerge. The most celebrated recent example of this is the 
factional struggle within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s, which provided the political opportunity for a democratising social 
movement to emerge that ultimately brought about a far greater degree of 
democratisation than even the reformers under Gorbachev had ever envisaged. 3 
A salutary lesson that perceived factional weaknesses in a regime are not always 
what they seem to be is however demonstrated by the tragic experience of the 
Chinese students who decided to continue their occupation of Tiananmen 
Square in May-June 1989, a decision attributed to their mistaken perception that 
the Chinese Communist Party was in the midst of a critical factional struggle. 4 
In Malaysia, factional struggles within the BN coalition were to prove vital to the 
emergence and direction of a sustained challenge to the regime in the latter half 
of the 1980s. In 1987, Malaysian politics was thrown into upheaval by a serious 
2 Supporters of Anwar Ibrahim since his 1998 fall from government have often used this line to 
defend his original decision to join UMNO in 1982. Interview, Raja Petra Kamaruddin, Free 
Anwar Campaign Director, Bangsar, April 2001. 
See M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and regime in the New Russian 
Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 206-23. 
3 
4 
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factional dispute within UMNO and a subsequent split in the party that many 
within the Malay community still viewed as both the vehicle for Independence 
and the sole protector of Malay rights. The UMNO split was, however, only one 
part of a broader internal crisis 
- 
or series of crises 
- 
facing the BN regime in the 
latter half of the 1980s, including factional struggles in the MCA and GERAKAN, 
the deterioration of UMNO-MCA relations, the demise of the BERJAYA party in 
Sabah in 1985 and the 1987 Sarawak `coup'. 
Factionalism in UMNO 
As the entrenched dominatrix of an entrenched coalition regime, it is 
unsurprising that UMNO has a long history of factional divides within the party. 
At its 1987 general assembly, however, factionalism within UMNO reached 
cataclysmic proportions, which was fought out in the party general assembly, in 
the courts and eventually in the 1990 general election, and which was to have 
substantial repercussions on the mobilisation of societal opposition to the 
regime. Just as political opportunity theorists argue that we must examine the 
timing and conditions under which social movements emerge, so it is equally 
important that we understand why the UMNO split happened when it did, 
especially given its repercussions on societal mobilisation. Before proceeding, a 
brief description of UMNO's internal structure is necessary for an understanding 
of what follows. 
UMNO's party hierarchy is complex in the extreme, a fact that only heightens the 
party's factional tendencies. The top two posts in the party are the presidency 
and the deputy presidency, which, in the BN coalition translate de facto into the 
government posts of prime minister and deputy prime minister. The next rung 
down consists of five vice presidents. Two of these posts are ex officio and 
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automatically allotted to the respective presidents of the party's youth wing, 
UMNO Youth, and its women's wing, Wanita UMNO. The other three vice 
presidencies are elected at the party elections; although nominally equal in 
status, there is a practical pecking order in the vice presidencies dependent on 
the number of votes received and record in office. The party assembly also 
elects twenty-five members of the top decision making body, the Supreme 
Council, to which the incoming party president nominates a further ten. UMNO 
party elections are usually held every three years, with delegates sent by the 
party's regional divisions, themselves made up of countless smaller branches. 
Because of the expectation of cabinet portfolios for those successful in the party 
elections, some commentators have characterised the UMNO party elections as 
more important in determining the government of the country than general 
elections, which, as we have seen, rarely present much of a challenge to the 
regimes More importantly for our purposes here, the triennial elections are 
inevitably the focus of factional rivalries. 
In April 1987, the party elections saw an unprecedented challenge to the 
existing leadership under Prime Minister and UMNO president Mahathir. In past 
party elections, senior posts were occasionally contested: Hussein Onn faced a 
weak challenge for the party presidency in 1978 and, as we shall see presently, 
the previous two elections had seen contests for the deputy presidency. In 
1987, however, the contest went a step further with, in effect, two separate slates 
See Jomo Kwame Sundaram, `Elections' Janus face: Limitations and potential in Malaysia', 
in R. H. Taylor (ed. ), The Politics of Elections in South East Asia, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, pp. 90-113. 
On the challenge to Hussein Onn, see Harold Crouch, `The UMNO crisis: 1975-77', in Harold 
Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds. ), Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Elections, 
Kuala Lumpur, University of Oxford Press, 1980, pp. 11-36. 
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of candidates. One faction, dubbed by the press `Team A', comprised the 
incumbent party president Mahathir, his nominated deputy Ghafar Baba and 
their supporters, including Anwar Ibrahim. The challenger faction, Team B, 
was led by former finance minister and UMNO vice-president Tengku Razaleigh 
Hamzah and former deputy prime minister Musa Hitam. 
The factionalism that led to the 1987 split can be traced back to the 
administration of Malaysia's second prime minister Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, 
who took over from Tunku Abdul Rahman following the 1969 riots. After 
Razak's first deputy, Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman, died of a heart attack in 1973, 
Hussein Onn was appointed deputy prime minister, a decision attributable both 
to his political closeness to Razak and to his familial ties 
- 
the two were 
brothers-in-law. Razak himself died of leukaemia three years later and Hussein 
ascended to the premiership. Although perceived as an honest and sincere 
politician with a distinguished pedigree (his father was UMNO founder Onn 
Jaafar), Hussein lacked a substantial support base of his own within UMNO, and 
thus also lacked an obvious choice of deputy.? Hussein's initial choice was 
apparently the powerful but unpopular home minister Ghazali Shafie 
-a man 
with a reputation that put him somewhere between a Malaysian Joseph 
McCarthy and J. Edgar Hoover. Ghazali, however, lacked a senior post within 
UMNO, and Hussein was thus given an ultimatum by the party's three elected 
vice presidents that he must choose one of them. The three were Ghafar Baba, 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah and Mahathir Mohamad. Hussein selected 
7 Hussein's father Onn Jaafar had left UMNO in the 1950s after a failed attempt to transform it 
into a multiracial party. Hussein, with a more chauvinistic ideological bent than his father, 
had assiduously resisted entering UMNO until the equally pro-Malay Razak replaced the more 
consociational Tunku Abdul Rahman. 
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Mahathir, who was politically closest to him, but also the most junior of the 
three. Ghafar promptly resigned from the cabinet and left frontline politics until 
the 1980s; Razaleigh was similarly disenchanted, though he retained his cabinet 
$ portfolio. 
In 1980, after his health deteriorated with heart troubles of his own, Hussein 
announced that he would be stepping down as prime minister, to be replaced by 
Mahathir. The transition of leadership from Hussein to Mahathir took place in 
1981 at the UMNO general assembly to select the party leaders who became, de 
facto, the government. In the context of an ordered and anointed transition from 
Hussein to Mahathir, there was never likely to be any challenge to Mahathir's 
position, but a contest did emerge for the deputy presidency of UMNo, and thus 
the position of deputy prime minister. The two contenders were Musa Hitam, 
one of the `young Turks' who had briefly been expelled from the government 
along with Mahathir, and Razaleigh. The contest was the first election for the 
deputy presidency, and with both candidates popular within the party, Mahathir 
remained officially neutral about who his preferred deputy would be. It has 
been suggested, however, that Hussein's public support for Musa was the 
swaying factor which gave him a decisive but less than over-whelming victory 
8 It has been alleged that Ghazali made use of his influence as Home Minister over the secret 
police ('Special Branch') to try and discredit Mahathir with purported link to the Singapore 
Communist underground. Syed Husin Ali, a professor and leader of the PSRM who was 
detained under the ISA for six years during the 1970s, alleged that special branch officers 
attempted to coerce him into admitting to being a `middleman' between Mahathir (and Musa) 
and the Singapore communist underground. See Syed Husin Ali, Two Faces: Detention 
without trial, Petaling Jaya, INSAN, 1996. 
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over Razaleigh. 9 Undaunted, Razaleigh again challenged Musa at the next party 
elections, in 1984. The contest was bitter and expensive, marking the real entry 
of money politics into the party. As we have seen, the NEP years had brought 
about a transformation of UMNO membership, with small businessmen 
increasingly forming its office bearers. For many of these businessmen, 
involvement in UMNO was an investment the same as any other, and one of the 
principle sources of return on this investment was factional patronage. 1° In 
1984, Razaleigh, a successful businessman who had helmed the state oil 
company Petronas before its nationalisation, was able to dispense considerably 
personal patronage to his supporters. In contrast, Musa, a career politician who 
had been an assistant minister in Tunku Abdul Rahman's cabinet, was a relative 
pauper in UMNO's top ranks. 
Despite Razaleigh's financial advantage, however, Musa won the contest again 
by a slightly increased margin, in part due to the fact that this time around 
Mahathir was openly supportive of him. " In the aftermath of his victory, Musa 
privately demanded that Mahathir remove Razaleigh from his post as the 
powerful UMNO treasurer and from his ministerial position. Mahathir half 
Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Singapore, Oxford University 
Press, 1991, p. 82. 
10 One former UMNO office bearer I interviewed during fieldwork, who had been active in the 
party for more than a decade before leaving to join KEADILAN in 1999, was able to give me a 
breakdown of how much he (claimed to have) spent on buying his nomination to various posts 
and delegations, and explained his departure from UMNO as partly due to his support for 
Anwar, but also due to the party's failure to provide him with a `big project', despite his 
investment. 
Also contesting was Harun Idris, a charismatic vice president who had briefly been 
imprisoned on corruption charges in the 1970s, before receiving a royal pardon. Harun 
surprised many, however, with his lack of support, garnering only a handful of votes. 
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complied, sacking Razaleigh from his party post, but keeping him in the cabinet, 
moving him from the Finance Ministry to Trade and Industry Secretary. 12 This 
move apparently disenchanted Musa even further, however, as he claimed that 
Razaleigh's new position would allow him even greater control of patronage 
networks. 
The protraction of the factional struggle between Musa and Razaleigh had 
important implications in that it caused the dispute to spill over into a deep 
factional divide within UMNO, and even beyond into Malay society at all levels. 
As one commentator put it: 
Before this any such division was only felt at the top but this 
time it went down to the grass roots... Orang Musa ('Musa's 
man') and orang Razaleigh ('Razaleigh's man') were not only 
labels but often became the `key phrases' which opened or 
terminated a business or any other discussion, guaranteed or 
denied an individual getting a contract or a scholarship, and 
expedited or delayed an application for a job, a licence, or even 
the transfer of a teacher from an ulu ('remote') to an urban 
school and vice versa. 13 
Recognition of Razaleigh's continuing command of a powerful faction within 
the party, as well as his regional popularity as a member of the royal family in 
Kelantan, may have prompted Mahathir to keep him in the cabinet against 
Musa's wishes. The decision, however, foreshadowed a slowly deteriorating 
12 `Rift at the top. ' Asiaweek, 16 March 1986. 
13 Shamsul A. B., `The "battle royal": The UMNO elections of 1987', in Mohammed Ayoob and 
Ng Chee Yuen (eds. ), Southeast Asian Affairs 1988, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1988, pp. 172-3. 
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relationship between Mahathir and Musa. By mid-1985, Mahathir was forced 
into making repeated public denials that a rift was developing between the 
two. 14 
At this stage, factionalism within UMNO was aggravated by the economic 
collapse of the mid-1980s. In 1985, the market price for all Malaysia's main 
exports 
- 
petroleum, palm oil, rubber, sawlogs, tin and cocoa 
- 
collapsed. The 
economic downturn was particularly felt by the Malay business class, where the 
effects of the recession were heightened by the ersatz nature of much Malay 
capital 
- 
based to a large extent on government patronage through the NEP and 
an associated flurry of mergers and acquisitions by new Malay conglomerates. 15 
By 1986, the UMNO-dominated government was finding it difficult to deliver 
`development plums' to its rural Malay constituency. 16 Small Malay 
businessmen, used to the frequent handout of development projects and 
preferential licenses, found their livelihoods severely affected both by the 
economic downturn and the concomitant contraction in government patronage. 
In such conditions, those businessmen who were also UMNO members started to 
pressurise their respective political patrons for further largesse, in turn 
heightening factionalism in the upper echelons of the party. '? 
After Musa left the country to perform the haj (Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca) in 
February 1986, Mahathir was left making another denial of a split between the 
14 `All's well at the top. ' Asiaweek, 9 August 1985. 
15 Kunio Yoshihara, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1993. 
16 `Godfather party runs short of Islamic plums. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 January 
1986. 
17 For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia. 
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two 
- 
only later to find that Musa had submitted a letter of resignation before 
departing. Musa initially resigned both from the government and from the 
deputy presidency of UMNo, but retracted the latter resignation, keeping his 
party post. According to his letter of resignation, Musa was disenchanted with 
the internal politics of UMNO and the rise of money politics in particular, though 
other sources within the party claimed that he was simply impatient to take over 
the premiership from Mahathir. 18 Whatever his reasons, it was the first public 
signal that internal UrvrNo factionalism was about to break out onto the national 
political agenda. The factionalist dimension of the dispute 
- 
rather than policy 
differences 
- 
was highlighted when Mahathir, under attack from within UMNO 
for his mishandling of the situation, produced the 1984 letter from Musa 
demanding Razaleigh's expulsion from his 19 
After Musa's resignation, it was clear that some form of challenge to Mahathir's 
leadership was likely at the impending 1987 UMNO party elections. Initially, it 
was assumed that Musa would challenge Mahathir for the party presidency, 
speculation which was apparently confirmed by the emergence of what 
appeared to be a proxy battle between the two for control of UMNO Youth in 
November 1986, in which Mahathir's protege Anwar Ibrahim soundly beat a 
relatively unknown Musa ally, Syed Hamid Albar. 20 Similarly, in the Women's 
wing (Wanita uMNO), a Mahathir ally won the leadership, although the deputy 
18 
'Musa's resignation shock. ' Asiaweek, 9 March 1986. 
19 `Rift at the top. ' Asiaweek, 16 March 1986. 
20 'First salvos in the battle of '87. ', Asiaweek, 28 September 1986. Syed Hamid was from 
Musa's support base in the southern state of Johor. Two other contenders had stepped aside 
and given their support to Syed Hamid. 
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slot went to a Musa supporter 
. 
21 As the main party elections approached, 
however, a surprise realignment of factions took place when Razaleigh and 
Musa 
- 
the bitter foes of 1981 and 1984 
- 
joined together to challenge, 
respectively, Mahathir and Ghafar Baba, who had replaced Musa as deputy 
prime minister, for the top two posts in the party. 22 These two pairings of 
candidates for the top posts soon broadened into unofficial slates of candidates: 
Mahathir's Team A and Razaleigh's Team B. 
When the party election was held in April 1987, the results demonstrated the 
deep divisions in the party. Mahathir and Ghafar both won, but by the smallest 
of margins: Mahathir beat Razaleigh by less than three per cent of the votes 
cast; Ghafar's winning margin over Musa was even smaller and indeed less than 
the number of spoilt ballots. On the next rung down, two of the three elected 
vice presidencies went to Team A candidates, the other to Team B. 23 Team A 
candidates also won fifteen of the twenty-five seats available on the party's top 
decision-making body, the Supreme Council. As president-elect, however, 
Mahathir was entitled to appoint another ten council members, thus tightening 
his control over the party's hierarchy, despite his own wafer-thin majority. 
Divisions within the party were further cemented when Mahathir, breaking with 
the Malay cultural tradition of reconciliation, dismissed three ministers and four 
deputy ministers who had openly supported Razaleigh and Musa; Razaleigh 
21 `A sideshow. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 02 October 1986 
22 ` Campaigning for the top. ' Asiaweek, 8 March 1987. Technically, Musa was defending his 
post and Ghafar was the challenger, as Musa had not resigned from the deputy presidency of 
UMNO. 
23 `The price of victory. ' Asiaweek, 03 May 1987. The two Mahathir allies were Wan Mokhtar 
Ahmad and Anwar Ibrahim; the Musa supporter was Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. 
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himself had already resigned his government post, as did one of his staunchest 
allies, foreign minister Rais Yatim. 24 Even senior civil servants suspected of 
supporting Team B found themselves transferred out of powerful positions; 
bank loans were also recalled, resulting in a number of bankruptcies. 25 In 
response, Razaleigh's supporters launched a court action to nullify the election 
results, threatening to prolong the crisis. Even after the party elections, it was 
thus clear that the deep divides within the party, which had spilled over into 
Malay society as a whole, were unlikely to be resolved speedily. 
Factionalism in UMNO, then, was a long-standing phenomenon but previously of 
limited impact on national politics. What raised it to the level of crisis in 1987 
was the broad structural transformation of particularly Malay society under the 
NEP, which had increased exponentially UMNO's role as a vehicle for the 
disbursement of patronage, and the economic collapse of 1985, which created 
pressures within this patronage system 
- 
essentially the same developments that 
gave rise to the increased societal mobilisation of the mid-1980s, as we saw in 
the previous chapter. The UMNO split, which created the political opportunity 
for an intensification of this societal challenge, was thus caused by the same 
broad set of factors that drove this challenge itself. 
Factionalism in other BN parties 
The UMNO split was the most important factor in creating the political 
opportunity for increased societal mobilisation in the late 1980s, but UMNO was 
not the only BN party to be suffering from internal factionalism and jockeying 
24 
'Mahathir cracks the whip. ' Asiaweek, 10 May 1987 
25 Hari Singh, 'Political change in Malaysia: The role of Semangat 46', Asian Survey, 31: 8 
(1991), pp. 712-28. 
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for power in the mid 1980s, all of which contributed to emerging political space 
for contentious mobilisation. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) had 
been wrought by a very public and increasingly convoluted factional struggle 
since the early years of the decade. Essentially, the dispute revolved around two 
leaders 
- 
Neo Yee Pan and Tan Koon Swan. In 1983, the popular MCA 
president Lee San Choon abruptly retired from office, shortly after ousting his 
elected deputy, Richard Ho, and replacing him with his own protege, Neo. 26 
Neo was not popular within the party, however, and was soon challenged by 
Tan Koon Swan and others, who accused him of creating `phantom' party 
members to boost his standing. 27 Neo responded by expelling Tan and thirteen 
of his supporters from the party. 28 Under an UMNO-brokered deal, Tan and his 
faction were readmitted into the party a year later, after agreeing not to 
challenge Neo and his supporters at the next party polls. 29 Neo, for his part, 
agreed to clean up the party membership rolls. The truce foundered, however, 
on accusations that Neo had not been straightforward in implementing his side 
of the deal. As the crisis deepened, the Neo faction split, with many of his 
erstwhile supporters distancing themselves from his confrontational and 
intransigent approach. 30 
26 The reasons behind Lee's sudden resignation have never been made clear, given his broad 
popularity both within the party and the Chinese community more generally. Various 
rumours of scandal circulated, and it was even suggested that he was forced out by UMNO, 
which was becoming concerned by his popularity, and his apparent appeal to the entire 
Chinese community. Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia, p. 166n. 
27 'Political poltergeists. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 March 1984. 
28 
'Expulsion, not exorcism. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 March 1984. 
29 
'Vitriol and fisticuffs. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 November 1984. 
30 
'A shock sacking. ' Asiaweek, 30 August 1985. 
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Just as the UMNO split was a clash of personalities driven by structural forces, so 
the MCA dispute was intensified by the politics of patronage. As we saw in 
chapter four, the MCA had in the 1970s consolidated its own patronage networks 
in the establishment of Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad (MPHB). Tan's 
popularity within the party was largely a result of his apparently successful 
running of MPHB, of which he was managing director. The dispute came to a 
head at the November 1985 party elections, where Tan officially challenged 
Neo for the party presidency. The delegates voted overwhelmingly for Tan, and 
the party split appeared settled. Shortly after, however, the impact of the 
economic slowdown intervened in an unexpected way. Just days after Tan won 
the presidency, Pan Electric 
-a major Singapore-based corporate conglomerate 
of which he was a director 
- 
went into bankruptcy amidst allegations of share 
price manipulation, prompting a collapse on both the Singapore and the 
Malaysian stock exchanges. 31 Tan was arrested in Singapore on charges of 
Criminal Breach of Trust, though later released on bail in an apparent 
arrangement with the Malaysian government, which wanted Tan to lead the 
MCA in the 1986 general election. Shortly after the election, in which the MCA 
performed disastrously, Tan was imprisoned in Singapore and relinquished his 
party post to his deputy, Ling Leong Sik. Ling, a staunch supporter of Tan 
during the crisis, picked another Tan stalwart, Lee Kim Sai, as his deputy. 
Factional squabbles in regionally-based BN component parties also heightened 
the regime crisis of the mid-1980s. In 1984, a three-way leadership tussle 
emerged in the other major Chinese party in the BN coalition, the Penang-based 
GERAKAN (Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, or The People's Movement Party of 
31 `Unravelling Pan El. ' Asiaweek, 20 December 1985. 
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Malaysia). One of the contenders, Michael Chen, had defected to GERAKAN 
from the MCA after losing his 1979 leadership bid. Chen had a strong factional 
base within the party, primarily made up of other MCA defectors. 32 After losing 
narrowly to the incumbent leader Lim Keng Yaik, Chen was openly courted by 
embattled MCA president Neo, clearly in the hope that should he return to the 
MCA as a Neo ally, he would bring many of his supporters back with him, thus 
strengthening Neo's position. In the event, however, the publicity surrounding 
Chen's vacillations did his credibility serious harm, and he decided the stay put 
in GERAKAN, defecting back to the MCA four years later in 1988, despite having 
won a GERAKAN vice-presidency post in the meantime. 33 
In the East Malaysian state of Sabah, the dominant party BERJAYA (Bersatu 
Rakyat Jelkata Sabah, or Sabah People's Union) suffered a factional split, 
which ultimately brought about the party's downfall in the state assembly. The 
BERJAYA split was important as it demonstrated clearly the link between 
patronage and ethnicity. Formed as a multiracial party in the 1970s, many of 
Sabah's native Christian Kadazandusun tribes, the largest ethnic group in the 
state, became increasingly concerned with the stridently pro-Islamic policies 
pursued by BERJAYA's president and Sabah chief minister, Harris Salleh. State 
government-backed development projects were often unofficially reserved for 
Muslims, and there were instances of entire villages converting to Islam to 
obtain projects in their area. These concerns were vocalised by the senior 
Kadazandusun in the party, Joseph Pairin Kitingan. Harris eventually expelled 
Pairin from the party and from the state government, whereupon Pairin formed 
32 `Political Graveyard. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 December 1984 
33 
'Cracks in Gerakan. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 January 1989 
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his own party, PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah, or the United Sabah Party), which won 
a slim victory in the 1985 state elections, and consolidated this hold in fresh 
elections the following year. 34 
In Sarawak, fragmentation of ethnic political identities and party factionalism 
spilled out into inter-party conflict. 35 The first of these was in the Sarawak 
National Party (SNAP). SNAP's membership was overwhelmingly from the 
Dayak tribes, but its leadership Chinese. After a failed attempt to take control 
of the party, a group of Dayak leaders left SNAP to form a breakaway party, the 
PBDS (Part Bansa Dayak Sarawak, or Sarawak Dayak Party). The PBDS sought 
membership of the BN, but was blocked by SNAP. 36 The Federal BN leadership 
was, however, keen to admit PBDS, whose leaders, including party president Leo 
Moggie, were generally popular with the Dayak community. A bizarre 
compromise was thus worked out whereby the party was admitted into the 
coalition at the federal level, but remained outside of the BN administration in 
Sarawak; Leo Moggie was given a Federal ministership, an apparent promotion 
which also brought him to Kuala Lumpur, where he could be kept on a closer 
rein. 37 
34 For a detailed analysis of the rise of the PBS, see Francis Loh Kok Wah, `Modernisation, 
cultural revival and counter-hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s', in Joel S. Kahn 
and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds. ), Fragmented Vision: Culture and politics in contemporary 
Malaysia, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992, pp. 225-53. 
35 In Sarawak, as in Sabah at the time, none of the major peninsular parties contested. State 
politics thus had an inevitably local dimension. 
36 Any party within the BN has the authority to veto the entry of another party into the coalition. 
37 A similar strategy had been used in dealing with Sabah's secession-minded Chief Minister of 
the early 1970s, Tun Mustapha Harun, who was offered the federal defence portfolio if he 
stood down from his state post. Harun refused, apparently demanding a price no less than the 
deputy primeministership and subsequently lost the 1976 state elections when the federal 
176 
Crisis and Response I, 1987-1990 
Intra-BN tensions were further aggravated in the state when a feud between the 
chief minister Abdul Taib Mahmud and his predecessor and uncle Abdul 
Rahman Yakub developed into a political crisis, with BN parties facing off 
against each other. In 1981, Taib had replaced Rahman as chief minister and 
president of the dominant party in Sarawak, PBB (Part Pesaka Buiniputera 
Bersatu, or United Bumiputera Party), the latter being `promoted' to the largely 
ceremonial position of state governor (yang di-pertua Negeri). Rahman, 
however, had continued trying to influence policy and a large number of state 
appointees remained loyal to him. After Rahman managed to cajole a majority 
of BN state assembly members, including Leo Moggie, into calling for Taib's 
resignation, Taib promptly dissolved the state legislature and called fresh 
elections, which were held in April 1987. The highly divisive election saw BN 
parties running candidates against each other, resulting in a narrow win for the 
parties loyal to Taib. 38 
Thus far, then, we have seen that the social transformations of the 1970s and 
1980s resulted in increased factionalism within BN component parties, virtually 
across the board. 39 As we have seen, the political dependency of the new 
middle class has often been identified as a principle factor in its apparent 
reluctance to push for democratisation. The flip side of this dependency, 
government threw its weight behind BERJAYA. See Robert O. Tilman, 'Mustapha's Sabah, 
1968-1975: The Tun steps down', Asian Survey, 16: 6 (1976), pp. 495-509. 
38 See Chin Ung-Ho, Chinese Politics in Sarawak: A study of the Sarawak United People's 
Party, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1997, especially pp. 177-229. Over the 
following years, a number of defections increased Taib's grip on the assembly. 
39 The major exception here was the Malaysian Indian Congress, which was, however, to suffer 
its own factional split in 1989. 
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however, was that political patrons had to satisfy this demand to ensure its 
compliance. 
The explicitly ethnic delimitations of the regime meant that this quest for 
patronage in turn took on an ethnic dimension. Thus, we have seen that where 
factionalism emerged in the more multiethnic parties of East Malaysia, these 
splits tended to fall along ethnic lines. This was not a simple, one-directional 
top-down process, however. In Sabah, for instance, the ethnically divisive 
development policies pursued by the BERJAYA administration brought about a 
popular Kadazandusun revivalism, which subsequently intensified the factional 
pressures within the party. 
INTRA- PARTY CONFLICT: THE UMNO-MCA SPLIT 
This interplay of development, patronage, ethnicity and mobilisation was played 
out on the national level in the deteriorating relationship between the two largest 
parties in the BN, UMNO and the MCA. Against the backdrop of the societal 
trends identified in the previous chapter, differences between the two parties led 
to a cycle of increasingly strident ethnic claims and social mobilisation under 
their aegis. These developments came to a head with the October 1987 
`Operation Lalang' crackdown, which decisively altered the trajectory of 
opposition to the regime. 
Relations between UMNO and the MCA were decidedly chilly through much of 
the 1980s, principally due to the MCA split, which was seen as a threat to the 
coalition's political dominance. 40 In 1984, Musa Hitam even suggested that the 
MCA should consider `opting out' of the coalition temporarily until its internal 
40 'Vitriol and fisticuffs. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 November 1984. 
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problems were solved 
. 
41 At the same time, PAS approached the MCA to `explain 
its aims', an indication that senior PAS members felt that tensions between UMNO 
and the MCA were high enough that PAS might be able to tempt the MCA out of 
the BN. 42 The resolution of the MCA split with Tan's victory did little to improve 
relations, as a series of disagreements kept the parties apart. The poor 
performance of the MCA at the 1986 general election was a major contributory 
factor to the continuation of poor relations; the MCA was seen in UMNO as not 
having pulled its weight in the coalition, and comparisons were made to the 
1969 general election, when a similarly poor performance by the party had cost 
the Alliance its parliamentary dominance. 43 The MCA, on the other hand, was 
torn between the need to mend relations with its senior partner and the need to 
repair its image in the eyes of the Chinese community. In November 1986, the 
Selangor branch of the MCA, which was headed by the national deputy president 
and Labour Minister Lee Kim Sai, thus passed a resolution calling for the 
abolition of bumiputera status for the Malays and the East Malaysian natives. 
The resolution provoked an immediate backlash from UMNO members, who 
interpreted it as a demand for the end of the cherished Malay `special rights'. 
Forty-six UMNO MPs wrote to Mahathir, asking him to sack Lee, who himself 
offered to resign. Whilst the rift was quickly patched over in public 
- 
the MCA 
withdrew the resolution and the Sultan of Selangor publicly reprimanded Lee 
and warned him not to question Malay special rights 
- 
many within UMNO 
remained unappeased, and it contributed to deteriorating relations between the 
41 `Shape up or ship out. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 December 1984 
42 `PAS wants to explain its aims to MCA. ' New Straits Times, 15 October 1984. Interviews with 
PAS activists, April-November 2001. 
43 Interviews, UMNO activists, April-November 2001. 
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parties, most notably in the virtual demonisation of Lee that was to arise later in 
44 1987. 
Ethnic tensions within the BN were heightened in 1986 when the Penang branch 
of uMNo, in response to the poor performance and internal chaos of the Chinese 
parties in the coalition, requested the prime minister to appoint a Malay chief 
minister in the Chinese majority state. In response, GERAKAN 
- 
whose leader 
Lim Chong Eu was the incumbent chief minister 
- 
demanded extra seats in the 
next election and threatened to withdraw from the BN. 45 Whilst the dispute was 
quickly patched over with the maintenance of the status quo, it was nonetheless 
another sign of the ethnic fragility of the regime, and may have contributed to 
GERAKAN's poor performance in the 1986 election. 
The economic recession, which had fed factionalism within uMNO, also 
contributed indirectly to UMNO-MCA tensions. As we saw in the last chapter, the 
recession had brought about the collapse of a number of `deposit-taking 
cooperatives' (DTCs), which functioned as a kind of collective investment fund, 
taking savings deposits from often poorer Chinese and investing them. With the 
economic recession, many of the cooperatives collapsed. Shortly after the 1986 
general election, the central bank froze the assets of twenty-four cooperatives, 
which had collected between them over five hundred million ringgit from 
almost six hundred thousand depositors. Originally promising returns of up to 
fourteen percent, the cooperatives' assets had been virtually wiped out in the 
property market crash and through gross mismanagement 
- 
many of the 
as 
'Stirring up a "hornet's nest". ' Asiaweek, 23 November 1986. 
as Chung Kek Yoong, Mahathir Administration, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1987, 
p. 80. 
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cooperatives had lent money to their own directors on very soft terms. As the 
government moved to wind up the cooperatives, depositors were faced with the 
prospect of receiving back barely one fifth of their investment. The government 
ruled out a rescue package, citing the poor economic climate. 46 Faced with the 
loss of their life savings, depositors held furious demonstrations around the 
country, even storming the home of the chairman of one of the cooperatives, 
and staging a number of `sit-ins' at the headquarters of others. 47 Many 
depositors held the MCA responsible for their predicament 
- 
most of the 
cooperatives had institutional links with the party, many of their office-bearers 
were also high-ranking MCA officials. Demonstrations were thus also held 
outside the MCA headquarters, and demands were made that the MCA persuade 
the government to subsidise a ringgit-for-ringgit refund. 48 The government's 
refusal to back such a plan was seen by some as another case of ethnic 
discrimination 
- 
in the 1970s, the government had bailed out Bank Rakyat, a 
cooperative bank with mainly Malay investors and had also rescued Bank 
Bumiputera from almost RM 1 billion losses in the Hong Kong property 
market. 49 
Cognisant of its already weak electoral position following the 1986 general 
election and facing this groundswell of popular anger directed at the party, the 
MCA was forced to act 
- 
and be seen to act 
- 
to resolve the depositors' woes. At 
the height of its internal crisis, the MCA had been threatened with expulsion from 
46 
"`Mismanagement, corruption or both". ' Asiaweek, 1 February 1987. 
47 
'Depositors show their anger. ' New Straits Tines, 4 January 1987; '21 held over co-op 
demo', 'Depositors stage "sit-in" at co-op head office. ' New Straits Times, 7 January 1987 
48 
'Co-op depositors protest outside Wisma MCA. ' New Straits Times, 17 November 1986. 
49 Interview, MCA activists, April-November 2001. 
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the BN. In May 1987, it was the MCA's turn to threaten to leave the coalition, 
should the government refuse to institute its ringgit-for-ringgit rescue package. 
UMNO, still reeling from the Razaleigh-Mahathir showdown the previous month, 
could ill-afford to lose its major coalition party, and acceded to the plan. The 
issue, however, left the parties even further estranged than before; during the 
negotiations, UMNO Youth suggested that the MCA make good on its threat and 
leave the BN. 50 Once again, it was Lee Kim Sai 
- 
the main player in the MCA's 
proposals 
- 
who received the most condemnation, with several UMNO Youth 
leaders calling for his dismissal from the post of Labour Minister. 51 
By mid-1987, then, the regime appeared at its most vulnerable since 1969. The 
UMNO party elections and the ensuing court cases had thrown the highest 
echelons of political power in the country into uncertainty. Whilst the MCA split 
appeared to be resolved by 1986, the long feud had done much to damage the 
party's standing in the Chinese community, and the fallout of the recession 
- 
most notably the collapse of the cooperatives 
- 
intensified this dissatisfaction. 
Relations between the two senior parties in the BN were at an all-time low. 
Whilst the difficulties faced by the BN in the first half of 1987 were primarily 
internal and elite-centred, it was the mobilisation of social forces that forced an 
ever-growing wedge between the differing factions and parties. This was most 
visible in the cooperatives protests, but had also been the case with respect to 
the uMNO factionalism, which was intensified by bottom-up pressure in patron- 
client links. In addition, the weakened position of all the major BN parties and 
So 
'Staying on the inside. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 July 1987; `Cooperative venture. ' 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1987. 
51 
'Playing to the gallery. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 July 1987. 
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the government as a whole widened considerably the political opportunity for 
social mobilisation to press popular claims and demands on the regime, claims 
which were themselves intensified by the economic recession. This dialectic 
cycle of regime weakness and social mobilisation escalated exponentially in the 
latter half of 1987, as the continuing power struggle in UMNO threatened to split 
the party in two and the MCA strove to regain its lost standing in the Chinese 
community. As the cycle progressed, party strategy and social mobilisation 
became increasingly ethnically chauvinistic and social tensions rose to the point 
of threatening widespread communal clashes. 52 
Language issues 
-a political flashpoint since the days of the Malayan Union 
plan in the 1950s 
- 
proved to be the spark point for the escalation of protest. 
The first round of protests came in August, when Universiti Malaya instituted a 
ruling limiting the use of Mandarin, Tamil and English in the teaching of 
elective subjects. The decision provoked demonstrations from non-Malay 
students, who interpreted the ruling as an attempt by the administration to boost 
the academic performance of the Malays compared to the other ethnic groups. 53 
The ever-belligerent UMNO Youth soon waded into the controversy, criticising 
the demonstrators but doing nothing to prevent counter-demonstrations by 
students supportive of the university's move. 54 As the protests continued, police 
52 Such a model of cyclically-increasing chauvinism or 'ethnic outbidding' was proposed in the 
late 1960s as a general model of democratic instability in ethnically divided countries. The 
theory as formulated then, however, was made in reference to the politics of elections, rather 
than social mobilisation more generally. See Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Politics in Plural Societies: A theory of democratic instability, Columbus, Merrill, 1972. 
53 `50 demonstrate against ruling on elective courses. ' New Straits Times, 2 August 1987. 
54 
'Demonstrations not the answer: UMNO Youth. ' New Straits Times, 4 August 1987. 
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were forced to keep the contending groups of demonstrators apart. 55 By 
October, the DAP had become involved in the protests and the police were 
making numerous arrests. 56 The politicisation of these demonstrations, coming 
shortly after the UMNO showdown, contrasted markedly with the relative quiet 
following similar demonstrations by Chinese students at Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia over perceived discrimination. 57 That the 1987 demonstrations 
escalated into a political storm is clearly demonstrative of the shifting 
opportunity structures for protest mobilisation. 
The Universiti Malaya uproar was soon overshadowed, however, by a national 
level dispute, also concerning language and education, when the Education 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim announced the promotion of around ninety teachers 
who were not educated in Chinese-language schools to senior positions in 
government-supported Chinese-language primary schools. The promotions 
caused a storm of protest from the Chinese community, which has traditionally 
placed a strong value on its vernacular education system. The promotions were 
seen as an attempt to `change the character of the Chinese schools', and perhaps 
ultimately pave the way for their disestablishment. 58 Although Anwar quickly 
backed down over the appointments, Chinese opposition parties and 
55 
'Demonstrators nearly clash. ' New Straits Times, 18 August 1987. 
56 '11 held in DAP demo at Universiti Malaya. ' New Straits Tines, 10 October 1987. 
57 
'UKM gives students ultimatum'. New Straits Times, 14 August 1986. 
58 Tan Liok Ee, `Chinese schools in Malaysia: A case of cultural resilience, ' in Lee Kam Hing 
and Tan Chee-Beng (eds. ), The Chinese in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 244. Chinese schools have long been subtly undermined in the national education 
system, and the Chinese community has tended to view any changes to the system as a move 
towards disestablishment. For a fuller study of education in the Chinese community, see Tan 
Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
184 
Crisis and Response I, 1987-1990 
educationalist groups continued to protest, demanding the instant withdrawal of 
the appointees. Again, the Chinese parties in the BN were clearly pressurised by 
the protests into adopting a more chauvinistic position, for fear of losing ground 
to the DAP. In a sensational turn, MCA and GERAKAN members, led by Lee Kam 
Sai, thus joined a protest rally with the DAP and other Chinese-based opposition 
parties, calling for a boycott of the schools involved. 59 The boycott saw over 
thirty thousand children kept away from school by their parents. 60 
The cycle of protest was intensified by a series of counter-demonstrations 
organised by various groups with UMNO. On the same day as the MCA-DAP joint 
rally, some five hundred UMNO members also held a demonstration, but the 
primary target of their anger was their coalition partner the MCA, rather than the 
DAP; demonstrators burnt MCA flags and posters. 61 Subsequently, on October 
17, utNO Youth held a rally at a disused stadium in Kampung Baru, a large 
Malay district in Kuala Lumpur. The rally, attended by some six thousand 
people, was highly chauvinistic, and the target of the protesters wrath was again 
the MCA rather than the DAP. Banners called for the resignation and of Lee Kim 
Sai, and urged the MCA to `go to Hell' (pergi Jahanam). Other banners 
expressed broader and often violent anti-Chinese sentiments: `May 13 has 
begun', a reference to the ethnic riots of 1969, and `Soak [the kris] in Chinese 
blood'. 62 The UMNO Youth president, Najib Tun Razak, addressed the crowd in 
59 
'Five parties support "boycott classes" move. ' New Straits Times, 12 October 1987. 
60 `Get them back to school. ' New Straits Times, 16 October 1987 
61 'UMNO members hold protest. ' New Straits Times, 12 October 1987. 
62 Government of Malaysia, Towards Preserving National Security, Kertas Perintah 14,1988: 
17. The kris is a ceremonial Malay dagger, which is also emblazoned on UMNO's party flag. 
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more moderate language, but still called for Lee's resignation and demanded 
that the MCA acquiesce to government policy, or else leave the BN. G3 
By the end of October 1987, then, ethnic tensions in the country were reaching 
critical levels. As news spread of freak shooting incident when an army 
sergeant ran amok killing one Chinese and wounding another Chinese and a 
Malay in the Chow Kit area of Kuala Lumpur, the centre of the 1969 riots, 
many people rushed to stockpile food, fearing the outbreak of rioting. 
Increasing public attention was focussed on a mass rally planned for I 
November to celebrate UMNO'S fortieth year, postponed since 1986 (the actual 
anniversary) and relocated from Johor (UMNO's birthplace) to Kuala Lumpur. 
Up to a half million Malays were expected to join the rally, in what was seen by 
many as a show of strength by Mahathir against the UMNO dissidents. 64 With 
ethnic tensions running high, however, it was feared that the rally would prove 
to be the spark point for fresh riots. In such a context, there was little doubt that 
the government needed to take action to calm sentiments and prevent an 
escalation of conflict. The form this response took, however, was far beyond 
what many expected. 
REPRESSION AND RESPONSE: OPERATION LALANG 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that the regime's response to the 
emergence of a middle class-based sphere of civil society was primarily 
discursive rather than coercive. That policy changed in October 1987. Faced 
with an incendiary ethnic situation, the regime cracked down not only on the 
63 
'Taking it to the brink. ' Asiaweek, 30 October 1987. 
64 
'A state of shock. ' Asiaweek, 6 November 1987 
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(perceived) immediate instigators of the conflict, but also on other challengers 
to the state, including the middle class-led civil society. 
On 27 and 28 October 1987, over one hundred people were arrested and 
detained without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA), in what was known 
as Operation Lalang. 65 The detainees came from a broad spectrum of political 
parties and social activist groups. Nine DAP MPs, including the party's two top 
leaders Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh, and many other party workers were 
detained, as were fifteen party leaders from PAS and two from the small Malay- 
based PSRM (Part Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia, or Malaysian People's Socialist 
Party). Four trade unionists were amongst those arrested; many other detainees 
came from NGOS, including ALIRAN president Chandra Muzaffar and CAP 
activist Meenakshi Raman. In Sarawak, two prominent anti-logging activists 
were arrested. 
The dragnet was not limited to the opposition and social activists, however. 
Also detained were a number of BN politicians from the MCA and GERAKAN, and 
even UMNO. Those detained from the Chinese parties were mostly from the 
youth wings, and those who had been more vocal in criticising the government 
over the Chinese teachers issue. Even MCA deputy president Lee Kim Sai was 
himself apparently on the list of those to be detained, and escaped arrest only by 
promptly leaving the country for `indefinite leave' in Australia. 66 The arrests 
also reverberated in the unresolved UMNO split 
- 
the three UMNO leaders who 
65 Official figures put the total number of arrests at 106, but other estimates suggest more were 
detained. Lalang is the name of a type of weed in Malay. 
66 
'A state of shock. ' Asiaweek, 6 November 1987. 
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were detained were all supporters of Razaleigh. G7 In addition to the detentions, a 
nationwide ban on public rallies and ceramah was instituted, including the 
UMNO rally scheduled for 1 November. A number of national newspapers and 
periodical were suspended, including the MCA-owned mass circulation Star, 
which had gained a reputation for its relatively liberal attitude and willingness to 
give column inches to critical social groups. 68 Amendments to tighten the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act and the Internal Security Act were also 
rushed through parliament. The ISA amendments were arguably the apotheosis 
of the BN regime's abuse of the parliamentary process. In March 1988, Karpal 
Singh obtained his release from the ISA through a successful High Court habeas 
corpus writ on grounds of illegal detention, essentially due to non-compliance 
by the police and Home Ministry of the strict procedures of arrest under the ISA. 
Although Karpal was rearrested leaving the courthouse, the regime was eager to 
avoid another such embarrassment and, with a virtually identical writ served by 
Lim Kit Siang due to be heard on 13 July, pushed retroactive amendments to the 
law through parliament to prevent such appeals. The amendments received their 
second reading on 12 July, and a compliant judge postponed Lim's case by two 
days, thus allowing the regime time to get royal assent. The amendments were 
gazetted at 12. Olam on 15 July, and handed to the judge at 8.45am, just in time 
to deny Lim his writ. On 14 July, Deputy Home Minister Megat Junid stated 
67 `A climate of fear. ' Asiaweek, 13 November 1987. 
68 See Zaharom Nain, `The structure of the media industry: Implications for democracy', in 
Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik (eds. ), Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and 
practices, Richmond, Curzon, 2002, pp. 111-37. 
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`The amendments have nothing to do with anyone. It is not because we want to 
victimise Lim Kit Siang... The changes are necessary... That is all. ' 69 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's first prime minister and Razaleigh supporter 
in the UMNO tussle, decried the operation as undemocratic and signalling the 
transformation of the country into a police state. 70 In an affidavit to support 
Chandra Muzaffar's habeas corpus writ, he further stated that `my cabinet 
colleagues and I gave a solemn promise to parliament and the nation that the 
immense powers given to the government under the ISA would never be used to 
stifle legitimate opposition and silence lawful dissent'. Similar comments were 
made by Mahathir's immediate predecessor, Tun Hussein Onn. 71 
The Operation Lalang crackdown was the widest use of the regime's repressive 
machinery since the 1969 ethnic riots and has also been compared to the 1967 
crackdown on the Left in Penang. 72 As we saw in previous chapters, repression 
has historically met with little resistance in Malaysia, and has been an effective 
tool for the regime. Whereas previous rounds of repression were focussed on 
leftwing groups and unions, however, Operation Lalang was a broader attack on 
civil society as a whole. Various reasons have been suggested for the severity 
of the crackdown, but it seems clear that the regime 
- 
and more specifically the 
Mahathir faction within UMNO 
- 
recognised the need to pacify the potentially 
explosive social tensions at the time, but also took the opportunity to repress and 
69 Democratic Action Party, The Real Reason, Petaling Jaya, Democratic Action Party, 1988, pp. 
84-98. 
70 
'A state of shock. ' Asiaweek, 6 November 1987. 
71 
'Dismissing the writs. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 December 1987. 
72 Simon Tan, 'The rise of state authoritarianism in Malaysia', Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars, 22: 3 (1990), pp. 32-42. 
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intimidate its opponents. 73 In particular, the regime accepted that the planned 
UMNO rally had to be cancelled or postponed and the arrests were made 
concurrently to save face. Said Lee Lam Thye, the most senior DAP leader left 
unarrested, `the prime minister was attempting to make the DAP a whipping boy 
or scapegoat to justify [his] decision to call off the UMNO mammoth rally'. 74 In 
addition, the DAP claimed that the arrests were designed to prevent the party 
highlighting a number of government scandals, including the allocation of a 
major privatisation project to an UMNO-owned company, a decision which Lim 
was challenging in the courts at the time. Interestingly, the party also claimed 
that the regime also sought to cripple the DAP's increasing success in attracting 
Malay support, especially by penetrating FELDA schemes, as we saw in the last 
chapter. 75 
In a revealing interview with Asiaweek magazine shortly after the operation, 
Mahathir placed the blame for the arrests firmly on both the MCA and the DAP, 
and their attempts to `show that they are better defenders of the Chinese' than 
each other. Of the social activists detained, he claimed that they were serving as 
`front' organisations for the DAP: `We know that ALIRAN backed the DAP during 
73 The influence of the Singaporean regime has also been detected by some commentators, who 
note the strong institutional and historical ties between the Malaysian and the Singaporean 
Special Branches. Some of the charges preferred against the detainees, particularly the 
allegations of a Christian-communist conspiracy, bore remarkable resemblance to the charges 
used in Singapore when Lee Kuan Yew's regime cracked down on social opposition in April 
and May 1987. See Jomo K. S., `Race, religion and repression: "National security" and the 
insecurity of the regime', in Committee Against Repression in the Pacific and Asia (CARPA), 
Tangled Web: Dissent, deterrence and the 27 October 1987 crackdown in Malaysia, 
Haymarket, CARPA, 1988, pp. 1-27. 
74 `The eclipse of the opposition. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 November 1987. 
75 Lim Kit Siang's first submission to the ISA Advisory Board, 4 April 1988. Reproduced in 
Democratic Action Party, The Real Reason. 
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the [1986] elections'. In fact, ALIRAN had not actively supported any party in 
the election, only calling for the BN to be denied its two-thirds majority. 76 
Indeed, the organisation had specifically rejected any collaboration with an 
electoral pact arranged by PAS and several of the smaller opposition parties on 
the grounds that, as a civil society group, it should not indulge in party politics. 
In March 1988, the government produced its official justification of the arrests 
in a White Paper entitled Towards Preserving National Security. The paper 
presented five reasons for the crackdown: 
" The `exploitation of sensitive issues', including the Bukit Cina 
controversy and the Chinese education furore; 
" `The Christianisation of Malays and the exploitation of the 
Christianisation issue'; 
" The `manipulation of the Islamic religion' by `deviationist' groups; 
" `Activities of the Marxist group'; and 
" `The continuing involvement of the Communist Party of Malaya'. 77 
The latter four groups accounted for only a handful of the arrests, mostly little 
known activists involved in small religious groups or secret societies. The 
White Paper was widely dismissed as a thin political subterfuge; it was accused 
of telling half truths or distortions, and concealing the real reason for the 
crackdown 
- 
to stifle dissent and silence critics. In the words of ALIRAN, `the 
76 Interview, P. Ramakrishnan, ALIRAN president, George Town, October 2001. 
77 Government of Malaysia, Towards Preserving National Security, Kertas Perintah 14,1988. 
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White Paper criticises those who cry out that the linen is dirty, but fails to 
chastise those who dirty the linen... It is biased, it conceals, it distorts'. 78 
Although many of those arrested were released within the initial sixty day 
detention period, 79 the crackdown had a lasting impact upon social mobilisation 
and civil society. Social mobilisation in the country was brought to a virtual 
halt; the protest activity that had escalated over the past five years stopped 
completely and, with the exception of the massive plantation strikes in January 
and February 1990, did not return to its previous levels until the outburst of 
reformasi in 1998. Even the most pro-regime commentators of the time 
accepted that a `climate of fear' had descended on civil society in the wake of 
Operation Lalang. 80 
For the forty detainees sent to the Kamunting Camp, however, incarceration 
provided an unlikely period of political networking and confidence building. 
The 1990 decision by a group of prominent but previously apolitical civil rights 
activists to join the DAP and, in some cases, stand for election has been 
attributed to `long discussions' between the detained activists and DAP 
parliamentarians in the detention camp. 81 One of the group, Kua Kia Soong, 
has noted: 
78 `Whitewash! ', Aliran Monthly, 8(3), March 1988. 
79 Under the terms of the Internal Security Act, police personnel have the power to detain 
individuals for up to sixty days on suspicion of being a threat to national security, after which 
the home minister must sign a (renewable) two year order for the detention to continue. 
8° Hasan Haji Hamzah, Mahathir: Great Malaysian Hero, Kuala Lumpur, Media Printext, 1990, 
p. 57. 
81 Interview, Lim Kit Siang, DAP national chairman, George Town, June 2001. Not all of those 
who joined the party were former Operation Lalang detainees, however. 
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We can say that if Operation Lalang had not happened in 1987, 
our entry into the DAP would not have happened. My 
incarceration with the other DAP leaders at Kamunting allowed 
us to get acquainted. 82 
Outside of detention, a support group for the ISA detainees was formed, which 
ultimately gave rise to the human rights organisation SUARAM (Suara Rak}yat 
Malaysia 
- 
Malaysian People's Voice), also fronted by Kua Kia Soong. 
Whereas other movements appear to have been demobilised by the events of 
1987, the labour organisations were also more resistant. Whilst the Operation 
Lalang crackdown may have dissuaded them from further illegal 
demonstrations, it also signalled a shift to increased official strike activity. This 
pattern is well demonstrated by a protracted dispute by plantation workers 
seeking monthly, rather than daily wages. Backing these claims, they had held a 
number of pickets and illegal strikes during the mid-1980s, failing to reach any 
settlement. 83 After 1987, however, they stopped these activities, instead holding 
one huge 
- 
but legal 
- 
strike in 1990, which saw hundreds of thousands of 
workdays lost over a four day period. 84 This change in strategy by the labour 
movement once again highlights the demobilising impact of repression in 1987. 
The movement's resistance and the actual increase in overall strike activity after 
1987, however, may be explained by the fact that, in the wake of 1987, legal 
12 Kua Kia Soong, Inside the 0.1P 1990-95, Petaling Jaya, PB, 1996, p. 4. 
13 
'45000 plantation workers down tool. ' New Straits Tintes, 8 April 1986; 'Estate workers 
picket over wage dispute. ' New Straits Times, 29 January 1987. 
94 E. g. '65,000 plantation workers go on strike. ' Straits Times, 1 February 1990. 
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strikes were arguably the only 
- 
certainly the safest 
- 
form of collective action 
left as a mobilisational option. 
POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER OPERATION LALANG: 
FORCING A COALITION 
Thus far, then, we have seen that the Operation Lalang repression effectively 
stifled the previous expansion of civil society at a moment when the political 
opportunity for mobilisation was otherwise widening with the intense internal 
conflicts of the BN. At the same time, however, the deepening schisms within 
the t3N, and within UMNO in particular, left an opening for more meaningful 
political participation than was possible previously. The combination of these 
two factors effectively redirected opposition politics from social protests to the 
politics of elections and parties. Thus was formed an admittedly uneasy, but 
nonetheless impressive, coalition of civil society groups, opposition political 
parties and former regime elites. 
The failure to resolve the U` NO split brought about a substantial opening in the 
political regime in Malaysia as the challenger `Team B' faction sought to wrest 
power from the Mahathir faction. Ironically, the depth and duration of the 
political crisis is arguably at least partially attributable to Mahathir himself and, 
in particular, his `winner takes all' attitude in the UMNO elections. After his 
narrow victory in the elections, Mahathir chose to purge the government of 
Razaleigh and his supporters, who responded by filing a court action to nullify 
the U, t\o elections. The court action was based upon allegations that illegally 
established U. t\o branches had sent delegates to the party assembly, thus 
invalidating the poll results. In response, the defendants 
- 
Mahathir's faction 
- 
claimed that the appellants, who did not include Razaleigh or Musa themselves, 
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had no locus standi in the case. On the last day of the trial, however, Mahathir's 
lawyers entered another `kamikaze' defence, arguing that if the relevant 
branches were deemed illegal, then, according to the Societies Act, the whole 
party was illegal. The judge concurred and, in a seismic ruling in February 
85 1988, ruled UMNO illegal. 
Following the decision, both factions scrambled to form a new party. At stake 
were two issues: the name UMNO, which still carried great weight in the Malay 
community, and the vast corporate assets of the party, including newspapers and 
a television station. An initial attempt by former prime minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, a Razaleigh supporter, to register a new party called UMNO Malaysia 
was rejected by the Registrar of Societies as premature, as the old UMNO had not 
yet been officially deregistered. Shortly afterwards, Mahathir was successful in 
registering a party called UMNO (Baru) and later pushed through parliament 
amendments to the Societies Act to ensure that the old party's assets were 
transferred to UMNO (Baru). 86 After a number of unsuccessful attempts to 
challenge the formation of UMNO (Baru) in court, Razaleigh and his supporters 
crossed to the opposition benches and, in 1989 with a general election 
approaching, formed a new party of their own: Semangat '46 (Spirit of '46 
-a 
85 `Challenge of the elders. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 February 1988; 'UMNO no longer 
exists. ' Asiaweek, 19 February 1988. 
86 `A grand master move. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 March 1988. As many noted at the 
time, the Registrar of Societies is a civil servant answerable to the Home Minister, a post also 
held by Mahathir. Mahathir thus had an obvious advantage in knowing exactly when the old 
UMNO was to be deregistered. 
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reference to the year of uMNo's founding). 87 Semangat subsequently forged 
two separate electoral coalitions. One, the APU (Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah, 
or Islamic Unity Movement), linked Semangat with PAS and two smaller Islamic 
parties. The other agreement, the Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia (GAGASAN 
- 
Malaysian People's Coalition), joined the party with the DAP and the smaller 
PSRM. 
Before the formation of Semangat '46, Razaleigh and the other UMNO dissidents 
faced their first electoral test when Shahrir Abdul Samad, one of the pro- 
Razaleigh ministers sacked after the UMNO election, resigned his seat to force a 
by-election in September 1988. Shahrir stood as an independent in a three way 
fight against his replacement BN candidate and a candidate from the PSRM. 
Shahrir's surprise and overwhelming win boosted opposition to Mahathir's 
UMNO, but the election gave out contradictory signals in terms of the potential 
for opposition collaboration. The DAP had campaigned for Sliahrir, delivering 
him valuable Chinese votes, but political commentators at the time concluded 
that a long-term coalition between Razaleigh and the DAP seemed `unlikely'. 
The decision of the PSRM to field a candidate 
- 
who came a distant third in votes 
- 
also demonstrated the general mistrust of Razaleigh's group amongst 
opposition parties. 88 Indeed, some observers at the time thought a Razaleigh- 
MCA pact a more likely scenario than Razaleigh-DAP. 89 The MCA was at the 
time at its nadir of support, and its relations with UMNO were extremely rocky. 
87 `Mine, yours or ours? ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 April 1988; 'No go for the Tunku. ' 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 April 1988; 'Mahathir rival Razaleigh registers new party. ' 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 June 1989. 
88 
'Princely opposition. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 September 1988. 
89 
'The gathering storm. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 October 1988. 
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Speculation was thus rife that if Razaleigh was able to temp the MCA out of the 
BN other parties would follow, and Razaleigh could in effect carry out an 
internal coup, replacing UMNO with his own dissident party in a new Barisan. 
In the event, however, the MCA remained loyal to the BN and Razaleigh's newly 
formed Semangat '46 was forced to look elsewhere for allies. Despite its 
grassroots collaboration with DAP in a series of by-elections, it was with PAS that 
Semangat first made a formal pact in April 1989, which created the APU. 90 In 
many respects, the alliance seemed a strange one. Both were Malay parties and 
both had their main base of support in the state of Kelantan. In as much, they 
were more natural competitors than collaborators, a problem which would haunt 
the coalition in the future. Moreover, there was some considerable bad blood 
between many activists in the two parties. PAS had controlled the Kelantan state 
assembly from Independence until 1978, and it was Razaleigh, who was then 
UMNO's Kelantan chief, who was credited with wresting control of the assembly 
away from PAS. Nonetheless, with Razaleigh's personal popularity and PAS' 
grassroot networks, there was little doubt that the two parties would dominate 
Kelantan as a Malay power base, if they could work together. 
The APU was strengthened in June 1989 by the defection of the Barisan Jamaah 
Islamiah SeMalaysia (BERJASA, or Pan-Malaysian Islamic Reform Front), a 
small BN component formed in 1980 from PAS dissidents. ' Although BERJASA 
was electorally insignificant, its departure from the BN was seen as a 
demonstration of the growing momentum for change in the Malay heartlands. 
90 
'A royal snub. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1989. 
91 
'Rally round Razaliegh. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 June 1989. 
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The Semangat-led opposition front took its full shape in 1990, with the 
formation of the GAGASAN coalition with the DAP and PSRM. It was in the 
context of its collaboration with Semangat '46 that DAP leader Lim Kit Siang 
began articulating his concept of Malaysia as a `two coalition system of 
democracy'. Recognising that the prospect of one multiethnic party forming a 
government in Malaysia was a long way off, Lim argued instead that the 
country could attain a more meaningful level of democracy by emulating the 
Western model of two-party democracy, but with two multiethnic coalitions 
instead of two monolithic parties. Yet if Lim saw the DAP'S collaboration with 
Semangat and the GAGASAN as the cornerstone of a new opposition politics, it 
was clear that he did not envisage closer cooperation with PAS. Indeed, the 
party went to great lengths to distance itself from PAS, to the extent of 
threatening disciplinary action against any of its member who shared a stage 
with PAS. 92 Nonetheless, the formation of a joint front through Semangat was 
unprecedented, and represented a genuine opening in the political system. In 
the words of a Far Eastern Economic Review article of the time: 
For the first time, the national electorate 
- 
instead of just... 
UMNO delegates 
- 
will, by choosing between the two coalition 
leaders, in effect choose the country's next prime minister. 93 
Within the space of two years, then, the opportunity structure for oppositional 
activity in Malaysia underwent a major transformation. New avenues for 
political participation opened up, whilst societal avenues were closed down. 
This had an important effect on the way the crisis played out. Almost without 
92 
'Ceramah: DAP to act against those inviting PAS. ' New Straits Times, 13 April 1990. 
93 ` Order of battle. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 October, 1990. 
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exception, civil society groups dropped their social mobilisation, and grasped 
the political opening. This meant, in effect, allying themselves with the 
emerging opposition coalitions. Symptomatic of this trends was the MTUC's 
traditional May Day rally in 1989, which was for the first time addressed by 
speakers from PAS and the DAP, as well as representatives of ALIRAN and the Bar 
Council. This coalition of forces clearly irked the government, which 
threatened to ban politicians from future MTUC rallies. 94 As already mentioned, 
a number of prominent activists, including Operation Lalang detainees, also 
threw themselves wholeheartedly into the opposition front, clearly perceiving it 
as the best chance for real change in the country. Among these was Dr Kua Kia 
Soong, who stood as a candidate for the DAP in Petaling Jaya in 1990 and won 
handsomely. 
In many cases, however, the engagement was less than enthusiastic, but 
nonetheless represented a considerable change from former positions. In the run 
up to the 1990 general election, for instance, ALIRAN distributed a `Manifesto 
for Human Rights', signed by over thirty NGOS and trade unions, and `endorsed' 
by Semangat, PAS, PsRM and the DAP. 95 ALIRAN also praised Razaleigh for his 
`strategy of openness'. 96 In contrast, ALIRAN had scorned all contact with a 
previous pact between PAS and three smaller parties in the 1986 general 
election. It had argued that, as an NGO, it must remain above party politics. 97 
The tenuousness of this rapprochement between civil society and the Semangat- 
94 
'KL may bar politicians from future May Day rallies. ' Straits Times (Singapore), 4 May 1989. 
95 Aliran et al, Manifesto For Human Rights, Penang: Aliran, 1990. 
96 `The Razaleigh Strategy. ' Aliran Monthly, 10(8), October 1988. 
97 Aliran Monthly, 6(5); `Where Aliran went wrong in rejecting electoral pact. ' New Straits 
Times, 20 September, 1986. 
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led opposition was well illustrated, however, by the disparity between this 
`Manifesto for Human Rights' and Semangat's own manifesto, Save Malaysia. 
Whilst the civil society manifesto, `endorsed' by Semangat, called for the 
complete revocation of a number of Draconian laws, Semangat's own manifesto 
promised only to revoke certain recent amendments. 98 ALIRAN president 
Chandra Muzaffar also reportedly refused an invitation from Razaleigh to stand 
for Semangat in the 1990 election. 99 
The Semangat opposition front had more success aligning itself with the labour 
movement, most notably with the MTUC. After a long and public debate, the 
MTUC announced in 1988 that it was officially dropping its constitutionally 
apolitical stance and entering the political fray, declaring that `the question of 
whether or not MTVC should involve itself in politics does not arise at all, simply 
because no labour organisation can ever divorce itself from politics'. 100 In an 
attempt to keep an at least nominally bipartisan stance, however, the congress 
stated that it would never `surrender its independence to any political party'. 101 
Instead, it would draw up a political agenda, and any political party which 
signed up would receive the MTUC's full backing at the general election. 
Despite this, however, it was clear where the organisation's sympathies lay. Its 
secretary-general, Dr V. David, had been a long standing MP for the DAP. In 
1990, the MTUC president Zainal Rampak, joined the newly formed Semangat 
'46, and declared his intention to stand for parliament. 102 Ahmad Nor, the MTUC 
98 Semangat '46, Save Malaysia, 1990. 
99 `Marina's letter. ' Malaysiakini, 13 January 2000. 
100 Malaysian Trades Union Congress, General Report 1990,1990, pg. 34. 
101 Ibid., pg. 36. 
102 
'Zainal Rampak tells why he's re-entering politics. ' New Straits Times, 2 May 1990. 
200 
Crisis and Response I, 1987-1990 
vice-president, had also been involved with the small Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) and in the abortive unionist party, Part Nasionalis Malaysia (NASMA - 
Nationalist Party of Malaysia), before switching to Semangat '46. 
The decision by the MTUC to enter the political fray was not unanimously 
supported by its member unions, and the large National Union of Bank 
Employees (NUBE) pulled out of the MTUC in protest, forming its own alternative 
union congress, the Malaysian Labour Organisation (MLO). 103 The MLO 
attracted fifteen breakaway unions, representing over 140,000 out of the MTUC's 
600,000 affiliated members. 104 CUEPACS was also less enthusiastic in its 
relations with the Semangat opposition. As we saw in the last chapter, CUEPACS 
was traditionally more supportive of the government than the MTUC, but a 
number of long running pay disputes in the mid 1980s had soured relations 
somewhat. Whilst CUEPACS officials did not become as active in the opposition 
front as their MTUC counterparts, however, it was one of the principle signatories 
Of ALIRAN's `Manifesto for Human Rights'. 
By the time of the 1990 general election, then, an uneasy but broad coalition of 
opposition political parties and civil society groups was ranged against the BN 
regime, itself weakened by protracted inter- and intra-party conflicts. The level 
of optimism among some opposition groups that the BN might finally be 
unseated was demonstrated just days before the election, when the PBS withdrew 
from the BN and threw its weight behind GAGASAN. 
103 `Bank workers union sets up rival labour federation. ' Straits Times, 28 May 1989. 
104 'KL unions set up rival body. ' Business Times (Singapore), 13 June 1989. 
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THE 1990 GENERAL ELECTION 
We have seen, then, that the trajectory of regime fracture, social mobilisation 
and repression in the latter half of the 1980s effective redirected oppositional 
politics towards focussing on the upcoming general election, which was 
eventually called on 4 October 1990 and held two weeks later, under recent 
changes to the election laws to shorten the campaign period, justified - 
ironically enough, as we shall see 
- 
as preventing the exploitation of ethnic 
sentiments in the campaign. 
By the time Mahathir called the election, economic and political conditions 
were turning to favour the BN again. The economy had recovered from the mid- 
80s recession and was performing well again. The repercussions of Operation 
Lalang also reshaped the political contest through the stifling of public debate 
through the continued detention of civil society and opposition activists. Lim 
Kit Siang in particular had been effective in uncovering and publicising a 
number of financial scandals involving the government and the BN coalition. In 
April 1989, Lim was one of the last two of the Operation Lalang detainees to be 
released. 105 In addition, the cancellation of the permits of several magazines 
and the six-month suspension of the Star newspaper under Operation Lalang 
had forced greater self-censorship upon the already generally compliant media. 
The coalition had also rebounded from its surprise defeat in the Johor Bahru by- 
election, winning five out of the subsequent six by-elections until August 1989, 
in some cases even improving its majority. 106 Nonetheless, the formation of 
two-interlinked coalitions of all the major opposition parties backed by a 
105 'Malaysia frees detained politicians. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1989. The 
other was Lim's son and fellow DAP MP, Lim Guan Eng, who was released the same day. 
106 'Eroding Malay support. ' Aliran Monthly, 9(8), August 1989. 
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significant sector of civil society constituted a significant challenge to the BN 
regime at the elections. 
The focus of civil society groups as well as the political opposition on the 
election was remarkable in two respects. Firstly, despite the undoubted crisis of 
legitimacy facing the BN regime, the fearsome state machinery at its disposal 
meant that there was never any realistic chance of it losing; civil society was 
backing a lame horse. Secondly, and more importantly, elections in Malaysia 
are, as we have already seen, inherently ethnic affairs. After a decade of 
campaigning to expand the nonethnic sphere of civil society, it may thus seem 
strange that these same organisations threw themselves into electoral politics 
with such gusto. Only if we take into consideration the trajectories of 
contention elucidated in this chapter can we explain this as a necessary move for 
a civil society eager to capitalise on the regime's problems after societal 
avenues of contention had been closed down. 
In the event, both the government and the opposition steered remarkably clear 
of overtly ethnic issues in the early days of the campaign, although the 
underlying structures of electoral politics remained inherently ethnicised. The 
mid-campaign defection of the PBS into the opposition fold, however, was 
significant not only in electoral terms, but also in the tenor of the campaign. 
The BN regime leapt on the PBS' move, upping the ethnic gambit by claiming, in 
contradiction of its own quasi-consociationalist stance, that it demonstrated 
Razaleigh's lack of commitment to the Malays. Playing on the mainly Christian 
constituency of the PBS and its leaders, ` Razaleigh was projected as having "sold 
out" the interests of the Muslim community' and as having been `used' by the 
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Christian PBS. 107 Most notorious here was the aftermath of Razaleigh's visit to 
Sabah to welcome the PBS into the opposition fold. As part of his trip, 
Razaleigh was photographed wearing a tengkolok (traditional Kadazan 
headgear), which carried a cross pattern. Although the cross on the headgear 
was not in any way a religious symbol, the regime-controlled media presented 
this as evidence that Razaleigh would `sell out' the Malays to the Christian 
Kadazans of Sabah. The UMNO-owned Utusan Malaysia newspaper, for 
instance, emblazoned its front cover with the image, with the headline `Many 
people angry at Razaleigh wearing a tengkolok with a cross'. 108 The image was 
also repeatedly broadcast on state-controlled television. After the election, the 
youth wing of GERAKAN, one of the more multiethnic BN component parties, 
publicly criticised the UMNO leadership for such tactics, 109 but the electoral 
damage to Razaleigh was already done. 
The results of the elections demonstrated the degree to which voting, and in 
particular voting shifts, had fallen along ethnic lines. As expected, the BN won 
the federal election with a reduced majority, although maintaining its two-thirds 
dominance; at the state level, the BN lost control of the Kelantan and Sabah 
assemblies, but kept other crucial assemblies, notably Penang, where the DAP 
had focussed its attention (see table 6.1). As in previous elections, the BN had 
done best in ethnically mixed seats, tending to lose support to PAS in the 
overwhelmingly Malay seats, and to the DAP in the strongly non-Malay seats. 
The shift in this trend in 1990 was remarkable (see figure 6.1). 
107Khong Kim Hoong, Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity, change and ethnic 
politics, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991, p. 6. 
108'Orang ramai marah Razaleigh pakai tengkolok bersalib'. Utusan Malaysia, 19 October 1990. 
109Khong, Malaysia's General Election 1990, p. 7. 
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Table 6.1: Prop ortionate breakdown of seats won at federal and state levels, 1982,1986 and 1990 
Federal 
1982 1986 1990 
BN 
Opposition 
DAP 
PAS 
S46 
Other 
Independents 
85.7 83.6 70.6 
9.1 14.1 27.2 
5.8 13.6 11.1 
3.2 0.6 3.9 
4.4 
10.0 
5.2 2.3 2.2 
Notes: In 1986, the PBS contested as part of the BN; 
Lumut 
State elections were not held concurrently in Sabah and Sarawak. 
Support for the BN in Malay-minority seats was virtually unchanged from 1986; 
the trend away from the BN was instead concentrated in the Malay-majority 
seats, with a greater swing the greater the proportion of Malay voters. In part 
this performance can be explained by the fact that the DAP was in 1986 already 
enjoying unusually high levels of support, but the result also clearly 
demonstrated that elections remained ethnically divisive events. Most notable 
here were the five Malay-minority seats which the BN had in 1986 won with less 
than half the votes on a split opposition 
- 
in 1990, the opposition front, 
represented by the DAP, managed to convert only one of these into a victory (see 
table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: 1990 election results in M. s1ay minority 
BN 
DAP 
PAS 
Malay 
Chinese 
Indian 
Other 
Beruas 
1986 1990 
48.8 51.6 
44.7 48.4 
6.5 
- 
33.9 
53.3 
12.8 
1986 19901 
seats with IIN split vote victo 
Telok Intan 
1986 1990 
State 
1982 1986 1990 
90.1 85.2 72.1 
9.6 14.8 27.6 
3.8 10.5 12.8 
5.8 4.3 9.4 
5.4 
0.3 0.0 0.3 
Klang 
1986 1990 
Election results (% of votes accepted) 
48.6 56.2 
44.0 43.8 
7.4 
- 
49.6 53.2 
44.9 46.8 
5.5 
- 
47.9 42.9 
46.6 57.1 
4.4 
- 
Ethnic composition (% of registered voters) 
40.9 
46.5 
12.3 
0.3 
33.6 
45.4 
20.8 
0.2 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate winning party. 
23.8 
58.6 
16.5 
1.1 
in 1986 
Bakri 
ry 
1986 1990 
49.4 54.5 
45.8 45.5 
4.8 
- 
43.8 
54.3 
1.8 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A question often asked of the 1987 ethnic disputes is whether they were 
'manufactured' by UMNO to detract attention away from its internal problems 
and provide an excuse for the incremental authoritarianism of Operation Lalang 
and its aftermath. Critics point out, for instance, that Anwar's decision to 
promote the non-Mandarin educated administrators was always likely to 
provoke a backlash from the Chinese community and thus may have been 
calculated to do just that. Given the already tense ethnic atmosphere at the time, 
his decision was thus at best ill-timed, at worst deliberately provocative. In the 
context of the arguments being made in this, however, such lines of reasoning 
miss the point. The point is that UMNO and the MCA 
- 
and to a lesser extent 
other parties including the DAP and GERAKAN 
- 
were caught in an escalating 
cycle of social mobilisation, regime fracture and ethnicisation. Student protests 
before the UMNO split were not politicised, either by the government or the 
opposition; similar protests following the split were appropriated by all sides as 
mobilisational instruments. Similarly, Anwar's decision to promote non- 
Mandarin speaking school administrators may have been confrontational, but 
the DAP's reaction was surely disproportionate 
-a charge that was indeed 
levelled against the party by ALIRAN, one of the few organisations that retained 
more balanced perspective at the time. In as much, if UMNO did 'manufacture' 
the crisis of October 1987, it was only because it was itself locked into a cycle 
of 'ethnic outbidding'. 
The years 1987-1990 saw a dramatic shift in the broader contours of Malaysian 
politics. On the one hand, the UMNO split and the formation of the opposition 
front for the 1990 general election represented an undisputed opening in the 
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political system. For the first time since independence, a conceivable political 
alternative to the BN emerged. On the other hand, however, the crackdown of 
October 1987 was a fundamental shift in the opposite direction for civil society. 
Until Operation Lalang, the Mahathir administration had been pursuing a more 
liberal policy that its predecessors, in terms of political repression. Numbers 
detained without trial under the Internal Security Act had fallen considerably. 
The October crackdown reversed this trend abruptly; it not only had the 
immediate effect of removing prominent oppositionists from activity, it also 
demonstrated an increased propensity for repression by the regime. 
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STATE ASCENDANT: 
STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY, 1990-1998 
Thus far, the empirical chapters of this thesis have focussed attention of the 
development of civil society and social movements and their impact on the 
trajectory of a regime crisis. In the model of state-society relations developed 
earlier, however, we saw that the state itself is an important actor in shaping and 
defining civil society and social movements. This chapter thus turns the focus 
of attention to the state itself, in a period of Malaysia's political development in 
which the state undertook a concerted and systematic project to reshape civil 
society, from after the resolution of the UMNO crisis and the 1990 general 
election until the outbreak of the reformasi movement in 1998. 
The Barisan Nasional regime has long been recognised as having developed an 
effective and varied arsenal of strategies for dealing with opposition. In 
examining party politics from independence until the early 1980s, for instance, 
Barraclough argues that the regime developed a fourfold approach to the 
`management' of opposition: competition, absorption, regulation and coercion. I 
Camroux notes a similar array of tactics 
- 
accommodation, co-optation and 
confrontation 
- 
employed in the face of the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s and 
80s. 2 Similarly, Jesudason characterises Malaysia as a `syncretic state', whose 
longevity is a result of its ability to incorporate and assimilate a variety of often 
Simon Barraclough, 'Political opposition and its management in West Malaysia', PhD Thesis, 
University of Queensland, Australia, 1984(a). 
Z David Camroux, 'State responses to Islamic resurgence in Malaysia: Accommodation, co- 
optation and confrontation', Asian Survey, 36: 9 (1996), pp. 852-69. See also Laurent Metzger, 
Strategie Islamique en Malaisie (1975-1995), Paris, L'Harmatten, 1996. 
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contradictory social and ideological forces. 3 During the 1990s, these strategies 
were deployed in an attempt to reshape civil society in a discursive mould more 
conducive to the regime's hegemonic stance. At the same time, the regime's 
hegemonic discourse itself was shifting, from one that emphasised ethnicity and 
consociationalism, to a discourse of developmental ism. This shift was 
predicated on the emerging class structure that had driven the expansion of civil 
society in the 1980s. 
For most groups within civil society, the early years of the 1990s were a period 
of recovery after the clampdown of the late 1980s. At the same time, the BN 
regime was enjoying period of political ascendancy, buoyed by a resurgent 
economy 
- 
between 1988 and 1996, Gross National Product growth averaged 
over ten per cent per annum, and never fell below nine per cent. In the 1990 
general election, the BN had polled its lowest proportion of the popular vote 
since the ill-fated 1969 election and had lost control of two states to opposition 
parties. By the mid-1990s, its electoral popularity had recovered to record 
levels, and in April 1995 the BN won its most decisive ever general election 
victory, taking almost two thirds of the popular vote and all but thirty of the 192 
Federal Parliament seats. The only major disappointment for the government in 
the election results was its failure to re-take the Kelantan state assembly. It was 
in this context of political resurgence that the BN undertook a radical, though 
often understated, transformation of its discursive orientation and relations with 
civil society. 
3 James V. Jesudason, The syncretic state and the structuring of oppositional politics in 
Malaysia', in Garry Rodan (ed. ), Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, London, 
Routledge, 1996, pp. 128-60. 
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CLASS TRANSFORMATION AND THE DECLINING POLITICAL SALIENCE OF 
ETHNICITY 
Government policy during the period 1970-1990 had been dominated by the 
regime's efforts to remould the economy towards greater Malay and bumiputera 
participation, principally through the 1971 
-promulgated New Economic Policy 
(NEP). The redistributive policies of the NEP, combined with twenty years of 
almost continuously high economic growth brought about a significant 
transformation in Malaysia's class make-up (see tables 7.1-7.4). In 1990, the 
NEP had fallen short of its targets in a number of respects: bundpiltera equity 
ownership lagged lower than had been envisaged, and the income divide 
between Malays and non-Malays persisted, although considerably reduced. 
Nonetheless, substantial progress had been made towards its goals, in particular 
with the creation of a large and burgeoning Malay middle class. 4 By 1990, 
bumiputeras accounted for almost thirty per cent of the registered professionals 
in the country, a vast improvement on the less than five per cent of 1970. From 
being predominantly 'own account workers' 
- 
padi (wet rice) fanners, hawkers 
(petty traders) 
- 
and unpaid family workers in 1970, Malays were, by 1990, 
overwhelmingly salaried employees. Under NEP tutelage and government 
patronage, the 1980s also saw the emergence of a powerful Malay capitalist 
class. 5 Corporate and political figures such as Dairn Zainuddin, Halim Saad and 
4 For a comprehensive review of the successes and failures of the NEP, see K. S. Jorno, 'Whither 
Malaysia's New Economic Policy9', PacificAffairs, 63: 4 (1990), pp. 469-99. 
There is much debate about how far this capitalist class is politically dependent for its 
advance. For contrasting views, see Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, 
Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, patronage and profit, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996; and Peter Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers 
or real capitalists? Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 1999. 
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Tajudin Ramli emerged with billions of ringgit in equity ownership, much of it 
often under trusteeship for UMNO. 
Table 7.1: Bumiputrra proportion of workforce by 
occupational category, 1970,1980 and 19906 
Sector 1970 1980 1990 
Professional and technical 47.2 53.7 60.5 
Administrative and managerial 22.4 28.6 28.7 
Clerical workers 33.4 52.3 52.4 
Sales 23.9 31.1 29.9 
Production workers 31.3 45.5 43.6 
Services workers 42.9 55.4 57.8 
Agricultural workers 68.7 73.5 69.1 
Total 51.4 56.6 52.9 
Table 7.2: Mean household income by ethnic group, 
1970 and 19907 
1970 1990 
Mean Ratio to 
Mean Ratio to 
Average 
monthly bumf- monthly bumi 
- 
annual 
income 
putera 
inco )e putera 
increase 
Bumiputera 177 
- 
940 
- 
8.7% 
Chinese 399 2.25 1631 1.74 7.3% 
Indian 310 1.75 1209 1.69 7.0% 
Table 7.3: Employment status by ethnic group, 1970, 
1980 and 1991 (percentages)8 
Malays 
1970 1980 1991 
Employer 
Own account worker 
Unpaid family worker 
Employee 
- 
2.6 2.2 
42.2 32.9 24.1 
22.0 9.2 2.9 
35.8 55.2 70.9 
6 
7 
8 
All Groups 
1970 1980 1991 
- 
4.0 3.1 
33.8 27.4 24.2 
17.0 7.3 4.1 
49.1 61.4 68.6 
Source: Third Malaysia Plan: p. 82, table 4-15; Third Outline Perspective Platt: p. 104, table 
4-5. Figures for 1970 refer to Malays only, excluding non-Malay buntiputera. 
Sourcc: Calculated from Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism, p. 34 and Seventh 
Malaysia Plan, p. 90, table 3-6. 
Source: Adapted from Jorno Kwame Sundaram 'A Malaysian middle class?: Some 
preliminary analytical considerations', in Jorno Kwame Sundaram (ed. ), Rethinking Malaysia: 
Malaysian Studies I, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Social Science Association, 1999, p. 134, 
table 6.2. The 1970 Census did not distinguish between 'Employer' and 'Own account 
worker'. 
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Table 7.4: Ownership of share capital (%), 1970 and 19909 
1970 1990 
Bumiputera 2.4 19.3 
Individuals and institutions 1.6 14.2 
Trust agencies 0.8 5.1 
Non-bumiputera 28.3 46.8 
Chinese 27.2 45.5 
Indian 1.1 1.0 
Others 
- 
0.3 
Nominee companies 6.0 8.5 
Foreigners 63.4 25.4 
Following the emergence of this larger and more ethnically mixed middle class, 
the 1990s witnessed a subsequent decrease in the 'discourse of ethnicism' 
practiced by the Barisan Nasional regime. The 1990s saw a dilution of the 
Malay chauvinism that had characterised government policy since 1970, as 
epitomised by the New Economic Policy, the National Culture Policy and the 
National Language Policy. 10 Whilst the government was clear in maintaining 
its official position of Malay dominance (ketuanan Melayte), it also introduced 
more liberal cultural policies for the non-Malays. Important here was the 
introduction of provisions for English to be allowed as the medium of 
instruction in state universities and the expansion of the private tertiary 
education, which was also often conducted in English and catered primarily for 
Chinese. " Also important were a range of smaller changes that indicated a 
9 Source: Adapted from Gomez and Jorno, Malaysia's Political Econonly, p. 168. 
'0 The National Culture Policy and the National Language Policy were supposed to be the social 
counterparts to the NEP. Whereas the NEP allowed room for non-Malay economic growth, 
however, the Culture and Language policies were much more stridently Malay chauvinism. 
Of the National Culture Policy, Means argues that 'Malay language and culture were taken as 
being appropriate for all citizens'. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The second 
generation, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 199 1, p. 133. 
Francis Loh Kok Wah, Developmentalism and the limits of democratic discourse', in Francis 
Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik (eds. ), Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and practices, 
Richmond, Curzon, 2002, pp. 19-50. 
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renewed ethnic liberalisation, such as the proliferation of Indian `Bollywood' 
movies and Hong Kong serials shown on state television. 
In place of an ethnically-centred political discourse, the regime attempted to 
forge a new hegemony based on its ability to deliver economic development. 
Representative of this new hegemonic project was Mahathir's 'Vision 2020': a 
set of nine 'central strategic challenges' for Malaysia to become a fully 
developed nation by the year 2020. The 'Vision', and its associated rhetorical 
paraphernalia, promulgated both a developmentalist ideology and a message of 
greater ethnic tolerance. As Hilley puts it, Vision 2020 'projects challenging 
messages of economic cooperation, ethnic integration and communal 
partnership and signifiers of a more inclusive nationalism'. 12 Central to the 
Vision 2020 programme is the creation of a bangsa Malaysia ('Malaysian 
nation'). Whereas three decades previously, Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew 
was castigated by UMNO for proposing a 'Malaysian Malaysia', the Vision 
emphasis on the fon-nation of a bangsa Malaysia went a step further in 
appropriating the Malay language to talk of inclusiveness: 
Chinese political observers were particularly struck by the 
unprecedented usage of the term Bangsa Malaysia. Malay 
leaders previously had employed the word bangsa within a 
chauvinistic Malay nationalist context... By widening the word's 
connotation to embrace non-Malay membership, Mahathir 
12 John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition. London, Zed 
Books, 2001, p. 19; emphasis original. 
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appeared to be breaking from the convention of Malay 
nationalist exclusivity. 13 
REMOULDING CIVIL SOCIETY 
Parallel to its reconfiguring of the state, the BN regime sought to impose its new 
hegemonic vision upon civil society. At the forefront of this attempt to remould 
civil society was Anwar Ibrahim, the Finance Minister and, from 1993, Deputy 
Prime Minister. With his background as a social activist and his widely 
respected Islamic erudition, Anwar cut a convincing figure as a voice for civil 
society within the regime. The close intellectual relationship with Chandra 
Muzaffar he had developed since the Societies Act protests and maintained in 
his government career added to this. Anwar's vision of a normative civil 
society, or masyarakat madani, was at once liberal and Islamic. He held out the 
promise of greater liberalisation in the political sphere, 'where the growth of 
civil organizations is not suppressed, where dissent is not Stifled'. 14 Yet he 
nonetheless asserted that 'the proper and legitimate assertion of one's individual 
rights must go hand in hand with the recognition of private duties towards the 
good of society'. Furthen-nore, the 'foremost [challenge for civil society] is the 
creation and preservation of social order'. 15 In language strongly reminiscent of 
Mahathir's own defence of Malaysia's democratic record, he also argued that 
13 Heng Pek Koon, 'Chinese Responses to Malay Hegemony (1957-1996)', in Zawawi Ibrahim 
(ed. ), Cultural Contestations: Mediating identity in a changing Malaysian society, London, 
ASEAN Academic Press, 1998, p. 73. 
14 Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance, Singapore, Times Books International, 1996, p. 51. 
15 Anwar Ibrahim, `Democracy and the challenges to civil society', speech in Bangkok, 20 
September 1994. Downloaded from <http: //www. smpkejpm. my/> on 15 July 2000. 
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`democracy should not be an end unto itself, but merely the means by which we 
can ensure humane governance'. 16 
The limits of how far the government was willing to go in seeking a 
rapprochement with civil society is well demonstrated by its response to three 
NGO conferences organised during the mid 1990s. The first was a conference on 
'Rethinking Human Rights', organised by the Just World Trust (JUST) in 
December 1994. JUST was formed in 1991 by former ALIRAN president Chandra 
Muzaffar, primarily as an attempt to create a Malaysian-based Nco with an 
internationalist perspective. 17 The conference attracted around three hundred 
participants, including many eminent scholars and campaigners from around the 
world, but most startling from the local perspective were the invitations, 
extended and accepted, to Mahathir and Anwar to attend and address the 
conference. A number of other NGOs and human rights organisations 
- 
most 
notably SUARAM 
- 
voiced concern at the conference and the participation of 
Mahathir and Anwar. ' 8 It was argued that whatever Mahathir's contribution to 
fighting Western dominance on the international level, his participation in such 
a conference on Malaysian soil would be widely seen within the country as a 
endorsement by JUST of Mahathir's domestic human rights practices. 19 This was 
16 Anwar, The Asian Renaissance, p. 50; compare Mahathir Mohamad, The Malaysian System of 
Government, Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister's Office, 1995. 
17 Interview, Chandra Muzaffar, Petaling Jaya, March 2001. Chandra said of his resignation 
from ALIRAN and move to form JUST that it was the result of a gradual realisation that the 
world system presented a greater threat to the well-being of Malaysians that the actions of the 
domestic government. The Just World Trust was later re-named the International Movement 
for a Just World. 
18 'Watershed of sorts for human rights movement. ' New Sunday Times, 11 December 1994. 
19 Interview, SUARAM activist, October 2001. 
216 
State Ascendant, 1990-1998 
certainly the perception that was promoted by many of the government- 
controlled newspapers, which emblazoned photographs of Mahathir and 
Chandra shaking hands on their front pages. 
The government was considerably less accommodating two years later, 
however, when an international group of NGOS including JUST organised the 
Second Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET 11), to be held in Kuala 
Lumpur in November 1996. The conference was to discuss Indonesia's 
continuing occupation and brutal oppression of the former Portuguese colony 
and was thus similar to the 1994 JUST conference in that it focussed primarily on 
international affairs. Whereas the 1994 conference had been embraced by the 
regime, however, this latter meeting was vociferously condemned. Mahathir 
lambasted the conference as irresponsible, and claimed that it threatened 
Malaysia's relations with Indonesia. 20 Less than a week before it was due to 
open, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced that the conference had been 
banned. 21 When the organisers attempted to go ahead with the conference 
anyway, a contingent of UmNo Youth members ston-ned the venue to break up 
the conference. In the ensuing fracas, over sixty people were arrested, mostly 
from the NGOS. 22 
A further demonstration of the government's continued willingness to employ 
its repressive machinery to stifle civil society came the following month, 
20 
'APCET 11: PM bidas penganjur ingkar. ' Berita Harlan, 11 November 1996. 
21 
'Jemaah Menteri sokong KDN. ' Berita Harlan, 8 November 1996. 
22 'Persidangan APCET i1 dihentikan. ' Berita Mingguan, 10 November 1996. The government 
initially tried to lay the blame for the scuffle with the NGOs. In the end it was four UMNO 
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December 1996, when a group of local NGOs attempted to organise a public 
forum to discuss police brutality, after a spate of deaths in police custody and 
rising concern over the number of suspects who died in `shootouts'. The forum 
came under strong criticism from the government, which accused the NGOs of 
trying to incite hatred against the security forces, and was finally cancelled after 
23 the Home Ministry threatened to detain its organisers under the ISA. 
The juxtaposition of these three civil society gatherings is instructive in that it 
demonstrates quite clearly the developing relationship between the government 
and civil society in the 1990s. On the one hand, some groups within civil 
society sought to engage with the government more constructively that they had 
done previously, and the government responded in kind. The 1994 JUST 
conference was indicative of such a process, but by no means the only instance. 
As will be argued below, a number of organisations within the environmentalist 
movement and the women's movement also began engaging with the regime 
during this period. On the other hand, however, the regime was quick to 
confront civil society when it perceived the country's, or its own, interests to be 
at stake. In as much, it is worth noting that even Anwar 
- 
the supposedly liberal 
face of the BN 
- 
spoke out stridently against the APCET 11 meeting, implicitly 
Youth members who were charged with rioting, however, and all the NGO participants were 
released. Interviews with conference participants, August 2001. 
23 `Batal sidang kutuk polis. ' Berita Mingguan, 15 December 1996. 
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endorsing the Indonesian annexation of the territory by stating that the problems 
in East Timor were `the internal affair of Indonesia'. 24 
We have seen, then, that the 1990s saw the BN regime attempt to remould civil 
society and its relations therewith. In presenting a more liberal face to civil 
society, the regime went as far as to claim on a number of occasions throughout 
the decade that it was in the process of reviewing 
- 
though not abolishing 
- 
the 
ISA, the bete noir of human rights organisations, to make it `easier for detainees 
to appeal against their arrest'. 25 Despite such moves, however, the regime 
continued to regulate and repress civil society and social movements. The 
extent and form of such regulation varied across sectors and movements, 
depending on the political alignment and discursive thrust of the organisations 
involved. To demonstrate this, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of 
state responses to specific movements during the 1990s. 
CONFRONTATION AND ACCOMMODATION: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
In chapter five, we saw that environmentalism had emerged in the 1980s as a 
strong force within civil society, and a potential source of popular mobilisation. 
As most of the enduring issues of major environmental concerns were 
geographically restricted to the East Malaysian state of Sarawak, however, they 
had had relatively little impact upon the broader contours of Malaysian politics. 
24 'Govt No to meeting on East Timor. ' Business Times, 8 November 1996. Needless to say, the 
same logic was not applied to Israel's annexation of Palestinian territory, which was 
frequently and vehemently criticised. 
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This changed in 1990s, as international criticism of Malaysia's environmental 
record forced the issue onto the national agenda. Criticism by international 
environmentalist groups of Malaysia's policies on the protection of its 
rainforests had been growing since the 1980s, but 1991 saw this escalate into a 
sustained campaign against the Malaysian government. Having low levels of 
external debt and international aid receipts, Malaysia was less susceptible to 
'green conditional ities' 
- 
the usual methods of political leverage used by 
international NGOS involving pressurising donor countries to withdraw aid and 
loans until environmental protection measures are enacted and enforced. 26 A 
more publicity-oriented campaign against Malaysia was thus seen as a 
potentially more productive approach. Demonstrations were held at Malaysian 
consulates and related industrial sites in many cities around the world 
- 
including The Hague, London, Nantes, Toronto, Sydney and New York 
- 
to 
protest Malaysia's continued logging of tropical hardwood. 27 In July 1991, a 
group of foreign environmentalists, led by organisers from the radical Earth 
First organisation, brought the protests to Malaysian soil by storming a logging 
barge in Sarawak and chaining themselves to cranes and other equipment. 28 
25 
'Rais confident provisions will be reviewed. ' New Straits Times, 15 October 1998. The 
promise to review the law was made as early as 1993: ISA to stay but provisions may be 
reviewed, says Ong. ' New Straits Times, 9 December 1993. 
26 Bernard Eccleston, 'Does North-South collaboration enhance NGO influence of deforestation 
policies in Malaysia and IndonesiaT, in David Potter (ed. ), NGOs and Environmental 
Policies: Asia and Africa, London, Frank Cass, 1996(a), pp. 66-89; Bernard Eccleston, WGOs 
and competing representations of deforestation as an environmental issue in Malaysia', in 
Potter, NGOs and Environmental Policies, pp. 11642. 
27 'Anti-tropical timber campaign intensifies. ' Business Times, 20 August 1991; 'Protest demo 
at Malaysian Consulate. ' New Straits Times, 23 August 1991. 
28 `Environmentalists launch global war on Malaysia. ' Business Times, 16 August 1991. 
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as being in the pockets of foreigners. 33 They were accused of cashing in on the 
international anti-logging movement to raise funds, but not distributing any of 
those funds to the communities affected by logging. 34 Unsurprisingly, the 
NGOS' response that the funds were used to campaign for the communities' 
rights rather than for distribution were not reported in the government- 
controlled media. 35 
Despite its aggressive rhetoric, however, the government took some steps to 
address environmcntal concerns. Prior to the Rio Summit, the Environmental 
Protection Society of Malaysia (EPSm) had called for better ties between NGOS 
and the government. 36 At the summit itself, local NGOS were broadly supportive 
of Mahathir's criticisms of Western hypocrisy over the environment, following 
which Mahathir was reported as stating that 'NGOs are no longer our enemy', 
37 
sentiments echoed by the prominent environmentalist Gurmit Singh 
. 
The 
government also instigated a number of legislative changes to address some of 
the environmentalists' concern, in particular clamping down on illegal 
logging. 38 In 1993, it increased 50-fold the fines for illegal timber logging. 39 It 
also announced rigorous implementation of the previously widely-ignored 
requirement for an independent Environmental Impact Assessment on any new 
33 `SAM rapped for "sabotage". ' New Straits Times, 19 July 1990. 
34 `Penan fund rip-off. ' New Straits Times, 1 November 1993; `Account for collections, NGOs 
told. ' New Straits Times, 11 November 1993. 
35 Interview, SAM activists, April-November 200 1. 
36 'Better ties sought. ' New Sunday Times, 23 June 199 1. 
37 6 Hitting the whistleblowers. ' Asiaiveek, 12 January 1996; 'Local NGOs did well against all 
odds, says environmentalist. ' New Straits Times, 18 January 1995. 
38 'Malaysia's war. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 June 1992. 
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logging project. Laws relating to pollution were also tightened, with increased 
penalties for violations. 40 
The regime's resilience to environmentalist demands can be explained on a 
number of levels. Firstly, these demands often touched on areas of deeply 
vested interest for the regime and its associated business cliques. The issuance 
of logging permits is an important source of political patronage for state 
governments. Similarly, the Bakun Dam project has involved companies linked 
to government ministers, as well as favoured businessmen such as TaJudin 
Ramli and Ting Pek Khiing. In as much, it is worth noting that the decision to 
clamp down on illegal logging may also have been connected with a 1992 
confrontation between the government and the royalty over the latter's extensive 
and lucrative business interests, which, along with the playboy lifestyle of many 
royals, were the source of much public chagrin. The government controlled 
press was certainly quick to highlight a number of incidences of illegal logging 
by companies with royal connections. 41 Secondly, on a more general level, the 
environmental movement challenged the hegemonic foundations of the state, 
with its increasing dependence upon a developmental ist discourse. The 
environmental movement challenged the underlying assumption that 
'development' was, in all places and at all times, a good thing. It was for this 
reason that the regime embarked on such a vituperative rhetorical argument with 
the movement, even as it gave some concessions 
- 
the regime could afford to 
make a few concessions, but could not afford to lose the discursive argument. 
39... 50-fold rise in fines still insufficient to curb illegal logging". ' Business Times, 6 August 
1993. 
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ACCOMMODATION AND COERCION: ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
In confronting environmentalist movements, the regime developed a discourse 
of fiery rhetoric and threats of coercion combined with understated concessions 
to undercut the thrust of the movement. Because of the politically sensitive 
nature of Islam, the government was typically more circumspect in dealing with 
Islamic movements. Moreover, whereas the environmentalist movement was 
constituted by small, professional NGOS, Islamic organisations tended to be mass 
membership and thus a more tricky target for coercive dominance. Historically, 
for instance, the government had not acted directly against ABIM in the 1970s, 
despite its key role in the student unrest of 1974-75. WhilSt ABIM leaders were 
detained under the ISA, the government did not move to disband or outlaw the 
organisation itself Only in the late 1970s, as ABIM as an organisation began to 
align itself more explicitly with PAS, did the government move to restrict ABIM 
through the proposed amendments to the Societies Act. 42 In the event, however, 
a confrontation with ABIM was avoided through the co-optation of its leader, 
Anwar Ibrahim, into UMNO. Rather than employ an overarching discursive 
attack on 'civil Islam', the regime thus varied its strategies from organisation to 
organisation, attempting to manipulate them both to bolster its own support and 
Islamic credentials, and to undercut support for its main Islamic political rival, 
PAS. 
40 'Jail, stiffer fines plan for violating environ laws. ' New Straits Times, 13 January 1994. 
41 'Clearcut mandate. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 October 1993. 
42 Fred R. von der Meliden, 'Me political and social challenge of the Islamic revival in Malaysia 
and Indonesia', The Muslim World, 76: 3/4 (1996), pp. 219-33. 
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Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) 
In the early 1990s, ABIM appeared to have been the most successful social 
cooptation that the BN government had achieved. From representing perhaps the 
greatest challenge to the regime in the 1970s, ABim had become decreasingly 
critical and strident, pursuing instead an official policy of political neutrality and 
moderation (kesederhanaan). As already noted, this about-face was largely a 
result of Anwar's entry into UMNO. In many respects, however, at least apparent 
political neutrality was a necessary position for the Organisation. Aside from 
Anwar, other former ABIM office-holders had reached prominent positions in 
both UMNo and PAS; by the mid- I 990s, a number Of BN Ministers and one state 
Chief Minister were former AM activists and two consecutive PAS presidents 
- 
Fadzil Noor and Hadi Awang 
- 
were ABIM alumni 
. 
43 The rank-and-file 
members of ABim also had considerable overlap with both parties. In such 
circumstances, political partisanship of the behalf of the leaders may have risked 
splitting the movement. AM avoided political controversy by focusing its 
attention on international affairs, calling for justice for oppressed Muslim 
communities from Palestine to Bosnia and Chechnya. Its donation drives raised 
millions of ringgit for war victims in Bosnia, and it was also instrumental in 
bringing hundreds of Bosnian orphans to Malaysia for adoption 
-a role for 
which it gained special dispensation from the government. 44 Perhaps following 
43 As of writing, Hadi is only acting president Of PAS, following Fadzil's sudden death in May 
2002, but he is unlikely to be challenged for the leadership at the next general assembly. Prior 
to Fadzil's death, Hadi was his deputy meaning that in 1998, before Anwar was sacked, three 
of the four top offices in Malay-based political parties were held by eX-ABIM activists. 
44 e. g. 'ABIm bedaya purgut derma RM3 juta. ' Berila Harian, 6 April 1994; Tanya ABINI 
dibenar bawa anak Bosnia. ' Berita Harian, 23 September 1992. 
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the example of Darul Arqam (see below), ABIM concentrated its domestic 
attention on business ventures and building a network of Islamic schools. 45 
Despite its official political neutrality, however, it was clear that AMM was 
developing closer relations with the government. ABIM leadership often spoke 
in glowing terms of government policies, and even justified their own activities 
on grounds being 'in line with' (selaras) government PoliCY. 46 In contrast, the 
organisation expressed reservation over PAS' plans to implement hudild laws in 
Kelantan, following instead the government's line that, whilst implementation 
of hudud was desirable in the long run, the contemporary situation in Malaysia 
was not conducive. 47 ABIM was rewarded with the use of government- 
controlled facilities, and the patronage of ministers at some of its functions. " 
The new accommodation between ABIM and the government left many people 
feeling uneasy by the rapid rise of ABIM members through UMNO ranks and the 
concomitant perception that the current and former ABIM leadership 
- 
including 
Anwar 
- 
intended to `ABIMise' (mengABiMkan) UMNO. 49 These fears were 
played upon by those who opposed Anwar's rapid rise through the party. When 
Anwar stood for the deputy presidency of UMNO in 1993, for instance, a poison 
45 , ABIM ventures into property business. ' Business Titnes, 31 August 1991; 'ABIM shifts focus, 
plans aggressive business ventures. ' New Straits Titnes, 3 February 1992; 'ABIM plans to set 
up secondary school network. ' New Straits Tinies, 9 February 1993. 
46 
'ABIM mahu lebih tumpuan wujud peluang niaga. ' Harian Minggli, II July 199 1; 'ABIM anjur 
seminar Islam. ' Berita Harian, 3 August 199 1. 
47 
'ABIM cautions Kelantan on hudud laws. ' New Straits Times, 6 May 1992; 'Be patient, says 
ABIM. ' New Straits Times, 5 March 1994. 
48 'Exhibition on ABIM activities. ' New Straits Times, 15 August 1991; 'ABIM gains recognition 
for its work. ' New Straits Times, 16 August 199 1. 
49 , ABIM tidal bemiat mengabirnkan UMNO. ' Berita Mingguan, 12 March 1995. 
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pen letter (surat layang) was circulated, purportedly signed by the current 
president Of ABIM, asking all ABIM members in IJMNO to vote for Anwar. 
50 
Ironically, these allegations, refuted at the time, were resuscitated by the 
government in 1998 as another justification for Anwar's expulsion. 51 As will be 
seen in the next chapter, ABIM was one of the first social organisations to come 
out in open support of Anwar after his dismissal. 
The importance of the 'ABIMisation' issue is not so much the veracity or not of 
the allegations, but that it clearly demonstrates the fears within UMNO that 
former and current ABIM members formed a substantial and cohesive faction 
within the party. As has already been shown, UMNO is beset with factional 
divisions and alliances, but most of these factions have been relatively fluid, as 
demonstrated by Musa's prolonged prevarication over whether to support 
Mahathir or Razaleigh after the fort-nation of UMNo(Baru). The ABIM faction 
within UMNo, however, was of unquestioning loyalty to Anwar - 'Anwar's 
Boys', as they came to be known. For them, loyalty to Anwar transcended 
loyalty to UMNO. After Anwar's dismissal, many within the ABIM faction were 
amongst the founding members of KEADILAN 
-a situation which, ironically, 
produced problems for the new party in 2001 when ABIM members attempted to 
'mengABimkan' KEADILAN. 
50, ABIM nafi isi surat layang. ' Berita Harian, 8 September 1993. AM denýied the letter's 
validity. 
51 
'Rais dedah Anwar guna ikatan musnahkan UMNO. ' Berita Harian, 28 September 1999; see 
also report of an UMNO ceramah at http: //members. tripod. con-L/-niabazalimd/270999zb. htH. 
Anwar's intention to 'ABIMise UMNO' was one of the 'Fifty Reasons' in Khalid Jafri's book. 
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The relationship between ABim and the government 
- 
and UMNO in particular 
- 
thus demonstrates the potential shortcomings for the state of a policy of 
cooptation in dealing with mass-based civil society organisations. Whilst the 
entry of Anwar into UmNo in 1982 may well have neutralised the significant 
threat ABIM posed at the time, it had the effect of creating a solid faction within 
the party, which contributed to Anwar's rapid rise through the party hierarchy. 
In coopting Anwar, UMNo also had to assimilate his myriad of followers. But in 
doing so, the party ran the risk of a 'reverse takeover bid'. 
Darul Argam 
The government's attitude towards the Dan il Argam movement is illustrative of 
its variable strategy towards civil society groups, and its continued willingness 
to use repressive measures even against Islamic groups, when its perceived 
interests are at risk. The Darul Arqam movement was fon-ned in 1968 by 
Ashaari Muhammad, a religious teacher and former PAs activist, and twelve of 
his followers. The original aim of the movement, like many other dakwah 
groups fori-ned at the time, was to revitalise the Islamic community through the 
adherence to individual piety. 52 Along with other dakwah groups such as ABIM, 
Darul Arqarn also experienced its first surge in popularity during the mid- I 970s, 
quickly spreading to neighbouring countries, establishing a substantial presence 
in Indonesia and southern Thailand. At the time, PAs had been coopted into the 
Barisan Nasional regime, leaving groups like Arqarn as the main outlet for anti- 
establishment Muslim youths. Where Arqam differed from other groups, 
however, was the immediacy of its commitment to an Islamic society or way of 
52 Muhammad Syukri Salleh, An Islamic Approach to Rural Development: The Argam way, 
London: Asoib International, 1992, p. 84. 
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life (ad di-n), before the realisation of an Islamic State. Ashaari was vocal in 
criticising other Islamic organisations such as PAS and ABIM for their slogan 
shouting and seminar holding, without practicing what they preached. 53 For its 
part, Arqam established a number of self-sufficient communities and embarked 
on a range of business ventures, which, by the time the movement was banned 
in 1994, exceeded four hundred business concerns in Malaysia alone and 
estimated aggregate assets of some RM300 million. 54 
As an Islamic movement, Daml Arqam defies easy classification. This 
ambiguity was arguably the source of its popularity. The success of Arqam lay 
in its appeal to both modemising and conservative Islamic tendencies. With its 
semi-idolisation of Ashaari and the messianic message of its teachings 
(especially the Aurad 
- 
see below), it had the trappings of a classic millenarian 
cult. Yet rather than attacking police stations in the belief that they were 
impervious to bullets, as one such cult had done in 1980, Arqam members 
expressed their piety in the most mundane of tasks 
- 
bottling ketchup, 
slaughtering chickens, and other economic activities. Its espousal of modem 
information technology, together with its vast economic interests attracted those 
who felt that Islam and a modem way of life were not incompatible. Its 
communal living and attachment to more traditional elemcnts of Islam, such as 
the practice of polygamy and eating from shared dishes, also gave the 
movement a strong conservative flavour. 
Jorno Kwame Sundaram and Ahmad Shabery Cheek, 'Malaysia's Islamic movements', in Joel 
S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds. ), Fragmented Vision: Culture and politics it? 
contemporary Malaysia, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992, pp. 79-106. 
54 
'Allah's bounty. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, I September 1994. 
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During the early 1980s, Arqam was arguably the closest to the government of 
all the major dakwah movements in the country. In 198 1, before assuming the 
post of Prime Minister, Mahathir described Arqam as the only authentic Islamic 
movement in the country. Throughout the early 1980s, Arqam had a close 
working relationship with several ministries involved with rural development, 
and had been offered the opportunity to take over a number of failed state 
projects. 55 In 1986, however, concerns were raised about Arqam's teaching, in 
particular its apparent idolisation of Ashaari and its publication of the book 
Aurad Muhammadiah, which claimed that a prominent Malaysian cleric, who 
had died in the 1920s, was about to return as the Iniant Maha(li, a kind of 
Muslim messiah. The Department of Islamic Affairs in the Prime Minister's 
56 Department declared that the book deviated from true Islamic teachings, but 
no action was taken against the movement at the time - possibly because it 
remained a more pro-govenu-nent organisation that detracted support from PAs 
and ABIM. The Arqarn leadership maintained that it did not promote idolisation 
and that the belief in the Aurad was a matter of personal faith, and not 
obligatory within the order. 57 
Concerns gained momentum in the early 1990s, after the neighbouring country 
of Brunci banned the movement in early 1991 for being a `threat to religious 
harmony'. 58 Shortly afterward, the East Malaysian state of Sabah, then under 
55 Muhammad Syukri, An Islamic Approach to Rural Development. 
56 Jabatan Perdana Menteri [Prime Minister's Department], Petyelasan Terhadap Buku Aurad 
Mithammadiah Pegangan Darul Arqam [Explanation of the book 'Aurad Muhammadiah' by 
Darul Arqam), Kuala Lumpur, Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam, Jabatan Perdana Mcnteri, 1986. 
57 'Behind the Darul Arqam veil. ' New Straits Times, 2 October 199 1. 
58 
'Darul Arqam: Ban won't affect us. ' New Straits Times, 15 February 199 1. 
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the control of the mainly Christian opposition party PBS, implemented a similar 
ban. 59 At first, the federal government played down the sanctions against 
Arqam, stating that it had no intention of banning the movement as a whole or 
of detaining its leader. 60 The first substantial move against Arqam on the 
peninsula came from the PAs-led state government in Kelantan, which banned a 
proposed exposition by Arqam in September 1991, and shortly after extended 
the ban to cover all of Arqam's activities in the state. 61 The federal government 
soon followed suit by curtailing Arqarn activities, including withdrawing its 
joumal publishing permits and banning its other publications, although it 
stopped short of an outright ban, stating that Arqarn was free to pursue its 
economic activities. 62 The final decision to outlaw the organisation came in 
1994, after the government claimed it had evidence that Arqarn was training an 
army in southern Thailand, an allegation that the Thai authorities denied. 63 A 
Royal Malaysian Navy officer, who had been an Arqam member, also claimed 
that Ashaari had ordered him to instigate a coup d'6tat in the country. 64 In 
August 1994, the National Fatwa Committee announced a complete ban on the 
organisation. 65 At the same time, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei jointly 
'9 'Arqam, Tabligh tetap diharam. ' Berita Harian, I March 199 1. 
60 
, Megat Junid: No plan to arrest Arqam chief' New Straits Times, 27 July 199 1; 'No plan to 
ban Darul Arqam. ' New Straits Times, 29 July 199 1. 
61 'Kelantan bars Al-Arqam expo. ' New Straits Times, II September 1991; 'It's a blanket ban 
on Al Arqam activities. ' New Straits Times, 12 September 1991. 
62 6 KDN permits for Arqam withdrawn. ' New Straits Times, 17 September 199 1; 'Arqam can 
carry on with its business activities. ' New Straits Times, 19 September 199 1. 'Arqam books 
banned, says PW Business Times, 5 October 1991. 
63 'Threat from Al-Arqam "serious". ' New Straits Times, 22 June 1994; 'No Al-Arqam army 
training. ' New Straits Times, 29 June 199 1. 
64 'Ashaari ordered me to stage coup, says ex-RMN officer. ' New Straits Times, 19 July 1994. 
65 'Al Arqam banned. ' New Straits Times, 6 August 1994. 
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announced that Ashaari had been banned from entering these countries. 66 
Ashaari and a number of other Argam leaders were later detained under the 
ISA. 67 
It seems clear that the movement was tolerated for so long in part due to its 
considerable contribution to the economic development of the country, 
particularly in rural areas, but more importantly because of its critical stance 
towards PAS. Thus, despite being deemed 'deviant' as carly as 1986, the 
movement was allowed to continue as it drew support away from PAS into an 
essentially non-political movement. By the mid- I 990s, however, the movement 
presented sufficient threat for the government to move against it. Whether this 
was, as the government claimed, because it constituted a threat to Malaysia's 
national security or else a political threat to the BN regime is less clear. None of 
the government's allegations of militarism within the movement were ever 
supported by hard evidence. The goverment was, however, undoubtedly 
alarmed by the growth in support for Arqam amongst government servants; 
shortly before it was banned completely, the government announced a ban on 
Arqam activities within government departments 
. 
68 After the 1990 general 
election, Arqam had also undertaken an ominous organisational restructuring 
that had seen its administrative districts redrawn along the lines of parliamentary 
constituencies. The perception that the regime banned the organisation on 
66 'Tbree countries agree to ban Al Arqam leader. ' New Straits Rines, 5 August 1994. 
67 'Asbaari detained under ISA. ' New Sunday Tinies, 4 September 1994. For an account of the 
detention by one of the detainees, see Zabidi Mohamed, Arqam: Tersungkir dipintil `s)'urga', 
Kuala Lumpur, Zabidi Publications, 1998. 
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political rather than security grounds is given credence by comments made at 
the time by the minister of defence, Najib Tun Razak. Said Najib, `Obviously 
they [Argam leaders] have a political agenda, kept secret all this while, to gain 
political power'. 69 
ATTRITION: THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
The labour movement emerged from the 1990 general election politically 
resurgent but more divided than ever. The long running feud between the two 
main union umbrella bodies 
- 
the generally pro-regime Congress of Employees 
in the Public and Civil Services (CUEPAcs) and the more confrontational 
Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC) 
- 
was intensified by the mTuc's 
open support for the opposition in the 1990 general election. The movement 
was further split by the emergence of the Malaysian Labour Organisation (MLO) 
as a rival to the MTUC. By 1997, however, the movement had reconciled many 
of its differences, with the merger of the MLo and the wuc, and the mTuc's 
concomitant shift towards a more pro-regime position. This shift in stance was 
in a large part due to the government's successful handling of the movement. 
The Malaysian Trades Union Congress 
By the time of the 1990 general election, the MTUC had hitched its horses finely 
to the opposition wagon, its three senior office bearers having stood for the 
opposition front, with mixed success. V. David, its secretary-general, and 
68 A survey of full-time Arqam activists in 1988 found that almost a quarter were former 
government servants, with another 5% from the armed forces and 10% teachers. See 
Muhammad Syukri, An Islamic Approach to Rural Development, p. 118. 
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Ahmad Nor, its vice-president, both won seats with the DAP. David was a long 
standing DAP MP, and Ahmad had stood in 1986 without success as an SDP 
candidate. In contrast, Zainal Rampak, the MTUC president, failed in his bid to 
win a seat on the Semangat ticket. He reaffirmed his support for Semangat in 
1992, however, when he took up a post on the party's supreme council. The 
MTUC had earlier demonstrated its continuing support for the opposition when it 
declared openly for the DAP's deputy chairman, Karpal Singh, in a July 1991 by- 
election. 70 
Aside from its parliamentary outings, the MTuc also became increasingly vocal 
in the early 1990s on two particular issues 
- 
the recruitment of foreign workers 
into the country and the government's refusal to withdraw a long standing ban 
on national-level unionisation for the electronics sector of the manufacturing 
industry. Malaysia's fast growing economy and rising living standards in the 
early 1990s had seen a labour shortage emerge in the labour intense, low paid 
sectors, particularly in construction and plantation work. This attracted an 
influx of foreign workers, particularly Indonesian and Filipino, many of whom 
were illegal 
- 
but semi-officially tolerated. The MTUC was concerned by the 
influx of foreign workers, and planned a series of demonstrations against 
them. 71 It claimed that the arrival of foreign workers would affect the welfare of 
local workers, and that the government was 'not doing enough to attract local 
69 Quoted in Abdullabi A. An-Na'im, 'The cultural mediation of human rights: 'I"he At-Arqam 
case in Malaysia', in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds. ), The EastAsian Challengefor 
Human Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 16 1. 
70 , MTUC pledges support for Karpal Singh in polls. ' New Straits Times, 20 July 199 1. 
71 'Ghafar raps the MTUC rallies plan. ' New Straits Times, 23 September 199 1. 
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workers'. 72 The mTuc's protest was dampened 
- 
in the most literal of ways 
- 
after a poor showing at its first rally in Kuala Lumpur, due to flash floods in the 
City. 73 Following subsequent reassurances from the government on the 
restrictions that would be applied to foreign workers, the MTUC called off the 
protest entirely. 74 Whilst the protest was short lived, then, it was important in 
that it signalled a continued confrontation between the government and the 
m-ruc, epitomised by the emergence of a very public feud between Zainal and 
75 the Human Resources Minister, Lim Ah Lek 
. 
The issue of the electronic workers union exploded spectacularly after Zainal 
made a speech at the 1992 International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference 
in Geneva in which he criticised the government for its failure to allow 
unionisation of the sector. The UMNO Youth leader, Najib Tun Razak, 
immediately called on the government to take action against Zainal. 76 Mahathir 
himself accused Zainal and David of 'treachery' and 'undermining the country's 
interest', although apparently ruled out legal action, saying 'they arc guilty but 
not by violating the law. Had they broken the law, we would have taken 
action'. 77 Nonetheless, thinly veiled threats were made that the government was 
monitoring 'leaders of various organisations who go abroad to tarnish the good 
72 `MTUC defends decision. ' New Straits Times, 24 September 1991. For an extended discussion 
of the impact of rrýgrant labour, see Amadit Kaur, 'Changing labour relations in Malaysia 
1970s- I 990s', Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 73: 1 (2000), pp. 
1-16. 
73 'Workers rally postponed. ' New Straits Times, 12 October 199 1. 
74 , MTUC calls off its protest rally. ' New Straits Times, 15 November 199 1. 
75 'Lim warns MTUC. ' Business Times, 30 September 1991. 
76 
"Act against MTUC leaders'. ' New Straits Times, 3 July 1992. 
77 
'Dr M: MTUC leaders guilty of treachery. ' New Straits Times, II July 1992. 
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name of the country', and 'would not hesitate to take action, including 
provisions under the Internal Security Act (ISA), if their actions were found to 
affect the country's stability and economy'. 78 The government defended its ban 
on a national union for electronics workers by citing foreign investors who had 
allegedly expressed unhappiness at the proposal 
. 
79 This stand was quickly 
reversed, however, when the mTUC accused the government of being in tile 
80 pocket of foreign multi-nationals. 
A repeat performance by Zainal at the 1993 ILO meeting was soon followed by a 
concerted campaign to rein in the increasing dissent of the MTUc leadership. 81 
Shortly after the ILO meeting, the Director-General of Trade Unions, a 
government appointed civil servant with wide-ranging discretionary powers, 
issued a directive to Zainal to quit either his post on the Semangat supreme 
council or else his post as deputy secretary-general of the Transport Workers 
82 Union (TWU), which would also have forced his resignation from the mTuc . 
Zainal initially defended his right to hold both, but eventually resigned from the 
Semangal supreme council. 83 Subsequently, in October 1994, Zainal and three 
other MTUC officials were charged with Criminal Breach of Trust for alleged 
misuse of union fundS. 84 They were subsequently joined by the mTuc president 
78 'Tell-tale leaders under close watch. ' New Straits Times, 27 July 1992. 
79 'Some investors against nationwide union: Lim. ' Business Times, 4 September 1992. 
80 , MTuc distorting policy, says Lim. ' New Straits Tinies, 14 September 1992. 
81 'Zainal sticks to original speech text. ' New Straits Times, 16 June 1993. 
82 'Zainal likely to choose union over Semangat 46. ' New Straits Times, 29 June 1993. 
83 , MTUC chief Zainal gives up S46 post. ' New Straits Times, 10 July 1993. 
84 'Zainal among three to be charged with CBV New Straits Times, 15 October 1994. The 
charges related to their actions as office-bearers in the Transport Workers Union, rather that 
the MTUC itself 
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V. David. 85 The fact that the sums involved were so small 
- 
RM5,000 in 
Zainal's case and RM15,000 in David's 
- 
and that the alleged offences had 
taken place in the 1980s led to much speculation that the trials were politically 
motivated. 86 
As the threats and intimidation continued, the MTUC sought to reconcile itself 
with the government. 87 At the congress' 1994 May Day rally, Zainal announced 
that lie had left Semangat to 'prove that the mTuc is apolitical' 
-a clear change 
from the congress' 1990 stance on the impossibility of apolitical unionism. 88 At 
the 1995 general election, the mTuc announced that it was not supporting any 
party, but left it up to members to vote for candidates who supported workers 
rights. By this time, Anwar had begun courting Zainal to woo him into UMNO. 89 
Zainal had previously attributed the organisation's move towards reconciliation 
with the government as partially due to Anwar installation as Deputy Prime 
Minister. 90 As reconciliation continued, the court cases against Zainal and 
others were dismissed after the prosecution withdrew its charges. 91 The 
following year, Zainal announced that he had joined UMNO, 'for the sake of the 
workers', apparently. 92 
85 
'Veteran unionist charged with CBT. ' Straits Tinies (Singapore), 28 October 1994. 
86 Interview, S. Somah Sundram, m-ruc Central Committee, Subang Jaya, September 2001. 
87 
, MTUC hopes to foster closer ties with Govt. ' New Straits Thnes, 01 January 1994. 
88 
, Zainal leaves S46 to mend fences with Government. ' New Straits Tines, 02 May 1994. 
89 MTUC sedia wuJud hubungan harmoni. ' Berita Harian, 18 May 1994. 
90 MTUC pilih kesederhanaan. ' Berita Mingguan, 16 January 1994. 
91 'T-WU officials in CBT case acquitted. ' New Straits Times, 10 October 1996. 
92 
'Zainal: I joined UMNO for the sake of workers. ' Business Rines, II October 1997. 
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The Congress of Unions of Employees in the Public and Civil Services 
In contrast to the MTUC, CUEPACS remained more comfortable with the regime 
throughout the 1990s. In 1992, CUEPACS' new president, Mohamad Mat Jid, 
pledged that the organisation would continue to 'cooperate' with the 
government. 93 Mohamad was also the president of the strongly pro-regime 
Malaysia Labour Organisation (see below). The ties between CUEPAcs and the 
government were underlined in 1993 when the Penang State CUEPACS chainnan 
was elected chairman of an UMNo branch in Penang. 94 In 1995, tensions arose 
between CUEPACS and the government over CUEPACS' proposals for the civil 
service salary review, conducted every five years. Mahathir accused CUEPACS 
95 
of 'unreasonable demands', which would bankrupt the government. The 
government claimed that CUEPACS' proposal would cost it over RM12 billion 
96 
and, in turn, set a limit of RM2 billion on any agreement. Afler initially 
rejecting any such cap, CUEPACS' claim was eventually settled in February 1996, 
at a cost ofjust over RM2 billion. 97 Despite some harsh words from both sides, 
the wage claim negotiations were noticeably different from those of the mid 
1980s, when CUEPAcs had been led by Ahmad Nor. Never during the 
negotiations was even the prospect of strikes or pickets raised, in stark contrast 
to the extensive pickets of the 1980s. 98 CUEPAcs also put up little resistance to 
the government's cap on any settlement, despite it being a fraction of their 
93 , CUEPACS chief pledges to cooperate with Govt. ' Business Tinzes, 25 June 1992. 
94 
, NUTP sec leads UMNO branch. ' New Straits Times, 12 July 1993. 
95 , CUEPACS demands will bankrupt the Govt: PW Business Tinies, 14 July 1995. 
96, RM2bn ceiling for CUEPACS to work on. ' Business Titnes, 7 October 1995. 
97 
, CUEPAcs No to RM2bn limit for pay revision. ' Business Tinies, 16 October 1995; 'CUEPACS 
accepts Govt's pay offer. ' Business Tinies, I February 1996. 
98 
'Bravo CUEPACS and PSW Business Tinies, 2 February 1996. 
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original demands. The congress also agreed to drop its demands that some 
contentious aspects of the wage structure be re-examined. 99 During the height 
of the negotiations, CUEPAcs resorted to flattery rather than confrontation; at its 
convention in January 1996, CUEPAcs bestowed a special award of Negarawan 
Teladan Berwawasan (Visionary and Exemplary Statesman) upon Mahathir. 100 
Similarly, CUEPACs arranged a rally in December 1995 to 'express appreciation' 
to the government for the role it was allowed to play in the negotiations. 
' 01 
Following the resolution of the wage claims, CUEPACS moved to adopt an even 
more pro-regime stance. In October 1996, CUEPACS announced a change of 
policy towards greater cooperation with the government to 'help national 
development'. 102 In a clear indication of how it was to achieve this, the 
congress spoke out against an NGO forum on police brutality, claiming it 
'showed a lack of respect' for the law. 103 The congress was immediately 
rewarded with a representative post on a trade mission to the United States, the 
first for a workers' organisation. 104 
The Malaysian Labour (Diganisation 
As already noted, the MTUC's decision in 1989 to enter the political fray spurred 
a number of its affiliates to form a break away union congress, the Malaysian 
Labour Organisation (MLO). By the early 1990s, the Wo had attracted fifleen 
unions, representing around 150,000 workers. The MLO was widely perceived 
as being more pro-government than the mTuc - its formation had, after all, been 
99, CUEPACS accepts RM2bn offer for salary revision. ' Business Times, 4 November 1995. 
100, CUEPACS honours Dr Mahatl-ýr with award. ' New Straits Times, 19 January 1996. 
101 'More than 5,000 to attend CUEPACS gathering. ' New Straits Times, 18 December 1995. 
102, CUEPACS to help national development. ' New Straits Tintes, 30 October 1996. 
103, CUEPACS is against NGO-organised forum. ' Business Times, 23 December 1996. 
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a response to the mTuc's support for the opposition during the UMNO crisis. The 
most influential of the MLO unions, its co-founder the National Union of Bank 
Employces (NUBE), openly favoured a 'good working relationship' with the 
government. 105 The mTuc, however, viewed the relationship between the 
government and the MLo as more insidious. David publicly accused the MLO Of 
being a 'political arm of the Barisan [Nasional]', a claim vigorously denied by 
the regime. 106 
The MLO certainly appeared often to support the government position over the 
interest of the workers. After its appointment to the National Labour Advisory 
Council (NLAC) the MLO stated that it would 'place national interest above 
others', a clear echo of the government's own line on the role of trade unions. 107 
It also regularly lauded government policies that were opposed by the broader 
union movement. 108 The MLO also appeared much closer to employers than its 
counterparts. When a proposal was made to jail employers who failed to 
'safeguard' their employees against fatal accidents, the MLO stood side-by-side 
with the Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) in opposing the move, which 
was strongly welcomed by the MTUC. 109 K. Sanmugam, the MLO secretary- 
general, also called for trade unions to 'abandon confrontation' and 'seek ways 
to bring employees and employers closer together'. ' 10 Most controversially, the 
104 'Move to include CUEPACS rep in missions lauded. ' New Straits Tittles, 5 November 1996. 
105, NUBE favours good rapport with Govt. ' Business Tittles (Malaysia), 02 May 1992. 
106, MTUC. ' MLO a polifical arm of Barisan. ' Nesv Straits Times, 26 February 1992; 'Lim: MLO 
has no connection with Govt. ' Business Times, 21 December 1992 
107 'MLO to place national interest above others. ' Business Times, 8 August 1991. 
108 , MLO: New pay scheme a model for private sector. ' New Straits Tittles, 15 October 199 1. 
109 'Mixed reaction to jail employers idea. ' New Straits Times, 13 March 199 1. 
110 'Abandon harsh stance, says MLO official. ' New Straits Tittles, 14 May 1993. 
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IMO became involved in the issue of the ban on a national union for electronics 
workers. Sanmugam questioned the importance of the ban, calling it 
`exaggerated', and claiming that there were greater priorities facing the labour 
movement. "' Sanmugan's position was undoubted affected by the fact that all 
the attempts to register a national union had been under the MTUC's auspices, 
whilst four of the in-house unions allowed by the regime in the sector had 
affiliated with the MLO. 1 12 Nonetheless, in speaking out on the issue that was 
one of the mTuc's main grudges against the regime, Sanmugarn was clearly 
marking the distance between the MLO and the mTUC, and the closeness of the 
MLO to the government. 
Whether or not the MLo had a tacit alliance with the government, its 
consolidation as a major player in the labour movement in the early 1990s was 
clearly to the regime's advantage, for two reasons. Firstly, as an organisation 
with a greater ideological convergence with the government, it would inevitably 
lead to easier dealings with the labour movement for the government. Secondly, 
the emergence of a challenger to the mTuc for the affiliation of private sector 
unions allowed the regime to intensify the kind of divisive tactics that it had so 
effectively pursued in the 1980s between the MTUC and CUEPACS. From 1991, 
the government began actively pushing the MLO as an alternative labour centre 
to the mTuc. As already noted, the MLO was appointed that year to the National 
Labour Advisory Council 
-a tripartite advisory body made up of representatives 
from the government, the unions and employers. The following year, the 
government gave the MLo a seat on the Employees Provident Fund advisory 
111 
'Sanmugam: Electronics union issue exaggerated. ' Business Times, 5 October 1994. 
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board, angering the mTuc, which had previously had the monopoly of the labour 
representatives on the board. ' 13 Finally, in 1993, MLo representatives actually 
replaced Zainal Rampak on the appellate board of the Social Security 
Organisation (SOCSO). 114 In addition to promoting the MLO as a workers' 
representative in statutory bodies, the government sewed further animosity in 
the labour movement with its selection of union representatives for the annual 
ILO conference. In 1992, the government appointed the MLo as an adviser to the 
Malaysian delegation at the ILO conference 
-a move that again angered the 
MTUC, as it had not been consulted on the appointment. ' 15 The next year, the 
government suggested that it may even select MLO representatives instead of the 
MTUC. 116 Zainal and Sanmugam had previously engaged in a bitter public 
confrontation over whose organisation should be selected. ' 17 
Although the mTuc and the MLo had been rivals from the start, then, the 
government's calculated playing of the two organisations off one another 
ensured that tensions were not allowed to subside. By mid-1992, the two 
organisations were nearing all out war. The MTUC used its May Day rally to 
accuse the MLO leaders of being 'timid' in their defence of workers' rights, and 
112 '4 electronics unions formalise ties with MLO. ' Business Tittles, 3 August 1992. 
113 t MLO vice-president Gurdev appointed to EPF Board. ' New Straits Tittles, 5 November 1992. 
114 , Another blow to MTUC. ' Business Tittles, 15 July 1993. 
115 1 MTUC to lodge protest over MLO appointment. ' Business Tittles, 9 May 1992. 
116 , MLO may be picked to attend labour conference. ' New Straits Tittles, 8 April 1993. 
117 , MTUC, MLO in tussle to attend ILO. ' Business Tittles, 30 March 1993. 
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exploiting the labour movement for their own benefit. ' 18 The MLO responded by 
accusing David and Zainal of being `leaders without principles'. "9 
Just as the MLo began to consolidate its position in the labour movement, 
however, it was faced with its own internal problems. In March 1993, the 
succinctly-named Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees' 
Union pulled out of the MLO, claiming that the MLo had not followed its own 
constitution in the appointment of its executive committee. 120 Following a 
complaint to the Registrar of Societies, the MLo admitted that it had breached its 
own constitution, but appealed to the Registrar not to deregister it, as this would 
be 'a big loss for the workers'. 12 1 The Registrar agreed to overlook the errors, 
though whether she was more moved by the potential loss for tile workers, or 
the potential loss of a government ally in the labour movement was not made 
public. 122 In 1995, the MLO was further hit by the withdrawal of its largest 
member, the Subordinate Staff Union Council (MKTR 
- 
Majlis Kakilangan 
Rendah), taking with it 50,000 of the MLO'S 150,000 affiliate members. 123 This 
signalled the begirming of the end for the MLO, eventually 'merging' back into 
the MTUC in 1996. 
This turnabout in the MLO'S fortunes, from upcoming government favouritc in 
1993 to ignominious 'merger' in 1996 can be understood as the result of two 
related developments. Firstly, as already noted, the mTUC had, since 1994, 
1" 'Union cWefs criticise each other. ' New Straits Times, 2 May 1992. 
119 'Unions edge nearer a free-for-all. ' Business Times, 15 May 1992. 
120 'Major affiliate quits mLo, alleges breach of rules. ' New Straits Times, II March 1993. 
121 ,M LO apologises to registrar. ' New Straits Times, II May 1993. 
122 'Registrar lets off MLO for violations. ' New Straits Pines, 3 July 1993. 
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moved away from its confrontational stance towards the regime. This greater 
accommodation between the government and the NITUC lessened the 
goveniment's need for the MLo as an ally in the labour movement. Secondly, 
the defection of a number of large unions away from the MLO in the 1980s 
weakened its position vis-A-vis the wuc. Most important here was the 
withdrawal of the MKTR. Following the MTUC's attempted rapprochement with 
the government in 1994, ties between the MLo and the NITUC also began to 
improve. By the end of 1994, both Sanmugarn and Zainal had voiced the 
possibility of a merger between the two erstwhile rivals, although this was 
quickly ruled out by the MLO. 124 By the middle of the year, the two 
organisations were working in tandem on a number of labour issues, and 
appeared considerably reconciled. 125 Merger talks were reactivated at the end of 
1995, and the MLo agreed to 'merge' with the MTUC in February 1996.126 
Whilst both parties spoke of a 'merger', however, the reality was that the MLO 
was to be disbanded, and its affiliate unions were to rejoin the wuc, which they 
did so in May 1996.127 
CONCLUSIONS 
As the economy grew apace during the 1990s and the regime's political 
popularity returned, the BN moved towards a more liberal position. As a 
123 , MLO loses biggest member. ' New Straits Times, 28 August 1995. 
124 , MTUC and MLO talk about merger. ' New Straits Times, 23 December 1994; 'MLO rules out 
merger with MTUC. ' New Straits Times, 3 January 1995. 
125 'Rival labour unions working together. ' New Sunday Times, 3 August 1995. 
126, M LO agrees to merge with MTUC. ' New Straits Times, 14 February 1996. 
127 , MLO set to merge with MTUC by May L' Business Times, 12 March 1996; 117 MLO 
affiliates return to mTuc fold. ' New Straits Times, 2 May 1996. 
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constituent of this, the regime proffered a cautious olive branch to civil society. 
This change in stance was most linked to the arrival of Anwar as deputy prime 
minister who, as we have seen, was key to developing links with former 
government critics such as Chandra Muzaffar and Zainal Rampak. The regime 
also held out the prospect of broadening the political space for NGos and civil 
society to operate; in 1994 the government announced its intention to review 
some provisions in the Internal Security Act, although ruling out a complete 
repeal. 128 Changes to other laws were also made to accommodate some civil 
society conccrns; in addition to the environmentalist movement, the women's 
movement successfully lobbied for a number of changes to laws affecting 
women and domestic violence. 129 Of course, this liberalisation of civil society 
controls was neither instantaneous nor universal. In 1993, for instance, 
Amnesty International was denied a permit to set up a local branch. 130 
Moreover, the government continue to harass organisations and individuals that 
it perceived to be a threat to its interests. For the most part, this took the form of 
csoft' coercion and attrition 
- 
encouraging divisions, and threatening the use of 
its repressive apparatus. Zainal Rampak and his union colleagues were not 
alone in facing legal action after criticism of the regime. In a case that dragged 
on for over six Years, women's labour activist Irene Fernandez was prosecutcd 
for 'false reporting' after highlighting appalling conditions in immigration 
camps. 131 A similar case was brought against DAP MP Lim Guan Eng, which 
128 'Amendments to Internal Security Act in the pipeline. ' Business Times, 26 May 1994. 
129 See Maznah Mohamad, 'At the centre and the periphery: The contribution of women's 
movements to democratization', in Loh and Khoo, Democrac), in Malaysia, pp. 21640. 
130 
'Amnesty's appeal rejected. ' Business Times, 17 June 1993. 
131 See SUARAM, Malaysian Human Rights Report 2000. 
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will be discussed further in the next chapter. A Far Eastern Economic Review 
journalist was also briefly jailed in 1997 after writing a critical article. 132 The 
regime was also highly successful in employing tactics of attrition against 
political opponents, most notably the PBS state government in Sabah. 133 
This chapter has examined the ways in which the Malaysian regime responded 
to the expansion of civil society and the broad challenge to its legitimacy in the 
1980s. Within the context of the state-society model being advanced here, it 
demonstrates both the extent of state capacity to restrict and direct civil society, 
and the limit thereupon. Moreover, where organisation and movements drew 
their strength from entrenched cultural beliefs and identities 
- 
in the Malaysian 
case, notably, Islam 
- 
the state's ability to exert hegemonic control was 
considerably more contested than in other areas. 
132 , FEER journalist jailed for contempt. ' Arew Straits Times, 5 September 1997. 
133 See Graham Brown, 'Restraining autonomy: The politics of Sabah during the Mahathir 
years', in Bridget Welsh (ed. ), Reflections: The Mahathir Years, Washington DC, School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2004. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CRISIS AND RESPONSE II: 
TEE DYNAMICS OF REFORMASI, 1998-2001 
Thus far, the empirical chapters of this thesis have examined the development of 
civil society and social movements in Malaysia in three broad periods, from the 
expansion of civil society in the early 1980s through the crisis of 1987-1990 to 
the state resurgence of the 1990s. This final empirical chapter deals with a 
second regime crisis, which dominated the Malaysian political scene from 1998 
through 2001 
- 
the 'Anwar Ibrahim affair' and the reformasi (reform) 
movement that it launched. Because of the dynamic interplay of state, civil 
society and social mobilisation that characterised the period, this latter crisis is 
particularly demonstrative of the theoretical arguments developed earlier. To 
demonstrate the robustness of these claims, this chapter takes a more explicitly 
comparative approach, using the previous UMNO crisis as its foil. 
On 2 September 1998, Mahathir sacked his deputy and former prot6g6 Anwar 
Ibrahim and expelled him from the government; the following day he saw also 
expelled from UMNo. Amid accusations of sodomy and corruption 
- 
widely 
believed to be trumped up 
- 
Anwar was later arrested, tried and convicted to a 
total of fifteen years in prison. Anwar's sacking provoked a sustained period of 
protest against the regime, seeing hundreds of thousands of mostly young, 
mostly male, mostly Malay protestors converging on the streets of Kuala 
Lumpur on a weekly basis. Eventually, this reformasi movement gave birth to a 
new political party, KEADILAN (Parli Kea&1an Nasional, or National Justice 
Party) and a united opposition ftont, the BA (Barisan Alteniatif, or Alternative 
Front) which contested the November 1999 general election. 
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Previous analyses of reformasi have tended to concentrate on its effects on the 
contours of Malaysian politics and have tended to view it as some kind of a 
watershed or turning point in Malaysia. Some studies, for instance, have 
explored its discursive value as a counterhegemonic challenge to the BN 
regime. ' Alternatively, they have focussed attention on the 'recon figuration' of 
Malaysian politics, in particular the changing understanding of Islam in the 
Malay polity. 2 Such studies that have analysed reformasi as a social movement 
have also been more concerned with the effects of reformasi on civil society, 
where it has been argued that the movement helped foster better 'norms' of 
interethnic collaboration. 3 
Whilst all these studies have contributed to an understanding of contemporary 
Malaysian politics, what is lacking is any thorough stnictural explanation of the 
origins and trajectory of the reformasi challenge. This chapter provides such an 
analysis within the theoretical framework developed throughout the thesis. It 
argues that the forces that created and shaped reformasi were predominantly the 
I Farish A. Noor, 'Looking for Reformasi: The discursive dynan*s of the reformasi movement 
and its prospects as a political project', Indonesian and the Malay Morld, 77 (1999), pp. 5-18; 
John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, London, Zed 
Books, 2001. 
Virginia Matheson Hooker, 'Reconfiguring Malay and Islam in Contemporary Malaysia', 
Rima, 34: 2 (2000) pp. 1-27; Mohamad Abu Bakar, Xonservatisme dan konflik: Isu 'kafir 
mengkafir' daIarn politik kepartian, 1955-2000', Pemikir, 21 (2000), pp. 121-59; Claudia 
Derichs, 'Competing politicians, competing visions: Mahathir Mohamad's Wawasan 2020 and 
Anwar lbrahinfs Asian Renaissance', in James Chin and Ho Khai Leong (eds. ), Mahathir's 
, 
4dministration: Performance and crisis and governance, Singapore, Times Books 
International, 200 1, pp. 188-214. 
Meredith L. Weiss, 'What will become of reformasi? Ethnicity and changing political norms 
in Malaysia', Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21: 2 (1999); Meredith L. Weiss, 'Overcoming 
race-based politics in Malaysia: Establishing norms for deeper multiethnic co-operation', in 
Chin and Leong, Mahathir's, 4dininistration, pp. 62-99. 
2 
3 
248 
Crisis and Response II, 1998-2001 
same as those that have shaped Malaysian societal politics over the previous two 
decades, drawing close parallels with the crisis of 1987 in particular. In as 
much, it suggests that the refon-nasi movement 
- 
though undoubtedly a dramatic 
and important development 
- 
may not be the watershed it is widely perceived to 
be. 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY I: THE MAHATHIR-ANWAR SPLIT 
As discussed in chapter two, the political opportunity structure is one of the key 
concepts used in understanding why social movements emerge when they do. 
The theory suggests that changes in the institutional i sed political system 
- 
formal or informal 
- 
provide the opportunity for social movements to arise. A 
wide variety of dynamic variables have been identified as potential 'dimensions' 
of such opportunities, of most relevance here being changes in the stability of 
elite alignments. 
The trajectory of the reformasi movement was affected by a number of shifts in 
the political opportunity structure, including the use of repression to demobilise 
protest and the imminence of elections as an alternative channel for protest. The 
origin of the movement, however, lay firmly in the shifting elite alignments 
within the regime and, more specifically, within UMNO. In as much, it is 
important to note that the origins of the Mahathir-Anwar split was remarkably 
similar to that of the previous UMNO Split in 1987 
- 
party factionalism 
intensified by economic woes. Whereas the Razaleigh challenge to Mahathir's 
leadcrship creatcd a schism within the party, however, the vast majority of 
senior UMNO officials closed ranks behind Mahathir after he sacked Anwar. 
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The Mahathir-Anwar split that catalysed the refon-nasi movements was sudden 
and drastic in its denouement, but had its roots in long existing factionalism 
within UMNO. Anwar first came to prominence in the early 1970s, as the 
founding president of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM - Islamic 
Youth Movement of Malaysia). He was instrumental in the student 
demonstrations in the mid 1970s, which eventually saw him detained without 
trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Towards the end of the 1970s, it 
became increasingly clear that Anwar was preparing to make the hop into party 
politics, and he was a regular speaker at PAS ceramah. PAS' deputy president at 
the time, Fadzil Noor, was an old ally of Anwar from ABim and there was much 
speculation after a leadership crisis in 1978 that Fadzil had not run for the 
Presidency because he wanted to 'keep the seat warm' for Anwar. 4 It was thus a 
great shock to his supporters and detractors alike when Anwar announced he 
was joining UMNO in 1982. His move was seen as a personal coup for Mahathir, 
who had been focussing on winning the support of young Malays since taking 
on the premiership one year previously. Throughout the 1980s, Anwar rose 
quickly through the cabinet and through the party, winning the presidency of the 
powerful umNo Youth barely five months afler joining the party. 5 During the 
1987 split, Anwar was one of the staunchest supporters of Mahathir and has 
been credited with winning the divisive UMNo election for l1iM. 6 In 199 1, lie 
was rewarded with the powerful finance ministry. 
4 
5 
Interview, Raja Petra Raja Kamaruddin, Director Free Anwar Campaign, Bangsar, April 2001. 
Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Singapore, Oxford University 
Press, 199 1, p. 100. 
Interview, Chandra Muzaffar, Deputy President KEADILAN, Petaling Jaya, March 2001. 
6 
250 
Crisis and Response II, 1998-2001 
Anwar finally took up his position as Mahathir's heir apparent when he assumed 
the deputy presidency of UMNo, and with it the post of deputy prime minister, at 
the party's general assembly in November 1993. His rise to the post appears, 
however, to have been not entirely with Mahathir's approval. Earlier in the 
year, Anwar had stated that he would not challenge the incumbent deputy 
president, Ghafar Baba. 7 Mahathir subsequently made clear his own preference 
for the status quo by commenting that he had not given his 'blessings' to anyone 
to contest the deputy president's PoSt. 8 In August, however, Anwar changed his 
mind 
- 
apparently after many pleas from UMNO members 
- 
and agreed to accept 
nominations. 9 He was almost immediately deluged with statements of support 
from UMNO officials, including his successor at UMNO Youth, Najib Tun 
Razak. 'O As UMNo divisional nominations for the party elections came in, it 
was immediately clear that Anwar would win; within two weeks of announcing 
his candidacy Anwar had received eighty-seven division nominations compared 
with six for Ghafar. 11 Significantly, however, Mahathir's own UMNO division, 
which he headed, chose to remain neutral and sent in no nominations for any 
7, Anwar: I am not challenging Ghafar for No 2 position. ' New Sunday Tinjes, 25 April 1993. 
$ 
'Anwar won't seek UMNO deputy president's post. ' Business Times, 12 June 1993. 
9 
'Anwar announces bid for UMNO deputy presidency. ' New Straits Times, 24 August 1993. 
10 'Anwar gets full support from UMNO Youth. ' New Straits Times, 25 August 1993; 'Malacca 
UMNo backs Anwar, three others. ' Business Times, 30 August 1993. It has been suggested 
that Najib's loyalty to Anwar was in fact a follow-on from the previous crisis, when Anwar 
had bought Najib's support for Mahathir's 'Team A' faction by offering to vacate the UMNO 
Youth presidency for him. Interviews, UMNo activists, April-November 2001. 
'Resounding support for Anwar. ' Business Times, 13 September 1993. Afler his close shave 
in the 1987 UMNO party elections, Mahathir had re-engineered the party's voting system to 
give blocks votes to the divisions, which out-weighted the votes of the actual delegates at the 
general assembly. If Anwar received enough divisional nominations, he could thus win the 
election before the assembly started. 
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Posts. 12 As the nominations piled up, Ghafar was forced to withdraw from the 
contest to avoid humiliation. Anwar thus took the deputyship unopposed at the 
general assembly. To complete the coup, Anwar supporters also won all three 
of the UmNO vice president posts, and the UMNO Youth leadership. 
Anwar's victory was not necessarily the groundswell of grassroots support that 
it appeared, however. As the UMNO general assembly was approaching, 
rumours; began circling of vote buying by Anwar's supporters. 13 The rumours 
were played down until the assembly itself, whereupon the issue exploded 
spectacularly. The day before the assembly opened, Mahathir held a closed 
door session with the delegates, where he apparently lambasted the prevalence 
of money politics and sought to distance himself from Anwar's team. 14 On the 
final day of the assembly, the issue surfaced again, with delegates calling for the 
'blatant bribery' of party elections to be stopped before it ruined the party. 15 
Whatever means they had employed, however, Anwar and his supporters looked 
in firm control of UmNo after the elections. The clean sweep was also a clear 
sign to Mahathir that Anwar had ambitions on his post. 
During the following years, Anwar tried to consolidate his grip on the party. 
Increasingly, he sought to take on Mahathir himself in proxy battles in UMNO 
divisional elections. As the 1995 UMNO general assembly approached, a 
number of Mahathir's staunchest allies fell in divisional elections to often 
12 
'Kubang Pasu stays neutral. ' Malay Mail, 24 September 1993. 
13 
'Nazri: No money politics involved. ' New Straits Times, 23 October 1993. 
14 
'All the Deputy President's men. ' Malaysian Business, 16 November 1993. 
15 'Members want bribery stopped. ' Business Times, 6 November 1993. 
252 
Crisis and Response II, 1998-2001 
relatively unknown candidates associated with Anwar. 16 With the triennial 
party elections again due in 1996, there was much speculation that Anwar was 
about to mount a challenge to Mahathir's leadership. A full-on battle between 
the two would, however, have been disastrous for the party; memories of the 
1987 UMNO elections were still fresh in delegates' minds. To avoid such a 
collision, it appears that a tacit compromise was reached. A motion was passed 
at the 1995 assembly to prevent any challenge to either Mahathir or Anwar in 
the 1996 UMNO elections. Anwar would thus have to wait until 1999 should he 
wish to challenge Mahathir. In return, Mahathir publicly stated that he would 
'soon' be handing over power to his deputy. 17 In effect, a timetable for the 
transition of power from Mahathir to Anwar was thus set; Mahathir would hand 
over power before 1999, otherwise Anwar would challenge him for the party 
presidency. 
Any hope that the rivalry between the two leaders would be placated by this 
compromise was dashed, however, at the 1996 UMNO elections. Whilst both 
Anwar and Mahathir stuck to the 'no contest rule' for the top two posts, proxy 
battles between the two emerged for all the major party posts. Attention was 
particularly focussed on the election for the head of the Wanita UMNO (UMNO 
Women) wing, which was headed by the widely unpopular but Mahathir- 
supported Rafidah Aziz. 18 Another proxy battle was brewing in the Youth 
wing, where Zahid Hamidi, an Anwar supporter, challenged the Mahathir 
loyalist Rahim. Thamby Chik. With Mahathir's personal support for Rafidah 
16 E. g. 'Sanusi loses chief's post by 12 votes. ' New Straits Titnes, 30 September 1995. 
17 'Surely the time will come, soon, for a new leader to head the party. ' Asiaiveek-, 8 December 
1995. 
18 'The prime n-ýinister's menu. ' Asiaweek, 2 August 1996. 
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and Rahim well known, however, their pro-Anwar challengers were considered 
unlikely to win. 19 
The election results were a mixed bag for Anwar. His candidates won in both 
the Youth and Wanita wings, but the decidedly anti-Anwar Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi took one of the vice presidencies. Mahathir quickly turned the tables on 
Anwar by readmitting Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah 
- 
his own former archrival 
- 
into UMNO shortly after the assembly. Razaleigh remained widely popular both 
within and beyond UMNo, and thus represented a potential threat to Anwar's 
position as heir apparent. 20 
As 1997 begun, then, the Anwar-Mahathir factionalism was more apparent than 
ever. A direct challenge by Anwar on Mahathir's leadership was unlikely, 
however. As Mahathir's appointed successor anyway, Anwar had little to gain 
and much to lose from such a challenge. Rather, he appeared to be jousting 
with Mahathir over when the latter should retire, whilst simultaneously ensuring 
a firm grip on the party to ensure his succession to an undisputed leadership 
position. Despite his apparent unassailability, Anwar had many enemies within 
UMNO, from those old hands aggrieved at his meteoric rise through the ranks to 
others who disapproved of his reliance on money politics. 
It was in this context that Mahathir appointed Anwar as acting prime minister 
when he went on a two month `working holiday' from May 1997, widely seen 
19 `Straight from the heart. ' Asiaweek, 25 October 1996. 
20 `Challenge to Anwar? ' Asiaweek, 15 November 1996. 
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as a `test' by Mahathir of Anwar's suitability for the premiership. 21 Anwar's 
brief tenure at the helm only served to emphasise the differences between 
himself and Mahathir, however. Firstly, Anwar immediately undertook a 
concerted anti-corruption drive, which did not exclude individuals close to 
Mahathir. Secondly, the financial crisis in Thailand, which broke during this 
period, brought into the open fundamental policy differences between the two. 
Anwar began his fight against corruption with the arrest of a senior UMNO 
politician on corruption charges, claiming that he was sending a 'clear signal' on 
corruption. 22 All state executive councillors were also ordered to declare their 
assets to the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA). A deputy minister was sacked and 
suspended from the party along with another UMNO politician over allegations of 
23 missing money from party coffers. After Anwar referred a number of officials 
within his own finance ministry to the ACA, other ministries and government 
agencies signed up to Anwar's 'all out war on corruption', vowing to root out 
corruption in their midst. 24 Anwar even earned the praise of opposition leader 
25 Lim Kit Siang for his proposals to strengthen the otherwise compliant ACA . 
Mahathir himself had often talked the talk of anti-corruption, but Anwar's 
apparent willingness to walk the walk as well unnerved many within the 
21 'Anwar to be acting Prime Minister. ' New Straits Tintes, 9 May 1997. Popular parallels have 
been drawn here with Musa Hitam's period as acting Prime Minister in the mid-1980s and 
with Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's similar tenure in 2003. Critics see this as Mahathir's way of 
'testing' his deputies, both in terms of capacity and loyalty. 
22 , Abu Zahar: Arrest shows serious view taken of graft. ' New Straits Times, 2 June 1997; 
'Clear signal on corruption. ' New Straits Times, 4 June 1997. 
23 , UMNO suspends Siti Zainab, Habshah. ' Business Times, 6 June 1997. 
24 , ACA should be thorough in probe. ' New Sunday Times, 15 June 1997, 'Customs gets tough in 
fighting graft, says Anwar. ' New Straits Tinies, II July 1997. 
25 , DAP lauds move to give ACA more power. ' Neiv Straits Times, 10 June 1997. 
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government, never more so that when he ordered the ACA to continue its probe 
in the Perwaja Steel scandal 
. 
26 Perwaja was a state-owned steel manufacturer 
that had run into problems in 1988. At the time, a close associate of Mahathir 
was put in charge of the company, tasked with turning it around. By 1995, 
however, the company was in an even worse state, with RMI billion in 
accumulated losses and over RM2 billion in debts. Accusations of managerial 
irregularities and inflated profits based on insurance claims forced the 
27 government to hand the matter over to the ACA 
. 
The ACA was, however, 
notoriously lax in its investigation of government-linked cases, and Anwar's 
intervention was thus a clear signal of his intent to crackdown on corruption. 
Crucially, it was also a signal to Mahathir that Anwar would not protect his 
family and associates' business interests after his retirement. 
The main event of Anwar's stewardship came towards the end. On 2 July, the 
Thai government allowed the baht to float, having previously been pegged to a 
basket of currencies. The instant collapse of the baht caught the attention of 
currency speculators, who brought similar pressure to bear on other regional 
currencies. Anwar's handling of the immediate crisis 
- 
refusing to use national 
funds to support the ringgit 
- 
earned him widespread plaudits, and for a while it 
looked as if Malaysia would escape the 'Asian Contagion'. As the ringgit 
slowly slid to one third of its previous dollar value of the next few months, 
however, very public differences between the two leaders emerged on how to 
deal with the crisis. Whilst Anwar favoured seeking IMF assistance, a 
programme of economic austerity and government cutbacks, Mahathir was seen 
26 'Per-waia Steel probe still on. ' New Straits Times, 24 May 1997. 
27 
'High-risk rivalry. ' Asiaweek, 18 April 1997. 
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as preferring a 'business as usual' attitude. Of particular contention were the so- 
called 'mega projects', such as the RM14 billion Bakun dam project. Anwar 
had long since been known for his disquiet over Mahathir's penchant for such 
projects, and economic pressures intensified this. 28 
Mahathir appears to have decided to move against his deputy immediately upon 
his return to the country at the end of July. Barely had he touched down in the 
airport than had he quietly rebuked the verve of Anwar's anti-corruption drive, 
assuring that he would not let it turn into a 'witch hunt'. He also implicitly 
criticised Anwar's handling of a dispute between two contractors involved in 
the construction of the Bakun dam. 29 A few weeks later, a cabinet reshuffle did 
Anwar no favours, with Anwar supporters being passed over in favour of other. 
Most notably, Zahid Harnidi, the UMNO Youth leader, was refused a ministerial 
post, despite the convention that the Youth leaders were made ministers. It was 
also around this time that rumours of sexual misconduct and homosexuality 
started spreading about Anwar, charges that were eventually to be used in his 
ouster. Although Mahathir initially dismissed the rumours asfitnah (slander), 
he also instructed Anwar not to pursue the matter legally. 30 
In the following months, Anwar found himself increasingly isolated in tile 
finance ministry. Mahathir himself took control of much of the response to the 
economic crisis, although Anwar apparently won a victory with the 
postponement of many of the mega projects in the 1998 Budget. 31A visit to 
28 'Is all well near the topT Asiaweek, 29 August 1997. 
29 'PM: Bakun dispute can be resolved. ' New Straits Thnes, 23 July 1997. 
30 'Sex allegation: Anwar won't pursue matter. ' New Straits Tinzes, 26 August 1997. 
31 'Mahathir shifts into reverse. ' Asiaweek, 19 December 1997. 
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Malaysia by IMF managing director Michel Camdessus at Anwar's behest 
apparently inMated Mahathir, who saw it as a white neo-colonialist telling him 
how to run his country. 32 When Mahathir then announced the creation of a 
National Economic Action Council (NEAC) tasked with developing and 
implementing an economic rescue package (dubbed 'an IMF package without the 
IMF'), Anwar was left out. Instead, former finance minister and one of 
Mahathir's closest confidants, Daim Zainuddin was brought out of political 
retirement to head the council. 33 
The first half of 1998 saw a series of financial bailouts of government linked 
companies, apparently orchestrated by Mahathir and Daim without Anwar. 
Most important here was the use of the state oil company, Petronas, to rescue 
34 the floundering shipping empire of Mahathir's son, Mirzan Mahathir. In an 
interview with Asiaweek magazine, Mahathir denied any connection with the 
deal, saying 'I have nothing to do with my son... It is not my fault that he is in 
business'. 35 Anwar publicly demonstrated his concern over the deal by calling 
for an independent valuation to ensure a fair price and 'to clear any 
misconception that the Government had interfered and influenced the proposed 
deal'. 36 Once again, it was clear that Anwar would not protect the Mahathir 
family business empire should he come to power. 
As the June 1998 umNO assembly approached, the perennial rumours resurfaced 
that Anwar would challenge Mahathir. Although party elections were not due 
32 Interview, Raja Petra. 
33 'Daim appointed NEAc executive director. ' New Sun(lay Times, 21 December 1997. 
34 'Bank on MISC's shareholding structure. ' New Straits Tintes, 13 March 1998. 
35 'Mounting pressure. ' Asiaweek, 27 March 1998. 
36 'Anwar: Appoint independent shipping valuer. ' New Straits Times, 21 March 1998. 
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until the next year, Anwar could still challenge indirectly. Mahathir himself 
was known to favour an extension of the party's self-imposed 1995 'no contest' 
ruling to prevent a challenge in 1999; if Anwar and his supporters could 
persuade the assembly to reject such a proposal, it would leave Mahathir 
extremely vulnerable. 37 The air of confrontation thickened when Zahid Hamidi, 
the pro-Anwar UMNO Youth chief, called for 'greater resolve and transparency' 
in the government's business dealings, indicating that the Youth wing would be 
taking a strong stand against corruption 
- 
meaning Mahathir and Daim. 
- 
in the 
upcoming assembly. 38 Zahid also implicitly scorned Mahathir's 'no contest' 
position and challenged his own pro-Mahathir deputy by openly calling for a 
contest for his own post in 1999.39 A day before the general assembly opened, 
Zahid used the most direct language yet, calling for the end of nepotism and 
cronyism within the government 
. 
40 A showdown appeared imminent. 
The showdown never came, however. Two factors effectively stymied any 
planned challenge by Anwar and his supporters. Firstly, an anonymous book 
was published entitled 50 dalil mengapa Anwar fidak boleh jadi PAI ('Fifly 
reasons why Anwar cannot become Prime Minister'), which repeated many of 
the allegations that had been circulated the previous years, and added a few of 
its own. Anwar denied all the allegations, and obtained a court order against the 
publisher. 41 The timing of the publication, however, was damaging to Anwar, 
as was the fact that the book mysteriously found its way into all the delegate 
37 'Little room at the top. ' Asiaweek, 19 June 1998. 
38 , UMNO Youth calls for greater resolve and transparency. ' New Straits Tifnes, II May 1998. 
39 'Ahmad Zahid reiterates his stand. ' New Straits Tinies, 20 May 1998. 
40 'Zahid: Nepotism, cronyism must stop. ' New Straits Tinies, 19 June 1998. 
41 'Book on Anwar: Injunction obtained. ' New Straits Tirnes, 18 June 1998. 
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bags at the UMNo assembly. 42 The second factor that ensured the stillbirth of 
any challenge was Mahathir's own performance. In a rousing speech, he turned 
the tables on his critics by claiming that all Malays were his cronies, because all 
Malays had benefited from government policies. 'Due to accusations of 
cronyism', he rallied, 'the Government is not able to assist anyone, especially 
43 during this economic downturn' 
. 
In a theatrical coup cle grace, Mahathir 
released an exhaustive list of all those Malays who had benefited from 
government patronage. Not only was Zahid Hamidi himself on the list, so was 
Anwar's father. 44 
The assembly passed, Mahathir wasted no time in orchestrating his final assault 
on Anwar. Daim Zainuddin was elevated to the cabinet as Special Functions 
Minister with responsibility for economic recovery, a post that further isolated 
Anwar. 45 A spate of 'resignations' of those close to Anwar ensued. First to go 
were two Malay newspaper editors and the head of operations at TV3, all close 
to Anwar. 46 The governor of the central bank and his assistant were also 
victims of the purge, 'resigning' a few days before Anwar was sacked. 47 At the 
same time, the rumours of sexual impropriety intensified, and were given scmi- 
official recognition. Mahathir, for instance, refused to ban the '50 Reasons' 
book until the completion of police investigations, implying that there may be 
42 Interview, Raja Petra. 
43 Translation of Mahathir's speech to the UMNO general assembly, New Straits Tinjes, 20 June 
1998. 
44 Asiaweek, 03 July 1998. The full list is available online at <http: //wNvw. asiaweek. coral 
asiaweek/98/0703/nat_3_list. htn-d>. 
45 Tairn returns to the Cabinet. ' New Straits Times, 25 June 1998. 
46 'Intelligence. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July 1998. 
47 'Bank Negara governor and deputy resign, assistant takes charge. ' New Straits Times, 29 
August 1998. 
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some truth after al 1.48 Apparently seeking to stave off the inevitable, Anwar 
announced that he would not challenge Mahathir for the UMNO presidency the 
following year. 49 Finally, on 2 September, Mahathir told Anwar to resign or be 
sacked. Anwar refused to resign; Mahathir sacked him. 
The changes in the political opportunity structure that gave rise to the reformasi 
movement were thus remarkably similar to those that led to the 1987 UMNO Split 
and the emergence of the Semangat opposition fronts. Indeed, some of the 
smaller details are tellingly similar; shortly before the 1987 UMNO assembly, a 
book appeared denigrating Musa Hitam in a way remarkably similar to the '50 
Reasons'. Whatever the similarities in the origins of the splits, however, they 
differed greatly in trajectory. Razaleigh's challenge was played out on a 
number of stages, but all of the within the normal institutional bounds of 
Malaysian politics 
- 
first in the UMNO general assembly, then in the courts, and 
finally in a general election. In contrast, the Anwar challenge exploded into a 
mass social movement that appeared for a long time to be contesting the very 
parameters of the political in Malaysia. 
CYCLES OF CONTENTION: THE REFo"AsiDEMONSTRATIONS 
The reformasi movement saw two distinct periods of collective protest against 
the BN regime (see figure 8.1) consistent with the changing dynamics of the 
movement. The first wave of protest was sparked by Anwar's sacking in 
September 1998 and saw heightened protest activity until the end of 1998, with 
intermittent protests continuing into 1999. Sporadic demonstrations continued 
48 'Decision on book after study of police findings. ' New Straits Times, 7 August 1998. 
49 'Wide support for Anwar's decision not to contest UMNO poll. ' New Straits Times, 13 August 
1998. 
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throughout 1999 and 2000, but these protests lacked any real sense of purpose 
or coherence. The second wave of more integrated protests picked up in August 
2000, after Anwar's second conviction, and continued with increasing intensity, 
until abruptly brought to a halt by a crackdown in April 200 1. 
Figwe 8.1: Reported refomiasi protest participation and incidence by quarter, 
1998 Q2 
- 
2001 Q4 
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'Me initial explosion of reformasi in September 1998 saw an outpouring of anti- 
government protestors onto the streets, such as had never been seen in Malaysia 
before, with total participation in the hundreds of thousands. %knesses and 
participants in these protests report an almost identical profile: that at every 
protest, the crowds were overwhelmingly young Way men, but that sizeable 
numbers of men and women of all ages from all races were present. ' 
5OParticipant inteviews and observation during fieldwork. For an eye-witness account of die 
demonstrations, see Sabri Zain, Face Off: A reforimsi diar),, 1998-99, Singapore, Options, 
2000. One noticeable exception was a small rally at the royal palace, where most of the 
demonstrators were women of all races, a fact that drew considerable ire from the regime, 
which accused opposition groups of manipulation. Government controlled newspapers 
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During the first week after his dismissal, Anwar addressed rallies every evening 
outside his house in a Kuala Lumpur suburb. Initially attracting around a 
51 
thousand participants, the numbers soon swelled to ten thousand or more. 
After several delays, Anwar then launched a 'roadshow' to press his demands 
for reformasi, speaking at rallies around the country, which were attended by 
tens of thousands of supporters each time. He also led a number of rallies in 
central Kuala Lumpur, culminating in a huge demonstration in front of the 
world media at the opening ceremony of the 1998 Commonwealth Games. The 
same evening, he was arrested in a commando-style raid on his house. 
After the arrest, weekly demonstrations by thousands of protestors continued 
throughout the next two months, finally dying out towards the end of 
November. Mostly concentrated in Kuala Lumpur, a few smaller 
demonstrations occurred in other areas, notably in Johor Bahru and Kuantan. 52 
The large demonstrations evolved into a weekly pattern, taking place on 
Saturdays along Jalan Tunku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur's main shopping 
thoroughfare. As Anwar's trial progressed, the weekly demonstrations dropped 
off, but sporadic demonstrations took place outside the courthouse. Anwar's 
first conviction in April 1999 set off four days of violent protests, which marked 
the end of this first wave of protest. 
During the latter half of 2000, refon-nasi-related protest activity picked up 
considerably, peaking in the first quarter of 2001, before dropping off abruptly 
subsequently alleged that the women were prostitutes hired by NGOS. See 'NG0s "hired 
prostitutes to join rally". ' Straits Times, 14 October 1998. 
51 10,000 turn up at Anwar residence as reform movement gathers steam. ' Business Titnes 
(Singapore), 9 September 1998. 
52 
'Johor mosques told to report rallies. ' Straits Times, 30 September 1998. 
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in April. This second wave of reformasi demonstrations was significantly 
different from the original demonstrations in that the rallies were more 
organised and spread around the country. The profile of the demonstrations 
remained the same, however 
- 
overwhelmingly young Malay men. The 
reformasi protests were reignited in August 2000 with Anwar's second 
conviction, this time on charges of 'unnatural sexual intercourse' (sodomy). 
The trial had ended in July 2000, and 4 August was set as the date when the 
judgment would be passed. Reformasi activists planned a mass rally, which 
fizzled out to a few hundred demonstrators after the verdict date was abruptly 
changed 
. 
53 The release of the less than surprising 
- 
and less than convincing 
- 
guilty verdict a few days later provoked four days of demonstrations, first 
outside the High Court in Kuala Lumpur, and then at Sungai Buloh, just outside 
Kuala Lumpur, where Anwar was imprisoned. 54 
After the BA'S surprise victory in the Lunas by-election in November 2000, a 
decision was made by the KEADILAN leadership to maintain the increased 
pressure on the regime through the remobilisation of protest demonstrationS. 55 
This decision was not unanimously supported, however. Some important 
figures within KEADILAN 
- 
notably its deputy president Chandra Muzaffar 
- 
had 
publicly expressed reservations about both the acceptability of street protests as 
a means of political change. He also questioned their efficacy, pointing to the 
fact that the BA had performed best in areas where there were few street protests 
in 1998, and had been disappointed with its performance in Kuala Lumpur, the 
53 
'Seven held for illegal gathering. ' New Straits Times, 5 August 2000. 
54 
'Eight held. ' Daily Express, 9 August 2000; 'Third day of Anwar protests. ' BBC Interactive, 
13 August 2000; 'Peaceful gathering at Sungai Buloh. ' Nciv Straits Times, 14 August 2000. 
55 Interviews, Raja Petra & Chandra. 
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56 heart of the protests. Nik Aziz, PAS' influential mursyidul 'ain (spiritual 
advisor) and chief minister of Kelantan, has also been on record as disapproving 
of demonstrations. 57 It was thus decided that the resurrection of the protest 
campaign would be held under the auspices of KEADILAN Youth 
-a tactic 
similar to that employed by UMNO, which uses its youth branch to pursue its 
more aggressive agenda. This had the duel advantage of distancing the 
KEADILAN leadership from the campaign, whilst simultaneously bringing it 
closer to the potential participants who, as we have seen, were overwhelmingly 
young Malays. 
From November 2000 until April 2001, a series of mass cerainah and 
demonstrations was organised. by the youth wing of KEADILAN, led by its 
president, Mohamad Ezarn Mohamad Nor, Anwar's former political secretary 
and increasingly the defacto leader of the 'protest wing' of the reformasi 
movement, as opposed to its political manifestation in KEADILAN. In March, the 
protest campaign was given the theme Gerakan menyelanialkan wang raAyat 
(Tampaign to safeguard the people's money'), and sought to build upon 
concern over a series of dubious business deals involving the government. It 
was to culminate with a mass 'Black 14' rally on the second anniversary of 
Anwar's conviction for corruption on April 14. 
In contrast to the initial explosion of reformasi protests, this second wave was 
well organised and designed to exert maximum pressure on the regime. The 
frontline of the new phase was the northern Malay-dominated state of Kedah 
- 
Mahathir's own state, and site of the Lunas by-election. Tile BA had made 
56 Interview, Chandra. 
57 Tarti Islam comes out against street protests. ' Straits Tirries, 14 April 200 1. 
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significant electoral inroads in Kedah in the 1999 general election 
- 
it had won 
eight out of the fifteen federal seats in the state, although the BN had retained 
control of the state assembly. The Lunas by-election had reinvigorated the idea 
that the BA could take Kedah at the next election, and the reformasi protests 
clearly sought to build on this. 
Whilst the protests replicated the earlier phase in that they were dominated by 
Malays, the organisers continued to present a multiethnic agenda, particularly in 
its focus on the government's financial dealings. In December 2000, the 
government had renationalised Malaysian Airline Systems, the ailing national 
airline, after having sold a substantial stake to Tajudin Ramli, a close business 
confidant of Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, in 1997. In buying back 
Ta udin's stake, however, the government paid well over double the market 
value of the shares, provoking claims of a bailout. In February 2001, further 
concern was raised by the market floatation of Time dotCom, part of the 
sprawling and debt-laden business empire of Halim Saad, another Daim 
associate. Market analysts had viewed the offer price for the shares as vastly 
overrated, and the offering was seventy-five per cent undersubscribed. The 
unsold shares were bought up by public pension funds and other government 
institutions, which had underwritten the flotation. On the first day of trading, 
the shares lost almost a third of their value, registering an overnight 'paper' loss 
of some RM300 million by the pension funds. 
The decision to emphasise financial matters in the protest campaign was clearly 
aimed at attracting the support of the Chinese, who are traditionally viewed as 
more money-minded that the Malays and Indians. Within the BA, it was the 
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Chinese-based DAP that had been most active in publicising and criticising the 
dubious financial dealings of the government. This period also saw a number of 
other Chinese issues emerge (see below), which led to hopes that the Chinese 
would become more involved in the reformasi movement. 58 
International developments also spurred the resurgence of refon-nasi. In 
January, massive demonstrations in Manila forced the ouster of Philippine 
president Joseph Estrada after his Senate impeachment on charges of corruption 
collapsed along partisan lines. 59 Reformasi leaders denied that the decision to 
focus on financial corruption was influenced by events in the Philippines and 
indeed some within the movement perceived Estrada's fall as the loss of a 
potential ally, given his outspoken support for Anwar when he was first jailed. 'O 
Despite this, however, it was clear that the 'People Power 11' revolution had 
added to the general sense of renewed expectation among reformasi activists. 61 
As the planned 'Black 14' demonstration to mark the second anniversary of 
Anwar's first conviction approached, however, the atmosphere darkened. An 
ethnic riot which broke out in an impoverished area on the outskirts of Kuala 
Lumpur heightened tensions and the government was quick to draw a parallel 
between this and the opposition demonstrations. After a Malay newspaper 
reported that Ezam had stated that KEADILAN Youth would hold daily 
58 Interview, Lim Kit Siang, DAP National Chairman, George Town, November 200 1. 
59 
'After the Gloria Euphoria. ' Asiaweek, 2 February 200 1. 
60 Interview, Raja Petra. 
61 Interviews with reformasi demonstrators, April 2001. 
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demonstrations to bring down the goveniment, he was charged with sedition. 62 
Just days before the 'Black 14' demonstration, ten of the principle organisers 
- 
including Ezarn 
- 
were detained without trial under the ISA. This brought an 
abrupt halt to the second wave of mobilisation. The 'Black 14' demonstration 
went ahead as planned, but far fewer took part than expected, probably due to 
government warnings of severe action taken to be taken against demonstrators, 
warnings made credible by the ISA detentions. 63 
The similarities and differences between these two cycles of contention in the 
reformasi movement are important as they point us to the emerging dynamics of 
the movement. During both waves of protest, organisers and key individuals 
sought to articulate multiethnic and nonethnic themes, but the protests remained 
dominated by Malays. The greater organisation and more precise message of 
the latter demonstrations were reflective of its integration as a political project 
under the multiethnic Barisan Alternatif, but it was also clear that popular 
mobilisation of reformasi remained overwhelmingly Malay. To understand this 
divergent trajectory, we need to turn to the mobilising structures which shaped 
the emerging movement and its political counterpart. 
MOBILISING STRUCTURES 
Theorists of social movements have highlighted the extent to which mobilising 
structures are integral in determining the emergence and spread of a protest 
movement. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald define mobilising structures as 
'collective vehicles, infon-nal as well as formal, through which people mobilize 
62 'Ezam charged with uttering seditious words. ' New Straits Times, 14 March 2001. The arrest 
provoked widespread derision because the only evidence 
- 
the newspaper report 
- 
was 
hearsay. 
63 'T'housands of Anwar supporters defy police ban to stage protest. ' AFP, 14 April 2001. 
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and engage in collective action'. 64 In the case of reformasi, the movement 
emerged in the context of a number of mobilising structures, which drew the 
movement in contradictory directions. On the one hand, the deep involvement 
of civil society groups in the movement helped foster a multiethnic dimension to 
reformasi. On the other hand, the extensive use of an 'Islamic infrastructure' 
tied the movement closely to a more Malay-based agenda. 
Multiethnic Structures: Civil Society Coalitions 
In addition to provoking the worst civil unrest since the riot of 1969, the Anwar 
crisis also encouraged a period of coalition building within civil society such as 
had not been seen since the opposition to legislative changes in the 1980s 
discussed in chapter three. Immediately after Anwar's dismissal, individuals 
and groups from across political, social and ethnic divides began expressing 
concern at his treatment, and the potential instability it may have caused. 
Opposition leader Lim Kit Siang called for an emergency sitting of parliament 
to discuss Anwar's accusations of corruption and conspiracy in the 
government. 65 Human rights organisation SUARAm and the Malaysian Tradcs 
Union Congress (mTuc) also expressed concern over the government's 
64 Doug McAdarn, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 'Introduction: Opportunities, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes 
- 
towards a synthetic, comparative perspective 
on social movements', in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds. ), 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures and culturalframings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 3. 
65 , DAP calls for emergency Parliament for a motion of confidence in Mahathir as Prime Minister 
as the most effective way to address the deepening twin political and economic crises. ' DAII 
media statement, 3 August 1998. Downloaded from <http: //www. malaysia. net/ 
dap/sgl278. htm>. 
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actions. 66 Consistent with the on-going division in the labour movement, 
however, the Congress of Unions of Employees in the Public and Civil Services 
(CUEPACS) asked its members to 'stay away from politics'. 67 Unsurprisingly, 
one of the most vociferous organisations in supporting Anwar was ABIM, which 
68 
called his dismissal a 'national disaster' 
. 
Together with three other Muslim 
organisations, ABim declared that it would launch a 'reformation movement' to 
69 highlight the 'injustices' done to Anwar. Surprisingly, however, PAS' 
religious leader Nik Aziz was more cautious, saying that PAS was 'not attracted' 
to Anwar's reform drive. 70 
Initially, Anwar himself appeared to be keeping his options opens 
- 
declaring 
his innocence of all charges and his belief in a conspiracy against him, but also 
stating that he would not be joining the opposition, and that he 'still believed in 
UMNO'. 71 At the same time, however, he made a concerted effort to find civil 
society allies beyond his core Islamic appeal. Within days of his dismissal, he 
had met with Hindu and Christian organisations, and with representatives of 
women's groups. 72 This move bore fi-uit when a Christian NGO, the Society for 
Christian Reflection, announced its intention to join ABIM's reform movement. 73 
He also met with non-Malay opposition party leaders such as Lim Kit Siang and 
66 
'M'sian NGOs accuse Dr M of disregard for people. ' Business Tinies (Singapore), 5 
September 1998. 
67 
, CUEPACS: Stay away from politics. ' New Sunday Tinies, 6 September 1998. 
6' 
'Muslim body stands up for Anwar. ' Business Titnes (Singapore), 5 September 1998. 
69 
'Four groups launch 'reformation movement'. ' New Straits Pines, 7 September 1998. 
70 
, PAS snubs call for reform movement. ' Straits Rines, 7 September 1998. 
71 
'Anwar to go on roadshow. ' New Straits Titnes, 8 September 1998. 
72 
'Campaign to gather public support gathers pace. ' Business Tintes (Singapore), 7 September 
1998. 
73 
'Tluee NGOs plan to join movement. ' New Straits Rines, 8 September 1998. 
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Syed Husin Ali, leader of the Malay-based but avowedly secular Parli Rakyat 
74 Malaysia (PRm 
- 
Malaysian People's Party) 
. 
Significantly, the Termatang 
Pauh Declaration', with which Anwar launched his reform drive, also contained 
no mention of Islamic goals, although it was couched in terms of 'the Quranic 
injunction which urges striving towards betterment'. Instead, it focussed on 
areas that were obviously of concern to all opposition groups, whether Islamic 
or secular, calling for social and economic justice, and an end to corruption. 75 
The reformasi movement first found organizational fon-n in a number of often 
overlapping coalitions across civil society groups and opposition political 
parties. The most active of these was the Gerakan Kea(lilan RaAyat Malaysia 
(GERAK 
- 
Malaysian People's Justice Movement). GERAK was founded by the 
three major opposition parties, PAS, DAP and PRm, and a number of civil society 
organisations, including Anwar's old alnia inater, ABIm, and jim (Janiaah Islah 
Malaysia 
- 
Malaysian Islamic Reform Society). Predominantly infon-ned by 
Islamic values, Fadzil Noor, President Of PAS, was selected as GERAWS 
chairman. Despite its obvious relation to the events of Anwar's sacking, GERAK 
sought to distance itself from claims that it was fori-ned to 'champion' Anwar. 76 
Its stated goal was to 'work together against the erosion of freedom and the rule 
of law'. 77 In particular, it made its objectives the repeal of the ISA and the 
establishment of an independent judiciary in the country. A number of the mass 
rallies organised around the country were under the auspices Of GERAK. 
74 'Supporters of eX-DPM continue visifing his house. ' New Straits Times, 5 September 1998. 
75 'The full text of the Permatang Pauh Declarafion is available online at a number of websites, 
including <http: //www. geocities. com/CapitolHill/Congress/3832/framefDeclare. htm>. 
76 'A fin-ther sign GERAK is unsure of its directions. ' New Straits Times, 12 October, 1998. 
77 'Opposition parties, NGOs launch GERAK. ' Business Tirnes (Malaysia), 28 September 1998. 
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Comprising many of the same organisations, another coalition called the 
Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat (GAGASAN 
- 
People's Coalition for Democracy) 
was less Islamic in its outlook that GERAK, and was chaired by Tian Chua, a 
prominent activist with the human rights organisation SUARAm. The origins of 
GAGASAN could be traced back to a 1997 NGo dialogue organised by the small 
opposition party PRM, but the formalisation of the coalition was clearly spurred 
by the Anwar affair. 78 In December 1998, a third civil society coalition was 
formed, the Pergerakan Keadilan SOSial (ADIL - Social Justice Movement). 
More explicitly linked to Anwar, it was headed by his wife, Wan Azizah Wan 
Ismail, and Aliran's former president, Chandra Muzaffar, who had developed a 
close intellectual relationship with Anwar during the 1990s. The formation of 
ADIL was an attempt to reclaim the momentum of the reformasi movement from 
GERAK, which was increasingly dominated by PAS. ADIL failed to make any 
significant impact, however, probably because of its redundancy in relation to 
GERAK. In April 1999, it was thus relaunched as a political party, KEADILAN. 
KEADILAN subsequently managed to forge a united opposition front, the Barisall 
Allenzatif, which included all the major opposition parties and contested the 
November 1999 general election, after which the remaining coalitions faded 
away. 
The reformasi coalitions were reminiscent of the SGS and the anti-OSA 
movements in the 1980s in that they were forged across ethnic boundaries and 
attracted the participation of both NGos and opposition political parties. 
Whereas the 1980s coalitions were very much goal-oriented and specific in tlicir 
agenda, however, the refon-nasi coalitions were much broader in their scopc. 
78 
'Alliance building. ' Asidweek, 30 October 1998. 
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Attention was focused on a few key issues related to the Anwar affair 
- 
repeal 
of the ISA, restoration of the independence of the judiciary and so forth 
- 
but 
they clearly sought fundamental change in the Malaysian political system. 
Whilst the civil society coalitions themselves were short-lived, they played an 
important role in fostering and shaping the opposition front. Even afler the 
broad shift in the reformasi trajectory from a societal agenda to a political 
opposition, civil society groups remained active in the opposition coalition to a 
far greater extent than in 1990. 
Edinic Structures: The Islamic Infrastructure 
As noted previously, one of the principle mechanisms through which the BN 
regime maintains its hold on power is through its control of the mass media. 
This monopoly is used to reinforce the regime's hegemonic stance and also 
hampers any attempt to spread a counterhegemonic hallenge, such a reformasi. 
Such movements must thus find alternative 'infrastructures' to convey their 
cause and organise their protests. One such infrastructure utilised by the 
reformasi movement was the Islamic infrastructure. 
Whilst Anwar's call for reform was clearly welcomed by a diverse range of civil 
society organisations, it was also immediately clear that the main mobilisilig 
force would come from Anwar's core supporters throughout his career 
- 
young, 
religiously minded Malays. Islam was a strong motivating factor for the 
thousands-strong crowds that converged on Anwar's residence every night, the 
vast majority of whom were young Malays. Regular calls of 'Allahu Akhbar' 
(God is Great) and the prevalence of Islamic dress, such as the kopiah headgear, 
demonstrated that, for these first protestors, the forthcoming struggle was to be a 
religiously informed one. The government was also well aware of this support 
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and one of its first responses to the outburst of support for Anwar in the wake of 
his sacking was to try and keep him out of mosques. 79 
The reformasi movement spread quickly and attracted so much support across 
the country in part due to its utilisation of a network of organisations and 
appropriation of an Islamic discourse that can together be termed the Islamic 
infrastructure. In this respect it mirrored the success of a number of other social 
movements that successfully utilised the broad, grassroots based networks of 
institutionalised religion, from the civil rights campaign in the southern states of 
the America to the anti-Marcos struggle in the Philippines. Whereas both these 
movements arose in countries of relative religious homogeneity, however, the 
multi-religious nature of Malaysian society meant that the Islamic infrastructure 
presented both opportunities and restrictions for the reformasi activists. 
The most obvious manifestation of the Islamic infrastructure in the reformasi 
movement was the use of mosques as a rallying point for demonstrations. Most 
of the mass demonstrations in the latter half of September were centred either at 
the National Mosque or at Kampung Bahru mosque, both in downtown Kuala 
Lumpur. Anwar himself made frequent use of mosques and other Islamic 
locations as rallying points during his brief period of freedom between being 
sacked and being arrested. His first public appearance outside his residence 
after being sacked was at Friday prayers at the Kampung Baru mosque, in the 
heart of the Malay area of Kuala Lumpur, where he addressed a crowd of 
thousands. 80 The next day, he spoke to a crowd of between ten and sixty 
79 
'Campaign to gather public support gathers pace. ' Business Times (Singapore), 7 September 
1998. 
80 
'Anwar speaks at KL mosque. ' Straits Tinies, 12 September 1998. 
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thousand supporters at a rally in the rural state of Kedah. The rally was 
organised by an Islamic organisation, the Kedah Ulama Association, and was 
held at a pondok 
-a traditional Islamic school 
.81 Finally, on the day of his 
arrest, Anwar led a mass march through the streets of Kuala Lumpur, which had 
started at the National Mosque. 82 
The decision to emphasise the multiethnic aspirations of refon-nasi saw a drop in 
the use of mosques as demonstration points from October 1998 onwards. 
Instead, Merdeka Square and Jalan Tunku Abdul Rahman became the centre of 
the Kuala Lumpur demonstrations. 83 Nonetheless, mosques across the country 
remained a centre for often spontaneous protests, particularly after prayer 
times. 84 In addition, mosques were used throughout the reformasi period to 
distribute pamphlets and flyers with infonTiation on the state of the movement 
and to organise future demonstrations. 85 Sermons themselves were also 
frequently used to spread the reformasi message; many mosque committees had 
86 close links with PAS 
. 
In an effort to neutralise political sermonising, a number 
of bans were imposed, most notably by the Selangor state goverment, which 
81 'Anwar roadshow attracts thousands of listeners. ' Business Times (Singapore), 14 September 
1998; 'Reaching critical mass. ' Asiaweek, 25 September 1998. The Business Times and other 
newspapers placed the crowd at ten thousand, based on reports from Bernanla, the Malaysian 
state news agency. Asiaweek placed the figure at 60,000. 
82 'Crackdown. ' Asiaweek, 2 October 1998. 
83 E. g. '5,000 defy ban on assemblies. ' Straits Tinies, II October 1998; '3,000 defy cops to 
protest on KL streets. ' Straits Times, 18 October 1998. 
84 See, for instance, 'Pancangan rusuhan tiada sambutan. ' Berita Harian, 17 April 1999. 
85 See, e. g., 'Anwar rally organisers warned they can be jailed. ' Straits Tittles, 30 July 2000. 
86 'Police to keep close watch on mosques. ' Straits Tittles, 28 July 2000. 
275 
Crisis and Response II, 1998-2001 
banned PAS leader Nik Aziz from giving ceramah in mosques 
-a ban that he 
blatantly disregarded. 87 
The extensive grassroots networks Of PAS and ABIM were also vital in the spread 
of reformasi. In rural areas that had little access to relatively independent 
sources of information such as the Internet, these organisations played a 
fundamental role in disseminating infon-nation about the movement. When 
KEADILAN emerged as the political manifestation of reformasi, ABIM took on 
additional importance as many ABIM members signed up to the new political 
party. Similarly, PAS provided much of the campaigning infrastructure for the 
Barisan Alternatif. The network relationship between PAS and reformasi was in 
many respects symbiotic; PAS formed the infrastructural backbone of refon-nasi 
in the rural areas, but the popular mobilisation of reformasi also allowed PAS to 
extend its own networks, particularly in the urban west coast 
- 
within two 
months of Anwar's sacking, PAS had already opened fifty new branches in and 
around Kuala Lumpur. 88 
The Islamic infrastructure thus manifested both positive and negative 
dimensions for the broad dissemination of reformasi and its message. On the 
positive side, it offered an extensive and pre-existing network that spread across 
virtually the entire country, through mosques and through grassroots 
organisations such as ABIM and PAS. It was also politically relatively safe 
- 
any 
attempt by the regime to crack down on it could be interpreted as an attack on 
Islam itself, and risk alienating further support. The use of mosques as a safe 
haven from potential repression was not new in Malaysia 
- 
ABIM members had 
87 
'Nik Aziz chided for disregarding ban on ceramah. ' New Straits Times, 16 October 2000. 
88 
, PAS Wilayah lancar 50 cawangan baru. ' Ilarakah, 30 October 1998. 
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used mosques to hide from riot police during the student protests in the early 
1970s and, in 1986, Muslim protestors against the Christian-dominated state 
govcmmcnt in Sabah had retreated into the State Mosque, where a three day 
stand off with the police took place. 89 
The main disadvantage of the Islamic infrastructure was that it was restricted to 
a Muslim audience, and may even have alienated the many non-Malays who 
were wary of political Islam. Anwar and his collaborators were clearly 
cognisant of this fact, and made a conscious effort to try and inject a more 
multiethnic image, including attempting to inculcate 'reformasi' as the 
movement's rallying call, rather than 'Allahu Akhbar', which has often been the 
main rallying call for PAS supporters and other Islamic groups. 90 Nonetheless, 
there can be little doubt that the predominance of the Islamic infrastructure 
within the reformasi movement proved to be a fundamental characteristic of the 
movement. 
Nonethnic Structures: The Intemet 
In addition to its use of the Islamic infrastructure, the reformasi movement was 
notable for its use of the Internet as a vehicle for the dissemination and 
negotiation of reformasi. Initially used simply as a means of bypassing the 
censorship of the mainstream media, it soon became an integral part of tile 
movement, as chatrooms and forums saw lively debate over the meaning and 
89 
'Harris and 321 to be charged. ' New Straits Times, 24 March 1986. 
90 Interview, Raja Petra. 
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goals of refon-nasi. Chandra Muzaffar, KEADILAN'S former deputy president, 
claimed that the Internet proved to be 'vital' for the spread of reformasi. 91 
The Internet first made the headlines in Malaysia in 1997, when Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad launched the Multi-Media Super Corridor project (msc) 
-a 
series of business incentives designed to create an Asian 'Silicon Valley' in 
Malaysia. Rather than viewing the Internet with suspicion, the Mahathir regime 
embraced it as part of an ICT revolution that would provide the driving force for 
economic growth, and see Malaysia take its place amongst the industrialised 
nations, a fundamental goal of Mahathir's developmental i st Vision 2020. Yet 
the rhetoric of this transformation hid a distinct lack of substance. Glib 
catchphrases such as 'smart partnership' and 'k-economy' abound, but often 
without any easily discernable or well-defined meaning. As Hilley puts it, 
4 92 awareness Of IT has been promoted more vigorously than IT awareness'. 
After Anwar's sacking, the Internet became a thorny subject for the Malaysian 
regime, as it increasingly became associated with the spread of the reformasi 
movement. Barely two days after Anwar was sacked, the first refon-nasi wcbsite 
came online, carrying foreign news reports covering the crisis and other relevant 
information, such as sworn statements by key people involved in the scandal. 93 
This website was soon joined by a host of others as rumours of ministerial 
resignations and even allegations that the police had injected Anwar with the 
HIV virus spread quickly across bulletin boards and other Internet foruMS. 94 
91 'Internet vital for the spread of reformasi: Chandra. ' Malaysiakini, 23 March 200 1. 
92 Hilley, Malaysia, p. 135. 
93 'Supporters take their battle to cyberspace. ' Business Tintes (Singapore), 5 September 1998. 
94 'Police clamp down on Net rurnours. ' Straits Times, 24 September 1998. 
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The websites carried a mixture of news, opinions, rumour and simple abuse 
- 
one website had an applet computer game in which points were scored by 
hitting Mahathir with a baseball bat. 95 During Anwar's trials, some websites 
carried 'censored' trial information, which the press was barred from making 
public. 96 
Over time, the myriad of accusatory reformasi websites evolved into a more 
sophisticated alternative media, most notably with the establishment of sites 
such as Malaysiakini (Malaysia now) and the Free Anwar Campaign. 97 
Malaysiakini was set up in 1999 a former Sun journalists, Steven Gan, as 
Malaysia's first commercial Internet newspaper. Disillusioned with mainstream 
media, Gan had originally planned to establish an alternative print media, and it 
was only the intense Internet activity of the inu-nediate post-Anwar period that 
persuaded them of the potential benefits of an Internet newspaper. Malaysiakini 
is ostensibly an independent publication, with no political allegiance. As Gan 
admits, however, it is 'pro-Opposition by default'. 98 Its limited resources and 
access 
- 
Malaysiakini reporters have often been barred from government press 
conferences 
- 
mean that it is often restricted to reporting opposition activities. It 
is not uncritical in its coverage of the opposition, however, and has garnered the 
ire of opposition party leaders Lim Kit Siang and Syed Husin Ali. 99. 
95 Mahazalim: <http: //www. tnahazalimtwo. netl>. 
96 
'Censored trial information emerging on the Internet. ' Straits Times, 02 March 1999. 
97 Malaysiakini: <http: //www. malaysiakini. com/>; 
Free Anwar Campaign: <http: //www. freeanwar. com>. 
98 Interview, Steve Gan, Malaysiakini editor, Bangsar, January 2002. 
99 
'Uphold integrity, DAP tells Malaysiakini, 'New Straits Times, 23 December 2001. 
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Malaysiakini thus emerged as the prime source of independent news about the 
refon-nasi movement and the political opposition. Moreover, Gan claims that 
the existence of Malaysiakini is forcing the print newspapers into more balanced 
reportage. This certainly appears to have been the case with the Sun newspaper, 
which gained a reputation for even-handedness, apparently a deliberate editorial 
decision in response to Malaysiakini. 100 After a revamp of its layout and 
formatting, the Neiv Straits Times also adopted Malaysiakini's own motto of 
'All the news that matters'. The influence of Malaysiakini is such that Asiaweek 
magazine placed Malaysiakini and its editor at number eighteen in its 'Power 
50' list of influential 'communicators' across all of Asia. 101 
The regime seems to have been at a loss at how to deal with such reformasi 
activity on the Internet. In an initial attempt to counter the anti-government 
rhetoric of Internet forums, for instance, the govenunent set up its own 'Love 
Malaysia' Internet forum, subsequently expressing dismay when anti- 
government messages were posted on it. 102 A forty man UMNO 'anti-defamation 
committee', which was charged with countering anti-government Internet 
activity, did little more than advertise which opposition sites were most 
100 
101 
102 
Interview, Sun journalists, July 2001. This mini-glasnost came to an end, however, after the 
Sun published an ill-advised Christmas Day front page story about an alleged plot to 
assassinate Mahathir. Although Mahathir initially laughed off the allegations, the story was 
picked up by international newswires. Most of the Sun's top editors resigned, and a spree of 
retrenchments ensued. Eventually, the Sun was relaunched as a free newspaper, a shadow 
of its former self It appears that the incident may have been used as an excuse to exert 
political pressure to reign in the independence of the paper. 
Asiaiveek Power 50: <http: //www. asiaweek. com/asiaweek/features/power50.200 1/toc. html> 
Bomeo Post, 27 February 1999. 'Me forum was located on the Department of National 
Unity homepage, <http: //www. kempen. gov. my/>, and has since been discontinued. 
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active. 103 Threats of legal action against webmasters also came to naught, 
probably because the government realised that even Malaysia's compliant 
courts would find it hard to make a conviction. 104 
The government tacitly admitted launching 'Denial of Service' attacks and other 
sabotaging measures against anti-government websites, although it also 
admitted that 'the initial missiles do not seem to follow the enemy but has [sic] 
ricocheted towards us'. 105 Government-controlled newspapers were also used 
in the counterattack. Editorials portrayed such websites as 'monsters', which 
'spewed... hatred and despairing tales'. 106 In logic typical of the Barisan 
Nasional regime, they decried the opposition websites for criticising Mahathir, 
when 'it is largely thanks to him that they are enjoying the facility [the 
Internet]'. 107 
The Internet itself was restricted in its mobilisational capacity by the limited 
access in the country. In practice, access to the Internet in Malaysia is 
overwhelmingly concentrated in urban centres. In 2000, Kuala Lumpur and the 
surrounding state of Selangor accounted for over half the Internet subscriptions 
in the country; PAS' rural stronghold of Kelantan had only twelve subscriptions 
per thousand population compared with over a hundred in the capital. 108 Much 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
'Websites used to attack Government idenfified. ' New Straits Times, 8 August 1999. 
'UMNO panel considers legal action. ' New Straits Times, 28 May 1999. 
'Gov't to launch "upgraded" missiles on dangerous websites' Malaysiakini, 5 July 2001. 
'Rumourville on the net. ' New Sunday Times, 9 November 1999. 
'No-holds-barred game of Malay politics on the Net. ' New Sunday Times, 23 May 1999. 
Government of Malaysia, Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001 
- 
2005, Kuala Lumpur: Government 
Printers, 2001: 368. 
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of the material on the Internet found its way to the rural areas, however, through 
the more tradition media of photocopying and faxing. 
FRAmINGREFoRmwsi THE STRUGGLE FOR A MULTIETHNIC FRAME 
It was argued in chapter five that the 1980s saw a move towards a more 
multiethnic civil society in Malaysia, but that ethnicity remained the master 
frame for mobilising social movements. Thus far, we have seen that a similar 
dichotomy existed within the reformasi movement itself Multiethnic influences 
from civil society ranged against the strongly ethnic mobilising infrastructure of 
Islam. Throughout the development of the reformasi movement, its leadership 
sought to reconcile this divergence and create a multiethnic frame for reformasi 
mobilisation. 
The dismissal, detention and trial of Anwar were an important focal point that 
raised multiethnic concerns. Anwar was widely seen as the victim of a corrupt, 
personalistic and undemocratic system. Non-Malay sympathy for Anwar was 
also spurred by the similarity between his predicament and the recently 
concluded trial and appeal of Lim Guan Eng, which had aroused much concern 
across all ethnic groups in Malaysia. In August 1998, Guan Eng 
- 
an up-and- 
coming DAP mp who is the son of the party's leader Lim Kit Siang 
- 
was found 
guilty on appeal of publishing false news and sentenced to eighteen months, 
though acquitted of another charge of sedition. Guan Eng had championed the 
cause of a Malay girl who had accused four men of statutory rape, including 
Rahim Thamby Chik, the Melaka chief minister and Mahathir loyalist. The 
charges against Rahim were dropped by the Attorney-General's office, even 
though the other three men had been found guilty on essentially the same 
evidence, and the girl herself was sent to a remand centre. In defending her, 
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Guan Eng accused the Attorney-General of 'selective prosecution', for which 
accusation he was himself selectively prosecuted. 
Lim Guan Eng's case cut across ethnic boundaries as he was seen by Malays as 
willing to go to prison to defend one of their own. Anwar's trial sparked similar 
cross-ethnic sympathies as the issues it raised 
- 
police brutality, the 
independence of the judiciary and the ever-increasing power of the executive 
- 
were concerns of all ethnic groups. Capitalising on the similarity of their 
circumstances, Anwar and Guan Eng exchanged a series of letters from prison, 
which were widely publicised by the opposition media and on the Internet. The 
letters emphasised the theme of the struggle for justice transcending 'the Great 
Divide of race and religion' and, as the reformasi propaganda documents that 
they clearly were, portrayed Anwar and Guan Eng as twin martyrs to the same 
cause. 
109 
Electoral Politics 
As we saw above, by early 1999, the initial outburst of refonnasi had faded 
significantly. Reformasi activists were increasingly focussing attention on the 
forthcoming elections, and it was here that they tried to forge a new multiethnic 
frame for their cause. The formation of the Barisan Alternatifwas a remarkably 
rapid process which contrasted strongly with the tentative formation of tile 
Semangat coalitions. In the immediate aftermath of Anwar's dismissal, 
however, the prospects of a united opposition front were not too rosy. PAS, in 
particular, had publicly ruled out any electoral cooperation was the other 
opposition parties. ' 10 The imperative for the BA came from the momentum built 
'09 The letters are reproduced on the DAP website: <http: //www. malaysia. net/dap/>. 
'10 'Pas rules out any electoral pact with GERAK members. ' New Straits Titnes, 16 October 1998. 
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up by the refon-nasi movement, its social mobilisation and civil society 
networks. By February 1999, both the DAP and PAs had thus declared their 
willingness to cooperate, although the DAP had made clear its continued 
rejection of any form of Islamic State. III KEADILAN, the keystone of the BA, 
was formed in April 1999, barely seven months after Anwar was sacked. By 
June, the four coalition partners had agreed on a common manifesto. ' 12 
The differences in the process of formation between the Semangat front and the 
BA arc instructive. The formation of the BA was almost inevitable, given the 
colossal social mobilisation of the time. Indeed, Lim Kit Siang admits that the 
DAP'S membership of the coalition was partly a matter of necessity, with the 
popular momentum of the reformasi movement virtually forcing the DAP into 
the opposition front. Under such conditions, however, the party leadership saw 
the BA as the best way to try and influence PAs and to 'nurture' the more 
moderate elements within the party. 113 Conversely, the fon-nation of the 
Sentangat '46-led opposition coalitions was not driven by the over-riding 
momentum for social change that forged the Barisan Alternatif. Rather, it 
evolved slowly out of the necessary search for political allies. 
Although both 'bridging' parties were primarily the result of internal UMNO 
schisms, the formation of Semangat itself was driven by political concerns 
almost diametrically opposed to those which inspired KEADILAN. Seniangat was 
formed as an essentially conservative party, which sought to revive the original 
111 
'Pas contradicts "no co-operation" stand. ' New Straits Times, 7 February, 1999; 'Kit Siang: 
We are willing to work with Pas in polls. ' New Straits Times, 25 April 1999. 
'12 
'Opposition in final stage of preparing common manifesto. ' New Straits Times, 26 June 1999. 
113 Interview, Lim Kit Siang. 
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tspirit' (semangat) Of UMNO. As Razaleigh himself said of Semangat, 'It is only 
the vehicle for reviving the old UMNO'. 114 This statement contrasts strongly 
with ADICS 'Statement of Objectives'. In its 'Declaration Of ADIL', the group 
declared: 
ADIL shall be a vehicle for unifying each and every group that 
yearns for political, economic and social change and refonn in 
line with the principles of the Malaysian constitution and the 
laws of the land. ' 15 
If Semangat was essentially conservative, then, the Barisan Alternatif was 
virtually defined by its civil society links, and it was through this that its 
multietlinic aspirations were expressed. KEADILAN'S first executive committee 
was a tcstament to multiethnic civil society. Its deputy president, Chandra 
Muzaffar, has undoubtedly been one of the key figures in Malaysian civil 
society since the 1980s. Tian Chua, the party's vice president, was a SUARAM 
activist. Saari Sungib, another ex-co member, was the former president of the 
Jema'ah Islah Malaysia (jim), a large Islamic movement. In addition, many of 
KEADILAN's rank-and-file members were brought in from civil society 
organisations. Most significant here was the large number Of ABIM members 
who joined KEADILAN. 
The close links of KEADILAN 
- 
and by default, the BA 
- 
with civil society was 
significant in that it led the coalition to take up a number of causes not directly 
linked to the reformasi struggle but which filtered through the dense 
114 
,A princely quest. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 September, I 99o. 
115 Declaration of ADIL. Downloaded from <http: //www. members. easyspace. com/refonnasi>, 
15 August 1999. 
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organisational networks into which KEADILAN was tied. Most notable here was 
their championing of the women's movement, which has otherwise been 
virtually ignored politically. The BA'S common manifesto included a pledge to 
address all the issues of the Women's Agenda for Change 
-a social manifesto 
drawn up by a number of women's organisations. A prominent women's rights 
activist, Zaitun Kassim, even stood as a BA candidate in the 1999 election. 
Although nominally under a DAP flag, she campaigned as an independent 
women's candidate aligned to the BA. 
Ironically, considering their involvement in the 1990 election, the sector of civil 
society that was least involved in the BA was the trade unions and the labour 
movement. This was not due to the reformasi movement being less appealing 
to the unionists than the Semangat opposition, however, but was rather a 
product of the government's successful neutering of the unions during the 
1990s. By the time of the 1995 election, CUEPACS was already standing firmly 
behind the government again, urging its members to back the government. 116 
Immediately after Anwar's sacking, CUEPAcs asked its members to 'stay away 
from politics'. 117 Later, at the height of the demonstrations, it reiterated its 
9 undivided support' for the government, and told its members not to take part in 
demonstrations. ' 18 
If CUEPACS position was unsurprising, having always been broadly supportive of 
the government, the MTUc had effaced a complete turnabout from its staunch 
support for Semangat '46 and its coalition partners. It will be remembered that 
Zainal Rampak, the MTUC president, had been a parliamentary candidate for 
116 , CUEPACS urges its members to back the Government. ' New Straits Times, 2 July, 1995. 117, CUEPACS: Stay away from politics. ' New Sunday Times, 6 September, 1998. 118, CUEPACS: Don't take part in demonstrations. ' New Straits Times, 2 November, 1998. 
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Semangat in 1990, before being wooed into umNo by Anwar himself Perhaps 
uncertain of where Zainal's new loyalties lay 
- 
with Anwar or with UMNO 
- 
the 
government in December 1998 appointed Zainal as a senator in the 
parliamentary upper house. ' 19 As the mTUC's support for the opposition in 1990 
was a contentious issue for some of its members, so Zainal's tacit support for 
the government in 1999 displeased other mTuc officials and created a rival 
faction within the organisation, led by Zainal's erstwhile confidante, secretary- 
general G. Rajasekaran. 120 
Their respective engagements with civil society thus mark significant 
differences between the Semangat front and the Barisan Alternatif. The caution 
with which Semangat approached civil society reflected its essentially 
conservative nature. Inasmuch, it is worth noting that even its relations with the 
labour movement was associated with the emergence of a number of prominent 
Malay unionists 
- 
such as Zainal and Ahmad Nor 
- 
where the movement had 
previously been Indian dominated. 121 In contrast, the BA'S open door policy to 
all sectors of civil society reflected its ambition of radical change in the political 
system and the desire among its leaders to create a multiethnic frame for the 
continuing mobilisation 
-societal and electoral - of reformasi. 
The coalition of political parties and civil society that contested against the 
regime when the election was finally called in November 1999, then, was an 
unpredecentedly multiethnic front, including some ethnically-oriented parties 
and organisations, but espousing and mostly campaigning on nonethnic issues. 
"9 'Zainal finally makes it to the Parliament. ' Business Times, 5 December 1998. 120 
, Towards an honourable MUTC. ' Aliran Monthly, January 2003. 
121 
'Opposition the only pathway to politics for some KL unionists'. Straits Times, 8 May 1990. 
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This was a remarkable feat given the decidedly ethnic infrastructure of the early 
reformasi movement itself. If civil society had effectively forged a multiethnic 
political coalition out of the uncertain but ethnically-inclined reformasi 
movement, however, the limits of this new multiethnicity would be tested, as in 
1990, at the election and, as in 1990, would be found wanting by the voting 
public. 
As we saw in chapter six, the 1990 general election has raised expectations with 
the promise of a broad, albeit somewhat mutually suspicious multiethnic 
opposition coalition supported, again somewhat suspiciously, by the nonethnic 
discourse of middle class civil society. These prospects, however, had 
foundered on electoral mobilisation which fell into the usual ethnic patterns. In 
1999, the promise of a new multiethnic politics was even greater, but once again 
the ethnic structure of the electoral system in Malaysia bedevilled these 
attempts. Put starkly, the election saw Malay support for the BN erode 
significantly 
- 
further even than in 1990 
- 
and non-Malay, especially Chinese, 
support strengthen. In the government, UmNo suffered substantial losses, for the 
first time since independence controlling less than half the BN seats in 
parliament. Among the opposition parties, PAS more than trebled its 
parliamentary representation from seven to twenty-seven; it also extended the 
states under its control to include Terengganu. KEADILAN failed to make any 
significant impact, winning only five seats, although many of its losses were by 
slim margins. The worst performer was the DAP, which picked up ten seats 
- 
only one more than its dismal 1995 performance 
- 
with losers including national 
chain-nan Lim Kit Siang and his deputy Karpal Singh. Most disturbing for the 
party was the loss of its core heartlands in the urban Chinese seats; in seats with 
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less than one third Malays, the opposition obtained overall a fractionally smaller 
proportion of the vote in 1999 than in 1995 victory (see figures 8.2 and 8.3). 
Once again, the 1999 election demonstrated the unwillingness of the electorate 
to abandon ethnically-determined patterns of voting. 
Figure 8.2: BN share of vote by ethnic omposition in West Malaysian 
parliamentary seats, 1986,1990,1995 and 1999 
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Rc- franiing rrfornusi aftcr the c1cction 
The Ocction results %%ere a disappointment for the reformasi activists, but they 
continued tlicir societal campaign to frame reformasi as a multiethnic movement 
bN, incorporatin and associating reformasi with a number of non-Malay causes 
that arL),, e during the period, most notably the Damansara School protests and 
the StiqlU CaLl-Se. The D. unansara protests revolved around the closure of the 
Daniansara School in the Kuala Lumpur suburbs. In early 2000, the Education 
Ministry announced that the school, one of the oldest Chinese schools in the 
country, %%ould be moved to a new location, allegedly following a request from 
the school y, %)%cniors. '-'2 Sceptics noted, however, that the school was situated 
01, an c\Irvinely %dlUable piece of real estate, which the government would be 
OnlYtOO Pleased to sell for development. As the date for relocation approached, 
discontentc,. 1 parents began protesting outside the school and at the Education 
Whilst the vast majority of the students eventually moved, around 
sc%cnty reftised to do so, and set up a temporary school in a nearby Chinese 
temple. 
'nIe Danians-tra protests quickly drew the attention of the Chinese conununity, 
"I"ch 11-Li traditionally placed a high valuc on its vernacular education. The 
I) kl' bevall a siLuiature campaign to save the old school and organised a protest 
. "alkathon'. N%hIch saw forty-seven people arrested. 124 Within the reformasi 
1110%C11jellt, tile D-1111an-SAra protcst was adopted as a something of a symbol of 
--, ýhýk)l it) iwýc to bli! gcr prenjiscs. ' Malav, kfail, 21 April 2000. 
I-, tfail, I January 2001; 'Parents, villagers 
-wt. t sdikk)l rclocation. ' Maki 
" 
Pfotc--t at I'ducation Nlinitry. ' Ne.. s- Straits Times, 30 January2001. 
%Ull% *'SA% c our 
-signature canipaign. ' New 5unda. v Times, 18 February 2001; 
4 t,, r p,,, t, n Pf t, t,, t , ,cI, Straits Times, 19 February 2 00 1. 
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the multiethnic concerns of the movement. At a PAS ceramah in Kedah, some 
two thousand Malays were claimed to have signed the DAP'S petition. 125 
Chinese support for the reformasi movement was also belatedly encouraged by 
the government's post-election response to the Suqiu appeal. The Malaysian 
Chinese Associations' Election Appeals (universally known as Suqiu, from its 
Chinese form) was an eighty-two point petition drawn up by eleven Chinese 
organisations, including the influential Selangor Chinese Asscmbly Hall and the 
Dongiiaozong educationalist movement, as demands for the coming general 
election. The petition was subsequently endorsed by over two thousand Chinese 
associations. The government originally responded relatively positively, with 
the three main Chinese-based parties in the BN - the MCA, GERAKAN and the 
Sarawak United People's Party 
- 
all declaring their acceptance of the petition. ' 26 
The MCA also proposed that representatives from the organisations be appointed 
to the Second National Economic Consultative Council. 127 On its part, the 
Barisan Alternatif also endorsed the petition, and included parts of it in its 
manifesto. 128 
The govenu-nent's apparent willingness to accommodate and negotiate with the 
Suqiu petition dissipated quickly once the election was over. In August 2000, 
the ever-belligerent UMNO Youth presented a 'protest memorandum' to the 
Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall over Suqiu's alleged questioning of Malay 
1256 MCA Ministers should emulate the example Of PAs and the 2,000 Malays in Kubang Pasu... '
DAP media statement, 27 February 2001. 
126 'Three BN components accept Hua. Tuan appeal. ' New Straits Times, 24 September 1999. 
127, NECC n will have some reps from Chinese associations. ' New Straits Times, 30 September 
1999. 
128 'Opposition endorses 17-point Election Appeal. ' New Straits Times, 20 October 1999. 
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'special rights', and subsequently made a related police report. 129 The MCA also 
sought to distance itself from Suqiu, claiming that it did not represent the 
Chinese community as a whole; prior to the election, MCA president Ling Leong 
Sik had stated that the appeal represented ninety-nine percent of Chinese 
voters. 130 The real controversy was sparked when Mahathir used his National 
Day speech at the end of August to attack Suqiu, comparing it to communists 
and Islamic extremists. ' 31A pro-government Malay students' organisation 
responded by releasing its own highly chauvinist set of demands, stating that it 
would not retract them until Suqiu did likewise, and threatening to hold a mass 
demonstration to back its challenge. 132 As ethnic tensions rose, the situation 
became increasingly reminiscent of the 1987 education controversy that had led 
to the Operation Lalang crackdown 
-a perception reinforced when Mahathir 
made direct reference to the 1987 crackdown, warning that, although there were 
no plans for 'another Ops Lalang', the government would take action 'if people 
no longer respect law and order'. 133 With increasing pressure on Suqiu, the 
committee finally agreed to drop seven of its most contentious demands. 134 
In fact, the majority of the Suqiu petition was relatively non-ethnic, calling for 
the same kind of reforms that permeated the reformasi movement 
- 
the 
129, UMNO Youth delivers protest note. ' New Straits Times, 19 August 2000; 'Police report 
lodged. ' New Sunday Times, 20 August 2000. It was alleged that, on handing over the 
protest, UMNO Youth had threatened to bum down the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 
which housed the Suqiu committee, should the petition not be withdrawn. 
130'Views don't represent all of Chinese community. ' New Sunday Times, 20 August 2000; 
'Three BN components accept Hua Tuan appeal. ' New Straits Times, 24 September 1999. 
131, PM: Don't play with fire. ' New Straits Times, 31 August 2000. 
132 
'Make Pm post a Malay right, says GPMS. ' New Straits Times, 15 December 2000. 
133 'No plans for Ops Lalang. ' New Straits Times, 16 December 2000. 
134 'Hail wisdom and maturity. ' New Straits Times, 6 January 200 1. 
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eradication of corruption, the restoration of faith in the police force, and so 
forth. Demands that did touch on ethnic issues 
- 
such an increase in Chinese 
and Tamil schools and the improvement of Chinese New Villages - were not 
expressed in any way that could reasonably be understood as challenging Malay 
special rights. 135 Instead, it seems clear that the issue was deliberately 
manipulated by the government in an attempt to 'play the race card'. 
Reinforcing ethnic tensions 
- 
and the associated portrayal of the opposition 
parties as extremist and the BN as the defender of national unity - has frequently 
been a successful strategy employed by the BN regime when its popularity is 
threatened. With Malay support for UMNo haemorrhaging, attacking the Suqiu 
petition may have seemed the perfect way to restore UMNO'S image as protector 
of the Malays. The suggestion that the issue was consciously manipulated is 
supported by the fact that the UMNO Youth president had public stated that the 
BN accepted that Suqiu was not questioning Malay special rights less than a 
week before Mahathir's inflammatory speech. 136 
Instead of recapturing Malay support for the goverru-nent, however, the 
controversy backfired spectacularly, giving the reformasi movement an 
opportunity to reaffirm its multiethnic claims while the Chinese parties in the BN 
squirmed at Mahathir and UMNO Youth's belligerence. At the height of the 
controversy, Keadilan gave its unconditional support to Suqiu, stating that 
Anwar was 'proud' of the petition. 137 Even PAS openly declared its support for 
1'5 Suqiu website: http: //www. sugiii. or2 
. 
136 
, BN Youth accepts Suqiu's explanation that it did not question rights. ' New Straits Times, 25 
August 2000. 
137 'Suqiu demands tally with reformation aims: Wan Azizah. ' Malaysiakini, 20 December 
2000. 
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Suqiu, describing the petition as 'agreeable'. ' 38 Opposition campaigners also 
credited the backlash against Mahathir's comments with their surprise win in 
the Lunas by-election in November 2000.139 This view was even supported by 
Shahrir Abdul Samad, an UMNO supreme council member, who upbraided 
Mahathir for being the sole cause of the BN'S loss. 140 
Whilst the emergence of these Chinese protests and their incorporation into the 
refon-nasi movement appeared to indicate the beginnings of a more multiethnic 
frame for reformasi mobilisation, however, tensions were rising between the 
ethnic components of the Barisan Alternatif coalition. This will be dealt with in 
more detail in the next chapter. Suffice it here to note that the principle 
contention was between PAS and the DAP, in particular over PAS' refusal to 
disavow its long term objective of setting up an Islamic State, and its proposals 
to implement hudud law in Terengganu. In the early months of 2001, then, the 
multiethnic political front of reformasi appeared to be breaking up just as its 
previously Malay-dominated societal mobilisation was showing signs of 
broadening support. The broadening of societal base of reformasi mobilisation 
was brought to an abrupt halt, however, with the April 2001 crackdown. 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 11: 
, 
qEFORff. 4SjrAND REPRESSION 
In 1987, the Malaysian government had effectively stifled societal dissent in the 
face of an elite crisis through the mass detention of civil society and political 
activists and the withdrawal of publishing permits for critical newspapers and 
magazines 
- 
the notorious Operation Lalang. At the time, this had been enough 
138, PAS defends Chinese group's memorandum. ' The Star, 21 December 2000. 
1391nterview, Raja Petra. 
140'Mahathir's Dilenima. ' Asiaweek, 26 January 200 1. 
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to halt the upsurge in protest activity that many feared would destabilise the 
country. In September 1998, however, the regime was faced with a slightly 
different situation. Virtually as soon as the crisis erupted (with Anwar's 
dismissal), protests broke out on the streets, and the government was thus faced 
with handling a mass protest movement, rather than attempting to stifle its 
emergence. 
Government repression against reformasi came in three distinct phases, geared 
respectively against the first wave of protest, the Barisan Altenlatif opposition 
and the second wave of protest. Repressive measures against the initial wave of 
protest grew incrementally. The first week of rallies outside Anwar's residence 
was allowed to proceed with no police intervention, and Mahathir publicly 
announced they would be tolerated. 14 1 The police presence also was minimal at 
Anwar's first mosque demonstration in the capital, despite a ban imposed on 
such gatherings. 142 It was only when Anwar started his series of rallies around 
the country that the government moved to prevent his gatherings. At first, the 
government took measures to try to hamper the demonstrations, rather than to 
break it them up by force 
- 
at one rally in Malacca the planned venue was 
locked up and all electricity cut off, leaving the area in complete darkness. 143 
The next day, police 'politely requested' that Anwar cancel the nightly 
demonstrations at his residence. 144 
""Anwar rallies can go on, says Mahathir. ' Straits Times, II September 1998. 
142'Anwar speaks at KL mosque. ' Straits Times, 12 September 1998. 
143 'Lights out at Anwar gathering. ' Straits Times, 14 September 1998. 
144 'Anwar to continue talks despite police advice. ' Malay Mail, 15 September 1998. 
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The mass rally in central Kuala Lumpur that precipitated Anwar's arrest marked 
the final turning point in police restraint after security barricades had simply 
been swept aside by the protestors. 145 Although the police were generally 
restrained on that day 
- 
possibly due to being ill-prepared for the number of 
protestors 
-a group of the demonstrators that broke off from the main march 
and started towards Mahathir's residence was met with tear gas, before being 
charged down by riot police. 146 The following day, further protests across 
Kuala Lumpur were met with none of the restraint of the previous day. Tear gas 
and water cannons were again deployed, and bloody scuffles erupted between 
the police and protestors. 147 Such violence continued throughout the first wave 
of protests. By the end of October, more than 230 people had been arrested and 
charged with illegal assembly. 
In addition to the mass repression of demonstrators, a number of Anwar's key 
supporters were also arrested under the ISA, including UMNO Youth leader Zahid 
Harnidi and Ahmad Azarn Abdul Rahman, the president Of ABM Two of the 
principle organisers Of GAGASAN 
- 
Saari Sungib and Tian Chua 
- 
were also 
arrested repeatedly. 148 After one protest, Tian Chua was charged with attempted 
suicide for sitting down in front of a police truck. 149 
Allegations of police brutality penneated the crackdown. Anwar's own assault 
whilst in police custody drew condemnation from around the world, but many 
145 'Crackdown. ' Asiaweek, 2 October 1998. 
146'Tear gas, water cannons, riot police greet Anwar supporters. ' Business Thnes (Singapore), 21 
September 1998. 
147'KL peace shattered for second day. ' Straits Tintes, 22 September 1998. 
148 'Bruised and battered. ' Aliran Monthly, October 1998. 
149'A most ridiculous charge. ' Aliran Monthly, May 1999. 
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others appear to have suffered the same or even worse. After his first arrest in 
September 1998, Tian Chua was allegedly beaten so severely that he was 
unrecognisable. Anwar's speech writer Munawar Anees and his adopted 
brother Sukma Darmawan, both of whom confessed to being sodomised by 
Anwar, later retractcd their confessions, claiming they were coerced whilst 
detained under the ISA. Anees later described his ordeal in detail, claiming not 
only that he was physical beaten but that he was also subject to psychological 
torture including being stripped naked and forced to simulate homosexual 
intercourse. 150 Such brutality was not just reserved for activists and those 
directly involved with Anwar; members of the public were also at risk. During 
one court hearing at which 127 people arrested during a demonstration were 
charged with illegal assembly, over four-fifths of the detainees claimed that they 
were beaten by the police whilst in custody. 151 
After its victory in the 1999 general election, the regime pursued a second phase 
in its repressive crackdown, this time targeting the political opposition more 
specifically. Karpal Singh, the DAP vice chairman, and Marina Yusoff, 
KEADILAN vice president, were both arrested and charged with sedition on the 
same day, as were the editor and publisher of PAs' newspaper, Harak-ah 
. 
152 
KEADILAN Youth leader Mohd Ezarn Noor was detained under the Official 
Secrets Act the following day. ' 53 Karpal's arrest in particular sparked 
international concern as it related to words uttered in his capacity as a defence 
15OStatutory declaration by Munawar Anees, 7 November 1998: <h"p: H%v%v%v. dranees. org/ 
affidavt. htrn>. 
15'Asian Human Rights Conunission Urgent Appeal UA981026 (Malaysia). Available online at 
<http: //www. ahrchk. net/ua/niainfile. php/1998/48/>. 
152'Four to face sedition charges. ' New Straits Times, 13 January 2000. 
153 'Ezarn to face OSA charge. ' New Straits Times, 14 January 2000. 
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lawyer during the course of Anwar's trial. International bodies such as the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights expressed concern and claimed that the 
arrest contravened the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of 
Lawyers. 154 After repeated delays in going to trial, the sedition case against 
Karpal was withdrawn in January 2002, two year after his arrest. ' 55 Marina's 
also much-delayed trial ended in a conviction and fine. ' 56 
In addition to arresting key opposition personnel, the regime also clamped down 
on the media. Four independently-minded magazines had their publishing 
permits withdrawn or not renewed. Harakah was also forced to restrict itself to 
two editions per month, down from its previous two per week. 157 A statement 
by the Deputy Home Minister that Harakah would also be restricted to updating 
its website only twice monthly was hurried denied and the government restated 
it non-censorship policy towards the Internet. 158 
The trial of many key opposition figures was in fact the intensification of an 
existing trend towards the regime using the courts to stifle and oppress 
opposition activists. As already noted, Lim Guan Eng had been imprisoned and 
disqualified from his parliamentary seat after being found guilty of publishing 
false news. The prominent women's rights activist Irene Fernandez and the 
'-54'Arrest of Malaysian on Sedition Charges Violates International Law. ' Press statement by 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 12 January 2000, downloaded from 
<http: //www. Ichr. org/media/anwarlOO. htm>, 15April 2000. 
155'Sedifion charge against Karpal Singh withdrawn. ' Xew Straits Times, 15 January 2002. 
156 'Marina found guilty of sedition, fined RM5,000. ' New Straits Times, 10 February 2001. 
157'A Y2K crackdown. ' Aliran Monthly, January 2000. 
158'Kerajaan jamin tidak kawal Internet. ' Berita Melayu, 5 March 2000. See Jason P. Abbott, 
'Democracy@ internet. as ia? The challenges to the ernancipatory potential of the net: Lessons 
from China and Malaysia', Third World Quarterly, 22: 1 (200 1), pp. 99-114. 
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critical academic Jorno Kwarne Sundaram have also been charged with 
publishing false news. This trend of using often comparatively minor charges to 
incapacitate and burden oppositionists 
- 
whether or not they are found guilty 
- 
appears to have been inspired by the example of Singapore, where a spate of 
libel charges brought by ministers and the prime minister against opposition 
leaders resulted in a number of imprisonments, and bankruptcy proceedings 
against the main opposition leader, J. B. Jeyaretnarn and the Workers' Party. 
The third wave of repression came in response to the resurgence of reformasi 
protests after September 2000. Once again, heavy handed police tactics were 
used to disperse gatherings, including tear gas and water cannons laden with 
chemical irritants, most notably at the 'Kesas Highway demonstration'. As the 
intensity of the protest wave continued, the government took more pre-emptive 
action, detaining key reformasi activists without trial in April 2001, a move 
which brought the protests to a swift halt. 
The Kesas Highway demonstration took place on 5 November 2000. 
Organisers had hoped to attract a hundred thousand participants to the gathering, 
which was to be addressed by all the Barisan Alternatif leaders, and was 
originally planned to be held at Keadilan's headquarters, near the Kesas 
Highway. After police cordoned off all exits from the highway, however, 
demonstrations broke out in several places along the highway itself, eventually 
bringing traffic to a standstill. 159 After police were accused of eXcessk 
violence in breaking the demonstrations up, the newly constituted Malaysian 
'59'122 held in illegal assemblies and clashes with police in Selangor. ' New Straits Tinjes, 
6 November 2000. 
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Human Rights Commission (suHAKAm 
- 
Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia 
Malaysia) decided to conduct a full scale inquiry into the events. 
SUHAKAM Was Set Up in July 1999 as an attempt to divert some of the allegations 
of ignoring human rights levelled against the government during the Anwar 
crisis. A nominally independent statutory body, it comprises individuals 
nominated by the Prime Minister and is tasked with investigating complaints of 
human rights abuses from the public. It has few powers other than to submit 
reports to parliament and visitorial rights to all prisoners in the country. 
Although initially a welcome move, the composition of commission was viewed 
as disappointing by most civil society actors, who questioned its independence. 
The selection of Musa Hitarn 
- 
the former deputy prime minister who had 
joined Razaleigh in challenging Mahathir's leadership in 1987 
- 
to lead the 
commission caused particular concern. Whilst it was in some respects a canny 
move by Mahathir to appoint a former political enemy to give an appearance of 
independence to the commission, Musa had long since returned to the UMNO 
fold. Moreover, as NGo activists were quick to point out, it had been Musa who 
was responsible for ordering the police into the notorious 'Memali incident', 
which left scores Of PAS supporters dead and injured. Musa's own human rights 
record was thus seriously compromised. 160 
Despite these reservations, however, SUHAKAm responded promptly to the 
numerous complaints it received after the Kesas demonstration, declaring it 
would set up an inquiry into the incident. After hearing depositions from forty- 
six witnesses, including police personnel, demonstrators and expert witnesses, 
160'Disappointing composition. ' Aliran Monthly, April 2000. 
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the commission produced its report in August 2001. The report was highly 
critical of the police, finding that the force used in dispersing the demonstration 
was 'not reasonably necessary' and that 'excessive force' was used against 
those arrested. 161 It concluded that the strategy of 'total denial and domination' 
employed by the police had resulted in numerous human rights violations. 162 In 
responding to the report, Mahathir accused SUHAKAM of 'not acting in the 
nation's interests'. 
163 
Repressive measures were used intermittently throughout the demonstrations in 
early 2001. A Keadilan gathering in Selangor in January was allowed a permit 
and proceeded without incident; a ceraniah held in Mahathir's own constituency 
a few weeks later was forcibly broken up by riot police. 164 For the most part, 
smaller demonstrations were tolerated for a short time and then dispersed 
peacefully by the police. ' 65 
As the April 'Black 14' gathering loomed, however, the regime took decisive 
action. In the two days preceding the demonstration, police detained a total of 
seven reformasi activists under the Internal Security Act in what many thought 
16 'Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia, Inquiry 212000: Inquiry on its own motion into 
the Alovember Yh incident at the Kesas Highway, August 2001: 42. 
162 Ibid.: 63. The phrase 'total denial and dornination' was used by one of the senior police 
officers in charge of dispersing the demonstration, and was subsequently used repeatedly in a 
critical manner by SUHAKAM in its report. 
163, SUHAKAM taken to task. ' New Straits Times, 23 August 2001. 
164, KEADILAN fails to muster 100,000 people. ' New Sunday Times, 21 January 200 1; 'PM should 
be held responsible for Kubang Pasu crackdown. ' Malaysiakini, 15 February 2001. 
165 'Police stop illegal PAS ceramah. ' New Sunday Times, 25 February 2001; 'Gathering 
dispersed. ' New Straits Times, 07 March 200 1. 
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was the start of 'another Operation Lalang'. 166 Another three were arrested the 
following week. Six of the detainees were from Keadilan, including Tian Chua 
and five committee members from Keadilan Youth, including its president 
Mohd Ezam. As was noted earlier, Ezam had also been charged with sedition 
the previous month over a newspaper interview where he had allegedly stated 
that he wanted to topple the goveniment through street demonstrations. 167 The 
other four detainees were also key activists in the reformasi movement. 
The immediate justification for the arrests was the detainees' involvement in 
planning the 'Black 14' gathering. 168 The police alleged that mass riots were 
planned and that a 'secret cell' in the reformasi movement was arming itself 
with grenades and explosives and readying to topple the government through 
violent means. 169 Whilst these charges were ridiculed by the opposition, and the 
police failed to produce any evidence of violent intent, the detentions brought an 
abrupt halt to the mobilisation of the previous months. 
As was noted in chapter six, the extent of the 1987 crackdown can be explained 
in part by its role as an information gathering process. The April 2001 
crackdown also appears to have been used as an infonnation gathering exercise, 
albeit on a more restricted level. The detainees had all been involved in 
organising the string of demonstrations throughout the early months of 2001, 
but had also been the most effective campaigners in the Lunas by-election. Of 
the ten detainees, eight attested in affidavits to the High Court that one of the 
166'Seven detained under ISA, says police chief. ' Business Times, 12 April 2001. 'Keadilan 
member arrested under ISA. ' New Straits Times, 27 April 200 1. 
167'Ezam charged with uttering seditious words. ' New Straits Times, 14 March 200 1. 
161 'Four held under ISA over gathering. ' New Straits Times, II April 200 1. 
169'Mass violence planned. ' New Straits Times, 12 April 200 1. 
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main topics of interrogation during their police detention was the tactics and 
issues used during the Lunas campaigning. Questions were also asked about the 
relationships between individuals and organisations, such as PAs and ABIM. 170 
The pattern of repression against the reformasi movement once again 
demonstrates the efficacy of repression in the Malaysian context. Although the 
government-controlled media played up stories of violence, it seems clear that 
smaller protests were easily broken up by the police 
- 
albeit with the threat of 
riot equipment such as water cannons. Even at larger protests, repressive 
measures were met with dispersal rather than confrontation, although protestors 
often regrouped elsewhere. Nonetheless, there were no accounts of the kind of 
stone-throwing confrontations between protestors and police 
- 
let alone 
Molotov cocktails or petrol bombs 
- 
that were so characteristic of the reformasi 
movement in Indonesia. If the reformasi protests were comparatively easily 
broken up, it was the select detention of the 'refortnasi ten' that unequivocally 
demonstrated to effectiveness of repression in Malaysia. In 1987, Operation 
Lalang had stifled social mobilisation with the arrest of over one hundred 
activists; in April 2001 a similar effect was achieved with the arrest of ten 
people, only six of whom were detained for an extended period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From an empirical perspective, this chapter has demonstrated that the dynamics 
of the reformasi movement did not represent any radical break from the 
prevailing structures of Malaysian society. Elite fracture, multiethnic versus 
ethnic tendencies and the efficacy of repression are all structural variable that 
170 Affidavits by the ISA detainees. Available online at <http: //www. hakam. org/>. 
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shaped the politics of the 1980s. This is not to say that reformasi had no effects 
on Malaysian politics and society, but rather that these effects are explicable 
within its existing parameters. Relating these findings back to our theoretical 
framework is the task of next and final chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Let us recap the journey this thesis has taken. We began with the simple 
observation that theorists of civil society and social movements rarely interact 
with each other, despite sharing a broad set of overlapping concerns and 
methodologies. Through a discussion of existing approaches within each 
paradigm, a reforrmilated model of state-societal relations was devised, which 
emphasised the dualistic nature of both state and civil society, placing cultural- 
discursive contestation alongside institutional engagement. It was argued that 
this cultural aspect is of particular importance in the mobilisation of protest 
under the aegis of social movements, which in themselves create new discursive 
frames, as well as institutional arrangements. The final theoretical step was to 
employ the 'privileged' relationship between ethnicity and culture to emphasise 
the potential explanatory benefits of such a model in multiethnic societies. 
We then turned our attention to contemporary Malaysia as a case study. After 
setting the scene with discussions of existing approaches to the study of the 
Malaysian state and society and of political developments prior to 1980, the 
empirical content of the thesis comprised a detailed analysis of the development 
of civil society and the state over the ensuing two decades, focussing on the dual 
crises at the end of each decade. Before drawing out the broad conclusions 
from this study, it is necessary 
- 
and, in the name of completeness, desirable 
- 
to enjoin a brief empirical epilogue and examine the post-election trajectories of 
the 1990 and 1999 opposition coalitions. 
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EMPIRICAL EPILOGUE: COLLAPSE OF THE COALITIONS 
Both the 1990 Semangat '46-based opposition grouping and the Barisan 
Alternalif were irrecoverably damaged by the withdrawal of the DAP, from the 
former in January 1995, from the latter in September 2001. Without the DAP, 
neither coalition could realistically claim to represent Chinese interests and 
maintain its multiethnic front. Although KEADILAN is a nominally multi-ethnic 
party, even its leaders privately accept that it is, in effect, a Malay party; ' 
Semangat made no real attempt to pretend otherwise. On both occasions, the 
DAP'S withdrawal was prompted by its irreconcilable differences with PAS. Yet 
internal differences within the two opposition fronts had emerged long before 
the decisive split. 
The GAGASAN coalition of the 1990 election was dealt its first blow when the 
PBS retracted its decision to join the coalition after the election. 2 The PBS, it Will 
be remembered, had spectacularly withdrawn from the BN just days before the 
election, but this decision proved to have been a primarily opportunistic one, 
and when it became clear post-election that the BN was still the dominant 
political force, the PBS tried to reconcile itself with the federal government. 
Initially, the PBS offered to set up a coalition government in the state with its 
fortner arch-rival, the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), a BN 
component, despite the PBS' own clear majority in the state assembly. After this 
Interviews with Raja Petra Karnaruddin, FAC Director, Petaling Jaya, March 2001 & Chandra 
Muzaffar, KEADILAN Deputy Presidený Petaling Jaya, March 2001. 
2, PBS unlikely to join GAGASAN. ' New Straits Times, 29 April 199 1. 
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failed, the PBS instead declared that it would 'work along with the Barisan', 
although remain in opposition. 3 
The departure of the never-quite-there PBS was soon overshadowed by cracks 
within the Islamist APU coalition on the mainland. Almost immediately after the 
election, divisions emerged between Semangat and PAS over the administration 
of Kelantan state. The Am had won an absolute victory in the state assembly, 
with PAS taking twenty-four out of thirty-nine seats. Semangat took fourteen 
seats, with the smaller APU component BERJASA taking the last seat. 
Disagreement arose, however, over the distribution of party members to the 
state's appointed district, municipal and town councils. Having a convincing 
majority on its own in the state, PAS leaders felt they should take the majority of 
these appointed seats, whilst Semangat apparently favoured an even distribution 
between PAS and its APU counterparts. 4 
Beyond such administrative squabbles, Semangat members in Kelantan soon 
became concerned with PAS' Islamisation drive in the state. 5 Whilst PAS and 
Semangat were both Malay Muslim parties, PAS' emphasis on the Muslim side 
of the equation unnerved many local Semangat members, who - being mostly 
ex-uN4NO 
- 
were more inclined towards Malay chauvinism than political Islam 
per se. After the defection of two Kelantan Semangat members back to UMNO, 
which triggered fresh by-elections in their seats, and a poor performance 
elsewhere in the country, however, Semangat looked more and more like a poor 
3 'Pairin: We'll work along with the Barisan. ' New Straits Times, 26 August 199 1. 
4 'Opposition front's Islamic wing appears at early end. ' New Straits Times, 14 February 1991. 
' 'Spreading the word. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 January 1991; 'Crossover season. ' 
Far Eastern Economic Review, II April 199 1. 
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brother to PAS in Kelantan, and its members' discomfort with PAS' Islamisation 
programme was thus tempered. 6 
The nationalist-Islamic dichotomy between Semangat and PAS was accentuated 
in 1992 by a proposal by the federal government to withdraw the legal 
immunity enjoyed by the Malay sultans. PAS expressed support for the move, 
viewing the immunity as un-Islamic. Semangat, however, viewed the proposal 
with concern, arguing that it insulted one of the vestiges of Malay supremacy in 
the country, and paved the way for the potential abolition of the sultans 
altogether. When the DAP expressed support for the government's proposals, it 
became clear that Semangat stood alone in its defence of the sultans' inununity. 7 
No doubt the fact that Razaleigh was himself a tengku (prince) in the 
Kelantanese royal family did little to assuage fears that Semangat's position was 
driven by personal interests rather than political ideals. Nonetheless, there was 
no small irony in the fact that the issue had driven the DAP and PAS into a joint 
stand against Semangat, the party that was supposed to provide a bridge 
between the two. When the proposals were put to parliament in the Constitution 
(Amendment) Bill 1993, the opposition parties fell into further disarray. The 
DAP abstained at the first reading, in what was seen as a concession to 
Semangat, but voted with the government at the second reading. Conversely, 
PAS deputy president Abdul Hadi Awang made a surprise attack on the 
6 'Clouded victory. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 September 199 1. 
' "'Razaleigh's views different from those of rakyat". ' New Straits Times, 19 December 1992. 
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govenunent for introducing the bill, despite his party's pronounced support for 
the move. 8 
The issue of the sultans' immunity undoubtedly put a severe strain on relations 
within both the Apu and the GAGASAN. DAP deputy chairman Karpal Singh 
admitted that the issue had illustrated a 'stark contrast of principles' between his 
party and Razaleigh's Semangat. 9 Dr Syed Hussein Ali, president of the PRM, 
called for the 'shelving' of the GAGASAN, as 'serious differences' between the 
parties' leaderships had left the coalition impotent. 
10 Both the GAGASAN and the 
APU survived a while longer, however, despite their internal differences over the 
immunity issue 
- 
perhaps not least of which because of their impotency. The 
BN's dominance of the federal parliament meant that even if all the opposition 
members had voted against the bill, the government still had the requisite two- 
thirds majority needed to amend the constitution. It thus may have been easier 
for all the parties concerned to overlook their differences at the national level, 
where they had limited impact, than for Sernangat and PAS to overlook their 
differences in Kelantan, where actual governance was at stake. 
By 1994, however, it was clear that the DAP was feeling increasingly restricted 
by its association with the GAGASAN and, through Semangat, with PAS. In June 
1994, the DAP proposed a 'loosening' of the GAGASAN, whereby component 
parties would campaign under their own symbol and with separate manifestos. II 
Finally, in January 1995, the DAP pulled out of the GAGASAN, though stated that 
8 'Opposifion parties, in disarray, change their views on amendments. ' New Straits Times, 9 
March 1993. 
9, DAP, S46 differ in priciples: Karpal. ' New Straits Times, 8 February 1993. 
10 'Hussein: Shelve impotent GAGASAN. ' New Straits Times, 7 June 1993. 
11 , DAP proposes a "loose" GAGASAN. 'New Straits Times, 20 June 1994. 
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it would retain 'bilateral' ties with the coalition members. 12 The steady stream 
of Semangat members back into umNo had undermined Semangat's and, by 
default, the GAGASAN'S credibility as a genuine alternative to the BN. 13 
Ultimately, however, it was the indirect links with PAS tied with concerns over 
its own popular support that drove DAP out of the coalition. PAS' move to 
implement hudud laws in Kelantan, and its refusal to disassociate itself from the 
ideal of an Islamic State caused the DAP to fear a loss of Chinese support if it 
maintained even indirect links with the party. The DAP accused PAS of failing to 
'respect the constitutional rights and religious sensitivities of non-Malay 
Malaysians'. 14 DAP insiders such as the prominent social activist Kua Kia 
Soong, who had joined the party prior to the 1990 election to express his 
support for a united opposition, later claimed that the DAP'S Central Committee 
and Secretary General Lim Kit Siang in particular were 'obsessed' with 
diminishing Chinese support for the party. Kua also claimed that the DAP 
leadership was unwilling to work with its counterparts in PRM. 15 
The final collapse of the Semangat-led opposition coalition came after the BN'S 
phenomenal success in the 1995 general elections, taking over sixty-five percent 
of the vote, and eight-five per cent of the parliamentary seats. Although the APU 
maintained control of the Kelantan state assembly, with PAs and Semangat 
taking twenty-four and twelve seats respectively in the enlarged forty-three seat 
assembly, Semangat members clearly saw the election result as the end of the 
road for the party. A revival Of PAs-Semangat divisions over the allocation of 
12 'Razaleigh: DAP pull-out won't affect coalition. ' New Straits Times, 28 January 1995. 
13 'Crossover season. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, II April 199 1. 14 DAP press statement, 5 May 1992. Reproduced in Lim Kit Siang, Selected Speeches and Press Statements April 
-May 1992, Kuala Lumpur: DAP, 1992: pg. 44. 15 Kua Kia Soong, Inside the DAP, Petaling Jaya: PB, 1996. 
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state executive posts dealt the coalition the death knell. 16 Semangat pulled out 
of the APU in July 1996, and the party dissolved itself in October the same year, 
with Razaleigh and his followers returning to UMNO. 17 
As with its pull-out from the GAGASAN, the DAP'S withdrawal from the Barisan 
Alternatif in September 2001 was ostensibly caused by its failure to come to an 
understanding with PAS over the latter's advocacy of an Islamic State. Yet the 
party's position within the BA had long since appeared untenable. This was not 
because of its differences with PAS, but rather a number of disputes with 
KEADILAN similar to those which plagued PAS and Semangat in the APU 
administration in Kelantan. 
Even before the November 1999 general election, the long-term viability of the 
BA was looking tenuous, with the DAP admitting that it was taking a 'very great 
risk' in joining the coalition; many activists within the party admitted that even 
at the height of the reformasi mobilisation, they were concerned that any 
association with PAS would spell electoral disaster, as it was perceived to have 
done in 1990.18 The BA'S joint election manifesto, 'Towards a Just Malaysia', 
had carefully avoided any reference to an Islamic State, and focussed instead on 
areas of common agreement, such as freedom of speech and independence of 
the judiciary. In the run-up to the election, however, a number of PAS leaders - 
most notably its 'Spiritual Advisor' Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and deputy 
president Haji Hadi Awang 
- 
reaffirmed PAS' commitment to the concept, 
16 'Kelantan rift. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, I August 1996. 
17 'Beyond reach. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 January 1997. 
19 , DAP taking great risk: Lim. ' Business Times, 15 November 1999; Interviews With DAP 
activists, April-November 2001. 
312 
Gonclusions 
drawing strong criticism from DAP and KEADILAN leaders alike. 19 Some DAP 
leaders were subsequently explicit in blaming the party's poor performance in 
the general election on its collaboration with PAS 
. 
20 Divisions between the DAP 
and KEADILAN in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak, which were to play a 
large part in the DAP's decision to leave the coalition, were also evident before 
the election, with a high profile squabble over seat allocation. Mistrust between 
the two parties in Sarawak had deeper roots, however, as many within the DAP 
21 
were resentful of the 'pinching' of some of its leaders by KEADILAN 
. 
From the time of its fon-nation, then, the BA was at best an uneasy truce between 
PAS and the DAP. If few commentators would have doubted that a rocky road 
lay ahead for PAS and the DAP, however, what was less expected was the 
continuing rift that emerged between the DAP and KEADILAN. After the initial 
wrangling over seats for the 1999 election, the first serious division between the 
DAP and KEADILAN arose around the selection of a candidate to fight a by- 
election called in the Kedah state assembly constituency of Lunas in November 
2000 after the murder of its popular BN representative, Joe Fernandez. The seat 
was of strategic importance, in that an opposition victory would have denied the 
BN its two-thirds majority in the state assembly. It was also, however, one of 
the safest BN seats in the country, and with the regime's fearsome electoral 
machinery gearing up there seemed little chance of an opposition victory. 
19 'Trouble brewing in opposition front. ' New Straits Times, 28 November 1999. 
20 
, DAP blames defeat on alliance with the PAS. ' New Straits Times, I December 1999. 
21 , DAP and KEADILAN tussle over Stampin, Bandar Kuching seats. ' New Straits Times, 13 
November 1999. 
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The apparent hopelessness of the situation did not prevent an explosive and 
much publicised (by the government-control led press) confrontation between 
the DAP and KEADILAN over the selection of a candidate for the by-election. The 
DAP were clear: 'Lunas is our seat. It should be the prerogative of the DAP to 
22 choose its candidate' 
. 
KEADILAN was also keen to contest the seat, however, 
and eventually announced its candidate, apparently without consulting the DAP. 
DAP leaders responded angrily, alleging 'dirty tactics' by KEADILAN 
-a charge 
usually reserved for the BN 
- 
and calling for a 'cooling off period on the issue of 
ý 23 DAWS position in the BA 
. 
Lim Kit Siang even expressed 'pure disgust at such 
unscrupulous politics in the Barisan Alternative [Sic] ). 24 
The war of words between the DAP and KEADILAN was probably ameliorated 
somewhat by KEADILAN'S surprise victory in the by-election, which led to a 
brief resurgence of euphoria in the opposition movement. If the national level 
parties were attempting something of a rapprochement, however, with 
KEADILAN deputy president Chandra Muzaffar offering Lim a public apology, 
the Lunas fracas appears to have stirred up the ill-feeling between the two 
parties in Sarawak. A state election was due in Sarawak some time in 2001, and 
the local DAP branches were clearly feeling uneasy at the prospect of contesting 
within the BA again. In December 2000, the Sarawak DAP announced that it 
22 
'Save Barisan Altematif for the sake of the people', DAP media statement, 24 November 2000. 
23 'Cooling off period over issue of DAWS position in the Barisan Alternatif, DAP media 
statement, 23 November 2000. 
24 
'1 have never agreed at any time that KEADILAN contest in Lunas by-election', DAP media 
statement, 23 November 2000. 
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would be unilaterally pulling out of the BA, calling KEADILAN 'the most 
unftiendly of partners', and accusing them of 'stabbing us in the back'. 25 
The main disagreement between the Sarawak DAP and KEADILAN was the large 
number of former DAP members joining KEADILAN, including the former DAP MP 
Chiew Chu Sing. This dispute spread to the national level a few months later, 
when another DAP stalwart and former parliamentary candidate Teoh Teik Huat 
joined KEADILAN in February 2001. The DAP claimed that this had breached an 
agreement between the BA parties not to accept membership applications from 
existing members of the coalition partners. 26 Lim Kit Siang responded to the 
controversy by pulling out Of BA meetings, whilst the Penang DAP announced it 
27 
would be 'loosening' its relationship with KEADILAN 
. 
By early 2001, it was clear that relations between the DAP and KEADILAN were 
approaching their nadir. Conflict between the two parties was not so much 
caused by political differences, however, as by their political similarities. 
Although the DAP is primarily a Chinese based party, and KEADILAN Malay 
based, the two share a multi-ethnic and refonnist outlook, which left them 
competing rather than cooperating on a number of issues. Yet when it became 
clear that the DAP was seriously reconsidering its membership of the BA, the 
party's rhetoric changed. 
25 'Opposition in Sarawak racked by discord. ' Mew Straits Times, 12 December 2000. 
26 'The issue is not Teoh Teik Huat's application to join KEADILAN but whether solemn 
undertakings made by Barisan Alternative parties to each other are serious and should be 
honoured', DAP media statement, 28 February 2001. 
27 
'1 will ask the DAP Central Executive Committee to relieve me from all Barisan Alternative 
discussions and meetings affecting DAP-KEADILAN relationship and replacement by another 
DAP leader', DAP media statement, 26 February 2001. 'Penang DAP Will loosen relationship 
with KEADILAN', DAP media statement, 26 February 2001. 
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In March 2001, the Sarawak branch of the DAP finally pulled out of the state- 
level BA. The justification given, however, was not connected to its infighting 
with KEADILAN, but rather its collaboration with PAS. With a state election 
approaching, the Sarawak DAP claimed its association with PAS Was losing it 
support amongst the state's mostly non-Muslim population. By pulling out of 
the BA, the party said, the government 'could no longer accuse it of supporting 
PAS in the creation of an Islamic State in the country', adding that the BN 'had 
exploited the issue and this resulted in the DAP losing badly in the last 
parliamentary elections in Sarawak'. 28 
The issue Of PAS' support for the implementation of an Islamic State, and its 
definition thereof, quickly took centre stage again in BA relations. A war of 
words between the DAP's deputy chairman Karpal Singh and PAS' deputy 
president and Terengganu Menteri Besar Hadi Awang on the issue was widely 
publicised by the government media. In June 2001, the DAP admitted that the 
BA was most likely 'no more tenable', claiming that 'if the voters are faced with 
the choice between an Islamic State and a sixth term of Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad as Prime Minister, the choice would be the latter'. 29 A number of 
high level meetings between the BA components were unable to break the 
30 deadlock 
. 
With the DAP increasingly feeling under pressure in Sarawak, and 
28 'Sarawak DAP chairman: We've pulled out from Opposition front. ' New Sunday Tittles, 4 
March 200 1. 
29 
'Barisan Alternative is at the crossroads as it is no more tenable with PAS leaders openly 
flouting the BA common manifesto for "A Just and Democratic Malaysia" and disregarding 
the opposition of the other three component parties towards an Islamic State', DAP media 
statement, 30 June 2001. 
30 , PAS, DAP split on Islamic state. ' Malaysiakini, 9 August 2001. 
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the September 11 attacks in the USA heightening the tension, the party finally 
31 
announced its complete withdrawal fforn the BA on 22 September 2001. 
The similarities in the trajectory of decline between the opposition coalition for 
the 1990 and the 1999 general elections, then, are striking. Both coalitions 
ultimately foundered on the irreconcilability of the DAP'S Chinese based secular 
modernism with PAS' conservative Islamic worldview. Both coalitions were 
also jeopardised, however, by conflicts between parties with similar political 
outlooks and constituencies, which resulted in internal competition rather than 
collaboration. It was the fundamentally ethnic constellation of elections and 
party politics that drove the opposition coalitions apart. Despite being formed in 
the flush of multiethnic civil society engagement, both fronts were ultimately 
'coalitions of convenience' rather than 'commitment', to use Horowitz's 
evocative phrases. 32 in such conditions, they could not long withstand the 
ethnic pressures of party politics. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN ETHNICALLY-DIVIDED SOCIETIES: 
THE LESSONS FROM MALAYSIA 
Having visited the demise of the Semangat and Barisan Alternatif opposition 
coalitions, we can see that on one level the two crises followed a remarkably 
similar trajectory: 
1. regime factionalism intensified by economic recession, in turn creating 
the political space for greater political contestation; 
31 
, DAP CEc resolves that the DAP ceases to be a member of the Barisan Alternative', DAP media 
statement, 22 September 200 1. 
32 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1986. 
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2. state repression closing down societal avenues of protest; 
3. putatively multietfinic opposition party coalition formed with the 
collaboration and encouragement of sections of the middle class-led civil 
society; 
4. opposition coalition fails to overcome the ethnic structures of electoral 
mobilisation; and 
5. speedy post-election collapse of opposition coalition. 
Such a story is not that different from those told by the statist perspective 
rejected in chapter three, and one might thus ask what need we have for civil 
society at all. This is not the whole story, however, and it has been the 
contention of this thesis that only by considering the impact of civil society and 
social movements can we understand the divergence between the two crisis 
trajectories. 
Drawing comparatively on the previous chapters, the following points can be 
made. Firstly, whilst both crises had their origin in internal regime factionalism, 
the extent of this instability differed greatly, the 1980s witnessing turmoil in 
virtually every BN component and extensive disputes between parties such as 
was not evident in the 1990s. Whilst part of the explanation for this may lie in 
the intertextuality of the two cases 
- 
BN elites learning from the mistakes of the 
past 
- 
it also seems clear that it was the pre-existing societal mobilisation of the 
1980s that heightened the regime crisis of the 1980s through an escalating cycle 
of ethnic claims and counterclaims. In contrast, the relative absence of social 
mobilisation prior to the 1998 split left the BN elites in a position to close ranks 
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with remarkable speed, even in the face of the spectacular protests after the 
Mahathir-Anwar denouement. 
More broadly, and returning to the theoretical case made in chapter two, it was 
argued that the lack of well theorised examinations of the relationship between 
civil society and social movements opens up the possibility of a forrn of 
'slippage' between these two spheres of association. In the Malaysian case 
study, such a slippage has become increasingly clear since the 1970s, as civil 
society has moved away from ethnic concerns, whilst the successful 
mobilisation of protest movements remains firmly rooted in ethnic dynamics. In 
the reformasi period in Malaysia, we found this slippage epitomised, as 
concerted and sustained efforts both by civil society groups and by opposition 
political parties to force open a multieth-nic political sphere foundered on the 
patterns of societal mobilisation that drew their cause of refornlasi along 
inevitably ethnic lines. 
Particularly at times when 'suddenly imposed grievances' - such as the 
dismissal of a popular deputy prime minister 
- 
are evident, the imperative for 
social movement mobilisation is enormous. 33 Such imperative force, however, 
may overwhelm movements' organisational and infTastructural capacity to 
orchestrate such mobilisation. It is at such time that existing avenues of 
mobilisation 
- 
societal networks, framing devices and so forth 
- 
may be utilised, 
even if their ideological and practical objectives do not coincide with that of the 
emergent movement. In Malaysia, the reformasi movement attempted to 
33 E. J. Walsh and R. H. Warland, 'Social movement involvement in the wake of a nuclear 
accident: Activists and free riders in the TMI Area', American Sociological Review, 48 
(1983), pp, 764-80. 
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cultivate new modes of mobilisation, such as the Internet, appropriate to its 
multiethnic aspirations, but also relied heavily on the existing mobilisational 
networks of the Islamic movement. This mobilisational bias was ultimately 
reflected in the degree of electoral support for the movement's political 
manifestation in the 1999 general elections and, as we have seen in this chapter, 
ultimately contributed to the quick demise of the electoral coalition it provoked. 
In chapter two, the theoretical contention was made that in ethnical I y-divided 
societies, organisational slippage 
- 
particularly at moments of heightened 
opposition 
- 
is likely to fall along ethnic lines for two principle reasons: the 
prior existence of ethnically oriented networks, and the mobilisational framing 
difficulties resulting from ethno-cultural differentials. The Malaysian case 
study demonstrates this process, both in the long-term divergence between civil 
society and social mobilisation patterns, and specifically at times of political 
crisis and heightened opposition. 
It is now widely accepted that ethnicity and, thus, ethnic divisions are not 
primordially determined. 34 It is the contention here that ethnicity and ethnic 
identities are 'constructed' phenomena, albeit within the limits of existing 
religious, cultural, and racial differences. What this thesis has demonstrated, 
however, is that even constructed identities become embedded not just in the 
structures of government and electoral politics, but even deeper in the structures 
of societal association and mobilisation. Attempts to overcome societal ethnic 
34 For such arguments in respect of the Malaysian case, see Charles Hirschman, 'The making of 
race in colonial Malaya: Political economy and racial ideology', Sociological Forum, 1: 2 
(1986), pp. 330-361; and Anthony Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya. - 
Contesting nationalism and the expansion of the public sphere, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. 
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divisions by governments or civil society thus face multiple levels of embedded 
practices and forms of association to overcome. Thus, in Malaysia, ethnicity 
remains the dominant political paradigm, despite the concerted efforts of civil 
society and even, since the 1990s, the government to reduce its importance. 
Ethnicity, to borrow Keynes' description of unemployment, is 'downwardly 
sticky'. 
FINAL WORDS 
Throughout this thesis, it has been attempted as far as possible to avoid 
normative comment in the interests of maintaining objectivity and a strictly 
theoretical perspcctive. In these final paragraphs it is hopefully excusable to 
break this convention and make a few prognoses and recommendations for the 
Malaysian case, however personal they may be. It seems clear that civil society 
has had, and must continue to have, a positive effect in fostering interethnic 
tolerance and political engagement in Malaysia. As yet, however, it has been 
unable to break down the structures of social mobilisation and electoral politics 
which reduce most everything to ethnic equations. The question must therefore 
be asked, what can and what should civil society do? 
In casual conversation with the Penang-based scholar-activist Francis Loh in the 
course of preparing this thesis, he opined that civil society had mistakenly seen 
KEADILAN and the Barisan Alternatif as a 'shortcut to democratisation'. This 
pithy assessment encapsulates the problem facing civil society. Whilst the 
structures of societal and electoral mobilisation in Malaysia remained tied to 
ethnicity, pushing for further democratisation may be futile and even 
counterproductive 
-a cursory glance at the experience of countries such as 
Kenya shows that 'shortcut' dernocratisation in ethnically charged societies can 
321 
Conclusions 
be disastrous. Civil society instead should be in for the long haul, seeking to 
promote and inculcate discursive frames and institutional arrangements that are 
nonethnic and pluralistic. The task is difficult and long but, I believe, one that 
civil society is uniquely capable of achieving. 
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